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In 1991, following its defeat in the Second Gulf War and as a response to the 
international humanitarian protectionist umbrella provided to the three Kurdish-
population governorates in Northern Iraq, the Government of Iraq (GOI) under 
Saddam Hussein centrally seceded from the area. The vacuum that ensued was 
soon filled by the leadership of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (KNA) and soon a de facto 
state resurrected from the ashes of destruction besieging Iraqi Kurdistan for many 
decades. 
Hence, the precarious existence of what came to be known as the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq (KRI) in a highly challenging geopolitical environment and the 
strategic imperative of preserving the de facto independence of the entity forced the 
Kurdish leadership to give high priority to building foreign relations and pursuit of 
foreign policy. Foreign policy as a political activity is of paramount importance to all 
actors including sovereign states to preserve and promote their national interests. 
The practice of foreign policy, however, is particularly acute for de facto states. As 
internationally non-recognized entities, the international system of sovereign states 
is often skeptical if not hostile to engage in foreign relations with de facto states. Yet, 
projection of foreign policy and building foreign relations is extremely vital for the 
continued survival and consolidation of de facto states.  
By exploring the case of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood, this research 
argues that, mutatis mutandis, de facto states can pursue independent foreign 
policies. By identifying major transitions in the KRI, this thesis seeks to better explain 
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foreign policy determinants, objectives and instruments of implementation of foreign 
policies of the KRI. In doing so, this thesis further seeks to contribute to the analysis 
of de facto statehood in general, and to contribute to the study of the KRI as the case 
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Were any proof required of the presence of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
(hereafter the KRI)1 as an actor in foreign policy and its status on the international 
stage, the paradiplomatic activities of its highest-ranking officials, including its 
president and prime minister, would give some indication. For the first time, in 
October 2005, Masoud Barzani2 was received in his capacity as President of the KRI 
rather than as leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (hereafter the KDP) at the 
White House by the President of the United States, George W. Bush.3 Until the end 
of his term in office in 2008, President Bush had invited President Barzani to the 
                                            
1 The official name of the Kurdish de facto state as recognized in the 2005 constitution of Iraq is ‘the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq’. For the purposes of this study, the term KRI is used as a shorthand for the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, i.e. the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. The term KRI is also useful to 
distinguish between the Kurdish political entity in Iraq and the entirety of ‘Kurdistan’ across Iraq, Iran, 
Turkey, and Syria. Furthermore, some analysts equate the KRI with northern Iraq. For examples of 
this, see: Nathalie Tocci, “Turkey’s Kurdish Gamble,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 
1310 (2013), http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1310.pdf. ‘Northern Iraq’ however as a 
geographical area with its own unique socio-religious and ethnic composition should be distinguished 
from the KRI which is only a part of the overall matrix of Northern Iraq. For a good analysis of Iraq’s 
distinct geographical regions with their unique socio-ethnic composition, see: Reidar Visser and 
Gareth Stansfield. (eds.). An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? (London: 
Hurst and Company, 2007). 
2 Since 2005, Masoud Barzani has served as the President of the KRI in two successive terms. 
However, many analysists and contributors to the Kurdish politics in Iraq intentionally or 
unintentionally name Masoud Barzani as the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). 
However, the KRG is only one branch of the KRI’s executive authority consisting of a ministerial 
cabinet and headed by a prime minister (the current prime minister is Nechirvan Barzani of the KDP) 
tasked with the day-to-day administration of the KRI. For instance, see: Michael M. Gunter, “Arab–
Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 9 (2011), pp. 1623-
1635; David Pollack, “To Kurdistan and Back: Iran’s Forgotten Front,” The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 28 February 2017, accessed: 4 March 2017, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/to-kurdistan-and-back-irans-forgotten-front; 
Denise Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
38, No. 2 (2015), pp. 145-164. 
3 “President Bush Meets with President Barzani of Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq,” The White 




White House on four more occasions,4 while his successor, President Barack 
Obama, continued the tradition of receiving the President of the KRI.5 Also in 2010, 
for the first time, Masoud Barzani was officially received as President of the KRI by 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey;6 the leader of what was once the 
staunchest opponent state to Kurdish autonomy or independence in Iraq. In addition, 
Masoud Barzani and other high-ranking officials of the KRI, including the prime 
minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (hereafter the KRG),7 have met, 
either in Kurdistan or abroad, countless world leaders, heads of multinational 
corporations, religious leaders, etc. These formal diplomatic activities by officials of 
the KRI, and the high international profile of the Kurdish de facto state, were the 
culmination of two decades of transition that took place in the KRI, a testament to 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s ability to build positive foreign relations and success in the 
projection of foreign policy, which is often thought to be the sole preserve of states.  
In the years since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of several political 
entities, usually called de facto states, has presented somewhat of a challenge to 
                                            
4 See: Hemin Hawrami, “President Barzani and Kurdistan's Advancement and Success during the 
Past Eight Years,” Gulan Media, 28 June 2013, accessed: 2 October 2010, 
http://www.gulanmedia.com/english/articles.php?id=142&eid=27.  
5 Michael Knights, “A big win for Kurds at the White House,” Aljazeera, 15 May 2015, accessed: 21 
November 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/kurds-obama-barzani-iraq-isil-
150512051306148.html.  
6 Michael Gunter, “Between Baghdad and Ankara: The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Delicate 
Balance,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. VIII, No. 41 (2010), p. 3.  
7 Even though Kurdish politicians attempt to construct a non-ethnic Kurdistani nationalism and 
promote the KRI as a non- ethnic geographical construct, many academics, observers and politicians, 
whether by accident and choice, continue to promote the ethnically Kurdish exclusive construct of the 
Kurdish region of Iraq. For an example, see: Ufuk Ulutas, “Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A Year of 
Pro-activity,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2010), pp. 1-12. For an informative analysis of the Kurdish 
attempt to forge civic or territorial nationalism in the KRI, see: Gareth Stansfield and Hashem 
Ahmadzadeh, “Kurdish or Kurdistanis? Conceptualising Regionalism in the North of Iraq,” in Visser 
and Stansfield (ed.), Op. Cit., pp. 123-149.  
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foreign policy-makers, foreign policy analysts and political scientists who were 
accustomed to the state-centric structuring of the international system of sovereign 
states. This is because de facto states do not fit neatly into the clear divide between 
state and non-state entities, for many years a prevalent feature of international 
politics. In the simplest terms, the de facto state is a political entity that by design or 
default has achieved domestic sovereignty, territorial control and de facto 
independence. The de facto state views itself capable of performing functions of 
statehood and pursues independent domestic and foreign policies, often in 
contradiction to its internationally-recognized parent state, and seeks a place at the 
exclusive table of sovereign states. 
However, despite the growing literature on the position and impact of non-
state actors in international and transnational relations,8 de facto states have not 
received sufficient attention as important foreign policy players in current 
international relations. Indeed, recent literature has also failed to provide a 
systematic analysis of the foreign policy component of de facto states. 
De facto states are often depicted as isolated entities unable to project their 
own foreign policies and not receiving attention from foreign policy-makers of 
recognized states. Most de facto states are small in terms of their territory and 
population and are often engaged in territorial disputes with their parent states. The 
official territorial areas of the KRI, for instance, include the three governorates of 
                                            
8 For an early account on the role of non-state actors, see: Richard Mansbach, Yale Ferguson and 




Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaimani as well as parts of Kirkuk, Diyala, and Mosul 
governorates that have been controlled by Kurdish parties since October 1991. KRI’s 
territory thus includes areas that are constitutionally defined, de facto controlled, and 
some proclaimed territory which is the source of intense contention between the KRI 
and the GOI (Figure 1: Map of the Kurdish De Facto state in Iraq including the 
disputed areas with its parent state-Iraq. Source: http://pbs.twimg.com/media/CAjK-
jgWEAADVaa.jpg  
).9 De facto states are also considered a rare phenomenon in the international 
system. Contemporary examples include: the three entities in the Caucasus, namely 
Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia); 
Transnistria (Moldova)10; Somaliland (Somalia), the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, TRNC (Cyprus), Taiwan (China)11, and the KRI (Iraq)12, while Kosovo, that 
has seceded from Serbia, falls into its own category as a partially recognized state.13 
Biafra (in Nigeria), Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Chechnya (Russia), Republika Srpska 
Krajina (Croatia), Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina) constitute historical 
cases which have been forcibly reintegrated into their parent states, while Eritrea 
                                            
9 See: Larry Hanauer, Jeffrey Martini, and Omar Al-Shahery, “Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in 
Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops,” RAND Corporation (2011), p. 3.  
10 Rick Fawn, “The Kosovo—and Montenegro—effect,” International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2 (2008), 
pp. 269–294. 
11 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 
12 Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (eds.), Unrecognized States in the International System 
(Oxon, NY: Routledge, 2011), p. 3. 
13 Ibid., p. 3.  
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(seceded from Ethiopia) is a case of successful ascension toward independent 
statehood.14  
Yet, despite their smallness and rarity in the international system, de facto 
states carry sufficient weight in international politics to command the attention of 
policy-makers. It is almost impossible to completely isolate de facto states and their 
leaders, because most of today’s de facto states exist in and around highly 
significant geo-economic, geopolitical and geostrategic regions. Their existence in 
these vital regions consistently draws attention of states with entangled and 
interactive foreign policy interests. The process of globalization, aided by information 
technology, has resulted in the world progressively shrinking into one global space, 
so it is almost impossible to think of a political entity existing in total isolation, 
unconnected with other international dynamics and processes. Thus, while in most 
cases sovereign states strongly uphold the principle of territorial integrity, they have 
found other means to socialize de facto states into the international system. 
Foreign policy as a political activity has been present since the very beginning 
of bodies representing different human groups. In a broad sense, it refers to how 
organized groups of humans, who are partially separate from each other, interact, 
negotiate, and attempt to influence each other to achieve their desired outcomes. 
Foreign policy as a written subject was for a long time the preserve of retired 
diplomats, historians, ministers, and journalists who sought to provide an account of 
                                            
14 Nina Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States,” The 
International Spectator, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2009), pp. 47.  
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specific foreign policy events. More recently and broadly, foreign policy has been 
defined as “the totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the 
environment beyond its borders.”15 However, foreign policy as a distinct field of study 
within the field of International Relations (hereafter IR), known as Foreign Policy 
Analysis (hereafter FPA), emerged in the 1950s and flourished following the end of 
the Cold-War.16 But the analysis of foreign policy has traditionally focused on the 
state as the primary foreign policy actor. However, the end of the Cold-War had the 
dual effect of refocusing attention on the importance of non-state actors and the 
relevance of foreign policy to the study of world politics.17 Therefore, the very 
traditional focus of foreign policy-making as the sole privilege of states has become 
the subject of questioning, and state entities no longer monopolize foreign policy-
making as perhaps they did previously. Interestingly, contrary to IR with its near-total 
focus on states as the main units in the international system, FPA has advanced a 
broader view focusing on actors other than states while recognizing the centrality of 
the role of states.  
While foreign policy is not a determining factor in the initial creation of de facto 
states, it plays an increasingly important role in the subsequent stages of their 
existence. For de facto states, the ability to conduct foreign policy independently of 
                                            
15 Marijke Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction (NY, Hampshire: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007), p. 5.  
16 Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations,” in Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 1 (2005): p. 5. 
17 Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis,” in Foreign Policy: Theories, 
Actors, Cases (eds.), Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), p. 113. 
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their parent states constitutes one of the primary tools for nation-building and state-
building. Article One of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties 
of States stipulates that the capacity to build foreign relations with other states is one 
of the primary qualifications of statehood as a person of international law.18 Hence, 
building foreign relations with a variety of actors, however limited, represents one of 
the primary objectives of de facto states, and therefore they spend a considerable 
amount of time, energy and resource on the conduct of foreign policy and relations. 
De facto states exist in an existential limbo and their existence is, in most cases, 
often precarious. Therefore, foreign policy as a political activity directed towards 
other actors in the international system, particularly states, is extremely vital for the 
continuous maintenance of de facto independence, survival and consolidation of de 
facto states. 
In recent years, the study of de facto statehood has gained further attention. 
Scholars from different branches of political science have put de facto states under 
closer investigation and analysis. A group of prominent scholars has directly focused 
on examining the position of de facto states in international law, the ever-perennial 
question of recognition and non-recognition, speculation on the future of de facto 
states and prospects of conflict resolution through various innovative, alternative 
political mechanisms.19 More recent works have diverged from these perspectives, 
                                            
18 Alison K. Eggers, "When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of Somaliland," Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 30, Issue 1 (2007), p. 214. 
19 Most notable examples of that are: Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State 
(Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998); Geldenhuys, Op. Cit.; Pal Kolsto, “The Sustainability and Future of 
Unrecognized Quasi-states,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2006), 723-740; Dov Lynch, 
Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto states (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2004); Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for 
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providing instead a valuable focus on the emergence, operation, policies and 
strategies of de facto states to maintain their de facto independence.20  
This study falls into the second group, but with the intention of highlighting 
one neglected dimension: analysis of the foreign policies of the Kurdish de facto 
state in Iraq. In so doing, this thesis makes two important arguments which have the 
potential to contribute to the continuing debate on the field of de facto statehood as 
well as a significant contribution to the subfield of FPA. Firstly, this thesis argues that 
the KRI can undeniably be incorporated into the analysis of de facto statehood. 
Secondly, this thesis argues that after two decades of existence and undergoing four 
different stages of transition, the KRI now pursues and projects its own independent 
foreign policies. 
The KRI is indeed a de facto state par excellence since the entity possesses 
all the attributes and characteristics associated with de facto statehood. While it is 
tempting to immediately dismiss the KRI as a case of de facto statehood due to its 
official status as an autonomous region of Iraq, a closer look reveals that its actions 
and strategies resemble those de facto states seeking independent statehood. The 
KRI has achieved de facto independence and territorial control over a significant 
                                            
Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of 
Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society & the Establishment of New 
States Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
20 For most comprehensive projects see: Nina Caspersen, Unrecognized States: The Struggle for 
Sovereignty in the Modern International System (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Caspersen and Stansfield 
(eds.), Op. Cit., Yaniv Voller, “From Rebellion to De Facto Statehood: International and Transnational 
Sources of the Transformation of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement in Iraq into the Kurdistan 
Regional Government” (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2012).   
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portion of its claimed territory, and it has maintained this control for almost 26 years 
without disruption. More importantly, the desire to achieve independent statehood is 
clearly manifested in the KRI. Attainment of independent statehood has been at the 
core of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement since its inception in the early 
twentieth century. The transition into de facto statehood, however, dramatically alters 
the strategies adopted by de facto states, while the goal of eventual independence 
remains intact. As is the case with other de facto states on today’s international 
platform, the KRI demonstrates a clear aspiration for independence as evidenced by 
the 25 September 2017 independence referendum held in the entity.21 The simple 
fact that an overwhelming majority of the KRI’s population voted in favour of 
independence in the referendum distinguishes the KRI from other autonomous 
regions, states-within-states or various semi-dependencies found in the current 
international system. Following the conduct of the unilateral referendum, what the 
entity now lacks is an official declaration of independence. De facto states are not 
satisfied with their status and transition into de jure statehood remains an 
unachieved but aspired goal. In this regard, the KRI is no exception. De facto states 
have been relatively successful in state- and institution-building; in other words, they 
have achieved several elements of sovereignty as defined by Stephen Krasner.22 De 
facto states therefore seek visibility not invisibility. Hence, foreign policy becomes 
                                            
21 Bethan McKernan, “Kurdistan referendum results: 93% of Iraqi Kurds vote for independence, say 
reports,” Independent, 27 September 2017, accessed: 19 December 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/kurdistan-referendum-results-vote-yes-iraqi-
kurds-independence-iran-syria-a7970241.html.  
22 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
p. 9. Also, see: Stephen Krasner, “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 
22, No. 3 (2001), pp. 229-251. 
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particularly significant when consolidation is achieved by de facto states, i.e., when 
they pass the initial stages of establishment and survival.  
Indeed, many autonomous regions and regional governments, particularly 
those in liberal Western democracies, pursue foreign policy and utilize 
paradiplomacy to promote their values, identities and interests whether they be 
economic, societal or cultural. Arguing that regional and autonomous governments 
have emerged as new international actors, Andre Lecours argues that regional 
governments “… are negotiating and signing international agreements, developing 
representation abroad, conducting trade missions, seeking foreign investment, and 
entering into bilateral and multilateral relations with states. Their action is no longer 
limited to the ‘internal.’”23 However, as this thesis illustrates, foreign policy for de facto 
states like the KRI is a much more serious exercise. Although the KRI is officially an 
autonomous region of Iraq, the power of Kurdish nationalism and the desire for 
independence and statehood means that the KRI utilizes foreign policy for purposes 
wider than economic or cultural issues. De facto states like the KRI have utilized 
foreign policy for several purposes:  
1- Ensuring the survival and consolidation of the entity 
2-  Acquiring material resources in the form of aid, investment or trade  
3- As an important tool of nation- and state-building 
                                            
23 Andre Lecours, “Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of 
Regions,” International Negotiation, Vol. 7, No. 91-114, (2002), p. 92. (A. Lecours 2002) 
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4- Demonstrating capacity to function as a state by proving its capacity to 
engage in foreign relations with other entities, as per point four of the 
Montevideo Declaration 
5- Increasing engagement or recognition by recognized states  
At the heart of the foreign policies of de facto states is the need for recognition 
and consolidation as a state. Thus, any kind of engagement, even of an economic 
kind, assists the de facto state in enhancing its consolidation, politically and 
economically. Autonomous regions desiring statehood, within their foreign policy 
agenda include gaining support for secession and eventual recognition by the 
international community. These entities are eager to sign international agreements, 
open offices abroad and engage in negotiations with foreign actors to increase their 
chance of recognition by sovereign states. 
Thus, from the outset this thesis emphasizes that the KRI has exerted a high 
profile in projecting foreign policies and building foreign relations since 1992, but 
even more strongly since 2003. Here, the concept of transition is important to this 
study in two major ways. The term transition often denotes passage or movement 
from one state, position or stage to another. The de facto state, it could be argued, 
is an entity that has already undergone several transitions from a form of ambiguous 
status to one that is more state-like within the parameters of ethnic conflict and 
nationalism. De facto states have already experienced transition from an armed 
nationalist liberation struggle to some form of territorial control and stateness,24 which 
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is often viewed as a step toward other greater transitions within which evolution 
toward de jure statehood remains a primary, if distant, aim. Within the scope of this 
study, the concept of transition is used to analyse the changes that have occurred in 
the KRI from 1992 to 2011. The concept of transition is also useful in analysing 
transformations in the foreign policy aims and objectives of the KRI as a de facto 
independent entity. Since 1992 the leading political parties in the Kurdish de facto 
state have built relations horizontally with the most geographically proximate state 
and non-state actors. Particularly since 2003, the KRI has pursued moderate foreign 
policies aiming to reassure its neighbouring states, and the international community 
at large, that the KRI is an entity that not only can they live with, but also that it can 
act as a factor of stability and moderation in the wider regional system. Furthermore, 
to ensure its longevity and strengthen its survival prospects, the leadership of the 
KRI has paid significant attention to building foreign relations with the United States 
and the West in general. The West has been acting as the main source of support 
and sympathy for Iraqi Kurdish aspirations, albeit so far one within the confines of 
the Iraqi state. Lacking official diplomatic relations (particularly before 2003), Iraqi 
Kurds have constantly pursued paradiplomatic activities and capitalized on public 
diplomacy to convey their messages, values, ideas and aspirations to foreign 
audiences, particularly those in the most powerful Western liberal states. In short, 
the leadership of the Kurdish de facto state has been eager to improve Kurdistan’s 
image: ‘nation-branding’25 in today’s parlance. Particularly important in this regard 
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has been the cultivation of relations with foreign policy think tanks, institutes of 
international affairs, and powerful lobbying firms, particularly those in the influential 
Western capitals of London or Washington. Realizing the importance of these 
institutions in informing and influencing foreign policy-makers, the leadership of the 
KRI has been eager to open a door in those capitals through their advocacy and 
support. This thesis asserts that after two decades of transition and semi-
detachment from Baghdad, the KRI now pursues independent foreign policies. Since 
its foundation, building foreign relations with foreign actors was of utmost importance 
for the KRI. The KRI, this thesis argues, has undergone four substantial transitions. 
During the first five years of its existence, after 1992, the foreign relations of the KRI 
were aimed toward ensuring the survival of the entity. After 1997, however, the 
foreign relations objectives of the KRI were upgraded toward assuring the 
consolidation of the de facto state. During both these periods, as will be outlined in 
chapters four and five of this thesis, Kurdish foreign relations were the preserve of 
Kurdish political parties. Each party, particularly the KDP and the PUK, enjoyed their 
own independent foreign relations with regional countries and the international 
community at large, although after 1997 both parties moved towards a coordinated 
approach to foreign relations. 
The 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, however, can be marked as a watershed 
in the transformation of the KRI. Not only did the KRI remained territorially intact, 
Kurdish politicians also succeeded in stipulating the de facto independence of the 
KRI in the 2005 Iraqi constitution – in other words, the KRI was transformed into a 
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recognized de facto state. The thesis argues that after 2003 the KRI gradually 
developed into a unitary foreign policy actor, pursuing image-building foreign policies 
to counter the negative images usually associated with de facto states. Central to 
the image-building foreign policy was the pursuit of legitimacy and recognition; or 
what has been termed ‘foreign policy of self-justification’26 by Barry Bartmann. The 
KRI showed respect for, or adopted democratizing measures based on, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It also sought to highlight its effective statehood, 
at least compared with its Iraqi parent state. By showing these credentials the KRI 
sought to gain not only the sympathy of the West, but also protection and legitimacy 
for the continued existence of the KRI, or even eventual recognition as an 
independent state. In this regard, every development in the domestic sphere was 
incorporated into the foreign policy strategy of the KRI, in its interactions with the 
environment beyond its borders, and particularly in its relations with the Western 
world. The intention of this foreign policy strategy was to increase the legitimacy and 
prospects of recognition for any potential future drive toward de jure statehood. 
However, it is contended that the most important transition in the KRI’s foreign 
policy-making occurred in 2007, when the KRI transformed into an independent 
foreign policy actor with weight and agency in regional and international relations. 
The newly reinvigorated institutions of the KRI - the presidency and the KRG - began 
to communicate with the outside world on behalf of the KRI. The KRG negotiated 
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and signed contracts with many oil/gas companies worldwide, despite fierce 
opposition from the federal government in Baghdad which claimed that, according 
to the Constitution of Iraq, managing hydrocarbon resources was wholly its 
responsibility. The KRI furthermore built independent foreign relations with a variety 
of states which, on the one hand, it deemed particularly vital to ensuring the survival 
and consolidation of the entity, but on the other hand, were potentially detrimental to 
the prospects of Kurdish statehood in the future. Within this sphere, foreign relations 
with certain actors were given additional priority and weight. For instance, for the 
KRI, building positive and strategic foreign relations with Turkey is of utmost 
importance. The KRI is landlocked and possesses a long border with Turkey, which 
represents the KRI’s sole reasonably close outlet to the Mediterranean Sea, as well 
as having importance as a NATO member. The foreign policy-makers of the KRI, 
this thesis asserts, in effect aimed to turn Turkey into a sort of patron state of the 
KRI. While before 2003 the KRI enjoyed relatively positive relations with Turkey, the 
coalescing of several factors after 2007, including strategic, religious, ideological, 
economic, security and political issues, helped in the success of the KRI’s foreign 
policy of rapprochement with Turkey. 
Keeping trade open with regional countries like Iran, Turkey, Syria and indeed 
the rest of Iraq, is, and has been, a major KRI foreign policy objective. But, this basic 
aim has not been without complications. The geopolitical position of the KRI in a 
dangerous regional zone facing constant threats from neighbouring Turkey, Iran, 
and, until recently, Syria, as well as the rest of Arab Iraq, creates immense 
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complications for the KRI’s foreign policy. To keep its borders open and trade 
continuing, the KRI must always balance its relations between the competing 
interests of those states and the nationalist aspirations of Kurds inside or outside the 
KRI. Regional countries have been greatly discomforted by the notion that the KRI 
could serve as the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state, or an aspiring model for 
the Kurds in their respective countries. Thus, while before 2003 the KRI refrained 
from making overtly secessionist overtures, the regional countries, and for that 
matter the rest of the international community, still refused to grant the KRI any sort 
of recognition, even of a de facto kind; any sort of dealings with the KRG would have 
implied recognizing its legitimacy or even its sovereignty over the Kurdistan Region. 
This lack of recognition therefore resulted in a policy of non-engagement with the 
official institutions of the KRI. However, to preserve their strategic, political and 
economic interests, states still socialized with the KRI by dealing directly with its 
major political parties. This policy, in effect, allowed the KRI to interact with regional 
countries and the international community through the KDP and PUK, as well as 
party representatives stationed in various regional and Western capitals. More 
importantly, the foreign policy of survival and consolidation necessitated containing 
armed actions against Iran and Turkey emanating from Kurdish oppositionist groups 
based in the mountainous areas of the KRI, and cooperating with those states in 
maintaining security of the border areas. These measures were internally costly 
because of the power of pan-Kurdish nationalism and its utilization by Kurdish 
oppositionist groups against the governing parties of the KRI - the KDP and PUK - 
in the intra-Kurdish political competition. 
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Not only did the KRI establish independent foreign relations with foreign 
actors, but it also began to view the rest of Iraq or indeed the government in Baghdad 
as a foreign entity or as an environment that lay beyond its borders, and therefore 
interactions with the rest of Iraq were viewed as matters of foreign policy. Kurdish 
leaders engaged intensively and extensively with the rest of the Iraqi political 
groupings during and after the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, and presented a united 
front in the constitutional negotiations in Baghdad. They participated actively in the 
writing of the Constitution of Iraq, lobbied coalition powers, particularly the United 
States and Britain, for enshrinement of the KRI’s de facto independence within the 
Constitution, and eventually lobbied their constituents to ratify the Constitution in the 
October 2005 constitution referendum. Instead of pushing for an independent state, 
the Kurdish leadership, in the words of one Chatham House Report, planned to 
‘defend Kurdistan from Baghdad.’27  
Contrary to the pre-2003 divided nature of Kurdish politics, Kurdish parties 
presented a unified electoral list in the three successive Iraqi parliamentary elections 
of January and December 2005, and 2010. The Kurdish leadership believed that 
maintaining absolute unity within the Kurdish camp, in relation to Arab Iraq, was 
indispensable for the continued security of the Kurdish de facto state. Moreover, with 
the aim of securing the KRI’s de facto independence, Kurdish parties explicitly 
disregarded presenting Iraqi-wide political agendas to appease or appeal to voters 
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beyond the KRI; Iraqi Kurds viewed the rest of Iraq as a foreign entity like Iran, 
Turkey or Syria. Therefore, gaining votes in areas beyond the KRI and the disputed 
territories was never too appealing for Kurdish political parties. Kurdish politicians 
also occupied important positions within the hierarchy of the Iraqi political system 
with several Kurdish leaders such as Jalal Talabani, Barham Salih and Hoshyar 
Zebari occupying the positions of president, deputy prime minister and foreign 
minister respectively. It is not unusual for components of a federal region to hold 
positions proportionate to their numbers in the institutions of the federal government. 
However, for the Kurds, active engagement and remaining relevant in Baghdad was 
seen as one of the best ways to secure the KRI and maintain its de facto 
independence. In turn Kurdish representatives holding important positions in 
Baghdad constantly lobbied for the interests and policies of the KRI. They lobbied 
hard for Kurdish foreign policy interests, namely those issues that are external to the 
KRI and need intensive negotiations to be resolved between the KRI and Baghdad. 
For example, these matters included the speedy implementation of the Iraqi 
Constitution’s Article 140, which laid out a three-step plan to resolve the status of 
the disputed territories between the KRI and Baghdad. Kurdish representatives also 
lobbied for a decentralized oil/gas law giving the regions the authority to manage 
their own hydrocarbon resources. And when Iraq sought to develop its air force, 
Kurdish representatives expressly stated their fears and sought guarantees that its 
weapons would not be used against the KRI at any time in the future.28 Through 
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these policies, the Kurdish leadership aimed to safeguard the economic, military and 
political survival of the KRI until such a time as the ground is prepared for eventual 
secession or independence from Iraq. So, in this manner, while the pre-2003 
relationship between Baghdad and the KRI can be characterized as state-to-political 
party relations (KDP and PUK), after 2003, the relationship was transformed into 
state-to-state, or state-to-government relations. 
So far, neither the analysis of de facto statehood as a theoretical framework 
in IR nor the literature of FPA have paid sufficient systematic attention to the foreign 
policy component of de facto states, the exception being Francis Owtram’s article in 
an edited volume titled The Foreign policies of unrecognized states.29 The article as 
the author admits, only aims to advance some initial lines of inquiry into the subject 
matter. Despite this, the author regrettably omits to mention the Kurdish de facto 
state admittedly based on the fact the KRI has not officially declared independence 
from its Iraqi parent state. There is little theoretical and empirical literature that 
addresses foreign policies of de facto states, particularly more so regarding foreign 
policies of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq.  
Therefore, by analysing the foreign policies and relations of the KRI in Iraq as 
a case study of de facto statehood from 1991 to 2011, this research aims to fill an 
important gap in the empirical analysis of de facto statehood as well as in the 
literature of FPA regarding foreign policies of de facto states. Its primary intention is 
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to pose two central questions which it will attempt to answer within the course of this 
thesis. The questions to be explored are: how do de facto states project foreign 
policy, and how does the international system of sovereign states respond to the 
foreign policies and interactions of these anomalous but important political entities 
in the geopolitics of their regions. Through posing these questions, this thesis aims 
to identify the major transitions that have taken place in the KRI and how these 
transitions have influenced its capacity to project foreign policy and build foreign 
relations, in the process identifying major trends in KRI’s foreign policy-making as a 
de facto state. It is also important to note that this thesis is mainly concerned with 
understanding and describing foreign policy action rather than the processes of 
foreign policy decision-making.  
Conceptually and theoretically, this thesis is placed within the theoretical 
framework of de facto statehood, which has been defined as a legitimate IR model, 
as well as the sub-field of IR known as FPA which is tasked with analysing, 
understanding and predicting the foreign policies of units, the most important of 
which are usually sovereign states. After introducing the issues in this section, the 
next sub-section contains a discussion on the choice of the term de facto state 
instead of other terminologies prevalent in the analysis of de facto statehood. The 
following section conducts a review of the literature. It is noticeable that despite the 
large volume of literature with a focus on the Kurds in Iraq, what is missing is a 
deeper analysis of the emerging trends of the foreign policies of the KRI, and how 
the status of de facto statehood effects the entity’s foreign relations and policies. 
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Chapter Two is divided into two sections. Section one elaborates on the 
nascent theory of de facto statehood within the framework of IR. This section 
discusses the emergence, operation and policies of de facto states, rather than 
engaging too deeply with issues related to their position in international law or the 
debate over recognition/non-recognition of de facto states. The main rationale of this 
section is to theoretically establish the place of the KRI as a case of de facto 
statehood. 
The second section elaborates on the literature of FPA. The section defines 
various meanings of foreign policy and highlights different FPA approaches to 
studying foreign policy. More importantly, the section aims to elaborate on the 
various domestic and external determinants that generically influence foreign policy 
of political entities of which states constitute the most important unit in the 
international system. This section also briefly elaborates on the new issues that have 
been brought to the agenda of FPA, such as the role of energy resources and the 
media in influencing foreign policy. Also, as implementation of foreign policy is 
equally important in pursuing foreign policy objectives, this section also briefly aims 
to highlight the elements necessary for a successful foreign policy implementation 
and the various implementation instruments at the disposal of foreign policy-makers.     
Chapter Three has also been divided into two sections. Section one primarily 
aims to provide a brief synopsis of the political history, physical geography and 
human geography of the KRI. Thus, although wider discussion of Kurdistan in Syria, 
Turkey, and Iran is of supplementary relevance because of trans-border Kurdish 
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nationalism, this section focuses on the relations between the Kurds of Iraq and the 
GOI to provide an elaborate account of developments before the onset of the Kurdish 
de facto state in Iraq. It is also important to note that physical geography, Kurdish 
cross-border nationalism and Kurdish movements across greater Kurdistan 
constitute significant determining factors on foreign policies and relations of the KRI 
and its ruling political parties. Section two of the chapter provides a brief history of 
the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq since 1958 as the precursor to the 
emergence of the Kurdish de facto state. This section especially focuses on the 
foreign relations of the Kurdish national liberation movement with the regional and 
international powers prior to the establishment of the de facto state in 1992. The 
purpose of this section is to argue that the Kurdish political elite had, early on, 
recognized the importance of soliciting outside support for the achievement of its 
desired goals. 
Chapter Four concerns the second part of analysis, namely the empirical 
analysis, which is the major focus of this research, i.e. foreign relations of the KRI 
during the first decade of its existence after its establishment in 1992. This chapter 
will discuss the survival strategies employed by the leadership of the Kurdish political 
parties. The major components of this chapter are the initial state-building project in 
the KRI, and the use of the perceived Iraqi Kurdish success as a self-justification 
strategy. In addition, this chapter examines the dynamics of relations between 
Kurdish political parties, the Iraqi Opposition, the governments of Turkey and the 
wider world. It argues that from 1992 to 1997, the KRI was not a unitary actor 
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pursuing official foreign policies. Rather, the Kurdish political parties followed their 
own distinct foreign relations that were heavily coloured by partisan interests. 
Moreover, despite the setback of warfare between various Kurdish political parties, 
this period constituted formative years in the existence of the KRI and its foreign 
relations.  
Chapter Five discusses developments that occurred in the KRI in the second 
half of the 1990s, specifically from 1997 to 2003. The chapter particularly focuses on 
the dynamics of the OFFP, the U.S. sponsored Washington Agreement which 
represented the first decisive U.S. involvement in the intra-Kurdish conflict, and the 
Iraq Liberation Act which acted as a catalyst for the building of official and overt 
relations between the U.S. and the major parties of the KRI. In addition, it discusses 
developments in the post 9/11 era and their influence on the KRI’s foreign relations. 
All in all, this chapter argues that although the KRI’s foreign relations were controlled 
by its major political parties, renewed peace, relative harmony and stability in the 
KRI expanded Iraqi Kurdish foreign relations enabling further consolidation of the 
KRI. 
Chapter Six starts the empirical analysis of the second decade of the KRI. 
The chapter illustrates the dynamics that enabled the KRI to transform into a 
recognized de facto state. Additionally, it examines the processes of accelerated 
state-building in the KRI. The chapter concludes by observing that, after 2003, the 
KRI gradually transformed into a unitary and rational foreign policy actor – rather 
than only possessing foreign relations – which initially aimed at creating and 
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enhancing a positive image for the KRI as a de facto state: a policy that continues to 
this day.  
Chapter Seven, which is the crux of this research, is concerned with analysing 
the transformation of the KRI into an independent foreign policy actor. The chapter 
describes the nature of relations and interactions between the KRI and the GOI, 
which are increasingly viewed as matters of foreign policy by the elite of the KRI, 
rather than internal Iraqi issues. More importantly, the chapter describes the KRI’s 
independent external economic relations, perceived as a tool to guarantee the 
survival, consolidation and autonomy of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. Of 
importance in the chapter is the KRI-Turkey relationship which was instrumental not 
only in implementing KRI’s energy policies, but also in providing the KRI with a sort 
of patron-state to ensure the future survival of the KRI. 
Chapter Eight contains further discussions and conclusions. It first highlights 
the KRI’s expanding foreign relations with various other states, mainly those in the 
Western world. It is noticeable that the leadership of the KRI, aware of the 
importance of the West as possibly the strongest source of support and legitimacy 
for the Kurdish de facto state, is keen to open and maintain official and independent 
foreign relations with the West, particularly the U.S. and western European states. 
The opening of consulates in the KRI’s capital therefore has been a key objective in 
ensuring the long-term survival of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. Finally, taking 
note of the transformations in the KRI’s foreign relations and foreign policy aims, the 
chapter concludes by asserting that after four different phases of transition, over 
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almost two decades, the KRI has emerged as an independent foreign policy actor 
pursuing foreign policies that aim at ensuring the de facto independence of the KRI. 
1.1 A note on Terminology and the Use of the Term ‘De Facto State’ 
It is important to highlight the reason why this thesis has chosen to use the 
term de facto state about the unit of analysis under discussion, i.e. the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq. Since the evolution of this field of study in the late 1990s, a plethora 
of terminologies and concepts have been produced to analyse de facto states as 
anomalous theoretical objects and analytical subjects. While seemingly an issue of 
semantics, the choice of terminology has implications over how one approaches the 
subject.  
It was Scott Pegg who first introduced the subject and coined the term de 
facto state to refer to those secessionist entities that have achieved de facto 
autonomy, and thereafter seek a place at the exclusive table of sovereign states, but 
have largely been unable to gain any substantive international legal recognition.30 
However, while accepting the basic elements of Pegg’s definition for such an entity, 
subsequent literature preferred to refer to them as separatist,31 contested,32 
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unrecognized,33 pseudo,34 almost 35 or quasi unrecognized states.36 Deon 
Geldenhuys, for instance, in explaining his preference for the use of the term 
contested states notes that in reality some of these entities such as Taiwan, Kosovo, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia or TRNC have actually managed to gain recognition by one 
or more sovereign states, but their existence is contested as they have not been 
accepted by all states.37 Kolsto insisted on adding the prefix quasi to the term 
‘unrecognized states’ arguing that if and when recognized as de jure states, many 
of these entities would resemble failed quasi-states of the Jacksonian type.38 
While this thesis recognizes arguments made by Kolsto and Geldenhuys, this 
researcher chooses to use Pegg’s initial terminology of the de facto state. This is 
because, as Yaniv Voller argues, terms such as ‘contested’ and ‘unrecognized’ 
states approach the subject matter from an essentially structural perspective 
focusing on the international community’s refusal to recognize these entities. On the 
other hand, the term de facto state focuses more on the agency of de facto states, 
namely the de facto independence they have achieved through their own actions 
and strategies, and it makes “the actor and its development… a focal point of 
analysis.”39 The term de facto state also seems to be the most neutral and widely 
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used term referring to de facto independent entities existing in today’s international 
structure.40 
More recently, James Harvey has introduced an important observation which 
again merits careful attention from students of de facto statehood. Harvey challenges 
the use of the term state in reference to de facto states. This terminology, Harvey 
suggests, not only depicts these entities as “singular, fixed and coherent unit[s]”41 
but it also places heavy burdens on the analytical concept quite simply because 
these entities are not states and sovereign statehood is not going to be the next 
natural stage in their political evolution. Instead, Harvey proposes use of the term 
unrecognized entity as perhaps the best term to refer to these entities.42  
Harvey brings up an important point which should be taken into consideration 
in future research. However, it seems that Harvey clings to the structure-level at the 
expense of the agent. While variations exist, most de facto states strive to highlight 
their agency, namely by demonstrating their successes in state-building, 
democratization and contribution to regional stability, security and prosperity. 
Furthermore, actors who fall into this category draw continuous aspiration from the 
model of nation-state as the basis of their future relations with their parent states. 
This is also true for actors who have never officially declared independence, such 
as the KRI, for example. Although the Kurdish leadership has constantly strived to 
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distance the Kurdish de facto state from unilateral secession, as soon as it gained 
autonomy from Baghdad under international protection, it began to perceive the KRI 
in terms of statehood by gradually building institutions closely associated with 
independent statehood, such as parliament, government, army, etc., and strove to 
highlight its agency through building independent foreign relations, even of an 
asymmetrical nature, with key regional and international powers. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Since the end of the Cold War, in part due to the emergence of several de 
facto states in the regions formerly controlled by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, a 
body of literature dedicated to the analysis of de facto statehood has emerged. 
However, despite the emergence of several book-length volumes dedicated to the 
study of de facto states, literature tackling the subject of the KRI in Iraq as a de facto 
state per se remains very limited. Studies on the foreign policy component of de 
facto states are even more limited, notwithstanding that some de facto states, for 
example Taiwan and the KRI, enjoy official external relations and assert a high 
profile in foreign policy and diplomatic activities.  
However, interestingly, the attention the KRI has received in recent years has 
probably been unparalleled in modern Kurdish history and probably unmatched by 
any other de facto state. There are major factors for this increased attention: the end 
of the Cold War, the alignment of geopolitical and strategic interests of great powers 
with those of Iraqi Kurds, the two U.S.-led wars on the regime of Saddam Hussein 
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in Iraq (1991 and 2003), international public awareness of the crimes committed 
against Iraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein’s regime, and lastly the Iraqi Kurds agency, 
namely the ability of the KRI to make its case known to the outside world through 
diverse means, including the increasing interaction of the KRI with the outside world, 
particularly after 2003, will be covered in this thesis.  
Indeed, several studies have been conducted about the expanding KRI’s 
foreign relations with sovereign states (Turkey has become a focus of attention 
within this context), but they have mostly failed to take note of the impact of the KRI’s 
foreign policies on regional geopolitics, and have continued with the assumption that 
the KRI is still an ‘object’ of other states’ foreign policies. 
Thus, part one of this section intends to review those seminal works that have 
specifically applied the framework of de facto statehood on the KRI. It should be 
noted that while many previous studies have applied the same framework, many of 
them have used the term without giving careful attention to the tenets of the theory 
of de facto statehood as a legitimate theoretical framework within IR. Part two of this 
section then elaborates on the rich literature that has focused on the Kurds of Iraq 
within various fields of academic studies. 
 
1.2.1 Literature Review on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a De Facto State 
This research, as outlined earlier, applies the framework of de facto statehood 
on the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. Despite the scarcity of literature focusing on 
the KRI as a case of de facto statehood, a small body of work can be identified that 
has applied this framework.  
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Notable examples are present in the field of area studies, which have applied 
terminologies and frameworks undoubtedly belonging to the field of de facto 
statehood. The first is an article by Chorev, which is unique because of his early 
attempt to apply theoretical frameworks developed by Scott Pegg and Pal Kolsto on 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and to establish the position of Iraqi Kurdistan within the framework 
of de facto statehood.43 Terminologically, Chorev adopts the term ‘semistate’ to 
define his subject of study, adding yet another word to the confused terminological 
entrepreneurship in the analysis of de facto statehood. A great part of Chorev’s 
analysis is concerned with an examination of political and economic issues in Iraqi 
Kurdistan during the two stages of the development of the Kurdish de facto state: 
between 1991-2003 and 2003-2007. More importantly, Chorev identifies external 
drivers that have contributed to the survivability of the Kurdish de facto state, 
referring specifically to “transnational space,” “external patron,” “global economy,” 
and “technological and information revolution.”44 He also underlines initiatives taken 
by the Kurdish de facto state in the realm of image-building arguing that the KRI 
launched ‘a massive public relations campaign called “The Other Iraq”, which aimed 
to frame the Kurdistan Region as a “second Dubai.”’45 However, Chorev’s paper, 
despite discussing external dimensions of Kurdish self-rule, does not discuss how 
the foreign policy objectives of the Kurdish semi-state relate to the advancement and 
perpetuation of the external drivers that allow the Kurdish de facto state to survive.  
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Another work, by Dahlman, is an excellent survey of the complex historical, 
ethno-political and physical geography of the stateless region of Kurdistan as a 
homeland residing with the territorial borders of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria.46 
Dahlman’s analysis is unique because the author early on explicitly refers to Iraqi 
Kurdistan as a ‘pseudo-state’,47 with all characteristics of statehood but without 
international recognition. While Dahlman’s paper is not concerned with the foreign 
policy component of the entity, it mentions some of the diplomatic initiatives 
undertaken by the Kurdish leadership, just prior to the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, 
to reassure regional states of the Kurdish commitment to a ‘federal resolution within 
a united and democratic Iraq.’48   
In the field of political science and IR, two excellent works have emerged that 
have specifically applied the concept of de facto statehood on the KRI. The first is 
Harvey’s PhD thesis which is the first work that explicitly utilized the KRI as a case 
of de facto statehood, which he terms unrecognized entity.49 The work is also a re-
examination of the theoretical and conceptual parameters, developed and applied in 
earlier studies, to study these anomalous but existing political entities usually called 
de facto states. These studies, according to Harvey, are problematic since IR 
scholars and political scientists incorporated de facto states “into the existing 
frameworks rather than attempting the creation of a new field of theoretical 
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47 Ibid., p. 29. This terminology was first used by Kolossov and O'Loughlin in reference to de facto 
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frameworks and new analytical frameworks.”50 Harvey rejects the view of the de 
facto state as a unitary actor having a “singular purpose, existence, or categorical 
meaning”51 and instead posits the view that de facto states are significantly shaped 
by “variables of geopolitical location; the localized interpretation of identity, 
sovereignty, historical experience, ethno-politics, and the contracts of political power 
which surround it.”52 Moreover, Harvey conducts a detailed examination of the 
concept of de facto independence as a causal dynamic enabling de facto states to 
survive and thrive in the current international system of sovereign states. Harvey 
argues that the possession of de facto independence gives de facto states a self-
installed geopolitical and geo-economic significance, which then explains the reason 
why some de facto states can negotiate from unorthodox positions of strength and 
influence with state governments.53 The dynamic of de facto independence is also 
very important for the purposes of this research, focusing as it does on analysis and 
description of the foreign policy component of the Kurdish de facto state. It can be 
argued precisely because the KRI possesses de facto independence, state 
governments seek to build foreign relations with the entity, and in turn allows the KRI 
to project its own foreign policies. 
In another work, Harvey and Stansfield discuss the concept and dynamics of 
secession, so often advanced as the central driving force behind the emergence and 
subsequent survival of de facto states, which they term as unrecognized states. They 
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note that while many secessionist impulses exist, secession is very difficult for ethno-
national movements to achieve, and that the act of secession should not be given a 
primary theoretical value in theorizing on de facto states.54 Instead, they suggest 
taking into consideration other dynamics such as ‘state fragmentation,’55 that may 
explain the initial emergence and development of de facto states. However, although 
formal secession might prove difficult for de facto states, the concept and the model 
of state, its institutions, and aspirations of attaining sovereignty, still provide a 
powerful incentive for the way de facto states view themselves and their future 
aspirations.  
The other work which is conducted by Yaniv Voller, as a PhD thesis, is a 
detailed survey of the evolution and transformation of the Kurdish national liberation 
movement in Iraq into the KRI. Voller takes the Kurdish de facto state as his main 
case study and specifically applies the framework of de facto statehood on the entity. 
Utilizing the case of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood, Voller identifies the 
pursuit of international legitimacy as the primary causal dynamic driving policies and 
strategies of de facto states, which then runs parallel with his analysis of the 
performance of the Kurdish de facto state in this regard. Voller notes that in their 
search for international legitimacy, de facto states quite often endeavour to 
demonstrate to the international community their relative success in achieving 
domestic sovereignty, signs of successful state-building, democratization, security 
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of the region under their control, their contribution to the global war on terror, 
economic viability and their contribution to regional peace and security. Thus, 
demonstration of these elements becomes central to the foreign policies of de facto 
states and in their interactions with the international community.56  
The work by Voller is not specifically concerned with a systemic analysis of 
the foreign policy component of the Kurdish de facto state. Yet he allocates a large 
part of his thesis (chapters four, five, six, and seven) to argue that the pursuit of 
international legitimacy and its links with domestic politics constitute a primary 
dynamic in the foreign policy-making, foreign policy actions, and foreign policy 
objectives of the Kurdish de facto state. Voller’s work with his focus on the Kurdish 
de facto state is an excellent addition to the literature of de facto statehood and it is 
referenced and consulted through this thesis. The bibliography is also of value for 
scholars researching issues surrounding the Kurdish de facto state from 1991 up to 
2010. 
The literature on the foreign policy component of de facto states, as 
mentioned previously, is far more limited. Only one article by Francis Owtram in an 
edited volume entitled the Foreign Policies of Unrecognized States57 is specifically 
concerned with the foreign policy component of de facto states. Owtram bases his 
analysis of five case studies: The Republic of China (Taiwan), the Palestinian 
National Authority, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Republic of South 
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Ossetia, and Somaliland. The author admittedly states that the article represents 
only an initial inquiry into this issue, and serves as a guideline for future analysis and 
further research. Despite the fact after Taiwan which enjoys some diplomatic 
recognition the KRI enjoys the widest range of foreign relations and very clearly 
pursues foreign policy as a de facto state, Owtram excludes the KRI from his case 
analysis because of a lack of declaration of independence. Still, the article by 
Owtram represents a base for this research as it contains important insights into the 
foreign policy component of de facto states. 
Lastly, a plethora of academic journals have recently emerged analysing the 
relationship between non-recognition, the desire for international legitimacy and the 
foreign policies of de facto states. These journals provide an addition to the study of 
the Kurdish de facto state, particularly as they relate to the argument that one of the 
major foreign policy aims of the Kurdish de facto state is related to the pursuit of 
international legitimacy, through demonstrating its earned sovereignty and its 
democratization.58  
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1.2.2 Literature on the Political Evolution and Development of the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq 
Even though scholarly works specifically applying the framework of de facto 
statehood to the case of the KRI are limited, Kurdish studies have started to flourish 
in recent years. Ofra Bengio, for instance, notes that significant changes at the 
international level at the turn of the twenty-first century manifested in the dissolution 
of Soviet Union, and the resultant emergence of new states in Europe and Central 
Asia, gave greater legitimacy to the Kurdish ethnic voices in the Middle East region. 
Moreover, political developments in Iraq itself, most importantly the two U.S.-led 
wards against Iraq (1991-2003), and the resulting establishment of the KRI, 
significantly increased the attention paid by scholars to Kurdish issues in Iraq. These 
developments, coupled with significant developments at the domestic level in the 
KRI and the growing involvement of the U.S. and other Western countries in Iraqi 
affairs, prompted a new generation of scholars to take a greater interest in Kurdish 
affairs.59 
 Gareth Stansfield is a widely recognized authority who has contributed 
significantly to the analysis of Kurdish politics in Iraq. Stansfield’s doctoral thesis 
Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy60 represents a 
milestone and a significant contribution to the analysis of internal politics of the 
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Kurdish de facto state from its inception in 1991 until just before the 2003 U.S.-led 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (hereafter OIF) which toppled the regime of Saddam 
Hussein in Baghdad. From the beginning, Stansfield treats the liberated Kurdish 
territories controlled by the KRI as a de facto state61 existing in a difficult geopolitical 
region, surrounded by neighbours either covertly or overtly hostile to any Kurdish 
political entity. Stansfield traces the modern origins, ideologies, leadership, 
organizational structure and decision-making processes of, until very recently, the 
two most powerful political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP and the PUK. He also 
analyses the organizational structure and decision-making within the newly created 
KRG and traces its evolution from 1992 to 2003, in the process analysing the 
dynamics and operations of the KRG under four successive cabinets, from 1992 until 
2002.  
Taking note of the deep divisions and rivalries between the KDP and PUK 
that resulted in the virtual divide of the KRI into two de facto states (due to the division 
of the KRI following the civil war), Stansfield argues that “the current divided political 
and administrative system is a direct manifestation of the historical development and 
characteristics of the political system of Iraqi Kurdistan. The current division of Iraqi 
Kurdistan between two separate administrations dominated by the KDP and PUK is, 
in effect, a function of party dynamics.”62 What is striking is that Stansfield, while 
noting the challenges facing the Kurdish de facto state, recognized early on the 
durability of the Kurdish de facto state despite pessimistic predictions by many 
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observers who envisaged the end of the de facto state. Indeed, Stansfield warned 
against attempting too quickly to unite the divided KRI. In the realm of foreign affairs, 
Stansfield remarks that the divided KRI “can also be seen as a geopolitical safety 
valve, as the ability of each party to interact with neighbouring countries is enhanced 
without overtly threatening the status of the other party.”63 Stansfield also notes the 
dual party-administration approach characterizing the Kurdish parties’ foreign 
relations observing that some Kurdish officials have dual complementary positions 
in the political party and in one of the Kurdish administrations.64 Stansfield’s 
assertions are important for the purpose of this research. On one hand, the dual 
party-governmental foreign policy machine in the KRI is perhaps even evident to this 
date; on the other hand, despite further cohesiveness within the KRI, political parties 
in the KRI still preserve their own distinct foreign relations – issues which will be 
discussed further in this thesis. 
Stansfield has also contributed to the analysis of the Iraqi and Kurdish politics 
in Iraq through authoring or editing several other books, and journal articles in edited 
volumes. Most prominent of these are: The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, 
or Division? Co-written with Liam Anderson,65 Iraq,66 and the Kurdish Policy 
Imperative Co-written with Robert Lowe.67 But perhaps the most important recent 
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contribution is a journal article in which Stansfield argues that the KRI has emerged 
as a state-like entity that has begun to influence the international relations of the 
Middle East.68  
Last, but not least, Ofra Bengio in The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within 
a State69 produces a detailed historical narrative of Kurdish politics in Iraq, dating 
from at least 1968 with the commencement of the Baathist rule in Iraq, until 2010. 
What is interesting about this book is that Bengio strongly asserts that the KRI  has 
transformed into a state within the Iraqi state after 2003 through the “juxtaposition of 
different domestic, regional, and international factors [that] have made possible the 
Kurds’ leap forward into post-Saddam Iraq.”70 Bengio’s book is an excellent addition 
to the analysis of the Iraqi Kurdish and Iraqi state dynamics, the impact of the 
geostrategic map on the Kurdish region, the evolution of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq 
and the complex and perplexing dynamics of the Kurdish national liberation 
movement of Iraq. More interesting, in terms of this research, is that Bengio 
dedicates a chapter to the evolution of the foreign relations of the Kurdish de facto 
state from 1991 until 2003. She notes that the ability to conduct foreign relations 
independently of the state is an important tool for nation and state building 
processes. She further comments that in the Kurdish case, the entity received a 
tremendous boost from outside forces enabling the KRI to build and conduct foreign 
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relations independently of the state, in turn assisting the Kurds of Iraq in the 
processes of nation and state building.71 Overall, this book is an important source 
and will be referenced and consulted throughout this research.  
Published in 1996, Robert Olson’s edited volume, The Kurdish Nationalist 
Movement in the 1990s, represented an early attempt to analyse and illustrate the 
impact of the Kurdish national movement(s) on the Middle East region and on 
regional geopolitics, particularly on Turkey’s foreign policies after the end of the Cold 
War and the creation of a semi-autonomous entity in the KRI. The book conducts a 
timely analysis of how the Kurdish question influenced respective foreign policies of 
regional states toward their respective Kurdish communities.72 The article by Michael 
Gunter, Kurdish Infighting: The PKK-KDP Conflict, in this volume is particularly 
illuminating in illustrating the entangled relationship between the KDP, PUK, and 
PKK in the early 1990s and the forming of alliances between the Kurdish political 
parties prevalent in the KRI and regional states, particularly Iran and Turkey.73 
However, what the analysis lacks is a detailed examination of how the transformation 
of the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq into a de facto state impacted on 
the foreign policies of regional states. 
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The Goat and the Butcher written by Robert Olson in 200574 is another 
contribution to the analysis of the Kurdish politics in Iraq. Grounded in historical 
studies, the book is essentially a historical narrative of a relatively short time-span 
between 19 March 2003. when the U.S. and its allies removed Saddam Hussein 
from power until mid-February 2005 when the first Iraqi national elections took place 
to elect members of the COR. The book mostly examines Turkey’s relations with the 
Kurdish political parties. The author argues that. prior to 2003. the relationship 
between Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq characterized those of a ‘state (Turkey)-to-
territory’75 relationship. However, by June 2003, the author argues that relations 
were upgraded to a ‘state-to-government(s) (KDP and PUK) relationship.’76 While 
this book by Olson considers the transformation of the Kurdistan national liberation 
movement into a de facto state, it does so regarding Turkey’s foreign policy-making 
toward the entity, without considering the KRI’s agency and its ability to influence 
events and project its own foreign policies.  
For his part, Michael Gunter has contributed to the literature of the KRI 
through publication of three major books. All three books are markedly descriptive 
narratives of the evolution of the KRI following the First Gulf War. In first book,77 
using a descriptive research method, Gunter surveys developments in the Kurdish 
national liberation movement from 1975, when the first Kurdish experience in 
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autonomy collapsed under the leadership of the late Mustafa Barzani, until the 
creation of the KRI. Gunter dedicates two chapters to describing the position of the 
Kurds of Iraq during the First Gulf War (1980-1988), and another chapter to cover 
developments during the Second Gulf War in 1991. He then allocates three chapters 
to focus on internal developments in the KRI. Although Gunter uses the concept of 
de facto state to describe the KRI in 1992, his use of the term is problematic and he 
omits to define it within his book. Perhaps one reason for this failure is that the 
concept of de facto statehood was first introduced into political science and IR 
studies, as a legitimate theoretical framework, in 1998 i.e. five years after the book 
by Gunter was published. In general, Gunter’s book is useful for students of Kurdish 
studies and for those following the political developments in the KRI.  
The second book by Gunter78 again adopts a descriptive analysis of 
developments in the KRI from 1992 till the end of 1997. He dedicates chapter three 
of his book to the Kurdish involvement in the Iraqi opposition that was activated 
following the closure of the Second Gulf War in 1991. The involvement of Iraqi 
Kurdish political parties, as will be demonstrated in chapter four, was crucial in the 
survival prospects of the Kurdish de facto state. Gunter then describes the nascent 
internal war between the KDP and PUK that erupted in 1994, and the rounds of 
negotiation and peace initiatives sponsored and encouraged by several states 
culminating in the Washington Agreement that effectively put an end to the civil war 
in the KRI. The main argument of the book seems to be that by October 1996 the 
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KRI was engulfed in a ‘power vacuum’,79 into which the neighbouring states and the 
U.S. have been drawn. According to Gunter, this scenario of vacuum in power is 
attributable to the nascent civil war between the KDP and the PUK, the presence of 
Kurdish armed groups opposing the governments of Turkey and Iran inside the KRI, 
as well as to several Turkish and Iranian military incursions inside the KRI to root-
out Kurdish oppositionist groups. Overall, while the book is not concerned with 
foreign relations of the KRI, it sheds some light on the political, geopolitical and 
military complexities facing the leadership of the KRI during one of the most sensitive 
periods in the history of the KRI. 
The third book by Gunter80 is mainly a brief comparative study of the status 
of the Kurds in Iraq after OIF, Kurdish politics in Turkey after the capture and 
detention of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 and developments pertaining 
to the Kurds in Iran and Syria. As far as the KRI is concerned, Gunter argues that 
the two U.S. wars against Saddam Hussein have helped to build the foundations of 
the KRI. Moreover, and very relevant to the discussion contained in Chapter Six of 
this thesis, Gunter notes that the KRI after 2003 has become an “island of democratic 
stability, peace, and burgeoning economic progress.”81 Gunter also looks at the 
three delicate relationships the Kurdish de facto state needs to manage to secure its 
continued survival and strength: relations with the GOI, relations with Turkey and 
lastly relations with the United States of America. Overall, while the book is not 
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concerned with a systematic analysis of the foreign policy component of the Kurdish 
de facto state, it is an essential read for scholars of the Kurdish de facto state and it 
contains important insight on developments in the post-Saddam era.   
Denise Natali has also contributed to the analysis of Kurdish politics in Iraq 
through publication of two books and several journal articles. The first book is a 
comparative analysis of the nature of Kurdayeti – the Kurdish national identity – and 
its similarities and variations across space and time in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.82 Natali 
provides significant insight into the nature and scope of political space available in 
each state and its direct link to the formation of Kurdish identity, arguing that “Political 
space matters in creating sets of motives, ideas, and mobilization potential for 
Kurdish communities. It shapes the nature of the nationalist elite, organizations, 
sentiment, and relationship between Kurds and central governments.”83 Natali’s 
book is not specifically concerned with analysis of the foreign policy component of 
the KRI. However, she provides valuable insight on the external sources or the 
external factors that have enabled the Kurdish de facto state to survive in the modern 
international system. Natali specifically discusses ‘transnational space’, arguing that 
“In Iraq, the large transnational space has helped create a legitimate and 
democratized sense of”84 Kurdish National Identity. Overall, she notices that 
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historically in Iraq the Kurds have enjoyed a larger and freer political space to 
articulate their national identity. 
The second book by Natali examines the influence of international 
humanitarian aid in creating and sustaining what she calls the Kurdish ‘quasi-state’.85 
Natali examines the impact of foreign aid on the KRI since its inception, specifically 
focusing on the changing nature of the external aid directed to the entity. She notes 
that, since the inception of the Kurdish entity in Iraq, external aid programmes have 
undergone three significant transitions: (1) emergency relief phase (1991-96); (2) 
OFFP phase (1996-2003); and democracy mission phase (2003-2011). Natali’s 
arguments are important for this research, as strangely it is the dynamics of 
international aid that assured the survival of the Kurdish de facto state from at least 
1992 until 2003. Natali notes that in an open political context external aid can have 
the positive affect of establishing “long-term relationships between foreign 
governments and non-state actors.”86 From the perspective of the KRI, Natali notes 
that in contrast with the first relief phase, the commencement of the OFFP 
encouraged political engagements from foreign governments to establish peace 
between the warring Kurdish political parties and to create an effective Iraqi 
opposition movement. Moreover, international aid helped the KRI in gaining some 
form of international legitimacy and domestic sovereignty. This contribution by Natali 
is an important piece of work as it sketches out the limitations imposed and 
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opportunities offered to the Kurdish de facto state, through external aid in the form 
of material resources and security protection by the international community. 
Although this book is not specifically concerned with Kurdish foreign policy, it 
provides a significant insight into how external aid assisted the KRI to build semi-
official foreign relations with several state and non-state actors, in the process 
helping to consolidate the nascent Kurdish political entity in Iraq through provision of 




2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
This thesis conceptualizes the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a de facto state. 
Therefore, this chapter examines the emergence, operation, identity and policies 
(including foreign policies) of such de facto states. It also assesses why it is 
appropriate to apply the theoretical framework of de facto statehood on the KRI.  
After the first section, section two is concerned with providing an in-depth analysis 
of the literature of FPA. This section elaborates the various definitions and different 
approaches to FPA. It examines the foreign policy aims of de facto states, as well 
as examining the various determinants which influence foreign policy actions of 
actors, including de facto states. The section primarily aims to the make the case 
that mutatis mutandis de facto states can project foreign policy to pursue their own 
specific policy interests and aims and can be significant actors in the politics of their 
region. 
2.1 Introduction 
It is not easy to place the KRI in a theoretical framework. The region is 
constantly at flux and the future of its political direction is uncertain. Since the 1960s, 
the predominantly ethnic Kurdish areas of the north have experienced a continuous 
transformation through multiple forms of territorial and political organization. Kurdish 
majority areas in Iraq transformed, at one time or another, from being an ‘insurgent 
state’, to an ‘autonomous region’, to an ‘insurgent/proxy state’, and then after the 
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1990s a Western-protected Safe Haven.87 Yet this thesis argues that after 1992, and 
under international protection, the Kurdish majority areas in Iraq were transformed 
into a de facto state with the establishment of the KRI, which continues to this day. 
While it is true that after 2003 the KRI was yet again reintegrated into the state of 
Iraq, this reintegration has not caused the collapse of the de facto independent 
Kurdish entity. Ironically it strengthened the KRI by formally recognizing its existence 
as a de facto independent entity. The central argument to support the contention that 
the KRI is indeed a de facto state is that it has achieved a large degree of de facto 
independence with a consolidated territorial control, and several elements of 
sovereignty, with perhaps the exception of international diplomatic recognition as an 
independent state. The KRI has also been engaging in processes of state- and 
nation-building similar to other de facto states existing in today’s international system 
and the desire for outright independence is strongly visible amongst Iraqi Kurds. 
 
2.2 Defining the De Facto State: The Emergence, Operation and 
Policies 
After the end of the Cold War, for the first time, attention began to be 
dedicated to the analysis of ethno-nationalist conflicts in the territories formerly 
controlled by the Soviet Union that had newly created de facto independent states 
from their erstwhile parent states. Initially, to most observers, these conflicts had 
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seemed to be ‘frozen conflicts’88 existing in a state of ‘no war, no peace’,89 while for 
others these self-proclaimed political entities were ‘places that don’t exist’,90 and 
‘informational black holes’,91 that did not merit careful analysis. 
However, the economic, political, security and humanitarian challenges 
resulting from these conflicts, and the creation of self-declared independent states, 
soon captured the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike. In the realm of 
academia, Pegg was the first to introduce the concept of de facto statehood as a 
worthy subject of theoretical analysis within the framework of IR. To differentiate his 
unit of analysis from other forms of statelessness, namely bandits, territories 
controlled by warlords, peaceful secessionist movements or even puppet-states 
established by imperialist powers, Pegg defines the de facto state based on the 
following criteria: 
First, there is an organized political leadership which receives some form 
of popular support. Second, this leadership has achieved sufficient 
capacity to provide governance or governmental services to a defined 
population. Third, the de facto state effectively controls its territory or the 
large majority of it for at least two years. Two years is a somewhat 
arbitrary figure but what I am trying to get at here is that these entities 
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have some degree of permanence. They are not here today and gone 
tomorrow. Rather, they have staying power. Fourth, the de facto state 
views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states. Fifth, 
the de facto state actively seeks widespread international recognition of 
its sovereignty. Finally, the de facto state is, however, unable to achieve 
widespread recognition of its sovereignty and remains largely or totally 
unrecognized by the international society of sovereign states.92  
To further support his proposition, Pegg draws on Robert Jackson’s 
distinction between positive and negative sovereignty. The former refers to the   
 
“…capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters. It 
is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively sovereign 
government is one… which possesses the wherewithal to provide political 
goods for its citizens. Positive sovereignty… is not a legal but a political 
attribute if by political is understood the sociological, economic, 
technological and psychological wherewithal to declare, implement and 
enforce public policy both domestically and internationally.”93  
Negative sovereignty, however, refers to the theoretical right of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and involves the ‘act of general 
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recognition’ attributed to a state by the international society.94 Thus, according to 
Jackson, despite retaining their negative sovereignty, most states that have 
emerged following the decolonialization process, or what he calls ‘quasi-states’, 
have mostly failed to provide governmental services, in other words, they lack 
positive sovereignty.95 Yet, as Pegg notes, despite the fact both quasi-states and de 
facto states are the resultants of the outcome of  the decolonialization process,  “The 
quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state 
is illegitimate no matter how effective it is.”96 This is because the international system 
of sovereign states strongly adheres to the principle of respecting the territorial 
integrity of existing states, which in most cases by default means denying 
international recognition to de facto states. 
However, since Pegg’s first introduction of the subject, an abundance of new 
studies has emerged which have enriched the analysis of de facto statehood. Yet 
while most writers have accepted the basic elements of the definition advanced by 
Pegg, later studies have objected or refined the edges of his definition. One source 
of disagreement has been Pegg’s insistence on a formal declaration of 
independence as a criterion for defining an entity as a de facto state. It remains the 
case that some de facto states have not formally declared independence for several 
reasons, that will be outlined later in this chapter, while maintaining their de facto 
independence.  
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Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, for instance, provide a more flexible 
definition of the de facto state. This study fully concurs with this definition as it 
enables the inclusion of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood. As such it is worth 
recalling the whole definition provided by them. While agreeing with the basic tenets 
of Pegg’s criteria, they have articulated three major principles for defining a de facto 
state as follows:  
“First, they have achieved de facto independence, including territorial 
control, and have managed to maintain this for at least two years. 
Unrecognized States control most of the territory they lay claim to, 
including the territory’s ‘capital’ and key regions, and this distinguishes 
them from other separatist movements. But the territorial control is not 
necessarily absolute; they may aspire to more territory than they currently 
control and the extent of their control is likely to vary over time; second, 
they have not gained international recognition, or even if they have been 
recognized by some states, they are still not full members of the 
international system of sovereign states; third, they have demonstrated 
an aspiration for full, de jure, independence, either through a formal 
declaration of independence, through the holding of a referendum, or 
through other actions or declarations that show a clear desire for a 
separate existence.”97  
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The third criterion is critical for the purposes of this research. On the one hand, 
it allows the categorization of the KRI and Taiwan as two important cases of de facto 
statehood who have never formally declared independence, yet variously function 
as highly independent entities and show great tendencies toward independence. 
One the other hand, perhaps, these two entities project foreign policies and enjoy 
official foreign relations with variety of state and international organizations possibly 
unmatched by any other de facto state existing in the current international system. It 
is also clear that it is precisely because of a lack of declaration of independence, 
these entities can assert a high profile in foreign policy. It is also the same dynamic 
that enables or encourages other state and non-state actors to engage with them. 
These entities are cases of ‘incremental secession’98 to borrow a term from 
Caspersen, and the lack of declaration of independence is a strategic decision by 
the leadership of these entities to ‘increase room for manoeuvre and the prospect 
for international support’.99  
It is also plausible to argue that another reason for the lack of declaration of 
independence by the leader of some de facto states relates to the fact that de facto 
autonomy, without de jure sovereignty, allows other sovereign actors to interfere in 
the internal affairs of de facto states without much concern for the viewpoint of their 
leaders. Harvey here notes, “Because of the apparent devaluation of de facto 
autonomy in the case of unrecognized entities, the ability of a proximate regional 
sovereign to interfere in the internal affairs of the metropolitan state in which the 
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unrecognized entity is situated is greatly enfranchised.”100 This simple fact is 
illustrative of the reason why the KRI and Taiwan have not declared independence. 
While both entities possess high levels of de facto independence and foreign 
relations, they both exist in highly challenging geopolitical environments with Taiwan 
facing its great power Chinese parent state, and the KRI being surrounded as it is 
by powers such as Turkey and Iran. Therefore, any movement toward a non-
negotiated independence would jeopardize the very existence and security of these 
de facto states. 
Indeed, to understand the position of de facto states, it is useful to borrow 
Stephen Krasner’s definition of sovereignty as a multidimensional and complex 
institution. Krasner identifies four different meanings of sovereignty. Domestic 
sovereignty, referring to “the organization of public authority within a state and to the 
level of effective control exercised by those holding authority.”101 Interdependence 
sovereignty, referring to “the ability of public authorities to control trans-border 
movements.”102 Westphalian sovereignty, referring to “the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority configurations,”103 and international legal sovereignty 
referring to “the mutual recognition of states or other entities.”104 De facto states claim 
they enjoy all but international legal sovereignty. They further claim despite the lack 
of international recognition, they have been successful at establishing positive 
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sovereignty in their de facto states. This is perhaps because recognition in such 
cases is not utterly necessary due to the existence of other dynamics that sustain 
the de facto independence of these entities. Harvey, for instance, in this regard 
notes:  
“It is the possession of de facto autonomy which enables the maintenance 
of political community and security in a state of equilibrium despite a lack 
of external recognition. This implies that whilst unrecognised entities are 
excluded from the dialogue of non-intervention attributed to sovereignty, 
their presence within the spheres of influence created by dialogue and 
interaction between sovereign actors affords them a great deal of 
protection from the use of force. The implication here is that there is a 
stark difference between de jure sovereignty and de facto autonomy – the 
sovereign state possesses both (in times of peace) whereas the 
unrecognised autonomous entity subsists quite effectively on the 
maintenance of de facto autonomy by any means.”105 
The fact that de facto states enjoy de facto autonomy/independence also sets 
them apart from other anomalous entities in the international system. De facto states 
are different from ‘shadow states’106, black spots107, insurgent states,108 autonomous 
                                            
105 Harvey, Op. Cit., p. 31.  
106 William Reno, “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa,” Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2000): p. 443.  
107 Stanislawski, Op. Cit., pp. 336-396.  
108 Robert McColl, “The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution,” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 59, No. 4 (1969), pp. 613-631.   
68 
 
regions, associated territories,109 and states-within-states.110 De facto states are also 
different from the recognized quasi-states of the third world which possess 
international recognition (negative sovereignty) but mostly lack domestic or positive 
sovereignty. De facto states have achieved de facto independence and domestic 
sovereignty and have built relatively successful state-like institutions capable of 
providing public services to the general population. Charles King, noting this 
dynamic, has argued that, “the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become 
the state builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field 
armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local 
economies is about as well developed as that of the recognized states of which they 
are still notionally a part.”111 As such they aspire to independent statehood and 
therefore seek visibility to demonstrate their achievements to the outside world in 
pursuit of international legitimacy and recognition.  
Yet, despite their visibility and the attempt to demonstrate their successes in 
state-building, most de facto states tend to possess negative images, which have 
significant implications for their survivability and their future recognition bids. De 
facto states are usually seen as grave threats to the sacred principle of territorial 
integrity, regional and international security and the cause of peace. Caspersen, for 
instance notes, “De facto states tend to be ethnically-defined and born out of 
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violence and the image that dominates in the media, in foreign ministries and in the 
limited academic literature is very much a negative one”.112 
However, the issue is not solely related to the fear of opening the frozen 
international map of sovereign states to create new political cartographies. De facto 
states are often viewed as “anarchical badlands”113, providing fertile grounds for 
criminal and illegal organizations and illicit trade activities, and as such constitute 
grave security threats that need to be eradicated, in most cases as soon as possible. 
Kolossov and O'Loughlin have described de facto states as entities “with fungible 
territorial control, which are predicated on criminal or quasi-criminal organizations; 
frequently specializing in the production and sale of drugs; as well as the illegal traffic 
of weapons and in the laundering of 'dirty money'.”114 An ad hoc European 
Parliamentary delegation in one instance described Transnistria as a “black hole”115 
in Europe and a “base for arms smuggling and trafficking in people, tobacco and 
drugs.”116  Other scholars have doubted whether the elites of de facto states truly 
represent their local populations’ will and determination, and the utility of self-
determination movements in the twenty-first century. Amitai Etzioni, for instance, in 
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a much praised article notes that “a bunch of local autocrats hardly constitutes 
progress toward genuine self-determination”.117 As such, de facto states are usually 
ignored; and if they are ever discussed, they are merely dismissed as “criminal 
stripes of no-man’s-land or as the puppets of external states,”118 while in other cases, 
de facto statehood has been closely associated with ‘foreign aggression’.119 
Moreover, as Deon Geldenhuys notes, unrecognized de facto states face ‘double 
non-recognition’: not only does the international community reject secession of de 
facto states, but it also rejects the claim made by de facto states that they have 
achieved positive sovereignty or have earned their sovereignty.120 In other words, de 
facto states are often seen as ‘failing states,’ or ‘racketeer states’.121  
Therefore, considering the fact most de facto states have a negative image, 
there must surely be other factors assisting de facto states in their initial emergence 
and subsequent survival. In this regard, several dynamics can be discerned 
straightaway. In most cases, the most important factor enabling the initial emergence 
and subsequent survival of de facto states is the existence of a proximate ‘external 
patron’,122 or a far distant geopolitical guarantor.123 Indeed, most scholars of de facto 
statehood have recognized the importance of patron states in enabling ethno-
national groups to create de facto independent entities. Kolsto and Paukovic have 
                                            
117 Amitai Etzioni, “The evils of Self-Determination,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 21, No. 35 (1992-1993): p. 
24.  
118 Lynch, Op. Cit., p. 4.  
119 Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game,” Op. Cit., p. 48.   
120 Geldenhuys, Op. Cit., p. 3.  
121 Scott Pegg and Helge Blakkisrud, “De facto states and democracy: The case of Nagorno-
Karabakh,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 45 (2012), p. 142. 
122 Kolsto, Op. Cit., p. 733 
123 Caspersen, “From Kosovo to Karabakh,” Op. Cit., p. 13. 
71 
 
noted “in order to survive de facto states must have a patron that will protect them 
and supply them with financial and other resources,”124 while Caspersen notes, “It is 
impossible to understand the creation and survival of de facto states without 
reference to external actors.”125  
The motivation of patron states to enable the emergence and continuity of de 
facto states is often driven by the existence of ethnic links126 or strategic interests.127 
Patron states act as important sources of diplomatic, political, economic, and military 
assistance for de facto states. De facto states often rely on military support from 
patron states to achieve territorial control and to exert control on the legitimate 
means of violence; while economic support is required to build governmental 
institutions, infrastructure and provide basic public services to the general 
population.128 Thus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria have drawn support 
from Russia, TRNC from Turkey, while Nagorno Karabakh has drawn support from 
Armenia in their initial victory and subsequent creation of their de facto independent 
entities.129 In other cases, a far more distant power can act as a patron state for a 
de facto state. For instance, the U.S. acts or has acted as a form of patron state for 
several de facto states, including Taiwan,130 the KRI, Kosovo, and Somaliland, which 
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has enabled either their first creation or their endurance as entities with a high level 
of de facto independence.131 The U.S. functioning as a patron state to these entities 
also explains their lack of isolation and their wider engagement with the international 
community.132 However, the impact of patron states is not just in the initial creation, 
they can also influence the eventual outcomes of the conflict between de facto states 
and their parent states. Graham and Horne remark that patron states can influence 
the eventual outcomes of equilibrium, as by providing military and economic aid to 
de facto states, they can minimize the possibility of renewal of warfare and make the 
secessionist elite’s payoff from the status quo high enough to prevent a negotiated 
settlement.133 In contrast, by withdrawing military, economic and political support 
they can force a different conflict outcome. This is evident in the case of the Serb 
Republic of Krajina (in Croatia) where the de facto state’s leaders fell out with the 
Milosevic regime in Serbia, lost Serbian support, and thereby the entity ceased to 
exist thereafter.134 
Moving forward, many writers, including Pegg, have depicted secession as 
the primary causal dynamic driving the policies of de facto states. In a general term, 
secession has been defined as “the creation of a new state by the withdrawal of a 
territory and its population where that territory was previously the part of an existing 
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state.”135 The de facto state has been portrayed as a secessionist entity and the 
logical outcome of secessionist struggles, representing an interim period between 
the armed national liberation struggle and independent statehood. For liberation 
movements, Voller notes, de facto statehood necessitates modification of strategy, 
although the ultimate aim of creating independent statehood remains unchanged.136 
As Caspersen comments, “however much we talk about globalization, erosion of the 
state and the increasing irrelevance of territory, statehood remains the top prize; it 
legitimizes the struggle, guarantees protection for the inhabitants and prestige and 
power for the leaders,”137 or as King observes, in a similar vein, ‘Why be mayor of a 
small city if you can be president of a country? Why be a lieutenant in someone 
else's army if you can be a general in your own?”.138 
However, this picture of secessionist or national liberation movements able, 
with the help of patron states, to carve out spaces in sovereign states and embark 
on the processes of separation and creation of new states must be balanced against 
increasing evidence that secession, in most cases is not the major dynamic 
prompting creation of de facto states. For example, in most cases, sovereign states 
refrain from supporting overtly secessionist outcomes in ethno-national conflicts. In 
this regard, Hechter presents two geopolitical factors that induce states to refrain 
from supporting secession elsewhere. First, he notes, most states are themselves 
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‘multinational’ spaces, and therefore the possibility of potential secessionist 
movements arising from their own territory means that supporting secession 
elsewhere could result in unpleasant precedents at home. Second, support for 
secession would harm relations with larger parent states which may have 
implications in other arenas.139 Therefore, secession for de facto states remains 
difficult because they face opposition not only from their parent states, but also from 
the wider international system of sovereign states which is primed toward preserving 
the sanctity of international borders. In short, the classical international system as 
Weller notes, is underwritten by sovereign states preserving their own interests in 
the international arena, the most important of which is the endurance of their 
territorial integrity.140 
Bearing the difficulties of secession, the most recent literature has articulated 
other dynamics that might be at play in the creation of de facto states. Stansfield and 
Harvey, for instance, argue that a significant, but hitherto understudied, factor that 
can lead to creation of de facto independent entities are the processes of ‘state 
fragmentation’.141  Indeed, as Stansfield and Harvey contend, the dynamic of 
secession in relation to the creation of de facto states becomes even more important 
when “understood as a phase in the creation of de facto independence when 
combined with processes of fragmentation and rupture in the fabric of the state 
system itself.”142 According to this very plausible argument, the processes of state 
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fragmentation enable the already existing national movements to benefit from the 
weakness of the state and achieve territorial control, rather than the liberation 
movement itself having power to capture territory from the sovereign state and create 
a de facto independent territory. They further note: 
“[T]he processes of ‘state weakness and instability in the parent unions 
and sovereign arrangements both pave the way for conflict and provide 
the necessary openings for secessionist movements to secure territory 
and engage in the process of separation – the formation of new political 
institutions, identities, ideologies, and methodologies of state-building – 
rather than the secessionist movement itself taking the risk of making the 
first move and being represented as a belligerent force.”143  
Stansfield and Harvey also note that a significant determining factor in the 
creation of new states is the collapse of imperial centres of power, overarching 
hegemonic political and economic systems, and defeat in war which then prompts 
victorious powers to enable secession and creation of new states.144 Hence, the 
recent establishment of new states in the spaces formerly controlled by the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, and the creation of the Kurdish de facto state following the 
defeat of the Baathist state of Iraq in the Second Gulf war “underscore the historical 
contingency of the role of geopolitical factors in state formation. [Because] In certain 
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historical conditions, geopolitical forces promote the fragmentation of states”145 
particularly after defeat in a war.  
It is, then, plausible to argue that the creation of Kosovo146 and the Kurdish 
de facto state147 were the direct result of the punitive actions of great powers and 
the international community against Serbia and Iraq after their defeat in wars, in 1999 
and 1991 respectively. There can also be other factors which may ultimately lead to 
the secession of regions or peoples from the confines of already-established states. 
Daniele Conversi, in the context of creation of new states in the spaces formerly 
controlled by Yugoslavia, argues that the leadership of central governments can 
also, at times, play a major role in the secession of its constituent parts. Indeed, 
Conversi develops the concept of ‘central secession’ or ‘secessionism by the 
centre.’148 Depicting the Serbian elites in Belgrade as secessionist, he argues that 
“after realising the impossibility of imposing their hegemony on a re-centralised 
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic and his circle opted for a project which, though 
cautiously disguised, in practice amounted to secessionism.”149 The implication here 
is that in certain historical circumstances-which is certainly applicable to the case of 
the Kurdish de facto state as will be outlined later – central state authorities 
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deliberately pursue policies pushing a certain part of its peripheral territory toward 
secession, for the achievement of other tangible aims. 
However, regardless of the factors that enable the creation of de facto states, 
the question remains on as to how these entities can interact with the international 
system of sovereign states, and preserve de facto independence in a state of non-
recognition. For many observers, the fact that de facto states do not possess de jure 
sovereignty, and constitute security threats, condemns them to total isolation on the 
margins of the international system. Based on this view, de facto states are 
delegated to the status of “pariahs, excluded from the mainstream channels of 
international diplomacy, existing in conditions beyond the pale of normal 
international intercourse,”150 and therefore ‘non-engagement’151 is the default 
international response to these entities.  
Yet, as Charles King notes, “Seeing ethnoterritorial confrontations as mainly 
a security problem can blind researchers to the deep political and economic 
incentives that sustain disputes and fossilize networks of war into institutions of de 
facto states.’’152 Therefore, it may then be the case that de facto independent 
territories are able to survive for a prolonged period without actually being accepted 
to the exclusive club of sovereign states. It is also plausible that de facto states are 
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indeed able to interact with sovereign states due to the existence of other factors. 
Harvey and Stansfield, in this regard, note: 
“It is meaningless to discuss a political entity such as an unrecognized 
state as though it operated in isolation, unconnected to other international 
dynamics and processes. Through political ties and interactions with 
governments and international actors, unrecognized states are often 
politically and economically socialized through means which reconcile 
abstractions of legal non-recognition with the needs of states, markets; 
and a range of commercial interests.”153 
Harvey and Stansfield further argue that dynamics of de facto independence 
in de facto states are greatly influenced by two variables: “strategic importance and 
resource importance.”154 Thence, despite the fact these entities are not legally 
recognized, the dynamics of de facto independence enables actors within these 
entities to interact with sovereign states from unorthodox positions of strength. This 
is because, as Harvey suggests, “Their position along longstanding political fault 
lines, their proximity to territories of resource importance and their geographic 
locations often mean that regional and international actors have to, or want to deal 
with them.”155 Indeed, Harvey and Stansfield, focusing on the geopolitics of natural 
resources, argue that more specific general economic and trade matters, specifically 
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the politics of natural resources, ought to be considered as a unique ‘geo-economic 
paradigm’ when considering international relations of de facto states.156  
Many de facto states are thus either endowed with vital natural resources or 
are located alongside regions with political, strategic and logistical importance in the 
business of resource and its transportation. The existence of commercially 
significant natural resources in or around de facto states is a highly placed issue on 
the agenda of foreign policy-makers concerned with issues of energy security, job 
creation and economic diplomacy. For instance, while Pegg, in his analysis of the 
impact of de facto states on international trade, states that de facto states suffer from 
the ‘economic cost of non-recognition’,157 he concludes that de facto states can also 
be focal points in the trade of precious natural resources, stating: 
“Charles Taylor’s “Greater Liberia” earned an estimated US$8-
10,000,000 a month in the early 1990s from various forms of timber and 
mineral extraction. The non-governmental organization Global Witness 
estimates that the Angolan rebel group UNITA earned nearly US$4 billion 
from diamond sales during the Angolan civil war.”158 
The role of natural resources in instigating civil wars has already been 
recognized in the literature.159 More important is the politics of third parties, including 
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neighbouring states, in regard to civil conflicts. In most cases, their policies may 
depend on the “optimal benefits they can expect to achieve during wartime relative 
to those they could gain in a negotiated settlement, a feature that can often depend 
on the resource endowments of their neighbors.”160 Thus, considering that most de 
facto states exist due to dependence on a proximate patron state, the possession of 
natural resources gives important leverages to governments of de facto states, which 
then allow them to maintain de facto independence in the face of strong support for 
the territorial integrity of states. Many stakeholders, therefore, come to benefit from 
business in and around de facto states and any lasting settlement would have 
important repercussions for all involved. This situation can evolve into what King has 
described as a “dark version of pareto efficiency: as the general welfare cannot be 
improved by reaching a genuine peace accord allowing for real reintegration without 
at the same time making key interest groups in both camps worse off. Even if a 
settlement is reached, it is unlikely to do more than recognize this basic logic and its 
attendant benefits.”161 
Somaliland and Taiwan are two prominent examples of how strategic 
interests and geopolitical position allow de facto states to build foreign relations with 
sovereign states. Taiwan, off course, in a special case. By 1979, the process of 
Taiwan’s derecognition was completed when, on 1 January 1979, the United States 
switched its diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (otherwise known as 
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Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole government of the 
Chinese state.162 The U.S. policy was motivated by the U.S.-Soviet competition and 
the desire to limit Soviet expansion in China. However, the United States and its 
allies had significant strategic, commercial and security interests in relation to 
Taiwan.163 Therefore, on 10 April 1979, the U.S. Congress adopted the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) that has governed the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship ever 
since.164 The TRA has provided for the establishment of a U.S. ‘de facto embassy’ 
in Taiwan – the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) – which is technically a non-profit 
corporation with a contract with the U.S. State Department. Under Section 7 of the 
TRA, the AIT is authorized to carry out most of the services and duties performed by 
other U.S. Consular offices. The AIT performs most of the functions that were carried 
out by the former U.S. Embassy in Taipei (the capital of Taiwan) before its de-
recognition by the United States.  The TRA also allowed Taiwan to establish 
representation offices in Washington D.C and twelve other U.S. cities, known as the 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). These offices are 
tasked with performing most of the functions that had previously been undertaken 
by the Taiwan Embassy in Washington D.C. and Consulate Generals in other 
cities.165    
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Taiwan, on the other hand, which had previously proclaimed itself as the sole 
legitimate government of the whole of China, switched its course in 1996 by revoking 
all claims to the PRC and announcing its intention to create an independent Taiwan, 
side-by-side with the PRC. Since then, Taiwan has pursued a ‘proactive foreign 
policy’166 underpinned by a ‘pragmatic diplomacy.’167 Taiwan currently possesses 
diplomatic recognition as an independent state from at least 29 states, in Asia, 
Europe, Africa and the Americas; and has substantial non-diplomatic ties with other 
states in South-East Asia, West Asia and many other places. Taiwan also enjoys 
official membership in 16 inter-governmental international organizations and 970 
INGOs.168   
 On the other hand, Somaliland’s strategic position on the Horn of Africa, and 
fear of general instability coupled with the wretchedness of its failed parent state-
Somalia, has allowed Somaliland to build ‘functional relationships’169 with several 
states and international organizations. Somaliland conducts international relations 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and liaison offices functioning in several 
African and Western states, including the UK and the U.S. Somaliland’s highest 
officials regularly travel on official visits abroad; and Somaliland passports are 
accepted by some African states, as well as European states such as Great Britain, 
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France and Belgium. Somaliland also possesses diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of South Africa, and has special relations, as its key partner, with Ethiopia 
in the field of security and unofficial political and economic relations,170 as well as 
functional relations with several international and regional organizations such as the 
EU, the UN, and the World Bank among others.171  
More interestingly, in addition to the above-mentioned factors that can prompt 
states to engage with de facto states, one can discern other dynamics at play that 
rule the level of engagement experienced by de facto states. In a recent study on 
U.S. foreign policy towards four de facto states (Abkhazia, Somaliland, TRNC and 
Nagorno Karabakh), Pegg and Berg ascertain the importance of Realism’s emphasis 
on great-power relations in articulation of U.S. foreign policy toward these de facto 
states. Basically, they suggest that U.S. foreign policy toward de facto states is 
determined by its relations with the patron states supporting these entities. 
Therefore, since the United States does not enjoy problem-free relations with Russia 
and Armenia, U.S. foreign policy-makers either oppose, or at best ignore, Abkhazia 
and Nagorno Karabakh which are supported by those states respectively. 
Conversely, since the United States possesses alliance-based relations with Turkey 
and enjoys good relations with Ethiopia – a strong U.S. ally in the Horn of Africa and 
a key partner for Somaliland – this translates into a greater and broader U.S. 
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engagement with TRNC and Somaliland.172 This also may help to explain the reason 
why Taiwan, Somaliland, and the KRI enjoy a greater level of foreign relations with 
the international community, since the United States has acted, at one time or 
another, as their primary patron state and it has had antipathetic, non-existent, or 
hostile relations with China, Somalia, and Saddam’s Iraq at one time or another. 
Yet, the existence of de facto states remains precarious. They are mostly 
seen as illegitimate entities that, in the best of cases, need to be reintegrated into 
their parent states through innovative peaceful means, such as federalism or 
confederation, or else, “the threat of renewed warfare is constant in almost all 
unrecognized states.”173 Moreover, “they are not protected by norms of non-
intervention and most parent states reserve the option of forceful reintegration.”174 
Likewise, illegitimacy and non-recognition have significant implications not only for 
their external survival strategy, but also for their most precious commodity: internal 
or domestic sovereignty. Even partial recognition is not enough to ensure that these 
entities function as normal entities in the international system. De facto states are 
usually barred from entry into formal multilateral and bilateral trade agreements and 
incorporation into the international legal frameworks that are vital for attracting 
foreign investment everywhere. In brief, what has been referred to as ‘rents of 
sovereignty’175 – basically foreign aid and loans – are not conferred on de facto 
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states. Consequently, de facto states could suffer from economic difficulties which 
would then have negative consequences on maintaining a supportive population 
willing to defend the de facto state. 
De facto states, therefore, must continuously legitimize their existence, 
actions and aspirations. Barry Bartmann is one of the first scholars to highlight the 
issue of illegitimacy in de facto states. Bartmann notes that de facto states suffer 
from a deep crisis of international legitimacy, and for all types of states that face such 
a crisis of legitimacy “self-justification becomes a foreign-policy priority reflecting 
both the lack of confidence in the state itself and the perceived skepticism or 
indifference of the outside world.”176 In discussing strategies of self-justification 
employed by de facto states, Bartmann highlights two important methods: moral and 
practical legitimacy. By employing moral legitimacy de facto states refer to their 
historical rights over their claimed territories, their right to self-determination, past 
promises of statehood, and violation of their human rights by their parent states. By 
employing practical legitimacy, however, they refer to their success in building state-
like institutions that can fulfil functions required of statehood.177  
Commenting on the de facto states legitimation campaigns in pursuit of 
international legitimacy, Caspersen notes that, in the last decade, de facto states 
have undergone a significant transition in terms of their claims for independence. In 
justifying their claims for independence, de facto states usually focus initially on their 
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right to self-determination and historical claims to their land, combined with a 
‘remedial’ right to secession based on the violation of their human rights by the 
parent state.178 However, the leaders of de facto states have finally realized that 
arguments for recognition based on national self-determination, at a time of territorial 
integrity, stand to lose; “The right to self-determination runs up against the principle 
of territorial integrity and it usually loses out; sovereignty trumps self-
determination,”179 or they may have realized, as Weller notes, that “the classical 
doctrine of self-determination serves to disenfranchise populations, instead of 
enfranchising them.”180 
By the mid-1990s, de facto states began to supplement the self-determination 
argument with a new discourse, in their pursuit of international legitimacy, that 
started emphasizing their earned sovereignty;181 namely their alleged success in 
building state-like institutions, capable of functioning relatively well despite the lack 
of recognition – in other words, their practical legitimacy. Noting that de facto states 
essentially ‘play the recognition game’ Caspersen states: “by emphasizing such 
credentials, the unrecognized states are attempting to shed their associations with 
instability, shadow economies, ethnic cleansing and external puppeteers, and create 
entities that are deemed acceptable and therefore ‘worthy’ of recognition. De facto 
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states are consequently trying to imitate what good, recognized states should look 
like.”182 This general focus on effective statehood by de facto states, however, is not 
accidental. By imitating effective statehood, leaders of de facto states attempt to 
demonstrate that they have built relatively successful entities that possess positive 
sovereignty and can provide governmental services; services that the quasi-states 
of the Jacksonian type have failed to provide. 
Yet, Pegg underestimates the importance of this legitimation strategy, arguing 
that these entities are ‘playing yesterday’s game,’183 implying that the game of state-
building in the twenty-first century differs from previous periods with no attention 
being given to the conditions of positive sovereignty. But, as Caspersen notes, what 
is more innovative in the approach is the increased emphasis on norms and values. 
De facto states, in other words, have increasingly begun making claims to 
democratic statehood. Caspersen states: “recently… these aspiring states have 
caught on to what they perceive as a normative change in the international arena… 
These entities now argue that they have proven their viability as democratic states 
and thereby earned their sovereignty.’’184 And elsewhere she notes: 
“[T]he statehood proclaimed in these entities has therefore been 
significantly influenced by international developments; or rather by 
perceived changes in international norms and practices of recognition… 
In their bid for international support the entities are often engaged in what 
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has been termed a process of ‘competitive democratization’: not only are 
they trying to demonstrate their own democratic credentials, they are also 
claiming to be more democratic than their parent states and they 
frequently describe themselves as ‘islands of democracy’ in otherwise 
authoritarian waters.”185  
De facto states, moreover, attempt to reframe the conflicts not as one between 
a metropolitan centre and a secessionist region, but as one over democratic values, 
portraying themselves as defenders of hegemonic international values: “not only are 
we the victims; we are the good guys, we are like you… we do not constitute a 
security threat,”186 and we share “hegemonic international values.”187  
The imitation of democratic and effective statehood, therefore, is significant 
for de facto states because it serves to achieve two of their primary objectives: 
“preserving their de facto independence and gaining international recognition.”188  
Elaborating on the new strategy, Voller notes that ethno-national liberation 
movements often initially base their claims for statehood or wider autonomy on moral 
legitimacy. However, when territorial control, or de facto statehood, is established, 
practical legitimacy takes the primary position. The attainment of de facto 
independence drives de facto states to view themselves in a different manner and 
therefore go through an ideational transformation. While the main security threats 
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during an ethno-national conflict are to the well-being of the population and the 
movement’s personnel, with the attainment of de facto statehood, the threat to de 
facto independence, territorial control, sovereignty and state institutions take primary 
place.189 Indeed, the leaders of de facto states carefully watch international 
developments regarding the changing basis of international recognition. They have 
carefully observed the conditions outlined by the EU to recognize breakaway former 
Yugoslav republics and the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union; the general emphasis on democratization in U.S. foreign policy; the 
EU accession criteria which emphasize the rule of law, democratization, human 
rights and respect and protection of minorities; and the conditions often attached to 
international aid, democracy and good governance.190 Furthermore, de facto states 
have monitored Kosovo’s Standards before Status,191 and have hailed its 
subsequent accession to partial recognition as an independent state as a case of 
‘secession moment’ in international practice.192 From this, the leaders of de facto 
states have concluded that the international community is ready to trump territorial 
integrity in favour self-determination if they build democratic and effective states on 
their territories.193  
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Yet, proving worthiness or domestic sovereignty goes beyond building 
effective statehood and democratization. Many de facto states have reached the 
conclusion that they may have been denied recognition because the international 
community, in consideration of other unstable, and poor, recognized states that have 
failed, may fear the creation of another state resulting in more instability, famine and 
war. Noting the failure of Biafra194 in convincing the international community of its 
independence, a confidential memorandum from the Biafran ministry of foreign 
affairs, for instance concluded “the humanitarian approach has backfired. Ours now 
is the picture of a piteous starving sickly people non-viable and incapable of 
defending themselves from hunger and war.”195 Therefore, as Voller recently notes, 
demonstrating economic viability and contribution to security and stability, both 
regionally and perhaps even internationally, have become two important aspects in 
the discourse of earned sovereignty employed by de facto states.196 Somaliland, for 
instance, has been striving to highlight not only its democratic credentials, but also 
its ability to contribute to global and regional security and stability, namely through 
the U.S. global war on terror. Referring to Somaliland’s fight against terrorism and 
piracy, a former foreign minister of Somaliland, stated: “Somaliland has been 
attacked by terrorists not only because they hate us, when I think what they are 
attacking is the principles and values we stand for, which is democracy,”197 while, a 
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former president of Somaliland stated: “The United States and United Kingdom 
should include Somaliland and other small nations in the fight against terrorism.”198 
The position of de facto states along significant geopolitical, strategic and 
geo-economic regions, in subtle ways, enables them to interact with the international 
community of sovereign states. Usually, this positioning has a significant influence 
on the policies and strategies of de facto states. The existence of de facto states in 
a status of non-recognition has significant implications for them. Seeking recognition, 
and a place in the international system as a sovereign state, remains the top priority 
for de facto states. However, the leadership of de facto states, most certainly of the 
Kurdish de facto state, has realized that international recognition may be contingent 
on other factors, that may lie beyond the ability of de facto states and national 
liberation movements to influence. The case of de facto states, is in a sense, the 
reverse of what Harvey and Stansfield note about the impact of state fragmentation 
and the collapse of hegemonic imperial economic, political and ideological spheres 
of authority on the creation of new states. This theme was taken up by the late Fred 
Halliday when he highlights the impact of international politics on political and ethnic 
disputes, which he labels as ‘the syndrome of post-colonial sequestration’ stating 
that certain “countries and peoples have – at a decisive moment of international 
change, amid the retreat of imperial or hegemonic powers – failed through bad timing 
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and or bad leadership to establish their independence.”199 Thus, while certain groups 
of people were granted independent statehood during post-colonial arrangements, 
nations making up most of today’s de facto states have been, for one reason or 
another, deprived of de jure statehood. Yet, as Halliday notes, establishment of new 
states is contingent upon “international system, great power politics, and political 
geography;”200 factors in most cases beyond the capability of de facto states to 
influence. But these very same factors provide incentives to the leadership of de 
facto states to wait patiently for the peak time, when one or more of these factors is 
in favour, to achieve independent statehood. 
Therefore, as secession, particularly opposed secession, is difficult to achieve 
and international realities in most cases militate against the creation of new states, 
the maintenance of de facto independence becomes the primary aim of de facto 
states, and the key principle guiding their actions, strategies and policies, including 
their foreign policies. In this regard, Harvey states, “a primary concern of political 
movements in unrecognised entities is the maintenance of autonomy over the long-
term under adverse political, geopolitical and intrastate circumstances.”201 And, 
interestingly, de facto states are able rather successfully to maintain de facto 
independence under adverse circumstances. Here, Harvey notes, “an important 
facilitator of autonomy in the case of unrecognised entities is their enhanced ability 
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to subvert the rubric of statecraft in international society, a strategy often involving 
the support of a proximate ethno-political or geo-political guarantor, claims of 
remedial ethno-political rights to secession, and the post-facto development of 
parallel institutional systems which accommodate a range of interest groups and 
actors emerging out of the post-conflict division of power within these political 
enclaves.”202 
The above discussions in the external legitimizing strategies of de facto states 
in the form of imitating democratic and effective statehood, economic viability, 
contribution to regional and international stability, dependence on external patrons, 
and political ties that de facto states can build through possession and trade in 
natural resources, are important for the subject matter of this research. These 
processes essentially link the achievements of de facto states in the sphere of 
establishing effective statehood, democratization203 and the politics of natural 
resources, with the foreign policy and foreign interactions of other members of the 
international community, be they state or non-state actors. Also important is that 
these discussions divert attention from the so-firmly entrenched structural 
perspectives in the literature of de facto statehood, focusing attention instead on the 
agency that de facto states can possess and exercise.  
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However, the nascent literature on de facto statehood has rarely given 
appropriate attention to the foreign policy component of de facto states. This is 
despite the fact de facto states spend considerable time, energy, and resources on 
conducting foreign policy. De facto states often establish ministries of foreign affairs, 
or other departments tasked with the same functions, to assist in the processes of 
foreign policy-making; implementation of foreign policy; and building, maintaining, 
and strengthening foreign relations with a variety of state and non-state actors. They 
also establish foreign representation offices in countries they deem significant for 
their political, economic, and security interests.  
Francis Owtram can be identified as the only scholar who has begun work on 
the foreign policy component of de facto states. Owtram observes that foreign policy 
is not relevant in the explanation of the initial emergence of de facto states; it is also 
irrelevant when expounding whether de facto states are reintegrated into their parent 
states on a federal or a confederal basis, or whether they gain recognition in the 
international system of sovereign states. However, Owtram argues that foreign 
policy becomes very important in the second stage of de facto statehood, which he 
terms as the phase of ‘consolidation.’204 Noting the importance of foreign policy 
during this stage, Owtram writes that “having achieved some kind of recognition that 
enables the entity to survive, the practice of foreign policy will be a significant factor 
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both as indication that it fulfils the criteria for a state and also in practical terms in 
ensuring survival, militarily, politically, and economically.”205  
Moreover, Owtram notes that de facto states in general have four key goals 
when pursuing foreign policy. Their first and the foremost goal is ‘survival – politically, 
militarily, and economically.’206 The second aim of foreign policy, which is related to 
the first aim, is to obtain material resources in the form aid, trade or foreign 
investment207 which are crucial for the continued survival, prosperity and 
maintenance of the state-building project. The third aim, which is very important for 
de facto states, is to demonstrate their capacity to engage in foreign relations with 
other states,208 and hence to demonstrate that the entity satisfies one of the 
conditions of statehood as specified by the Montevideo Convention of Rights and 
Duties of states. The fourth and the final aim as specified by Owtram is “to increase 
the degree of recognition by recognized states, either of a de facto or a formal 
kind.”209 Hence, Owtram notes, the only difference in the foreign policy aims of 
recognized states with those of de facto states is that the latter strive to use foreign 
policy as a mean to increase their de facto – if not de jure – recognition and 
consolidation as a state through economic engagement.210  
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Moreover, to demonstrate their capacity in building foreign relations with other 
states, as stated by the fourth point of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of the State, de facto states usually establish ministries of foreign affairs or 
similarly named departments and representation offices abroad to highlight this 
aspect of their stateness. These offices are often tasked with building and managing 
foreign relations with other states, promoting engagement, and encouraging foreign 
investment, trade, and acquiring aid.211 
Moreover, in their foreign policy, de facto states give considerable attention 
to building foreign relations with three sets of actors. The main priority for de facto 
states is usually ‘relations with patron state’.212 Most de facto states, as Kolsto 
observes, even those that face weak parent states, are dependent on an external 
patron to ensure their survival;213 therefore, the maintenance of relations with their 
patron states becomes a top priority for foreign policies of de facto states. The 
second set of important relations is with ‘great powers.’ Owtram notes that the views 
and policies of great powers in relation to de facto states have important 
consequences on their prospects and durability.214 Therefore, de facto states pursue 
vigorously any bilateral contact, either directly or indirectly, with the great powers of 
the day. The third and the last set of important relations is those with ‘international 
organizations.’215 To emphasize their stateness and aim to eventually join 
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international organizations when statehood is achieved, de facto states also robustly 
pursue relations with important political, economic, and security organizations such 
as the UN, EU, IMF and WTO, among others.216 It could also be said that 
collaboration with a variety of organizations, be they regional, international, 
governmental or non-governmental, enables de facto states to enhance their de 
facto independence and domestic sovereignty, by acquiring the assistance needed 
to provide essential public goods, or at least being seen to be operating in the 
diplomatic field – a  point covered neither by Owtram nor the wider literature. 
Moreover, the literature of de facto statehood still lacks a comprehensive analysis 
on the alterations in foreign policy or foreign relations interactions when 
consolidation is achieved by de facto states. The strategic decision by the KRI 
leadership to refrain from declaring immediate independent statehood helped in 
shifting the regional and international reaction from open hostility to some 
acceptance and legitimacy by the international community. Yet what is still missing 
in the literature of de facto statehood is a comprehensive analysis of what changes 
occur in the conduct of de facto states’ foreign policies when a certain degree of 
consolidation is achieved, and how the international system of sovereign states 
responds to or socializes de facto states due to their geostrategic, geoeconomic or 
geopolitical positions. 
 Harvey, for instance, recognizes the fact that de facto states are usually not 
so isolated in regional and international relations in terms of geoeconomic and 
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geostrategic locations, which then enables the governments of de facto states to 
engage in regional and international relations. He also recognizes the role of natural 
resources in influencing international relations of de facto states. However, he fails 
to provide an elaborate account of how the Kurdish de facto state - his case study - 
utilized hydrocarbon resources in foreign policy and diplomacy. Utilizing 
hydrocarbon resources, as chapter 7 of this thesis illustrates, played an important 
role in achieving economic independency and demonstrating economic viability - two 
primary foreign policy objectives of the KRI after 2007 which have been highlighted 
by Yaniv Voller. However, in addition to having an economic dimension, hydrocarbon 
resources possess a political dimension and serve as an important foreign policy 
instrument for de facto states such as the KRI. 
As this thesis sets out, hydrocarbon resources also serve as an important 
foreign policy instrument for the KRI. Indeed, this thesis argues that economic 
statecraft was an important instrument used by Kurdish foreign policy-makers. 
Lacking a proximate committed patron state willing to guarantee its survival, and not 
wholly trusting the intentions of any one actor, the KRI employed hydrocarbon 
resources as an insurance policy. The reasoning behind this policy is that investment 
opportunities in hydrocarbon resources play an important role in the foreign policy of 
states. As part of economic diplomacy, states endeavour to acquire investment 
opportunities for their companies abroad. Thus, the foreign policy decision-makers 
of the KRI believed that attracting multinational corporations from a variety of states 
would firstly open the door for direct foreign relations with those states and, 
99 
 
subsequently, incentivize those states to protect the Kurdish de facto state from 
threats and destruction in the future. To attract oil/gas multinational corporations, the 
KRI offered more lucrative deals than Baghdad, granting Production Sharing 
Contracts which in essence entitled companies to a larger share of the revenues 
accrued from oil/gas fields. As in the rest of Iraq, hydrocarbon resources have the 
potential to garner easily recoverable revenues for the KRI. The KRI possesses 
mostly untapped oil/gas reserves in need of significant investment, and the KRI’s 
oil/gas policies have been a subject of contention between Baghdad and the KRI at 
least since 2005. Yet, despite these facts, multinational corporations have been 
eager to build ties with the KRI and have invested significant amounts of resources. 
The politics of natural resources has helped the KRI to form alliances and lobby 
politicians abroad. In this regard, attracting the U.S.-based ExxonMobil in 2011 as 
one of the early oil companies to enter the Kurdish energy market was seen as a 
major foreign policy success by the KRI, and helping to put the KRI on the world 
energy market. President Masoud Barzani clearly stressed that the presence of 
ExxonMobile in the KRI equals the presence of 10 American military divisions,217 
meaning that a major oil firm representing U.S. interest will act as a security buffer 
for the KRI. The success of this foreign policy instrument was put to test when 
militants associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, commonly known as 
ISIS, appeared to be threatening the core areas of the KRI in early August 2014. 
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Within days, President Barack Obama, who had refused calls from the government 
in Baghdad to help fight the ISIS menace which had overrun several major Iraqi 
provinces, ordered military strikes on ISIS militants approaching the capital of the 
KRI and started what became a global coalition to counter ISIS.218 While the 
motivations behind the U.S. move were multi-dimensional, the presence of leading 
U.S. corporations certainly played a significant role. Oil/gas resources also had a 
weighty impact on the rapprochement between the KRI and Turkey, an important 
regional state, as will be outlined in chapter 7.219 
It can also be observed from the above argument that de facto states often 
change or adopt new foreign policy positions when the entity gains further 
consolidation. Consolidation often precipitates a significant change in the foreign 
policy aims and external strategies of de facto states beyond the issue of 
international legitimacy, and often leads them to adopt more independent foreign 
polices serving their own interests. During the first decade of the KRI’s existence 
(1992-2003), for instance, Kurdish political parties felt compelled to cooperate with 
the governments of Turkey and Iran, sometimes alone or jointly by using force, to 
contain the threat posed to these governments by their Kurdish opposition 
movements, mostly located on the mountainous border areas of the KRI. However, 
a major change can be seen after the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq. The further 
consolidation of the KRI, and presence of U.S. forces, meant that it pursued more 
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independent foreign policies towards these states. Instead of assisting in the fight 
against Kurdish groups such as the PKK (Turkey) or the KDPI (Iran), the KRI refused 
to engage in armed confrontations against these groups, repeatedly stressing its 
belief that fighting would not solve the Kurdish issues in those states, and 
emphasizing, in the meantime, that it wished and was willing to play a constructive 
role in the peace processes in Turkey and Iran. 
Indeed, the actions of the KRI post-2003 reveal the emergence of a unitary, 
rational foreign policy actor. KRI leaders could have bolstered their domestic 
popularity and legitimacy by adopting a pan-Kurdish platform or using aggressive 
rhetoric against the states oppressing neighbouring Kurdish communities. However, 
the KRI leaders refrained from using such hostile language. Geographic location and 
geopolitics obligates the KRI to pursue good relations with surrounding states and 
the wider regional system. As such, similar to many Arab states allied to the United 
States, such as Egypt and Jordan, which must pursue domestically unpopular 
foreign policies with regard to the Palestinian cause, the KRI has been subject to 
criticism and contempt internally for refusing to adopt pan-Kurdish policies. 
Moreover, as a region or a nation interested in sovereignty, power and security, 
adopting such pan-Kurdish political platforms would immediately mark the KRI as a 
revisionist or an excessively destabilizing power, thereby endangering the very 
security and existence of the KRI. Therefore, as a second point of consideration, the 
consolidation of the KRI has enabled its leaders to consistently and reliably pursue 
foreign policies of rapprochement and engagement with neighbouring states, despite 
102 
 
the fact that these policies are not overtly popular within the Kurdish communities 
throughout the region. 
Furthermore, geostrategic position plays an instrumental role in enabling the 
projection of foreign policy by de facto states. For instance, the strategic position of 
the KRI in the north-eastern part of the Middle East and its location between Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria means that the entity can play a pivotal role in the complex 
international relations of the Middle East. Indeed an argument can be made to the 
effect that despite the weaknesses of, and constant threats directed to, the existence 
of the KRI, the Kurdish leadership has successfully employed the geostrategic 
position of the KRI to achieve foreign policy goals. After 1997, for example, its 
strategic position enabled the KRI to play an important role in the anti-Saddam 
coalition engineered and led by the United States. Indeed, this clearly illustrates how 
the geopolitical importance of the KRI, both for the anti-Saddam coalition and the 
wider Iraqi opposition, enabled Kurdish political parties to advance their foreign 
relations of consolidation. The vitality of the KRI for the anti-Saddam efforts 
encouraged the United States to include the KDP and PUK as essential components 
of the Iraqi opposition. These parties had territorial control over a portion of Iraqi 
territory - the KRI - which could then be used not only as a launch pad against the 
regime of Saddam Hussein, but also presented as a democratic experiment that 
could be replicated throughout the rest of Iraq. This process extended and provided 
much-needed financial, political and military support to Kurdish political parties; in 
the process further assisting consolidation of the KRI. In addition, the KRI is located 
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in the trade routes between Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran as well as being the territory 
where a significant amount of Iraqi oil is exported by pipelines running through 
Kurdish territory. The KRI has very successfully used its strategic geopolitical 
location to achieve its foreign policy of rapprochement with Turkey. As Ofra Bengio 
notes, the friendly KRI acts as a buffer zone between Turkey and the rest of Iraq 
which is marred by instability, terrorism and insurgency; as a bulwark against the 
expansion of Iranian influence and Shiism in Northern Iraq and Turkey; a well as 
being an important security partner since the entity controls the whole of the Turkish 
border with Iraq.220 These examples and others reveal that de facto states such as 
the KRI can be focal points or territories of importance for foreign policy-makers. 
This thesis conceptually places the KRI within the framework of de facto 
statehood. Thus, it has been necessary to illustrate how the concepts or definitions 
used to analyse other cases of de facto statehood apply, or deviate, in the case of 
the KRI. Within this in mind, the next section discusses the position of the KRI as a 
significant case of de facto statehood. 
 
 
2.2.1 Application on the Kurdish De Facto State 
The case of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood has mostly been 
neglected in a literature focused mainly on the cases emerging from the Caucasian 
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and Balkan regions after the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Furthermore, the case of the KRI has either been treated as a borderline case221 or, 
when it has been labelled as a de facto state, the term is often borrowed without 
significant attention being paid to how the position of de facto statehood influences 
the policies and strategies of the entity, at least regarding the subject areas under 
investigation by those studies.  
However, this thesis argues the KRI is a de facto state par excellence. Firstly, 
almost from the moment the KRI achieved autonomy from Iraq after 1991, it has 
focused its agency on state-nation building processes creating institutions 
reminiscent to those of sovereign states such as presidency, government, 
parliament, security apparatus, army and, for the subject matter of this thesis, a 
gradually growing foreign relations service. Secondly, excluding Taiwan which is a 
special case by all standards, the level of development and visibility of the KRI in the 
international system is probably unmatched by any other de facto state. Harvey, for 
instance, in this regard argues, “the de facto independent Kurdish enclave in 
northern Iraq has experienced significant political, economic and infrastructural 
development and regeneration on a scale unmatched by many other disputed 
territories. The trajectory of its political and economic development, its longevity in 
the international system, and the region’s high level of de facto independence makes 
Iraqi Kurdistan an important addition to the study of unrecognized entities.”222  
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However, it is true that the Kurdish de facto state deviates from the major 
assumptions and conceptual frameworks used to analyse de facto statehood in other 
regional contexts. Most often, the rationale to not include the KRI as a case of de 
facto statehood has been predicated on the premise of a lack of declaration of 
independence by the leadership of the KRI – which is presented as a definitional 
criteria by early pioneers of de facto statehood theory, such as Scott Pegg – and  the 
KRI’s inclusion as a legally approbated federal entity within the body politic of its Iraqi 
parent state, following the constitutional negotiations of the second Iraqi state-
building formation after 2003.223 
The lack of a declaration of independence, this thesis argues, is a deliberate, 
conscious and strategically calculated choice undertaken by the KRI for several 
reasons. First, non-recognition has significant costs for a nascent entity. As is the 
situation with most other de facto states, the KRI has emerged after long years of 
Kurdish national liberation struggle in Iraq. The many years of military struggle 
between the Kurdish minority and its political masters in Baghdad was devastating 
in terms of public infrastructure and humanitarian, economic and psychological 
destruction. Thus, processes of regeneration in the region require substantive 
amounts of aid and investment from outside parties, the most important of which are 
multinational corporations and international financial and trade institutions. Hence, 
the problem essentially lies here. Unrecognized de facto states which have declared 
independence often suffer from what Pegg has called “the economic cost of non-
                                            
223 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, Op. Cit., p. 12. 
106 
 
recognition.”224 Entities such as South Ossetia (Georgia) and Nogorno Karabakh 
(Azerbaijan), among others, exist in a kind of limbo and bear the cost of non-
recognition. Unrecognized de facto states cannot obtain the much-needed 
international financial loans so urgently needed for their economic restoration and 
subsequent development. Companies are also reluctant to invest capital in these 
entities as they are not covered under relevant international financial and trade laws 
so crucial for financial protection.  
Secondly, and probably differently from many other de facto states, the KRI 
lacks the external support of a proximate ethno-politically allied patron state. Patron 
states often play vital roles in the emergence and subsequent survival of de facto 
states to the extent that, without a patron state, one cannot think of a de facto state 
able to withstand the pressures emanating from the parent state, and with an 
international system supportive of the parent state, based on the principle of respect 
for the territorial integrity of states. The KRI is a typical in this regard. Despite the 
fact the United States, the UK and some other Western states have essentially acted 
as a semi-patron for the KRI since its establishment in 1992, these states while being 
supportive of wide Kurdish autonomy, have prioritized territorial integrity over self-
determination, and have constantly urged the KRI to remain within the confines of 
the Iraqi state. The KRI is also located in an extremely tough geopolitical 
environment, as it is both a landlocked territory and surrounded by states with 
sizeable Kurdish populations, which places any nascent Kurdistan secessionist 
                                            
224 Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, Op. Cit., p. 43.  
107 
 
entity in an existential paradox. The KRI’s geopolitical constraints, in terms of moving 
the de facto independent entity toward a more ambitious political construct such as 
independent statehood, as other nations existing within similar geopolitical 
constraints attest – e.g. Israel – requires more forceful and direct support from 
established powerful states such as the United States, Russia, the UK and powerful 
states in the EU.    
In the absence of a dedicated patron state(s) overtly committed to a Kurdish 
separatist agenda and willing to provide necessary physical protection, the KRI has 
opted for a strategy that is not only highly innovative but is also very effective. After 
existing for a decade under international protection and semi-detached from its Iraqi 
patron state, in the 2005 constitutional negotiations the KRI enshrined its de facto 
independence and its semi-detachment from Baghdad in an effective manner. 
Harvey, for instance, notes,  
“By remaining a legally approbated constitutional component of Iraq, Iraqi 
Kurdistan remains an internal Iraqi affair. Since the war of 2003, this 
counterintuitive integration into the sovereign space of Iraq provides a 
political buffer against external actors altering the physical parameters of 
Kurdish de facto independence in the north. Despite regular military 
actions by Iran and Turkey against militant factions in the mountainous 
border areas, the region has experienced no significant attempt by an 
external authority to alter the geopolitics of Kurdish self-rule in northern 
Iraq. With the absence of internal interference from the government of 
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Iraq and external actors, Kurdish political parties have been able to 
bargain from a remarkably strong position with the governments of 
sovereign states considering the lack of juridical and diplomatic 
recognition attributed to Iraqi Kurdistan.”225  
This innovative political arrangement also circumvents the need for an immediate 
patron state and allowed the KRI to interact with sovereign actors from a relatively 
strong position of strength, rather than the self-isolation experienced by many 
unrecognized de facto states. 
Thus, this thesis argues, it is precisely because of Iraqi Kurdistan’s increasing 
de facto independence, that the KRI must pursue its own foreign policies. First, Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s lack of declaration of independence, and its incorporation as a federal 
entity within Iraq, theoretically places certain constraints on the KRI’s pursuit of 
foreign policy. However, as will be explored throughout this thesis, the KRI’s nominal 
place with the sovereign state of Iraq means the KRI is less isolated, because 
sovereign states are willing to engage with the KRI as a recognized de facto state, 
and because of its important geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic position. 
Secondly, its high level of de facto independence from Iraq means that the KRI must 
continually justify its existence, actions and policies and to protect its constantly 
contested achievements. Therefore, an essential part of the KRI’s foreign policies is 
concerned with the pursuit of international legitimacy, by highlighting the KRI’s 
achievements and its domestic sovereignty. Moreover, the need of the KRI to attract 
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aid, trade and investment means that the KRI places a high value on external 
economic relations which is also linked to its survival strategies, internally and 
externally. 
 
2.3 Foreign Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice 
Foreign policy has been around since the existence of organized political 
groups who are strangers to each other in many ways. These different organized 
political groups, be they tribes, city-states, empires, or nation-states have always 
needed some form of strategy to deal with their external environment, in peace or in 
war. For a long time, foreign policy as a written subject was the realm of retired 
diplomats, politicians, journalists, and historians who were looking for a place in 
history. Thus, FPA-style work, Valerie Hudson remarks, “has been around as long 
as there have been historians and others who have sought to understand why 
national governments have made the choices they did regarding international 
relations.”226  
However, over the last fifty years or so, under the rubric of FPA, a new 
literature has emerged in the academic world, dealing specifically with foreign policy 
in the field of IR. Noting that the emergence of FPA within IR dates back to the 1950s 
and early 1960s, Hudson argues that three major works built the foundation of FPA:  
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1. Decision Making as an Approach to the study of international politics by 
Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin.  
2. Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy by James N. Rosenau. 
3. Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the context of International Politics by 
Harold and Margaret Sprout.227 
These major works have left an imprint on the literature of FPA in different 
ways. Snyder and his colleagues, for instance, have urged researchers, when trying 
to find answers to why a certain state has taken a certain action, to look inside the 
state to the actors involved. In taking this approach, Snyder and his colleagues 
emphasized foreign policy decision-making (FPDM) as the main approach to FPA. 
They further viewed decision-making as an ‘organizational behaviour,’228 by which 
the basic determinants of foreign policy would be “spheres of competence of the 
actors involved, communication and information flow, and motivations of the various 
players. Desirable explanations would thus be both multicausal and 
interdisciplinary.”229  
James Rosenau, on the other hand, in his pre-theorizing, encouraged 
scholars to come up with systematic and scientific generalizations that are applicable 
across national cases. For Rosenau, middle-range theory that can mediate between 
grand principles and the complexity of reality was of paramount importance. 
Rosenau also noted that the best way to understand foreign policy is to draw on 
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knowledge and information from the most micro level – individual leaders – to the 
most macro level –the international system. As with Snyder, Rosenau advocated 
that the best explanations would be multilevel and multicausal.230  
Harold and Margaret Sprout, however, significantly contributed to the field of 
FPA by focusing attention on foreign policy undertakings. They essentially 
associated undertakings with strategies, decisions, and intentions, and argued that 
it is almost impossible to understand foreign policy outputs, which they linked with 
power capabilities, without reference to undertakings.231 Moreover, to explain 
undertakings, Harold and Margaret Sprout argued that, “one needs to look at the 
psycho-milieu of the individuals and groups making the foreign policy decision. The 
psycho-milieu is the international and operational environment or context as it is 
perceived and interpreted by these decision makers.”232  
In the decade following the end of the Cold War, and particularly after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, interest in foreign policy increased. The events of 9/11 had 
wide-ranging implications on world politics. One ramification of 9/11 was the 
understanding that independent actors, other than states, can now influence foreign 
policy and generate their own foreign polices with visible consequences on world 
politics. Steve Smith et al. for instance, insists that foreign policy is usually about 
explaining the behaviour of states, and analysis of foreign policy has traditionally 
considered the state as the central foreign policy actor. However, it is now widely 
recognized that other actors such as companies, regional government, supra-
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national regional bodies, and other non-state actors can pursue their own foreign 
policies and can act as significant players with agency and weight in a range of 
regional and international issues.233 
Yet, as it is the case with most political concepts, it has not been easy to 
provide a single definition of what is, by all measures, an important political action. 
Since the beginning of interest in foreign policy, multiple, varied, and sometimes 
overlapping definitions of foreign policy have appeared. Walter Carlsnaes, for 
instance, defines foreign policy as “those actions which, expressed in the form of 
explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed 
towards objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-
governmental–which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial 
legitimacy.”234  
Christopher Hill, on the other hand, has provided a broader definition that allows 
the inclusion of actors other than states as entities pursuing foreign policy. Hill 
defines foreign policy as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an 
independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.”235 Hill further 
elaborates on the components of his definition noting that:  
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“[T]he phrase ‘an independent actor’ enables the inclusion of phenomena 
such as the European Union; external relations are ‘official’ to allow the 
inclusion of outputs from all parts of the governing mechanism of the state 
or enterprise while also maintaining parsimony with respect to the vast 
number of international transactions now being conducted; policy is the 
‘sum’ of these official relations because otherwise every particular action 
could be seen as a separate foreign policy-whereas actors usually seek 
some degree of coherence towards the outside world. Lastly, the policy 
is ‘foreign’ because the world is still more separated into distinctive 
communities that it is a single, homogenizing entity. These communities 
therefore need strategies for coping with foreigners (or strangers) in their 
various aspects. Hill notes that the word ‘foreign’ is equivalent to the latin 
‘foris’ meaning ‘outside’.”236 
However, the above definition raises the question of what is the relationship, 
or in other words, whether foreign policy and foreign relations are simply two sides 
of the same coin. Hill here notes that the idea of foreign policy implies both politics 
and coherence. Foreign policy is essentially a political action that manifests itself 
through actions, statements and values an actor undertakes to advance its interests 
by influencing the outside world. Foreign policy also should enjoy a degree of 
coherence in the sense that it should be based on a clear strategy, whereby 
objectives, time-frames, and instruments for implementing foreign policy should be 
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taken into consideration. Hill makes an important assertion in regard of the link 
between foreign policy and foreign relations, noting that, “foreign policy is… both 
more and less than the ‘external relations’ which states [and other independent 
actors] generate continually on all fronts. It attempts to coordinate, and it is the way 
in which – at least in principle – priorities are established between competing 
externally-projected interests… It is in short, the focal point of an actor’s external 
relations.”237  
Interestingly, FPA has also recognized the ability of de facto states to 
generate foreign policy, or at least partial foreign policy. Hill, for instance, in 
commenting on foreign policies of de facto states notes that: 
“States and foreign policies are nearly Siamese twins, but not quite. There 
are other actors which generate activities resembling foreign policies, and 
this complicates the conventional domestic/foreign divide further. It is not 
always clear who is representing whom in international relations. Some 
unrecognized states effectively conduct independent external strategies, 
even if the lack of normal representative facilities and/or dependence on 
what is often an overbearing supporter makes them difficult to implement. 
Taiwan and Northern Cyprus since 1974 are prominent examples. Hong 
Kong has maintained extensive external relations in the sphere of political 
economy since becoming a Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1997, including becoming a member of the WTO 
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before China itself. It does not assert a profile on traditional foreign policy 
issues, but civil society’s views on human rights and democratic 
governance seep out into the world through the still relatively free media. 
It thus has something like a partial foreign policy, even if it would never 
dare to use the term.”238 
Moreover, it is noticeable that the literature of FPA has not solely associated 
foreign policy with possession of international-legal sovereignty. In fact, FPA asserts 
that the lack of external sovereignty does not necessarily preclude de facto states 
from having foreign policy. Hill, for instance, in this regard argues that “foreign policy 
exists in the space created by states’ existence and by their very lack of 
omnipotence… It depends on sovereignty bot being extinguished where it already 
exists… The formal possession of sovereignty makes it highly likely that a state will 
have a foreign policy. Conversely, where sovereignty is denied or the capacity to 
exercise it severely impeded, foreign policy becomes particularly difficult – but not 
impossible.”239 Moreover, the literature of FPA has recognized the utility or suitability 
of using FPA methods to study and examine foreign policies of actors other than 
states. Hill comments that “It is true that states remain important to FPA, but its 
methods may be used to study all types of actors in international relations.”240 
Moreover, the study of foreign policy has, since its inception, been remarkably 
complicated not only because of the existence of various actors and structures, but 
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also because foreign policy always looks two ways: looking inward to the domestic 
environment and looking outward to the international environment. Many scholars in 
the field of FPA have taken note of this issue. Carlsnaes, for instance argues that 
“foreign policy is neither fish nor fowl in the study of politics, but an empirical subject 
matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a 
state.”241 Such foreign policy, Laura Neack notes, “is made and conducted in 
complex domestic and international environments; it often results from the work of 
coalitions of interested domestic and international actors and groups; its issues are 
often linked and delinked, reflecting the strength of various parties and their 
particular concerns; the stuff of foreign policy derives from issues of domestic politics 
as well as foreign relations; [thus] foreign policy analysis needs to be multilevel and 
multifaceted in order to confront the complicated sources and nature of foreign 
policy.”242 “As a crucial form of agency in international relations,”243 Hill remarks, 
foreign policy, is “at the hinge of domestic politics and international relations;”244 and 
subsequently it influences equally domestic and foreign environments. Thus, to 
pursue their domestic interests abroad and attempt to mediate the impact of the 
external on the domestic, foreign policy-makers must be cognizant of the inter-
relations between the inside and outside of the actor. In his analysis of states in the 
Middle East, Hinnebusch notes that “foreign policy making elites are ‘Janus faced’, 
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looking both inward and outward, attempting to reconcile demands from domestic 
actors with threats or constraints from external powers.”245 Indeed, Robert Putnam 
has famously suggested conceiving of foreign policy as a ‘two-level game’ where 
“domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt 
favourable policies” at the national level while “national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments at the international level.”246 
Arguments such as the one proposed by Putnam refutes single-factor explanations 
that relate determinants of foreign policy solely to either domestic politics or 
international politics. Based on the ‘two-level’ game, central foreign policy-makers 
must always be ‘Janus-faced’, or in Putnam’s words “the two-level approach 
recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and 
international imperatives simultaneously.”247 
The very existence and influence of foreign policy on both domestic and 
international politics has also significantly complicated the analysis of the role of 
actors and structures in foreign policy analysis. Indeed, the relationship between 
agency and structure has been one of the most intense debates, in social sciences 
in general, and in FPA. Actors – also called agency – and structures are important 
elements in foreign policy making, thus these two factors need to be taken into 
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consideration by any foreign policy analyst. In stressing the link between actors and 
structures and its influence on foreign policy making, Hill notes that “Foreign policy-
making is a complex process of interaction between many actors, differentially 
embedded in a wide range of different structures. Their interaction is a dynamic 
process, leading to the constant revolution of both actors and structures.”248 
Put simply, the debate has revolved around whether actors or agents shape 
structures or vice versa. Hill defines actors as “individual human beings taking 
decisions and implementing them on behalf of entities which possess varying 
degrees of coherence, organization and power – of which the most effective are 
generally states.”249 These actors are not “conceived as abstract entities but as the 
decision-makers who are formally responsible for making decisions for the units 
which interact internationally – that is, mainly but not exclusively states.”250 
Moreover, “they may be single individuals or collectives, and they may be 
characterized by conscious intentions or by patterns of behavior which at least in 
part do not result from deliberation.”251 Hill also states that despite the prevalence of 
‘agency-structure’ debate in the academic literature, he prefers the use of the term 
‘actor’. This is because the term ‘agent’ connotates subordination to a higher 
authority in the English language, and thus it is better to use the term ‘agent’ to refer 
to the bureaucratic entities that are under the control of the primary political actors.252 
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Thus, based on the above argument, one can identify that heads of state, prime 
ministers, foreign ministers or secretaries of states, politburos, parliaments, 
parliamentary committees, and political parties are the primary foreign policy actors. 
These individuals enjoy the position of authority in foreign policy-making apparatus 
regardless of how they originally achieved positions of power and authority, and they 
are furthermore in constant contact with their counterparts in other countries, and 
with other governmental and non-governmental organizations inside the entity and 
abroad. Moreover, these actors ought also to be clearly distinguished from a wide 
array of agents operating in the ministries of foreign affairs, as well as other ministries 
and institutions, such as military establishments, economic ministries, intelligence 
services, think tanks, lobbying firms, research institutions, and the media.253 
There are also structural factors influencing foreign policy-making. Hill defines 
structures as “the set of factors which make up the multiple environments in which 
actors operate, and they shape the nature of choices, by setting limits to the possible 
but also, more profoundly, by determining the nature of the problems which occur 
there, by shaping our very life – worlds.”254 In the Realist theory of IR, as well as in 
most IR theories, the international system is seen as the main structure constraining 
foreign policy-makers. However, the FPA has taken into consideration a wider range 
of structures that influences foreign policy. Structures, whether “political, cultural, 
psychological, economic, national, regional, global, technological, ideational, 
cognitive, and normative are omnipresent in societies everywhere, existing in various 
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degrees on all levels from the most isolated tribal groupings to the global system as 
a whole.”255 Broadly speaking, then, the position of foreign policy between domestic 
politics and international politics, as well as the influence of both actors and 
structures on foreign policy-making complicates the matter for foreign policy 
analysts. In view of this complexity, Carlsnaes notes it has been essential for 
scholars of foreign policy to apply analytical frameworks or approaches to unravel 
the complexities of foreign policy as an empirical subject of study. However, while 
this is exactly what scholars have done, there remain disagreements over the best 
approach to rationalize the complex world of foreign policy-making.256 
In approaching this complexity, the literature of FPA has approached the 
academic subject of foreign policy based on two fundamentally different explananda. 
In general, the varying approaches the scholars of foreign policy have adopted have 
their roots in the building periods of FPA and to the three aforementioned major 
works that have built the foundations of the subject. Reflecting on these two 
approaches in the field, Carlsnaes notes that the first approach emphasizes 
decision-making processes in a broad sense (borrowing from Snyder and his 
colleagues), while the second approach emphasizes foreign policy undertakings, i.e. 
the choice of action in pursuit of a foreign policy goal .257 The articulation of these 
different explananda is essential as they emphasize two different sets of 
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‘explanandum’ (object of analysis) and ‘explanants’ (explanatory factors) with having 
known consequences for the roles both of actors and structures. 
As noted above, a decision-making approach is one of the main explananda 
currently in use in FPA. Valerie Hudson has become the primary articulator of this 
approach in FPA through publication of several influential articles over the past 
decade or so. Hudson argues that ‘the explanandum of foreign policy analysis’ – that 
which is to be explained or understood – includes “the process and resultants of 
human decision making with reference to or having known consequences for foreign 
entities.”258 Elaborating on her conceptualization, she further notes: 
“One may be examining not a single decision, but a constellation of 
decisions taken with reference to a particular situation. Furthermore, 
decisions may be modified overtime, requiring an examination of 
sequences of decisions. Also, the stages of decisionmaking may be the 
focus of inquiry, from problem recognition, framing, and perception to 
more advanced stages of goal prioritization, contingency planning, and 
option assessment.”259 
Moreover, Hudson states that “every theoretical discipline has a ground. A 
‘ground’ means the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at 
which phenomena in the field of study to occur… International Relations (IR) as a 
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field of study has a ground, as well. All that occurs between nations and across 
nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.”260 Thus, 
based on this approach, the object of analysis, or what is to be explained or 
understood in foreign policy, is what foreign policy decision-makers are thinking and 
doing. i.e. ‘their purposive behaviour,’261 and the complex and dynamic processes 
through which the decision-makers reach the decisions they have made on behalf 
of the polities they represent.  
Moreover, according to this tradition – the decision-making approach – 
Hudson notes, “the explanants of FPA are those factors that influence foreign policy 
decision-making and foreign policy decision makers.”262 The emphasis on explaining 
and understanding the whole process of foreign policy decision-making, or what 
Carlsnaes describes as ‘human decisional behaviour’, instead of focusing on a 
specific policy per se, makes this approach “the most ambitious and multifaceted 
subfield of international relations.”263 Thus, ‘foreign policy analysis theory’ according 
to this approach, Hudson notes, “is rich, detailed, multilevel, multidisciplinary, and 
centered on foreign policy decisionmaking (FPDM) as it is performed by human 
beings.”264 
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Looking at the role of actors and structures within the approach that 
emphasizes FPDM, a clear trend is discernible. In other words, does this approach 
consider the state in realist terms as the sole foreign policy actor, or does it view 
foreign policy actors as the central decision-makers, making decisions and 
implementing them on behalf of entities, the most important of which are usually 
states? Hudson is clear in this regard. She notes that “states are not agents because 
states are abstractions and thus have no agency. Only human beings can be true 
agents.”265 She further notes “the single most important contribution of FPA to IR 
theory is to identify the point of theoretical intersection between the most important 
determinants of state behavior: material and ideational factors. The point of 
intersection is not the state, it is human decisionmakers.”266  
Moreover, to analyse the factors influencing foreign policy, FPDM prefers to 
approach the subject based on several levels of analysis. Hudson notes that one of 
the hallmarks of FPA scholarship – being the second hallmark – is that it is 
‘multilevel’267: “explanatory variables from all levels of analysis from the most micro 
to the most macro are of interest to the analyst to the extent that they affect 
decisionmaking.”268 Commenting about the level of analysis approach, Laura Neack 
states that levels of analysis are ‘tools-heuristic devices’269 that can help analysts to 
focus on one level at a time; help manage the study in a more effective way; and 
                                            
265 Ibid., p. 6. 
266 Ibid., p. 8.  
267 Ibid., p. 7.  
268 Ibid., p. 7. 
269 Neack, Op. Cit., p. 11.  
124 
 
help provide better explanations for questions about which we are intrigued. Using 
a level of analysis approach, the FPDM has considered the analysis through the 
lenses of individual, state and international levels of analysis,270 with additional levels 
or lenses of analysis developed over the years, including group decisionmaking – 
focusing on small group dynamics – organizational process, bureaucratic politics, 
and one focusing on national self-image and culture.271 Hence, the levels of analysis 
prevalent in FPDM examine the effects of actors and structures on the decision 
making process on a level by level basis. Thus, actors usually dominate individual 
and group decision levels of analysis, precisely because actors can usually have 
more input and exercise more influence into these levels, while structures gradually 
come to define state, cultural, and international levels of analysis when analysis 
becomes more general and abstract.272 
The second explananda as mentioned above focuses on exploring specific 
foreign policy actions or undertakings as opposed to explaining the whole process 
of foreign policy decision making. Consequently, this strand of FPA makes use of a 
different set of explanandum and explanants. Charles Hermann, one of the main 
spokespersons of this tradition argues that explanandum, or that which is to be 
explained in foreign policy “is the discrete purposeful action that results from the 
political level decision of an individual or group of individuals,” and as such it is “not 
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the decision, but a product of the decision.”273 Scholars within this tradition tend to 
concur that the explanandum of foreign policy should emphasize “the purposive 
nature of foreign policy actions, the centrality of policy, and the crucial role of state 
boundaries.”274 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov have further elaborated on this 
conceptualization, noting that: 
“When we are puzzled by a happening in foreign affairs, the source of our 
puzzlement is typically a particular government action or set of actions… 
These occurrences raise obvious question: Why did the Soviet Union 
place missiles in Cuba? Why were 500,000 soldiers in the Persian Gulf? 
Why did Germany give up the Deutsche-Mark? Why did the United 
Nations do so little to defend Srebrenica in July 1995? In pursuing the 
answers to these questions, the serious analyst seeks to discover why 
one specific state of the world came about-rather than some other.”275  
The crux of Allison and Zelikov’s argument is that analysts could explain 
foreign policy choices or actions undertaken by governments in different ways 
depending on the conceptual model or lens used by the analyst. In their study on the 
‘Cuban Missile Crisis’, Allison and Zelikov, for instance, use three conceptual models 
– rational actor, organizational behaviour, and governmental politics – to explain and 
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assess foreign policy choices or actions of the U.S. administration of John F. 
Kennedy in October 1962.276 
In explaining the implications of the role of actors and structures in this strand 
of FPA, Carlsnaes notes that this approach “does not a priori view either actors or 
structures in any particular way, since the focus here is on ‘policy undertakings’, ‘not 
the behavior of any particular entity within a specific structural environment’ (such as 
‘decision making’).”277 Carlsnaes highlights that in the explanandum that focuses on 
foreign policy undertakings or actions there are approaches that either favour actors 
or structures as basic forms of their explanations. In general, Carlsnaes argues that 
approaches that are based on a structural perspective include: realism with its 
variants, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism,278 whereas, 
approaches from an actor-based perspective include: cognitive and psychological 
approaches, bureaucratic politics approach, new liberalism, and interpretative actor 
perspective.279 
However, regardless of which approach a foreign policy analyst adopts in 
explaining and understanding a foreign policy decision, foreign policy is influenced 
by other factors or determinants that must be taken into consideration. In other 
words, beyond recognizing that individual leaders and the decision they make 
constitute a major determinant of foreign policy, there are other sets of determinants 
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that influence foreign policy in states or other entities for that matter.  
Although, there is a great deal of overlap, the determinants of foreign policy 
are usually divided into domestic and external determinants. The first, and possibly 
the most important determinant is what Hudson calls ‘national attributes’280 which 
are also considered to be the power of the nation-state. Under the heading of 
‘national attributes’ lie elements such as: geographic size and population size, 
economic capability, geography, natural resources, political system, and military 
capabilities.281 As elaborating on each element requires much space, this thesis only 
elaborates on those elements that are thought to have more direct influences on the 
foreign policy of de facto states. 
In the first place, foreign policy is strongly influenced by a state’s geographic 
and population size. Being a large or a small state has consequences on the foreign 
policy goals of any state. Hudson notes that small states tend to align themselves 
with a neighbouring larger state. However, if a small state finds itself surrounded by 
two large states which are in conflict, neutrality might be more logical, given the 
dangers associated with aligning with one state against the other. Moreover, Hudson 
notes that small states usually do not possess sufficient power to either reward or 
punish other states.282 Population demographics, however, has its own 
complications in influencing foreign policy. Under the heading of demographics, 
students of foreign policy should examine factors belonging to the population that 
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prompt states to undertake certain foreign policy actions. Some of these factors for 
instance include: size of the population, high and low population growth rates, age 
and gender distribution, ethnic/linguistic, religious fractionalization of the population, 
education, and health and disease burden of the population, among many others.283 
States with large territories and population, taking variations in consideration, 
traditionally play or pursue more assertive foreign policies. Thus, terms such as 
hyperpower, superpower, emerging power and developing country all reflect in a 
way to the geographic and population size of a state and the ability to pursue foreign 
policy.284 Moreover, the geographic and population size of states is directly entwined 
with the resultant economic and military capabilities and how leaders can turn these 
capabilities into foreign policy resources.285 Of course, wider geographical and 
geopolitical features, or what have generally been called external or international 
determinants, also play an important role in influencing foreign policy. Access to 
ports and the sea, waterways, landmasses, fertility, climate, and the location and 
borders of states have serious foreign policy implications.286 For instance, landlocked 
countries and those surrounded by larger states or a superpower may pursue 
moderate foreign policies to maintain their access to the sea, particularly if their 
economy relies on the access to the sea, or to please their larger neighbours for 
defense and security. 
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Natural resources have many features and possession or dispossession of 
these resources plays an important role in foreign policy. Amelia Hadfield has 
developed a fine-grained analysis on natural resources, energy security, and their 
impact on foreign policy. She notes that energy is a ‘strategic resource’ par 
excellence for three main reasons. First, energy resources are underpinned by 
‘geographical, historic, and even social attributes’ that play important roles in shaping 
social attitudes in peace and war. Therefore, societies place unique values upon a 
resource such as oil, based on shared social underpinnings and understandings. 
Secondly, material issues of access, combined with perceptions of insecurity of 
access to energy resources, determine the politics of natural resources. Additionally, 
the fact that some states possess energy reserves and some do not, makes natural 
resources a ‘strategic resource.’287 Moreover, energy resources are essentially 
‘territorialized’288 meaning that they constitute the very strategic ‘national assets’289 
of any given actor, thereby they consolidate and enhance the domestic and foreign 
position of a given actor.  
It is important to note that energy as a ‘sovereign stake’290 regarding its 
‘ownership, access, transport, and sale’291 brings new foreign policy actors of both a 
public and private nature to the complex matrix of foreign policy. In the public sector, 
the responsibility is shared mostly between state actors – themselves divided 
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between exporter, importer, and transit states – and state-owned or controlled 
institutions or companies that are charged with management of energy resources for 
the state. The private sector includes large, medium-sized, and small oil companies 
such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Q8, Exxon Mobile, Texaco, and Chevron.292 
Taken together, Hadfield argues, “the foreign energy policies of states are a complex 
mix of ‘national interest’ of the public sector and ‘business interests’ which many not 
always sit easily within the national goals of a given state.”293  
Energy security, in its most fundamental sense, indicates “assurance of the 
ability to access the energy resources required for the continued development of 
national power”294… and the “adequate infrastructure to deliver these supplies to 
market.”295 In today’s world, attainment of energy security constitutes a major foreign 
policy aim of many states alongside attainment of military and economic security, as 
energy helps to promote national prosperity, and in many ways it is also imperative 
to national security. Hadfield moreover notes that energy security has two 
components depending on the actor or context: ‘security of supply’ and ‘security of 
demand.’ Security of supply applies mostly to importer states which strive to 
guarantee continuous access to affordable, trustworthy and diverse supplies of 
energy with minimum sudden shocks in prices and supplies. Security of demand, 
however, means the ability to have a reliable and continues market to sell energy 
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products in the long term.296 
Energy resources also serve as a foreign policy tool or instrument for foreign 
policy-makers. Exporter countries can use energy resources as a foreign policy 
instrument of diplomacy (OPEC), embargos (Organization for Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries in 1973), and coercion (Russia). Importer countries generally 
lack the leverage that is associated with possessing large amounts of oil and gas. 
However, they do possess large markets that exporter countries need to access. 
Importer countries can also utilize energy to influence the behaviour of other states 
as a means of soft power (the Commonwealth of Independent States), political 
sanction (Iraq), economic embargos (Iran). Energy can also prompt states to 
establish military presence to defend their security of supply as the case of the 
United States and its historic activities in the Middle East and the Gulf indicates.297  
It is important to note that natural resources important to states include 
resources beside oil and gas. The possession – and dispossession – of minerals 
(e.g. natural uranium, phosphate, yellowcake, rare earth metals), water, arable land, 
and agricultural capability represent important issues for foreign policy-makers and 
are important tools in themselves for the achievement of foreign policy goals. To take 
only one example, during the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey constantly exerted control 
over the distribution of the downflow of the Euphrates, from Turkey to Syria and Iraq, 
by building a series of dams and irrigation projects as a major foreign policy 
                                            




instrument to exercise pressure on the Syria and Iraq. This, in turn, partially resulted 
to Damascus’s support for the Kurdish PKK in its fight against Turkey beginning in 
1984.298 
Another set of factors which is usually grouped together under the rubric of 
domestic determinants looks at inside the political organization of states. Under this 
category, foreign policy analysts examine the nature of the regime, the institutional 
framework of the state, i.e. the role of the legislative branch and its relationship with 
the executive branch in foreign policy-making, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and 
the political system or organization of the state – whether it is a democracy or 
pursues other forms of political organization. However, beside the regime and its 
political institutions, there are other actors in the domestic constituency that can 
influence foreign policy. These actors include: political parties, business coalitions, 
powerful individuals in the state, political action groups, domestic interest groups, 
ethnic groups, the media, public opinion, religious groups, and even terrorist 
groups.299 In short, as Hill notes, the domestic constituency in foreign policy can be 
epitomized as the four Ps: parliaments, public opinion, pressure groups and the 
press.300  
However, there are diverging viewpoints with regard to the influence of each 
of the above-mentioned domestic determinants. To take just one example, the role 
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of the media and public opinion in influencing foreign policy is illustrative of this fact. 
The role of both media and public opinion as two domestic determinants of foreign 
policy is long being discussed in the individual level explanations, so prominent 
within the decisionmaking approach.  
In general, analysis of the influence of the media and public opinion on foreign 
policy-making revert to two basic perspectives: ‘the pluralist model’ and ‘the elite 
model.’301 The first model is essentially a ‘bottom-up’302 approach that assumes 
societies (including the media and the public) can wield powerful influences on 
foreign policy decision-makers, and that no single group has total monopoly over 
means of power. It further argues that the views of the public and the media can act 
as instances of significant constraint upon foreign policy-makers.303 In sum, they 
argue that ‘leaders follow masses.’304 Scholars of this ilk usually cite the so-called 
‘CNN effect’305 to demonstrate evidence that global real-time news coverage, 
particularly in cases of massive human rights violations, as witnessed in case of the 
Kurds of Iraq in 1991, pressures foreign policy-makers, particularly western 
governments, to intervene militarily to prevent gross violations of human rights. 
Conversely, the elite model defends the proposition that power rests with the political 
elite. Consequently, the public and the media are less independent and are merely 
                                            
301 Piers Robinson, “The role of media and public opinion,” in Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne (eds.), Op. 
Cit., p. 169.  
302 Neack, Op. Cit., p. 129. 
303 Robinson, Op. Cit., p. 169.   
304 Neack, Op. Cit., p. 129. 
305 Piers Robinson, The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention (London: 
Routledge, 2002).  
134 
 
tools in the hands of political elites who use them to generate support for their foreign 
policy decisions.306 Hence, this model is a ‘top-down’307 process that defends the 
view that public consensus over an issue is relational to the elite consensus. 
However, regardless of whichever argument in more accurate, as will be touched 
upon in this thesis, the media has in fact become an important tool of public 
diplomacy which many actors, including the governments of de facto states, use as 
a tool through which they convey their messages, ideals, values, and interests. 
Indeed, public diplomacy is of particular interest to the subject matter of this 
thesis. Recently, the FPA has taken a new interest in investigating the importance 
and influence of public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy in foreign policy of states. 
Public diplomacy according to Hans Tuch is “a government’s process of 
communicating with foreign publics to bring about understanding for its nation’s 
ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and 
policies,”308 whereas Breuning defines public diplomacy as “a government’s 
diplomatic efforts that target citizens, the press, and other constituencies in other 
countries rather than their governments.”309 Citizen diplomacy on the other hand has 
been defined as “the efforts and effects abroad of actions by actors who are not 
official representatives of the state or its government.”310 More interestingly, Melissen 
observes that not only states conduct public diplomacy for attainment of their foreign 
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policy objectives; a range of non-state actors also conducts public diplomacy, 
including subnational and supranational bodies, for attainment of their foreign 
policies.311 Lacking official diplomatic relations, many de facto states or national 
liberation movements – as the case of the Kurdish de facto state attests – use these 
tools to convey their grievances, values, ideals and to protect their interests, as will 
be focused upon further in this research. 
Another area of interest to this research is what is called the ‘implementation 
phase’ of foreign policy, focusing particularly on instruments available at the hand of 
foreign policy-makers. Luckily, the literature of FPA has given sufficient attention to 
the phase of implementation both in theoretical and practical terms, perhaps due to 
the fact it is essentially within this phase that actors meet challenges to their foreign 
policy goals. Hill and Brighi state that “the phase of implementation is that in which 
actors confront their environment and in which, in turn, the environment confronts 
them.”312 Reflecting on the significance of implementation in attainment of foreign 
policy goals, Bright and Hill note that “hardly a technicality, implementation is in fact 
a fully political activity, not least in the sense of reflecting a clash of wills between 
different actors, or between actors and their often intractable environment.”313 But 
more important from the point of view of this thesis is the issue of instruments at the 
disposal of foreign policy-makers, since it directly relates to the question of what 
instruments leaders in de facto states possess to implement their foreign policies. 
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Two caveats need to be made here in discussion of instruments of foreign 
policy implementation. Instruments usable by foreign policy-makers are “the 
combined result of resources, capabilities, and varying levels of power and influence 
available at a given time. These instruments can be ranked on a continuum of power, 
a spectrum denoting the actual ‘means’ that a state [or any other independent actor] 
can use to achieve its desired ends.”314 Secondly, foreign policy choices and actions 
are also influenced by the nature of available instruments;315 in other words, foreign 
policy goals are constrained by the level of available resources and capabilities.  
The actual instruments at the disposal of foreign policy-makers can be located 
on a spectrum from soft to hard power. In general, there are four major instruments 
employed by foreign policy-makers: diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, economic 
statecraft, and deterrence and military intervention.316 
However, when it comes to implementing foreign policy, de facto states 
usually have fewer resources and capabilities than many recognized states to 
pursue foreign policy goals. Like many micro-weak states existing in the current 
international system, de facto states lack the economic wherewithal, military strength 
or cultural influence possessed by large or middle nations. For this kind of actor, 
diplomacy becomes particularly vital to pursue national interests, which is usually 
interpreted as ensuring survival of the entity. Diplomacy, in the most general terms, 
has been defined as “the human face of getting your own way in international 
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politics,”317 and it intends to “enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign 
policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law. It follows that diplomacy consists 
of communication between officials designed to promote foreign policy either by 
formal agreement or tacit adjustment.”318 Commenting on the role of diplomacy for 
weak states as a means of negotiation, communication, participation in multilateral 
institutions, and the promotion of economic prosperity, Hill notes “As a means of 
implementing policy, diplomacy is particularly important to weak states. With few 
resources, they have little choice but to play a poor hand as skillfully as possible.”319  
But, it remains the case that most de facto states lack official diplomatic 
relations to pursue foreign policy objectives. However, in recent years, a new and 
vibrant research agenda has emerged focusing as it does on the international 
activities of sub-national governments. Put simply, the increasing involvement of 
regional governments in international affairs; a phenomenon usually called 
‘paradiplomacy’,320 ‘constituent diplomacy’,321 or ‘protodiplomacy’;322 has refocused 
attention on the underlying dynamics, factors or motivations behind a non-state 
region’s international activities. There are various economic, cultural and political 
factors intimately related to economic and technological globalization that prompt 
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regional governments to engage in paradiplomacy to secure and defend their 
interests, values, and identities, as well as promoting some global values such as 
pluralism, solidarity, peace and development.  
However, protodiplomacy323 is more intense in regions endowed with 
nationalist sovereign aspirations. Regions seeking achievement of sovereign 
statehood endeavour to obtain international personality or agency through 
protodiplomacy. Noting that protodiplomacy is primarily a ‘function of stateless 
nationalism’,324 André Lecours and Luis Moreno state that protodiplomacy serves as 
“a means for identity/nation-building; that it sustains and promotes specific interest 
definitions such as cultural preservation; and that the intergovernmental conflicts it 
involves provides opportunities for political-territorial mobilization.”325 Moreover, 
Ferran Requejo notes that regions aspiring statehood actively pursue independent 
foreign policies, show a clear tendency to become parties to international treaties 
with other actors, as well as a definite inclination to pursue foreign policies in distinct 
contradiction or conflict with the foreign policies of their parent states.326  
However, even though foreign policies of de facto states can be grouped 
within this umbrella, there is a distinct lack of attention towards de facto states and 
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their paradiplomatic activities, both in FPA and in the study of paradiplomacy. One 
reason for this deficiency is the exclusive focus of paradiplomacy study on examples 
drawn from sub-state regions located in Western decentralized liberal states, such 
as Catalonia and Basque Country in Spain, Quebec in Canada, German Landers, 
etc. Overall, three factors seem to enable Western sub-state regions to pursue 
foreign policy and paradiplomatic activities: “the degree of democratization and 
federalization, the degree of socio-economic development and the increasing 
internationalisation of markets,” experienced both domestically and internationally.327 
However, as Viyan Rahman notes, the increasing importance in paradiplomatic 
activities and foreign policies of the Kurdish de facto state raises the suggestion that 
“paradiplomacy should be developed as a field of study that can encompass sub-
state regions located outside Western, decentralised liberal systems and that can 
still take advantage of global changes to operate as diplomats that claim to 




It is important to note that this research is essentially a descriptive study of 
the foreign policies of a single political entity: which is the Kurdish de facto state in 
Iraq. Despite the advantages of a comparative analysis of two or more cases, this 
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research has opted for a single case study. A single case study enables a researcher 
to conduct a more in-depth analysis of a political entity under constant 
transformation. A singular focus on the KRI as a case study is also useful given the 
relatively small number of such studies in the literature of de facto statehood, and 
the virtual negligence of the KRI as a case of de facto statehood. This is compounded 
with the fact that the analysis of de facto statehood, in general, has been increasingly 
neglected in a mostly state-centric analysis of FPA. On the other hand, de facto 
states experience unique trajectories in terms of their path to creation, policies, 
strategies and their level of engagement with the international community that resists 
simplistic generalizations across cases. Therefore, comparisons between two or 
more cases is rife with fluidity and it requires much more space than is available 
here. As possibly the only case of de facto statehood in the Middle East region, the 
transformation of the Kurdish national liberation movement into the Kurdish de facto 
state possesses many unique attributes and dynamics that are better captured in a 
single case-study method. 
While conducting interviews with relevant actors in charge of the KRI’s foreign 
policies would have been extremely useful, it poses significant problems of its own. 
On the one hand, as Valerie Hudson notes, analysts of foreign policy face immense 
difficulties as many foreign policy decisions are either not immediately observable to 
the analyst, or they may be secret and may remain so for an incredibly long amount 
of time for national security concerns.   Indeed, the issue of secrecy is double in de 
facto states as there is a heightened sense of fear towards the present and future 
survivability of the de facto state. For de facto states, foreign relations with other 
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actors in the international system is either condemned or viewed suspiciously by 
their parent states. Moreover, they frequently face immense pressure and hostility 
from their erstwhile parent states or other actors in the international system and, 
therefore, an element of secrecy is often present in the de facto states’ conduct of 
foreign policy. This may mean that the analyst, especially someone from a Kurdish 
background, may either not so easily be granted face-to-face interviews with high-
ranking Kurdish officials in charge of foreign policy, or even if s/he is, officials may 
be reluctant to share sensitive details or reveal true motivations behind foreign policy 
decisions. Moreover, according to the Constitution of Iraq, foreign policy is the 
exclusive responsibility of the federal government in Baghdad. Therefore, Kurdish 
officials can be reluctant to explicitly acknowledge projection of foreign policy, let 
alone independent foreign policies.  
Similarly, due to the reasons of secrecy, international agreements signed by 
the KRI are not publicly accessible or available. For instance, the oil/gas contracts 
and agreements signed between the KRG, oil/gas corporations and states such as 
Turkey remain secret, and may remain so for a considerable amount of time.  
Therefore, in many cases the analyst finds himself/herself working with 
historical or contemporary data available in secondary sources, which may not be 
completely true or it may even be false. Secondly, as this thesis stops at the year 
2011, which ushered in yet another transition in the KRI, this researcher has 
refrained from conducting interviews with relevant KRI officials in charge of foreign 
policy. This is because most politicians naturally focus on current issue areas and 
events happening around them. In many cases, the nature of policies or alliances 
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have changed and politicians do not want to recall or to justify their earlier foreign 
policy decisions. 
Consequently, this researcher has opted to primarily depend on secondary 
sources as the main source of data. Despite the limitation of the lack of interviews, 
secondary resources in the case of the KRI provide a wealth of insight and 
knowledge, probably unmatched by any other de facto independent entity in the 
current international system, for several reasons. The two U.S.-led wars on Iraq 
(1991 and 2003), establishment of the KRI in 1991 and the geopolitical and 
geostrategic position of the KRI significantly increased the amount of attention 
dedicated to the KRI. Furthermore, the KRI’s need to garner international support, 
particularly from the West, to legitimize and guarantee its existence, prompted 
Kurdish officials to provide open access to Western politicians, academics, 
researchers, journalists or for that matter anyone interested. In turn, these individuals 
have written and published a considerable amount of material on various aspects of 
political development in the KRI. Having access to these secondary sources, then, 
enable students of Kurdish politics to discern motivations of foreign policy or the 
effects of foreign policy decisions on the domestic and external environments. 
Another major methodological problem faced when studying foreign policies 
of the Kurdish de facto state is that of bias. The sensitiveness of foreign policy in the 
KRI due to national security concerns, and partisan competition in an environment 
of heightened insecurity, has two significant results. One, most media outlets, 
research papers, publications and even single officials in the KRI are sympathetic to 
the viewpoint of one party against the other. Two, it results in secondary published 
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data being circumvented in provision of data on foreign policy issues in general 
because of fears of creating complications either internally or externally. 
While these publications still constitute important sources of data, for the sake 
of objectivity and balance, this researcher has strived to use internationally 
accredited secondary sources as the primary sources of analysis. Apart from the 
literature review which is acceptingly short, this researcher has extensively used 
published data by prominent academics in the ever-expanding field of Kurdish 
studies. This published date includes books, articles in journals, periodicals or 
magazines published by knowledgeable academics on the affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Therefore, paper or online articles in well-known newspapers and magazines 
constitute excellent sources of data for this research. Furthermore, research articles, 
policy papers, reports, events’ summaries and publications by various think tanks, 
research institutions and governmental and non-governmental organizations have 
been extensively used for the purposes of this research. 
Lastly, relating to the issue of bias, this researcher identifies as a Kurd, a 
member of the KDP and a citizen of Britain. Therefore, despite the sincere efforts at 
objectivity and endeavoring to maintain some distance in analysing the Kurdish de 
facto state’s foreign policies, this researcher cannot proclaim full objectivity as a 
degree of subjectivity might have influenced the analysis. 
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3 The Contextual and Historical Analysis of the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq 
This chapter provides a contextualization of the de facto independent Kurdish 
entity in Iraq. Its primary task is to set the scene for providing an elaborate account 
of the Kurdish de facto state. Although concise and brief, section one examines the 
human and physical geography and the geopolitics of the KRI which represent 
significant determinants on foreign policies of the KRI. Section two briefly examines 
the history and foreign relations of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement in 
Iraq. It primarily aims to make the case that even before the onset of the de facto 
state, the Kurdish national movement had already enjoyed foreign relations with 
variety of actors regionally and internationally.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Any serious analysis requires a comprehensive contextual analysis of the 
internal and external factors which influence the foreign policies of the KRI. While 
the list of applicable factors can be long, section one of this chapter provides a brief 
analysis of those factors which have an immediate impact upon the KRI’s foreign 
policies, namely the physical and human geography of the KRI. It is important to note 
that this chapter focuses only on the KRI, rather than discussing the physical and 
human geography of the Kurds in the wider Middle East.  
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This thesis has also found it necessary to provide an elaborate but brief 
historical account of the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq, in its earlier 
format as a movement struggling to press for Kurdish autonomous rights within the 
compact Iraqi state. This is because, as with most other de facto states, the KRI 
finds its origins in the preceding national liberation movement in Iraq, with ethnically-
based grievances that sporadically engaged militarily and/or politically through 
dialogue with successive Iraqi governments, to press for Kurdish national rights 
within the body politic of Iraq. Writing a narrative of the Kurdish national liberation 
movement is also useful in other ways. The leadership of the Kurdish national 
liberation movement employed various tools and strategies to build foreign relations 
with many key regional and international actors. For the Kurds in Iraq, these relations 
were indispensable to sustain their struggle in pressing their national rights within 
the framework of Iraq. Therefore, section two of this chapter, as well as providing a 
brief historical analysis, is dedicated to discussing foreign relations of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement in Iraq. The section notes that prior to the 
establishment of the de facto state, Kurdish political parties had already embarked 
on the road to building secretive foreign relations with a variety of actors. It notes the 
secretiveness built into Kurdish foreign relations. This secretiveness can be 
attributed to the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict, regional hostility to the Kurdish cause, 
international ignorance of the Kurdish plight partly due to the importance of Iraq as 
a strategic prize during the Cold-War and the tough geopolitical position of the Kurds 
of Iraq. It also observes the pattern of using public diplomacy, citizen diplomacy, and 
utilizing the media as means of conducting foreign relations– not only to influence 
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public opinion, but also to send messages to key international powers in order to 
build foreign relations through unofficial channels and to attract enough international 
support to sustain their struggle in Iraq. 
 
3.2 The Human and Physical Geography of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq 
No serious study of the recent formation of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq 
can be undertaken without briefly introducing the Kurds. In retrospect, every study 
on Kurdish politics in Iraq starts with the ever-perennial questions: who are the 
Kurds? what is their origin? do the Kurds constitute a nation based on various 
standards of nationality making? and as such do they deserve independent 
statehood? It is noticeable that, with the emergence of the KRI, many if not most 
studies have focused on Kurdish nationalism and political developments in Iraq. 
These debates and the multiple answers around modern Kurdish nationalist identity 
have been long and painful. However, perhaps the best answer and the simplest 
one, is that a Kurd is “a person who identifies himself or herself as a Kurd,”329 speaks 
one of the Kurdish dialects prevalent in Iraqi Kurdistan (Sorani, Bahdinani, Gurani 
and Hawrami),330 and who shares feelings of Kurdish nationalism as an important 
personal ethnic identity. Most Kurds in Iraq are Sunni Muslims living alongside 
Kurdish Twelver Shiites (known as Faili Kurds), Yezidi, Ahl-I Haqq (also known as 
                                            
329 Voller, “From Rebellion to De Facto Statehood,” Op. Cit., p. 93.  
330 For more on Kurdish dialects, see: Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, Op. Cit., pp. 37-38. Also, see: Joyce 
Blau, “Refinement and Oppression of Kurdish Language,” in The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics 
(eds.) Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawod (London: SAQI, 2006), pp. 103-113.  
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Kakai) and Christian Kurds.331 There are also Jewish Kurds who have mostly 
migrated to Israel following its establishment in 1948.332 The KRI is heterogenous in 
terms of its ethnic and religious composition, as the KRI contains many ethnic and 
religious minority groups such as Assyrians, Chaldeans and Turkomans with their 
own self-identity.333 The KRI is small in terms of its population comprising between 
5.2334 to 6 million people, representing 20 percent of Iraq’s overall population.335 
The geopolitics of the KRI obviously constitutes a significant determinant on 
its foreign policies. It is not easy to pinpoint the KRI on a map as the territory does 
not possess internationally recognized borders, and even its internal boundaries are 
strongly contested. From the aspect of physical geography, the KRI is a landlocked 
territory with no access to seaports, and this geopolitical consideration significantly 
shapes, or influences, the KRI’s foreign policies. As Stansfield notes, “In a land-
locked area such as Iraqi Kurdistan, physical geographical influences and 
geopolitical considerations are omnipresent within political actions.”336 The KRI is 
                                            
331 For more detailed info, see: G. R. Driver, “The Religion of the Kurds,” Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1922), pp. 197-213; Nader Entessar, “The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary 
Iran and Iraq,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1984), pp. 911-933; Kerim Yildiz, The Kurds In 
Iraq: the Past, Present and Future (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp. 7-10; David McDowall, A Modern 
History of the Kurds (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 18; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, pp. 26-59; Martin 
Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London 
and New Jersey: Zed Bools Ltd, 1992), pp. 11-25; Michiel Leezenberg, “Political Islam Among the 
Kurds” in Jabar and Dawod (eds.), Op. Cit., pp. 203-231.  
332 Ofra Bengio, “Surprising Ties between Israel and the Kurds,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 
3 (2014) http://www.meforum.org/3838/israel-kurds.  
333 See: Stansfield, Iraq, Op. Cit. 
334 “Kurdistan at a glance,” KRG website, accessed: 28 August 2015,  
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=050000&r=303&p=213. 
335 Ofra Bengio, “Meet the Kurds, A Historically Oppressed People Who Will Get Their Own States,” 
Tablet, 14 August 2014, accessed: 26 July 2015, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-
politics/182042/kurdish-independence.  
336 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, Op. Cit., 26. 
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surrounded by the two largest, and potentially strongest, states in the Middle East: 
Turkey from the northwest,337 and Iran from the southeast. Also, Syria surrounds the 
entity from the west and remnants of Iraq’s territory surround the entity from the 
south.338 Furthermore, the KRI is small in terms of its geographical size with its 
territory measuring 40,643 square kilometers of territory.339  
From the aspect of physical geography, the territorial borders of the KRI are 
confusing and subject to a great deal of flux and change.  While defining the contours 
of greater Kurdistan is an anthropological guess, the issue of defining the borders of 
the KRI turned into an issue of academic and practical interest following the creation 
of the Kurdish de facto state in 1992. The KRI enjoys territorial control over a 
significant piece of its claimed territory in Iraq. For the purposes of this research, the 
KRI territory includes those areas evacuated by the GOI in 1992, and subsequently 
controlled by the Kurdish parties. This territory was later recognized in the interim 
Transitional Administrative Law of Iraq (hereafter TAL) in March 2004,340 and in the 
subsequent 2005 Constitution of Iraq, as the legally recognized territory of the KRI. 
This territory includes the whole of Dohuk Governorate, most of Erbil Governorate, 
all of Sulaimani Governorate, and portions of Kirkuk, Diyala, and Mosul 
                                            
337 Turkey shares a 400-kilometer mountainous border with the KRI, see: “War in Iraq: What’s Next 
for the Kurds?” International Crisis Group, 19 March 2003, accessed: 13 January 2013, 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/war-iraq-whats-
next-kurds. 
338 “Kurdistan at a glance,” Op. Cit. 
339 Ibid. 
340 See: Article 53 (section 1) of Iraqi Interim Constitution (TAL), “Law of Administration for the State 




Governorates.341 However, while the KRI is in control of most of the territory it claims,  
including its capital – Erbil,  the contours of its physical geography and territorial 
space is still in flux due to the ongoing territorial disputes between the KRI and its 
Iraqi parent state, with significant complications arising from the existence of several 
ethnic and religious groups existing in the trigger line between the two entities. As 
such, the borders of the KRI with its Iraqi parent state in the south are still unsettled 
because the KRI possesses constitutionally stipulated and de facto controlled 
territories, as well as claiming more territories. 
Also, significant in terms of determining the KRI’s foreign policies, and its 
influence on the foreign policies of other states, is the geopolitics of natural 
resources. The KRI is rich is natural resources, including primarily hydrocarbon 
resources, various kinds of minerals, arable lands, agricultural capability as well as 
water resources. In recent years, the availability of vast hydrocarbon resources has 
been salient in the KRI’s projection of foreign policy and its utilization of energy 
resources as a means of influencing the foreign policies of other states. According 
to a recent U.S. geological survey, the KRI’s hydrocarbon reserves are estimated to 
be 45 billion barrels of crude oil and 1 to 3 TCM of gas (for hydrocarbon resources 
of KRI see Appendix B);342 reserves larger than those available in Azerbaijan or 
Ecuador, two influential members of OPEC. While there are other factors that may 
be taken into account, it is understood that the greatest influences on KRI foreign 
                                            
341 see: “The Constitution of Iraq,” adopted on 15 October 2005, accessed: 26 December 2012, 
http://www.presidency.krd/uploadedforms/_IraqiConstitution_en.pdf. 
342 Matthew Bryza, “Turkey’s Dramatic Shift Toward Iraqi Kurdistan: Politics before Peace Pipelines,” 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2012), p. 56.   
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policies are the human and physical geography of the KRI which interact with the 
political history of the Kurds in general, and in Iraq in particular, and the political 
history of the Kurdish national liberation movement that influenced the foreign 
policies and relations of the Kurdish political entity that emerged after 1992. 
Therefore, the next section aims to provide a brief synthesis of the history of 
the Kurds and the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement and its foreign relations 
prior to the establishment of the Kurdish de facto state. 
 
3.3 History of Foreign Relations of Kurdish National Liberation 
Movement in Iraq, 1958-1991 
The end of the World War I and the subsequent creation of successor states 
of Turkey, Iraq and Syria dashed the Kurds’ hope for independent statehood. While 
during the Ottoman era, the Kurds were considered part of the Millet System343 of 
Muslims, with rights and responsibilities like other constituent Muslims, in the newly 
established nations-states the Kurds became peripheral ethnic minorities struggling 
against their respective political centres. Initially the Kurds were promised their own 
independent state in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. However, later developments 
rendered the idea of a Kurdish state, in the former Ottoman territories of Kurdistan 
obsolete. This culminated in the Treaty of Lausanne, which officially divided the 
                                            
343 Natali, The Kurds and the State, Op. Cit., pp. 1-4. 
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Kurdish-inhabited Ottoman lands between Iraq, Turkey and Syria.344 However, 
contrary to other Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria and Iran, which became part of the 
dominant ethnic groups’ state-building projects and discourses, Kurdish nationalism 
in Iraq was boosted with promises of autonomy, increased opportunity structures 
and political space (Appendix A). For one, Britain as the Mandate authority over the 
newly-established state of Iraq, intentionally or unintentionally invited, or indeed 
encouraged, Kurdish nationalism and/or independence, at least as a threat card 
towards Iraq and other states with Kurdish minorities, to advance British interests. 
The Kurds in Robert Olson’s words, “were to be the cudgel that made Baghdad bow 
to London.”345 Certainly, encouraged by British colonial officers and the indecisive 
policies of Great Britain, and the struggle between Turkey and Iraq over the inclusion 
of the Mosul province in their respective states, the Kurds had some sort of de facto 
autonomy until the end of 1925.346  Thereafter, a great deal of legitimacy was 
bestowed on the national rights of the Kurds in Iraq for the following reasons: 
• the League of Nations’ recommendation to link the Mosul Province to the 
newly British-created state of Iraq;347  
                                            
344 For a brief analysis on the circumstances leading to the Treaty of Lausanne, see: Othman Ali, “The 
Kurds and the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-23,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(1997), pp. 521-534. 
345 Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and 
Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1992), p. 476. 
346 Ofra Bengio, “Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective,” in The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, 
(eds.), Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005), p. 173. 
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• the1922 joint Anglo-Iraqi statement of intent regarding the Kurds, promising 
appointment of Kurdish officials to administer government functions in the 
Kurdish territory of Iraq;348 
• the passing of a 1926 Local Languages Law recognizing Kurdish as the 
language of education and print books in the Kurdish areas of Iraq,349 
• as well as a 1932 Iraqi statement in regard of the national right of the Kurds 
upon its admission into the League of Nation as an independent state350 
As David Romano notes, the result of these promises was that “politicized Kurdish 
ethnicity was officially accepted as one of the founding principles of the Iraqi state… 
Kurds did not have to be convinced that they should demand group rights from the 
state since they had already been promised by state authorities.”351  
Hence, as the Iraqi state authorities gradually began to renege on their earlier 
promises of cultural autonomy, or at times denied the existence of a separate 
Kurdish ethnic group in Iraq, the seeds of a Kurdish nationalist liberation movement 
with an ethnically-based grievance were sown. The Kurdish nationalist hopes for 
recognition too often clashed with the ever-insecure Iraqi state formation processes 
that conceived of any meaningful concession to the Kurds, in the form of autonomy, 
as a prelude to secession and dismantling of the state of Iraq. It seems as Stansfield 
                                            
348 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 187.  
349 Helena Cook, The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan 
(London: Human Rights Centre, University of Essex and the Kurdistan Human Rights Project, 1995), 
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350 Michael Gunter, “Federalism and the Kurds of Iraq: The Solution or the Problem?”, in Jabar and 
Dawod (eds.), Op. Cit., p. 235.  
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suggests, that the domestic Kurdish conflict became entangled with the real and/or 
perceived geopolitical insecurity experienced and felt by Iraqi state leaders.352 This 
geopolitical insecurity resulted at times, particularly under Saddam, in Iraq adopting 
belligerent or hostile stances towards its neighbours, most notably Iran and Kuwait, 
over boundary issues. In analysing Iraq’s belligerency, particularly regarding its 
boundary disputes with neighbours, Tripp notes, “the defiant rhetoric of Iraqi 
governments often conceals a deeper fear that what the great powers created, they 
may one day decide to dismantle, indicating an awareness of the vulnerability of Iraq 
in a world not of its own making”.353 The Kurdish nationalist liberation movement 
was, then, enabled from the beginning to capitalize on the antipathy and support of 
neighbouring states to advance its struggle against successive Iraqi governments.  
By 1958, the Kurds of Iraq had an established a Kurdish political party in the 
form of the KDP with an overtly Kurdish nationalist orientation.354 The Kurdish 
nationalist liberation movement intensified following the overthrow of the 
Monarchical regime in 1958. Initially, the new Iraqi leader, General Abd al-Karim 
Qasim, who turned Iraq into a republic, promoted an Iraq-first nationalism based on 
Kurdish-Arab fraternity in Iraq, by promulgating a provisional constitution which 
stipulated that Kurds and Arabs are partners within the Republic of Iraq. General 
Qasim also made symbolic gestures such as placing the Kurdish sun and dagger on 
                                            
352 For an excellent analysis on the influences of Iraq’s domestic communal and ethnic contestations 
on foreign policy, see: Gareth Stansfield, “The reformation of Iraq’s foreign relations: new elites and 
enduring legacies,” International Affairs, Vol.  86, No. 6 (2010), pp. 1395-1409. 
353 See: Ibid., p. 1399.  
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Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, Op. Cit., pp. 60-79.   
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the new Iraqi national flag and coat of arms. He furthermore legalized the KDP, 
welcomed Mulla Mustafa Barzani from the former Soviet Union and authorized the 
publication of Kurdish literature and advancement of the Kurdish language. 
However, soon the hopes for the recognition of a distinct Kurdish national identity 
with territorial prerogatives was buried into the ground.355 Consequently, the seeds 
were sown for a prolonged on/off Kurdish nationalist revolution in Iraq that continues 
to this day, albeit under different dynamics.  
The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s represented formative years in the emergence 
and consolidation of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq; the precursor phase 
to the KRI. While the MENA region underwent cumulative changes due to the 
increasing influences of pan-Arab nationalism, anti-colonialism and the global-level 
bipolar competition, the governments of Iraq were unstable, weak, fragmented and 
constantly deposed. All in all, between 1958 to 1968, there were at least five military-
led coup d’états in Iraq.356 As Arab governments in Baghdad increasingly Arab-
ethnicized the political space by employing the rhetoric of pan-Arab nationalism, the 
Kurdish political identity also reacted by being more Kurdish-ethnicized and 
gradually became estranged from the wider Iraqi political domain. This also 
coincided with the return of the charismatic Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani from the 
former Soviet Union, in which he had sought refuge since the collapse of the Kurdish 
                                            
355 Natali, The Kurds and the State, Op. Cit., pp. 48-51; Ozum Yesiltas, “Iraq, Arab Nationalism, and 
Obstacles to Democratic Transition,” in Mehmet and Romano (eds.), Op. Cit., p. 47. 
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Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, Op. Cit.; Gareth Stansfield, “Divide and heal,” Prospect Magazine, 20 
May 2006, accessed: 20 August 2016, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/divideandheal.  
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republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan.357 For these reasons, the resulting political 
stalemate and the contracting views of an Arab-ethnicizing central government in 
Baghdad, and a Kurdish-ethnicizing KDP-led movement, set the scene in 1961 for 
internecine armed conflict between Baghdad and the Kurds of Iraq which is marked 
in Kurdish historiography as the 11 September Revolution. 
Yet to all intent and purposes, the KDP understood that, without meaningful 
external assistance, the Kurds did not stand a chance of winning a war against a 
relatively well-armed Baghdad government. Therefore, the KDP began its first 
actions to lobby foreign governments who might be willing to assist the Kurdish 
revolution in Iraq: in other words, the pursuit of foreign allies became a primary aim 
of Kurdish foreign relations. However, the fact that, geopolitically, Iraqi Kurdistan is 
surrounded by three states with similar internal dynamics to those in Iraq constituted 
a complicating determinant on Iraqi Kurds’ foreign relations. In its efforts, the KDP 
looked beyond the immediate Kurdistan border to states such as Egypt, Israel, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union, among others, for support. In retrospect, this 
thesis argues that the KDP had a twofold aim in its foreign relations. From one side, 
the KDP aimed to obtain immediate military and financial aid to sustain its revolution 
in Iraq. On the other, the KDP sought to legitimize the Kurdish revolution and gain 
international recognition. To this end, the KDP relied persistently on highlighting the 
Kurds’ right to self-determination, their historical claim to the land, past promises of 
                                            
357 Mustafa Barzani played a great role in defending the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad. For an early 
analysis on Barzani’s role, see: Archie Roosevelt, Jr., “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” Middle 
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statehood and grievances based on Baghdad’s discrimination and persecution of the 
Kurdish people. However, these aims were difficult to achieve for several reasons. 
The Kurds faced a conundrum in pursuing and building foreign relations because, 
as Rahman notes, they were isolated geographically and politically, lacked enough 
(if any) personnel with fluency in any foreign languages, the Kurdish diaspora was 
very small and above all the KDP lacked any representations abroad.358 Moreover, 
the Cold War had cast an iron wall around Kurdistan; the interests of major powers 
were influenced by keeping Baghdad pleased rather than Kurdish interests, and 
regional powers were all the more determined to keep the Kurds at bay. 
So, to achieve its ends, the KDP had to use all the tools at its disposal, 
however limited. Interestingly, early Kurdish attempts to build foreign relations with 
states resulted in the crystallization of patterns in foreign relations that have 
continued even after creation of the de facto state in 1992. These patterns include 
the use of citizen and public diplomacy, including the media, and utilization of think 
tanks – particularly after establishment of the de facto state. The Kurds also went 
through an educational process to adopt secrecy in foreign relations and to 
constantly diversify their sources of foreign support, where possible, to prevent 
falling victim to the perils of one power. The Kurds were geographically and 
psychologically isolated and they urgently needed to solicit support from outside 
sources. In addition to that, the refusal of states to build overt relations with the 
Kurdish movement ultimately resulted in the building of covert relations 
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intermediated by intelligence services of the states concerned. Naturally, for these 
covert relations to be effective, the element of secrecy had to be preserved.  
Interesting, in the absence of official diplomatic relations, the KDP as a 
political party came increasingly to rely upon public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy 
as initial methods of achieving its aims. In analysing the Kurds’ paradiplomacy during 
this sensitive period of Kurdish history, Vian Rahman notes that the KDP sought to 
disseminate its message, gain international legitimacy and advance the cause of the 
Kurdish movement in Iraq. In the absence of official diplomatic relations, lack of 
funds and large scale foreign representation, the KDP came to rely upon unofficial 
roving ambassadors and overseas representatives, both Kurds and foreigners; the 
media, particularly the Western media359; and Kurdish diaspora organizations like 
KSSE and AKSA which effectively acted as foreign branches of the KDP, and their 
members as its unofficial ‘diplomatic representatives’360 abroad. Over the years, the 
KDP dispatched several roving emissaries such as Ismet Sharif Vanly, Kamiran 
Bedir Khan, Jalal Talabani to solicit support from states as diverse as the Soviet 
Union, Israel,361 Egypt362, Iran, and the United States, among others.363 In Cairo, 
Kurdish roving emissary Jalal Talabani met with the Egyptian president Jamal Abdel 
Nasser in 1963 and described the Kurdish revolt to him as an anticolonial struggle, 
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“part of an overall nationalist movement,” and as a “just war conducted by an 
oppressed people against a chauvinistic dictator.”364 Moreover, illustrating the 
element of citizen or public diplomacy, Kurdish roving emissaries attempted to 
internationalize the Kurdish cause and obtain the support of the international 
community by appealing to the United Nations. For instance, Bedirkhan who served 
as the Kurds’ unofficial representative in New York City, sent several letters to U 
Thant, the Secretary General of the UN, to advance the Kurdish cause.365 
Sovereign states, however, were wary of any sort of overt relationship with 
the KDP. Many states feared that by overtly making contacts or establishing relations 
with the KDP and Iraqi Kurds they would enrage the GOI whose cooperation was 
needed to contain or counter the Soviet domination of the Gulf region. The fact that 
Iraq also possessed abundant hydrocarbon resources also came to play an 
important role in the global geostrategic and geopolitical rivalry between the United 
States and the former USSR. The GOI thus could act as a major strategic asset, a 
major weapon consumer and an energy supplier. However, any sort of relationship, 
even a covert one, could help the KDP in its battles against the central government. 
To achieve this end, the KDP extensively used the Western media to send signals 
to foreign governments. The KDP desperately sought to cultivate contacts with 
media persons and journalists writing on the affairs of the Middle East region. From 
the early 1960s unofficial Kurdish representatives abroad regularly circulated official 
communiqués to the media on the war in Iraq and its consequences on the Kurdish 
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people.366 Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the KDP (19461979), gave priority to visiting 
journalists and on most occasions received them personally: “KDP leader Barzani 
was desperate to internationalize the Kurdish issue for the first time, and therefore 
paid personal attention to visiting journalists. No country would receive him, he could 
not travel, and the Kurds had very limited secret contacts with Western states. 
Barzani understood the media as a means to conduct diplomacy and encouraged 
journalists to come to the region, report on the Kurds’ military successes and hear 
his claim that the movement had the support of all classes of Kurdish society.”367 
Interestingly, the KDP’s tactical use of the media achieved some success in 
attracting foreign journalists and reporting on Kurds’ situation in Iraq. Several 
journalists, such as Richard Anderegg and Dana Schmidt368 visited Barzani and 
several major newspaper editorials such as Le Monde and the Daily Telegraph 
published sympathetic reports on the Kurdish revolt in Iraq.369 In one such report, a 
Le Monde editorial wrote that “The most striking achievement of the Kurdish rebellion 
is in the international arena. At last, the world is taking an interest in a problem that 
has existed for forty years.”370 The articles published by these journalists were vital 
in sending messages to the West, particularly to the U.S. government. Barzani 
realized very well that the Cold War had divided the world into two camps, and he 
strived enthusiastically to position the Kurds within the U.S. camp. According to Sami 
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Abdul Rahman, a veteran Kurdish politician, “in his heart of hearts Barzani loved 
Americans… It was a relationship spanning three decades, starting with his 
encounter in Tehran on New Year’s day of 1947 with Archie Roosevelt, then the 
assistant U.S. military attaché there.”371 In describing the importance of the reports 
on Kurds and Barzani and the attempt to dispel misunderstanding about the Kurdish 
revolution in the United States, Brya Gibson notes, “The articles portrayed Barzani 
as a freedom fighter desperately seeking American assistance to protect his people 
from a brutal war imposed on them by a Soviet-backed military dictator,” and that 
Barzani “was not a communist but rather a Kurdish nationalist, seeking to establish 
Iraq as the West’s strongest ally in the Middle East.”372 It is interesting that Barzani 
also sought to highlight to Americans Kurdistan’s geopolitical importance within the 
overall U.S.-Soviet competition in the Middle East, stating in on instance, “Look at 
our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle 
East through the Caucasus and remember that, whether as guerrillas or as regulars, 
we are the best soldiers in the Middle East.”373 
Astonishingly, the Kurdish national liberation movement was quite successful 
in building and maintaining secretive relations with several states. It seems that 
these early media encounters with KDP leaders eventually resulted in building 
secretive relations between the KDP and several states with interests in Iraq and the 
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Middle East region. Being wary of overt relations with the Kurdish movement, states 
thus resorted to the building secretive relations through their covert intelligence 
services. Over the years, the KDP built ties with key states such as Israel,374 Iran, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States among others.375 Indeed there was also a 
certain overlap between the media and building relations with intelligence services, 
as the KDP also considered the possibility that some of the journalists visiting 
Kurdistan might be hidden spies or agents discreetly reporting to their intelligence 
services on the Kurdish war.376 It is noticeable that the KDP not only used the media 
to press foreign governments to adopt more favourable policies towards the Kurds, 
but it also employed the media to send messages to foreign governments. Hoshyar 
Zebari, who for many years acted as head of KDP’s foreign relations, summed up 
the KDP’s aim in using the media as ‘politicising the intelligence’ that the KPD had 
on Iraqi military apparatus and movements. By disseminating information on Iraq’s 
military apparatus, Zebari states, “We wanted to send the message: we’re not just a 
tribal fratricidal bunch, we are a good source of information.”377 
Hence, this thesis argues that the Kurdish movement, despite its weakness, 
economic destitution and its geographical isolation, was quite successful in building 
secret ties which could bring increasing leverage on the Iraqi state to satisfy Kurdish 
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political demands. The element of secrecy was perceived as fundamentally 
important in the tough geopolitical environment in which the Kurds operated. The 
way the KDP leadership organized its different teams is indicative of the high 
premium given to the secret relations. While several Kurdish organizations and 
unofficial foreign representatives in the West participated in unofficial Kurdish public 
diplomacy, the secret KDP relations with foreign states were placed under the tight 
control of a few in the top KDP echelon in Barzani’s headquarters. Furthermore, as 
Bengio notes, while the KDP leadership put its full weight behind covert relations 
with states through their secret agencies, Barzani tactically maintained a separation 
between Kurdish delegations negotiating with different actors such as Baghdad, Iran 
and the United States among others.378 
Moreover, as the KDP did not fully trust the intentions of any one actor: it 
strived to maintain a diversification of the sources of support. Despite the fact the 
leadership of the KDP managed to establish secretive relations with officials of 
regional states such as Iran, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Lebanon, it did 
not trust the intentions of these governments with regard to the Kurds of Iraq, so the 
KDP looked to the West and its ally in the Middle East, Israel, as the main possible 
source of sincere support. For instance, regarding the KDP-Israeli relationship, 
Bengio comments that, as the KDP did not fully trust the intentions of the Shah of 
Iran, it sought to diversify its sources of support by building relations with Israel, and 
through Israel it sought to build relations with the U.S. government.379 Indeed, 
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illuminating the element of secrecy, the Kurds’ secret relations with Israel were only 
publicly revealed by the Israelis, not the Kurds, and that almost five years after their 
closure. In 1980, Menachem Begin, the then prime minister of Israel, disclosed that 
Israel had assisted the Kurds in their revolution against the GOI from 1965-1975 with 
“money, arms, and instructors.”380 
The tradition of building discreet ties with intelligence services was expanded 
after the 1968 coup in Baghdad which brought the Baath party to power. Although, 
since 1961, the Kurdish movement had appealed to the United States for assistance, 
only after the Baath party’s accession to power did the United States begin to 
respond positively to Kurdish appeals. Specifically, following the first contacts by 
Mustafa Barzani with William Rogers, the then U.S. Secretary of State (1969), the 
first aid payment of US$ 14 million was made to the Kurdish movement in Iraq. The 
aid, however, which constituted the first direct U.S. contact with the KDP, aimed to 
encourage Kurdish relations with the Shah of Iran, in exchange for the U.S. 
commitment to help the Kurds overthrow the Baathi regime in Iraq.381 In retrospect, 
it is also evident that not only was the Iranian intelligence service (SAVAK) the main 
mediator between the KDP and the United States, it was indeed in control of the 
relationship. However, as Bengio notes, Barzani never trusted the Shah believing 
firmly “The Shah wants the Kurds with their heads over the water, with him holding 
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their forelocks.”382 Thus, the Shah asked the United States to act as the Shah’s 
guarantor vis-a-vis the Kurds, which the U.S. gladly endorsed.383 Although the KDP 
had endeavoured to use its relations with Israel as a means to get a hearing in 
Washington D.C., it was ultimately through the Shah of Iran that the KDP managed 
to build its secret ties with the United States. 
In what is described as the second stage of U.S. foreign policy toward the 
Kurds of Iraq, which saw transformation of KDP-U.S. contact into an official, direct 
but secret relationship, in 1972 a top-level KDP delegation travelled to the United 
States to discreetly meet with CIA, Pentagon and National Security Council officials 
to plead for U.S. assistance.384 However, the U.S. side requested secrecy and 
indicated all aid sent to the KDP would be channeled either via Iran or Israel.385 The 
KDP, from its side, requested support for Kurdish autonomy stressing that Kurdistan 
“albeit small, could exploit its strategic location and fighting potential as an effective 
tool in a free world effort to reverse the trend of Soviet expansion in the Middle 
East.”386 However, later events makes it clear that the United States did not have 
any specific foreign policy towards the Kurds of Iraq as U.S. policies were motivated 
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by the global Soviet-U.S. competition, scrutinizing Soviet influence in Iraq and the 
Middle East region and, as a favour to its ally, the Shah of Iran.387  
Meanwhile, not fully trusting the intentions of the Shah and being constantly 
pressurized by Soviet representatives, as well as some leftist cadres within its own 
ranks, Barzani reached an agreement with the Baath party on Kurdish autonomy. 
The 11 March 1970 Agreement, as it came to be known, envisioned far-reaching 
autonomous powers for the Kurdish areas in Iraq and gave the KDP four years of 
breathing space.388 Indeed, the Agreement reflected a recurring theme in Iraqi-
Kurdish relations. As Gibson notes, Iraq gradually became a battleground of Cold 
War rivalry and, as such, the United States and the Soviet Union alternated between 
supporting the Kurds or the Iraqi government, based on the Cold War orientation of 
the regime in Baghdad. So, during the Qasim regime, the Soviets advocated greater 
rights for the Kurds, based on the belief that the Kurds had the potential to destabilize 
Qasim’s pro-Soviet regime. When the Qasim regime was overthrown in February 
1963 by a junta of the so-called Free Offices under the leadership of Colonel Abdul 
Salam Aref, with Baath Party involvement, the Kennedy Administration supported 
the new regime, while the Soviet Union supported the Kurdish revolution to disrupt 
the pro-American regime. Subsequently, when the pro-Soviet Baathist Party 
regained power in Baghdad in 1968, Moscow again attempted to consolidate the 
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Baathists in Bagdad by solving the Kurdish problem.389 The 1970 agreement 
Between the KDP and Iraq was very much the result of the rapprochement between 
the Baath and the Soviet Union which resulted in intense pressure being exercised 
by the Soviet Union on the KDP to reach an agreement with Baghdad. 
One of the side-effects of the Autonomy Agreement was that the Kurdish 
national liberation movement benefited by gaining administrative experience and a 
degree of territorial control. Indicating the element of transition in territorial control 
and assumption of governmental functions by national liberation movements, at least 
since 1961, the KDP had established a form of statehood in the shape of an 
‘insurgent state’390 or a ‘de facto self-rule’391 in the Kurdish majority areas of Iraq by 
controlling most of the countryside, leaving only major urban centres in the hands of 
the GOI. The Autonomy Agreement, however, transformed the Kurdish region into 
an autonomous province with its own internal administration and de facto autonomy. 
Labelling the autonomous period as a ‘golden period’, Sami abdul-Rahman, who 
served as the Kurdish minister in the post-Agreement Iraqi government, commented 
in an interview with Gareth Stansfield that: 
“During 1970–4 the Kurds gained] four years [experience] of direct 
governance and administration in Erbil, Dohuk and Suleimaniyah 
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governorates . . . During this period, the KDP had a strong military force, 
and Kurdistan was peaceful.”392 
However, in the end, the agreement which had envisioned a Kurdish 
autonomous region by 1974 failed to materialize due to domestic, regional and 
international pressures including highly contentious issues, such as the power and 
authority of the autonomous government in the Kurdish areas and delimitation of the 
Kurdish autonomous territory including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.393  
In 1974, the Baath party issued its own version of autonomy for the Kurdish 
region of Iraq which fell well below clauses agreed upon in 1970 and, therefore, the 
Baathi version was rejected by Mustafa Barzani. Consequently, another round of 
warfare erupted. In the ensuing war, the KDP relied heavily on American, Israeli, 
Jordanian and Iranian support which were channeled via Iran. However, by 1975, 
aware that without cutting sources of support to the Kurds, Iraq would be unable to 
defeat the Kurdish revolution, Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Agreement with 
the Shah of Iran. The Agreement effectively marked Iraq’s concession to Iranian 
claims over parts of Shatt al ‘Arab in return for Iran ceasing all support for the Kurdish 
movement in Iraq.394 While the KDP attempted to lobby Henri Kissinger, the then 
U.S. Secretary of State who had secretly initiated and directed with U.S. President 
Richard Nixon the U.S. secret relations with the KDP, and the wider U.S. government 
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over their previous promises to the KDP,395 the fate of the Kurdish revolution was 
sealed. Barzani never heard from Washington D.C. and the Shah of Iran fulfilled his 
promise to Saddam of halting all aid to the land-locked Kurdish region and the KDP, 
leaving Kurds at the mercy of Baghdad396, which by default also meant halting all 
aid, including Israeli and American support, for the Kurdish movement.397 Within 
days, possibly the first Kurdish movement with clear nationalist aspirations, and the 
biggest Kurdish national revolt against a central government, collapsed. Many KDP 
fighters accepted the offer of amnesty from Baghdad while Mustafa Barzani and 
many in the KDP leadership, alongside an estimated 150,000 Kurdish refugees, 
crossed the border to Iran.398  
Narrating this episode is more than just about recounting a phase in the 
Kurdish national liberation movement which is full of narratives of revolution and 
subjugation. While it would be by no means the first failed test of U.S.-Kurdish 
relationship, the abandoning of Iraqi Kurds in 1975 had wider implications on Kurdish 
foreign policy toward the United States which made itself evident during the later 
phases of U.S.-Kurdish relations. Put simply, the episode of 1975, which is referred 
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to by Kurds as the ‘betrayal of 1975’,399 had a deep psychological affect and ingrained 
a deep sense of distrust toward the United States in the collective political memory 
of Kurds everywhere. To those KRI leaders who lived through to see the collapse of 
the Kurdish autonomous project, the betrayal of 1975 was very real and catastrophic. 
Masoud Barzani, the son of Barzani, stated, “had it not been for the US support, the 
way of negotiating [with Saddam] might have been different,”400 and that while 
Mustafa Barzani admitted that he should have been more wary of the Shah, he 
“didn’t think the Americans would cheat us.”401 Although it is true that the United 
States was instrumental in creating the Kurdish de facto state through its actions in 
1991-1992 and after 2003, Iraqi Kurdish foreign policy-makers have been constantly 
worried over the U.S. intentions and rhetoric of maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Iraq. The KRI leaders simply fear the possibility of being sold-out when U.S. interests 
require rapprochement with regional states at the expense of the KRI. 
After 1975, Kurdish fortunes worsened. The Baath regime razed thousands 
of Kurdish villages, and displaced and deported many of their inhabitants to the 
government-controlled resettlement towns across Iraq. As part of an ongoing 
‘Arabization’ programme, symbols of Kurdish identity and culture were subjugated.402 
While the destruction of Kurdistan was extensive and far-reaching, Kurds in Kirkuk 
and other mixed Kurdish-Arab areas received particularly harsh treatments. After the 
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discovery of oil in 1927, Kirkuk had become a cornerstone of Iraq’s oil-dependent 
economy. As such, successive Iraqi governments attempted to change the 
demographic composition of Kirkuk to an Arab-majority province, at the expense of 
Kurdish and Turkoman communities. However, during the 1970s Kirkuk became the 
epicenter of the state’s Arabization programme and a major point of contention 
between the Kurdish national liberation movement and the GOI. Efforts at 
gerrymandering the ethnic composition and administrative structure of the province 
of Kirkuk intensified after the 1972 nationalization of Iraq’s petroleum industry, and 
the consolidation of the Baath party in Baghdad, which undertook extensive 
measures to Arabize Kirkuk by repopulating whole districts with Arab newcomers 
from Southern Iraq.403 In reaction, Kirkuk, as well as its economic, political and 
strategic importance, came to hold a symbolic significance in the Kurdish nationalist 
liberation movement. For the Kurds, Kirkuk became the ‘the Jerusalem of 
Kurdistan.’404 Kirkuk and other disputed areas would come to represent a major focus 
of territorial dispute between the Kurdish de facto state and its Iraqi parent state as 
will be illustrated in chapter seven.405  
In 1980, Saddam Hussein revoked the terms of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, 
which he had signed with Iran, to break the Kurdish revolution. Saddam’s Iraq then 
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initiated the First Gulf War against the Islamic Republic of Iran.406 In the war, after 
some wavering and changing alliances, the Kurdish national liberation movement 
including the KDP and the newly established PUK under the leadership of Jalal 
Talabani, allied with Iran, based on an agreement which stipulated that both sides 
would refrain from making any unilateral deals with Iraq until such a time as the 
regime of Saddam is toppled in Baghdad.407 The alliance of major Iraqi Kurdish 
political parties with Iran later paved the way in 1987 for the formation of an all-
Kurdish umbrella group called the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) that consisted of all 
major Iraqi Kurdish nationalist groups.408  
The Kurdish alliance with Iran in the war against Iraq by default placed the 
Kurds in the category of enemies of the United States and the West and its allies in 
the Gulf and the Arab world.409  As Samantha Power notes, “Not only did some 
[Kurds] take up arms and rebel against the Iraqi regime which was supported by the 
United States, but some also teamed up with Iran, a U.S. foe. As “guerillas,” the 
Kurds thus appeared to be inviting repression. And as temporary allies of Iran, they 
were easily lumped with the very forces responsible for hostage-taking and “Great 
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Satan” berating.”410 Consequently, in revenge, and without much care for the views 
of the international community, Saddam embarked on a ruthless and systematic 
genocidal campaign against Kurdish civilian populations, including the 1983 
genocide of 8000 Barzani civilians (only men),411culminating in the 1988 chemical 
bombardment against noncombatants in the Kurdish town of Halabja412 and the 
murder of around 180,000 Kurdish civilians between February and late September 
1988, in the so-called Anfal Campaign. 
The chemical bombardment which has come to be known by the Kurds as the 
‘Hiroshima of the Kurds’413 and the subsequent genocidal campaign, as one 
observer concluded, represented the ‘birth of an unwanted nation’.414 The Anfal 
campaign renewed the Kurdish attempt at informal diplomacy and the attempt to 
publicize it through their foreign relations, albeit limited. Integrating the Anfal 
campaign, and the wider destruction and suppression of Kurds in Iraq, into their 
discourse of self-determination and their remedial right to secession, the Kurdish 
leadership sought foreign support in protesting and halting the war of genocide in 
Kurdistan and tried to enhance their cause regionally and internationally, however, 
with virtually little success. Once again, the Kurds came to rely heavily on their 
private contacts with foreign officials and journalists. Although limited and late, these 
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contacts were instrumental in publicising the Kurdish sufferings immediately 
following the Anfal campaign. With help from Peter Galbraith, a long-time friend of 
the Kurds,415 dignitaries of the IKF, including Jalal Talabani416 and Dr. Mahmoud 
Othman417 visited Washington and tried to enlist Western support in halting the Iraqi 
war of genocide against the Kurds. Talabani declared “It’s the first time in history a 
government has used chemical weapons against its own citizens who are not at the 
battlefront.”418 Kurdish friends in the media, mostly right-wing American journalists 
such as William Safire and Jim Hoagland,419 wrote sympathetic pieces highlighting 
Saddam’s genocidal campaign against Kurdish civilians and demanded action from 
the U.S. government. Galbraith, aided by the U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell, the then 
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, drafted “the Prevention of 
Genocide Act of 1988”420 to punish Iraq’s use of forbidden weapons against Kurdish 
non-combatants.  However, the plight of the Kurds remained muted. The United 
States had extensive trade, business and geopolitical interests in Iraq. Saddam was 
a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf region and the U.S. placed a high 
value on its relationship with Iraq. As Marianna Charountaki notes, “the United States 
needed to find a regional satellite to replace Khomeini’s Iran as the base from which 
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to facilitate its regional interests.”421 But, more importantly, the Kurds did not exist in 
the Washington officialdom. As Latif Rashid, once PUK’s representative in London 
states, “Because we [the Kurds] had no representatives based in Washington, it was 
easy for American leaders to pretend the Kurds didn’t exist.”422 The Kurds also did 
not wield any lobbying pressure either through influence-buying firms or through 
ethnic lobbying comparable to the influence that Jewish-American or Armenian-
American groups possess in Washington – a  situation that would gradually change 
after 1992 and 2003 as will be illustrated in this thesis. 
In a less-noticed historical event, on 20 August 1988, Iran finally and formally 
endorsed the UNSC Resolution 598 that called for the end of the First Gulf War and 
return to the status quo.423 The unilateral Iranian deal with Baghdad marked yet 
another episode where the Kurdish movement was betrayed and left to its own 
devices by its one-time staunch ally and the intricacies of the international system of 
sovereign states. Once again, the Kurds were victims of realpolitik and geopolitical 
interests. By signing the ceasefire agreement with Iraq, Iran gave no care to the 
views or plight of the Kurds. In summing up the Kurdish conundrum, Shlomo Avineri 
notes that “the Kurds are not only a small people, they also do not have powerful 
friends. They are a nation without many cousins abroad or fraternal allies.” 424 
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Rather than being an extensive historical analysis and examination of the 
history of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement, this chapter has aimed to 
highlight those factors that have had widest consequences on early Kurdish foreign 
relations. It aims to make the argument that foreign relations are not solely the 
preserve of sovereign states. As the Kurdish case shows, political parties, liberation 
movements and a range of other non-state actors can also engage in foreign 
relations in pursuit of their interests. 
In the twentieth century, the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire turned into 
minorities in the newly established states of Syria, Iraq (see  
and Turkey. In Iraq, several, political, geopolitical and geographical factors 
contributed to the early rise and intensity of the Kurdish national liberation movement 
compared with other parts of the divided Kurdistan. However, since its inception, it 
was clear to the Kurdish leadership that without outside support it was difficult to 
achieve meaningful autonomy. Thus, the Kurdish leadership, represented by its 
political parties, strived to build foreign relations with states, international 
organizations as well as non-state actors. Lacking the ability to build official and overt 
foreign relations, the Kurdish political parties resorted to other means. These means 
included the use of public diplomacy through the media and journalists; and citizen 




The Kurdish movement represented by the KDP, later joined by the PUK in 
1975 and other smaller parties, successfully built secretive foreign relations with 
several Middle Eastern states such as the Arab states of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Libya, 
and Saudi Arabia among others; non-Arab regional states like Iran and Israel, as 
well as world superpowers, the United States and the former USSR. During the 
1960s and early 1970s, the KDP built official, direct, but secret relations with the 
United States and Israel as well as overt relations with Iran. After 1975, both the KDP 
and PUK revived their relations with Iran and Syria, while at times they negotiated 
with the GOI. 
However, the Baathist genocidal campaign of terror and use of chemical 
weapons put Kurdistan in a black hole. The Kurdish movement was by default on 
the wrong side of alliances. Despite this, the genocidal campaign prompted the 
Kurdish leadership to combine arguments based on the Kurdish right to self-
determination with a remedial right to secession based on the massive violations of 
Kurdish human rights, historical persecution and discrimination. 
Yet, a distinctive feature of this phase of Kurdish relations with state actors 
was that the Kurds were constantly used as a tool in the foreign policies of other 
states, in other words, Iraqi Kurds were the objects of other’s foreign policies. After 
1992 Kurdish fortunes changed with the creation of an internationally protected de 
facto state. Instead of warfare and adaptation of maximalist policies, the Kurds 
changed their focus on state-and nation-building processes. The de facto state also 
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widened Kurdish foreign relations horizons with the outside world, issues that will be 
covered in the next chapter of this thesis.   
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4 The First Decade of De Facto Existence: Foreign 
Relations of Survival  
This chapter starts the empirical analysis of what is in effect the first decade 
of the existence of the Kurdish de facto state. It examines the circumstances leading 
to the creation of the KRI, the initial processes of de facto state-building and the 
impact of this newly found status on foreign interactions and strategies of the Kurdish 
political parties. Furthermore, it examines the nature of relations between Kurdish 
political parties, the Iraqi opposition and neighbouring states, particularly Turkey, 
and the wider international community. It also covers the civil war in Kurdistan (1994-
1997), which shattered the already weak international legitimacy and seriously 
endangered the survival prospects of the Kurdish de facto state. The chapter also 
highlights the early foreign policies of self-justification utilized by Kurdish leaders to 
ensure the continuous survival of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq. This chapter 
argues that between 1992 and 1997, survival constituted the major aim of Iraqi 
Kurdish foreign relations.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Kurdish de facto state emerged at the weakest point of the Kurdish 
national liberation movement in Iraq. This chapter starts the second part of analysis, 
namely the empirical part, which focuses on the transition of the Kurdish national 
liberation movement into the governing body of a de facto state. It does so against 
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the background of the discussion provided in chapter two about the formation, 
operation, policies, including foreign strategies, of de facto states. It analyses the 
impact of the status of de facto statehood on the foreign policy strategies of de facto 
states, and the nature of relations between de facto states and the rest of the 
international community.  
Overall, this chapter argues that transition into de facto statehood in a context 
of non-recognition made survival or, in other words, the maintenance of the newly 
acquired territorial control and de facto independence, the main aim of Iraqi Kurdish 
foreign relations. The chapter also shows that during this period the KRI was not a 
unitary actor pursuing foreign policy. Iraqi Kurds merely enjoyed foreign relations 
with the outside world. Moreover, the newly established institutions of the KRI, for 
instance, the KRG, did not constitute the primary actor in Iraqi Kurdish foreign 
relations with other state and non-state actors as foreign relations remained the sole 
business of the major parties of the KRI in an environment of threats, weakness and 
economic deprivation. This is perhaps because while it was not totally ostracized, 
neighbouring states and the international community at large were careful not to 
grant extensive legitimacy and recognition to the Kurdish de facto state by dealing 
with its official institutions. Yet, to preserve their interests in the KRI, sovereign states 
had or even forced to build relations with Kurdish political parties, which in turn 
granted a degree of indirect recognition or legitimacy to the Kurdish de facto state.  
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4.2 Emergence of the Kurdish De Facto State: The Second Gulf War, 
Kurdish Uprising, the Safe Haven, and Centrally Propelled 
Secession 
The defeat and expulsion of the Iraqi army in Kuwait sparked instability in 
Iraq. Immediately after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the leadership of the IKF realized 
that a golden opportunity had arisen, unparalleled in the 100 years of Kurdish 
struggle in Iraq. It grasped that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was a geopolitical 
game-changer that would alter the political and geopolitical landscape in Iraq and 
the Middle East region.425 Once again, the IKF leadership resorted to the use of 
unofficial diplomacy to approach the U.S. administration to gauge its views with 
regard to any possible Kurdish role in the war.426 Meanwhile, despite the policy of no-
contact with the Kurdish opposition, the United States still sought to capitalize on 
Saddam’s genocidal campaign against the Kurdish people in its coercive diplomacy 
against Iraq, and therefore the CIA-run Voice of Free Iraq constantly highlighted 
Saddam’s brutal policies against the Kurds and the wider people of Iraq.427 
In the meantime, the new geopolitical landscape acted as a catalyst for the 
reinvigoration of the much weakened and dispirited IKF. The survivability of 
Saddam’s regime looked bleak following Iraq’s expulsion from Kuwait, and President 
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George H. W. Bush’s call on the Iraqi people “to take matters into their own hands 
and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside” seemed to suggest U.S. 
support for regime change in Iraq.428 Encouraged by the turn of events, a popular 
uprising erupted in Kurdistan culminating in the liberation of most of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
including the city of Kirkuk, by 19 March 1991. The triumph, however, was short-
lived. As soon as Saddam moved his powerful Republican Guards to the North, 
Kurdish cities fell one-by-one to the GOI forces.429 Fearing chemical bombardment, 
like those experienced during the 1980s, nearly two million Kurdish civilians fled in 
panic towards the Turkish and Iranian frontiers. While Iran allowed entry to some 
refugees, Turkey refused them entry, causing a severe humanitarian catastrophe 
and much suffering. Refugees were trapped on mountain hills, stopped and 
harassed by Turkish soldiers, and it was estimated that between 400 and 1,000 
people were dying every day from hypothermia, exhaustion and disease.430  
It was a bitter defeat. It endangered the total displacement of Kurds from Iraq. 
Once again, the Kurdish leadership tried to lobby Western governments through the 
traditional means employed by the Kurds. An IKF delegation visited Washington, but 
to no avail.431 Both Presidents Barzani and Talabani accused Washington of 
washing its hands of the catastrophe that Washington was partly responsible for 
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creating by stating: “You personally called upon the Iraqi people to rise up against 
Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship.”432 
However, the presence of thousands of TV crews and journalists covering the 
Second Gulf War, and the transmission of live pictures to Western audiences of the 
catastrophe unfolding on the mountain steeps between the Turkish-Iraqi border, 
created an immense pressure on Western leaders to save the Kurds. As Nick 
Gowing notes, the overwhelming pictures “from the mountain quagmire in southern 
Turkey of Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein's troops after the Gulf war forced first 
Europe and then the United States to create 'Safe Havens'” for the Kurds of Iraq.433  
Galbraith, being in Kurdistan on the eve of uprising’s success and its rapid collapse, 
had taken footage of the fleeing Kurdish civilians in dismal situations, and thereafter 
Galbraith conducted a well-orchestrated public diplomacy campaign on behalf of the 
Kurds, accusing the West of abandoning the Kurds to the hands of genocidal 
Saddam Hussein. 434 The CNN effect was created.435 
In reaction to an international public outcry, the UNSC adopted Resolution 
688, and eventually adopted a British proposal to create a safe haven for the Kurds. 
Under the judicial cover of UNSC Resolution 688, Allied forces initiated the “OPC” 
and a “no-fly” zone was declared north of the 36th parallel line. The United States, 
Britain and France also stationed a protectionist force at the Incirlik military base in 
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Turkey to prevent Saddam’s army from attacking or bombarding the ‘safe haven’.436 
The Incirlik base continued its protectionist role up to the removal of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003. 
The provision of international protection saved the Kurds of Iraq from 
imminent obliteration. Moreover, the importance of international protection to the 
Kurds was not lost on both belligerent sides in the conflict. Masoud Barzani, for 
instance, welcomed the international protection as “a great humanitarian gesture 
and a big step forward,” while the GOI considered the international intervention as a 
“Flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, an independent country and a 
member of the United Nations.”437 Once back inside Kurdistan, the IKF Peshmerga 
and GOI forces had an uneasy co-existence. Unsure of the length and depth of the 
international protection, and encouraged by the U.S.-led coalition forces to ‘make 
your arrangements with Saddam’,438 the leadership of the IKF negotiated with 
Saddam Hussein. In the negotiations, Masoud Barzani of the KDP, realizing the 
scale of destruction wrought upon Kurdistan, adopted a softer approach to the PUK 
and declared to reporters that “There will be an agreement by the 15th of June, or 
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maybe the 20th of June,” based on “democracy for Iraq and autonomy for the 
Kurds.”439  
However, by October 1991 the negotiations stalled and unexpectedly a new 
development crystallized in the birth of a Kurdish de facto state.  In a case amounting 
to ‘central secession’ or ‘secessionism by the centre’,440 Saddam withdrew all the 
central government’s military, security and civilian apparatus from Kurdistan. In 
addition to the UN sanction imposed on Iraq, Saddam further placed the KRI under 
an internal economic embargo cutting off the KRI from the rest of Iraq. In explaining 
Saddam’s motives, Stansfield notes: 
“Saddam, content that the Kurds had been stopped from threatening 
to secede from the state and aware that the international community at 
large, and Turkey and the US in particular had no desire to see them 
independent of Iraq, withdrew his forces from Kurdistan. His motives were 
pragmatic as he recognized that his forces would be needed to ensure 
that his regime remained well defended in Baghdad in critical months to 
come, and he also needed to have them available in case the Shiite 
rebelled again.”441 
Adding to that, Harvey notes: 
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“Unable to impose its hegemony over the entire country in the wake 
of defeat and coalition military intervention following the Second Gulf War, 
the government of Iraq effectively seceded from component parts of its 
own territory. In this way, the government of Iraq, it can be argued, set the 
precedent for the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish enclave 
(secessionist or not) in the north of the country.”442 
Faced with the new situation, the IKF formally withdrew from the negotiations 
and announced its intention to hold free regional elections to elect a Kurdistan 
National Assembly (hereafter KNA).  
The Kurdish de facto state was born. 
 
4.3 De Facto Statehood: Establishment of the KRI, Initial Steps of 
Institution-Building and the Democratic Experiment  
The IKF leadership was eager to fill the vacuum deliberately created by the 
withdrawal of the state from the Kurdish region. However, despite achievement of 
autonomy and de facto statehood under international protection, the KRI faced 
immense challenges and difficulties. For one, the region was placed under double 
embargo and, as is the case with most de facto states, the infrastructure of the region 
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was devastated following years of destructive wars which took place mostly in KRI 
territory. The crisis was further intensified with the return of refugees to the major 
cities and towns in search of jobs, services and resources, privileges mostly lacking 
in the countryside due to the GOI’s deliberate policy of destroying villages. 
However, the task of running civilian affairs and establishing a central 
structure of governance proved daunting for the IKF. A New York Times report of the 
time, noted that “the remnants of Iraqi civil authority in this region, deprived of 
leadership and money from Baghdad but lacking direction from any central Kurdish 
authority, are nearly paralysed.’443 Interestingly, the IKF leadership did not hide its 
inexperience in running civilian affairs. In an interview with Gareth Stansfield, Jalal 
Talabani articulated vividly the obstacles facing the IKF when he stated that “we 
came from the mountains, we were trained as fighters, and now we had to run 
cities.”444 Masoud Barzani reiterated similar sentiments reporting that in meetings 
with Kurdish technocrats he stated that “his experience, and the experiences of the 
peshmerga, were in destroying bridges, cutting electricity and destroying roads.”445 
The desperate economic situations also led to increased political tensions within the 
Kurdish camp, particularly between Kurdish nationalist parties and some tribal 
leaders. A CIA report from the period demonstrates the atmosphere in the Kurdish 
zone at the time, noting that “Frustrated by the deep rift between Masoud Barzani 
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and Jalal Talabani, Iraqi repression, and the dwindling prospects for an autonomy 
agreement with Baghdad, local Kurdish tribal leaders and small rebel groups are 
taking more independent or extreme measures to oppose Iraqi government and gain 
a say in Kurdish politics.”446 
Therefore, the IKF leadership soon realized the necessity of conducting free 
regional elections and putting in place central structures of governance. The Kurdish 
leadership had several motives for holding regional elections. For one, as Barry 
Bartmann illustrates, in the current international system, the legitimacy of states is 
composed of two aspects: “on the one hand, viability and survivability, that is, the 
capacity to fulfil the functions of statehood; on the other, the ‘right’ to a separate 
destiny.”447 Therefore, having established territorial control under international 
protection, the leadership of the IKF now sought to establish and portray its domestic 
legitimacy not only by establishing monopoly over legitimate means of violence, 
provision of public services and security, but also by demonstrating the domestic 
legitimacy enjoyed by Kurdish political parties, in other words, its right to govern the 
region. Secondly, although the Kurdish leadership persistently refrained from making 
any secessionist proclamations and, contrary to the wishes of Iraqi Kurds, never 
formally declared independence, it nevertheless had to justify the autonomous 
existence of the region in a context of non-recognition. Perhaps, bearing in mind that 
the IKF leadership enjoyed a high degree of domestic legitimacy at this moment of 
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Kurdish history, it can be deduced that the need to garner international legitimacy 
for the continued existence of the Kurdish de facto state was more prevalent in the 
thinking of the IKF leadership. As Yaniv Voller notes, “Amid Baghdad’s constant 
accusation of the Kurds of undermining Iraq’s territorial integrity, and facing their 
usual portrayal as a backward element in the region, conducting democratic 
elections was seen as a means to legitimise the unpopular Kurdish autonomy.”448 
However, the IKF leadership had to tread very carefully; the conduct of regional 
general elections was bound to raise the sensitivities of regional states fearful of any 
Kurdish movement toward independent statehood. Indeed, the voluntary central 
secession of Iraq from the KRI was perceived by many in the Kurdish leadership as 
a trap by Saddam Hussein, intended to provoke the region into clashes or conflict 
with neighbouring regional states.449  
In these sensitive circumstances, the direction taken by the IKF leadership 
was to form a Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), and an executive branch 
modelled on the 11th March 1970 Agreement between the GOI and the KDP which, 
in theory, provided the Kurds with legislative and executive powers in the Kurdish 
north.450 However, the IKF also realized that a government in the land-locked 
Kurdish de facto state could not fulfil even the minimum functions of statehood 
without a certain degree of regional and international engagement and legitimacy. 
Therefore, IKF leaders began their first paradiplomatic interactions with the outside 
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world to gather support, or at least ease opposition, for the upcoming regional 
elections in the KRI. Thus, in February and March 1992, Masoud Barzani visited 
many European states to inform them of the Kurdish point of view and Kurdish plans 
to hold a regional election. In France, he held talks with Bernard Kouchner, the 
French secretary of state for humanitarian action and Foreign Minister Ronald 
Dumas. He also visited Turkey where he was received by the highest echelon of 
Turkish political establishment, including its president, Turgut Ozal.451 However, in 
addition to government officials, the election campaign provided an incentive for the 
IKF leadership to interact in different ways and with different members of the 
international community. Election monitoring and the Kurdish diaspora abroad are 
two prominent examples. As is the case with most de facto states, concern about 
conveying a positive international image of the Kurdish de facto state led the IKF 
leadership to search for internationally-accredited observers to monitor, and thus 
legitimize, its regional elections. Therefore, playing their role in the election 
campaign, members of the Kurdish diaspora approached prominent organizations 
such as the British Electoral Reform Society (ERS), the Washington-based National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) and the American International Human Rights Law 
Group.452   
Meanwhile, the IKF as the de facto ruling authority in the KRI issued its first 
rules, designated as Law No. 1 and Law No. 2, detailing procedures and principles 
                                            
451 Michael Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 
2 (1993), 295.  




for the election of a KNA and a leader of the Kurdistan national liberation movement 
respectively. Based on these laws, the first free regional elections in the history of 
the KRI, and indeed the history of the independent Iraq, took place in May 1992 to 
elect a 105-member KNA and concurrently the leader of the KRI.453 The huge popular 
participation in the election signaled the unambiguous domestic legitimacy enjoyed 
by the Kurdish de facto state. Reports published by observers following the election 
highlighted the democratic nature of the election, depicted as the first of its kind in 
the Middle East.  A publication issued by the ERS described it as a “full and free 
expression of the wishes of the Iraqi Kurdish electorate.”454 These views were echoed 
by other independent observers present. Commenting on the popular incentive to 
participate in the election, Hoff, et al., for instance, state that “practically the entire 
electorate, both men and women turned up,” and that “the turnout was an 
unambiguous sign of the population’s awareness of the importance of democratic 
principles, and of protest against Saddam’s regime.”455 David McDowall, a leading 
western historian on Kurds and Kurdistan, has a more nuanced assessment of the 
Kurdish elections, stating that: “The Kurdistan election was, for all the haste in its 
preparation and the occasional cases of fraud or malpractice, an historic moment. 
Externally, it demonstrated almost uniquely outside Israel and Turkey, the ability of 
a Middle Eastern electorate to conduct a peaceful, multi-party election. Its example 
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was a symbolic threat not only to Saddam but to all un-elected regimes in the 
region.”456 
Meanwhile, the election results reaffirmed the strong popular support enjoyed 
by the KDP and the PUK. Each party won 50 seats in the KNA, while the five-
remaining seats which were reserved for the Christian community in the KRI were 
taken up by the Christian Assyrian party, ADM.457 However, none of the candidates 
contesting the position of leadership won a clear majority. Disappointed with the 
outcome, and aiming to achieve unity in the face of the tremendous challenges 
facing the KRI, Presidents Barzani and Talabani agreed to retain outside official 
organs of governance, and tacitly agreed to lead the Kurdish de facto state on a joint 
basis.458 
With the conduct of elections, the Kurds initiated their first steps in institution-
building in the KRI. While no leader of the KRI was elected, one of the first actions 
of the KNA was to appoint a regional government (KRG) tasked with administration 
of the KRI. The KRG that emerged reflected the neat popular parity between the 
KDP and the PUK as ministerial and vice-ministerial positions were divided equally 
between both parties, in what was called the 50:50 system.459 Moreover, in a 
significant move, and taking into consideration the new conditions, the leadership of 
the KRI reformulated Kurdish nationalist goals and now sought to organize its 
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relations with Baghdad based on federalism – not autonomy, as was envisioned in 
the 1970 agreement. In October 1992, the KNA passed a resolution expressing the 
unanimous commitment of the KRI “to determine its fate and define its legal 
relationship with the central government at this stage of history on the basis of the 
federation (al-ittihad al-fidirali) within a democratic parliamentary Iraq.”460 
The nascent institution-building in the KRI immediately raised the fears of 
neighbouring states, Baghdad, as well as the international community. Although not 
totally hostile, paying lip service to the territorial integrity of Iraq, the international 
community did not lend any considerable support to the Kurdish elections. The 
United States, for instance, adopted an ambiguous stance. On the day of the 
elections, Margaret Tutwiler, the White House spokesperson, repeated U.S. support 
for the territorial integrity of Iraq by stating that “the elections could not be a step 
towards political independence.”461 The United States also refused to send official 
observers to the elections, and made it hard for U.S. private citizens to travel to the 
Kurdish region. Yet, the U.S. unofficially welcomed the elections as a major blow 
against Saddam’s one-man rule and as a way to strengthen the Iraqi opposition.462  
Despite this fact, the GOI came out against the Kurds, describing the elections 
as a ‘farce,’ ‘illegitimate,’ and an ‘unconstitutional’463 move designed by Western 
imperialism to split up Iraq. Whereas in the past, the Baathist regime either 
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constantly depicted the Kurds as agents of external powers or as traitors enabling 
the interference of other states in Iraqi affairs, following the elections it launched a 
vicious propaganda attack against the KRI and its leaders aimed at shaking the 
confidence of the Kurdish citizenry towards their elected government and the long-
time leadership of the IKF. A report published in a newspaper run and controlled by 
Uday Hussein, Saddam’s elder son, alleged clashes between the people of the KRI 
and the forces loyal to the KDP and PUK, stating: 
“The angry protest demonstrations against what is known as the 
Kurdistan Front continued in the regions of Sulaymaniyah, Bdhinan and 
Chamchamal. The demonstrators protested against the actions of this 
front against the citizens of the autonomous Kurdistan region... 
[observers] added that the feelings of the protestors reveal the depth of 
the tragedy which this front has caused.”464 
Regional states, particularly Iran, Turkey and Syria showed a great degree of 
nervousness after the elections and establishment of the KNA and the KRG. To put 
it simply, the fact that humanitarian protection was turning into a de facto state 
caused a great deal of anxiety and fear for these states. Despite constant 
assurances by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership that they were committed to the territorial 
integrity of Iraq based on federalism, and that they did want to interfere in the affairs 
of other states, these states feared that the Kurdish de facto state would have a 
dangerous effect on their own Kurdish people. Indeed, their fear was not totally 
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baseless, as establishment of the Kurdish de facto state was considered an 
achievement for Kurds everywhere. A CIA report issued in September 1992 noted:  
“The recent achievements of Kurds in northern Iraq have reinforced the 
commitment of politically active Kurds in Turkey to change their own 
status. Hoping to emulate the May elections in Iraq, some Turkish Kurdish 
activists… speak of holding unofficial “elections” in the southeast to form 
a local Kurdish parliament. Iranian Kurds have also become more active 
this summer, although not on a scale of their Iraqi and Turkish 
counterparts.”465 
The establishment of the Kurdish de facto state in time led Iran, Turkey and 
Syria to coordinate their policies in relation to Iraqi Kurds regardless of any 
differences they might have had on other issues. Thus, in November 1992, the 
foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Syria held a tripartite meeting in Ankara to 
discuss and coordinate their policies toward the KRI. Press statements made after 
the meeting are clearly indicative of the extent of the threat perceived by these 
states. Farouq al-Sharaa, the Foreign Minister of Syria, declared: 'There is currently 
a de facto situation in the form of a Kurdish federal state. This must be prevented. 
This is, in fact, the main goal of this meeting.”466 He further explained that “We are 
concerned about the transfer of this de facto partition of Iraq into a permanent 
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reality… We want to avoid a situation where this partition is inevitable."467 Citing the 
situation in northern Iraq as ‘chaotic’, the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, 
expressed concern that the creation of the Kurdish de facto state could “affect the 
national security of all our three countries,” while Hikmet Cetin, the Foreign Minister 
of Turkey explained that “'it was necessary for the countries of the region to consult 
with one another in connection with the region's status quo and developments in 
northern Iraq in particular.”468 
In these circumstance, a foreign policy of self-justification became a primary 
aim of the KRI leadership. Although, as stated before, the KRI leadership constantly 
reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq, the establishment of the KRI 
was seen by its antagonistic neighbours, and indeed the rest of the international 
community, as the foundation for a future independent Kurdish state.  As Voller 
notes, “the existence of the KRG was contested from its establishment… This 
objection has constantly threatened its already precarious existence. The lack of 
international legitimacy meant that the KRG faced a constant threat of destruction 
and forced reintegration into Iraq.”469 Now, the Kurdish leadership was not just 
concerned with protecting its personnel and fighters, more importantly, it needed to 
protect its domestic sovereignty and its newly-found territorial control in the shape of 
a de facto state. Thus, aware of the international normative changes following the 
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end of the Cold-War and the increased focus on democratization, the leading 
Kurdish nationalist political parties – the KDP and the PUK – attempted to convey a 
different international image of the Kurdish nationalist project, from one of being a 
nationalist project to one that is ostensibly a democratic project. In this context, the 
KRI leadership started to use a new discourse, describing their de facto state as 
“Free Kurdistan.”470 The apparent success of the Kurdish leadership to conduct free 
elections and set up a regional administration then prompted it to frequently use the 
discourse of “earned sovereignty,”471 stressing primarily its democratizing drive and 
its nascent state-building in free Kurdistan, as it came to be called by Kurdish 
nationalist elite and the Kurdish diaspora. 
Therefore, earned sovereignty entailing democratization and apparent 
successes in state-building, became central principles in the KRI’s construction of 
its “alternative legitimacy”472, to borrow a term from Madsen. The KRI leadership, 
instead of referring to the KRI as the nucleus of a future Kurdish state, began to 
denote the region as a democratic experiment in the heart of the Middle East worthy 
of Western protection and support. As Natali contends: 
“Taking advantage of the democratization efforts across the globe, and 
hoping to attract the political support of the West, former diasporic Kurds 
and the Kurdish nationalist elite redefined their government as an 
experiment in democracy. Kurdish nationalist organizations and 
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sentiment have become tied to Western liberal ideology, norms, and 
institutions… Since 1992 the KRG has transformed from a quasi-legal 
entity to a legitimate model of democracy in the Middle East”473 
Indeed, coming up with a new self-legitimizing strategy was not accidental. With the 
continual tensions between Saddam Hussein’s regime and the West, and the 
continuous protection offered by U.S. and British air forces stationed in Turkey, the 
KRI received a great deal of attention. The Kurdish leadership, primarily Barzani and 
Talabani, gained broad access to the international media. But still, lacking official 
diplomatic relations, the KDP and the PUK had to capitalize on any opportunity 
presented to inform the Western and international public opinion of their aspirations, 
goals and general developments in the region.   
Like the previous phase of the Kurdish national liberation movement, both 
Presidents Barzani and Talabani allowed easy access to journalists, academics, 
observers and indeed any civil society group visiting the KRI. As such, in the 
absence of official foreign relations, both presidents strived to use these means to 
legitimate the already precarious existence of the KRI. In this period of Kurdish 
history, legitimizing federalism in the eyes of the international community became 
the most vital goal of the KRI. Therefore, both presidents sent strong signals to the 
international community that federalism was not intended to be the foundation of a 
new and independent Kurdish state. In this regard, Barzani declared that: “a 
federation is a more advanced concept than autonomy but is not outside the 
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framework of Iraq”474 and that “We wish to maintain the unity of the state and build a 
democratic, parliamentary, and multiparty federation capable of strengthening rather 
than splitting Iraq... The decision is to stay in Iraq and keep it united.”475 Talabani, on 
the other hand, in a similar vein, declared that: “We will not set up a state in northern 
Iraq...This will be a new federal state.... For example, Germany is a federal state. 
Canada is . . . a federation.”476 
In addition, in order to extend its voice to Western governments, the Kurdish 
leadership successfully and skillfully benefited from access to influential think tanks 
based in Washington, London or other European capitals. Being unable to obtain 
accredited information from inside Iraq, due to the black-out imposed by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, the Kurdish leadership was allowed a welcome entrée to many 
think tanks with interest in the issues of Iraq and the Middle East. If think tanks were 
to function as institutions that perform research and study aimed at “seeking to 
inform and influence”477 foreign policy-makers, then the input provided by the KRI 
leadership as the only pro-West governing force within Iraq was of utmost 
importance. 
In its early interactions with the rest of the international community through 
think tanks, the KRI leadership increasingly began to employ the discourse of earned 
sovereignty, referring specifically to the Kurdistan Region as a democratic 
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experiment. For instance, in July 1992, the same month that the KRG was formed, 
President Talabani was invited to speak at a meeting held at the Washington-based 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before the enactment of the de facto 
state, in Washington or other capitals, the IKF leadership used to highlight Saddam 
Hussein’s violations of fundamental human rights and general suppression practiced 
against the Kurds in Iraq, i.e. focusing mostly on moral legitimacy.478 However, 
intending to self-legitimate and justify the existence of the KRI, Talabani on this 
occasion chose to focus on highlighting the KRI’s democratization incentives, 
referring 11 times to the democratic experiment in the KRI and the general 
democratic aspirations of the Kurdish people in Iraq.479  
Meanwhile, the association of democratization with the foreign policy of self-
justification becomes apparent in the statements made by Kurdish leaders to the 
media prior or after the elections. When launching the election campaign, for 
instance, Masoud Barzani, declared: 
“These elections should demonstrate to the entire world that when our 
people are given the chance, we can run our own affairs. The world should 
see that we know how to practice and entrench democracy, and how to 
live with the freedom and dignity which we have lacked so far because we 
have not been given a chance to exercise these rights.”480 
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That the elections and the practice of democracy became associated with the 
right to self-determination and Kurdish self-rule also becomes evident in Talabani’s 
post-election statements. In one instance, he insisted that he “'personally believe[d] 
that the elections proved that the Kurdish people are worthy of freedom and capable 
of engaging in democracy and the electoral process, despite the lack of experience,” 
and that “this people can exercise government in their region and that they deserve 
to enjoy the right to self-determination within a unified democratic Iraq.”481 
The strategy of utilizing the democratic experiment argument also became 
widespread in Kurdish responses to regional challenges. When regional neighbours 
convened repeatedly to coordinate their policies regarding the KRI, the Kurdish 
leadership, while not hiding its fears, constantly attempted to legitimize its existence, 
if not in the eyes of those states per se, then at least in the eyes of the powerful 
Western states. When Turkey, Iran and Syria convened in 1992, Hoshyar Zebari of 
the KDP, stated: “we fear regional collusion designed to suppress the Kurdish 
experiment. 
It is also remarkable that even during this early stage of the existence of the 
Kurdish de facto state, the KRI leadership sought to portray itself as a factor of 
stability, not instability, in the region. Most de facto states possess a negative image 
based on their territory becoming a heaven for illicit activities or sources of regional 
instability. Aware of this, the KRI sought early on to reassure regional states of its 
intention to be a source of stability. In a statement delivered by the KNA and 
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addressed to the parliaments of Turkey, Iran and Syria, the KNA stated that, “'we do 
not conceal our desire for these states to solve their problems with our Kurdish 
brothers in the spirit of the age, with a civilised, democratic mentality.”482 It also added 
that “We do not interfere and will not permit interference in the internal affairs of the 
neighbouring states in any way. The relations of these states with members of the 
Kurdish people in their territories are their affair.”483 
However, highlighting its democratization, successes in institution-building, 
and countering its image as a source of regional instability, were not guarantees for 
the continued existence of the Kurdish de facto state. The KRI was located in a tough 
geopolitical environment and it faced immense and complicating challenges from 
states that viewed the KRI as a security threat. Meanwhile, the KRI also suffered 
from the strong impulse of pan-Kurdism practiced as part of a bigger competition 
and rivalry with other Kurds in Greater Kurdistan. As relations with Turkey were the 
most fundamental for the continued survival of the KRI, the next section will examine 
relations with Turkey during this sensitive period of the KRI’s existence. 
 
4.4 Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Complexities and 
Opportunities 
During the long years of the Kurdish national struggle in Iraq, the Kurdish 
political parties established covert and overt relationships with Iran. Iran provided a 
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life-line and a sanctuary to the personnel and leadership of the Kurdish national 
liberation movement. Parties of the IKF, particularly the KDP and PUK, made 
alliances with Iran at different times to gain material, financial, political, military, and 
logistical support in their fight against the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
With the inception of the Kurdish de facto state in 1992, however, building 
foreign relations with Turkey gained a unique status for Kurdish political parties and 
the newly established KRG. Turkey instantly became a very important factor in the 
survival prospects of the Kurdish de facto state. There were several determinants 
prompting the Kurdish leadership to give primary importance to building foreign 
relations with Turkey: 
1-  Given the political and geostrategic tensions between Iran and the West, 
especially the United States, Iran took the second position in terms of its 
importance for the KRI. 
2- The geopolitics of the KRI, specifically its landlocked position with the 
entity being surrounded by the two largest powers in the Middle East 
region.  
3- Turkey is a U.S.-ally and the only member of NATO in the Middle East 
region.  
4- The fact that the U.S. acted as a semi-patron for the continuous survival 
of the KRI, and the continuous presence of the Western protectionist force 
on Turkish soil under the name Operation Poised Hammer. 
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5- International sanctions on Iraq, and Baghdad’s embargo against the KRI, 
enabled Turkey to be the KRI’s only supply route for goods and other 
commodities being provided to the local market. 
However, relations with Turkey was not free from complications. Turkey has 
a sizeable Kurdish minority and, since 1984, the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) has 
launched an insurgency against Turkish armed forces in southeast Turkey. The PKK 
has also benefited from the largely mountainous uninhabited areas between the 
Turkish-Iraqi (KRI) border to station its forces and launch cross-border attacks 
against the Turkish state.484 As one Turkish observer stated, “in Turkish security 
perceptions . . . northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey are the geographic and 
ethno-cultural extensions of each other.”485 Therefore, the Kurdish question in Turkey 
is not only a matter of domestic politics. On the contrary, for many years the domestic 
Kurdish issue has had far reaching implications on Turkey’s foreign policy both 
regionally and internationally. Put simply, as many Turkish observers have stated, 
since the founding of the Turkish republic the Kurdish question has occupied “a 
significant place in Turkish foreign policy,”486 which has led to the Kurdish question 
turning Turkish foreign policy “to security dominated policy preferences with 
international actors and neighboring countries.” 
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The creation of the KRI, on the southern Turkish border on a delimited territory 
semi cut-off from the rest of the country, created a dilemma for Turkish foreign policy-
makers. Turkey had highly significant economic, security, and political interests in 
Iraq that were affected by the creation of the Kurdish entity. In one sense, while 
President Ozal supported the idea of the ‘Safe Haven’, or even spearheaded its 
creation, he was caught off-guard when the Iraqi state withdrew from the region and 
the KRI was established. The establishment of the KRI was sure to have significant 
political ramifications on Turkey’s domestic politics. The first sign of this emerged 
when, during the Kurdish new year (Nawroz) celebrations on 21 March 1992 in 
Turkey, violent clashes erupted between Turkish Kurds and Turkish security forces, 
perhaps due to the rising tide of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and the attempt by 
Turkish Kurds to emulate the success of the Iraqi Kurdistan national liberation 
movement in self-governance.487 
Historically speaking, Turkey and Iraq had enjoyed relatively good relations 
since their formation in the aftermath of the First World War. At least during the 1980s 
both states enjoyed good relations on the basis of identical domestic and foreign 
policy objectives. Indeed, Iraq enjoyed smoother relations with Turkey than most of 
its immediate neighbours such as Iran and Syria. There were economic, geopolitical, 
political and ideological factors prompting Turkey and Iraq to maintain positive 
foreign relations with each other. Domestically, both states faced the strong impulse 
of Kurdish nationalism. Externally, both viewed the Shiite Iran and the Alvei-
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controlled state of Syria as enemy states.488 Thus foreign policy objectives of both 
countries coincided to a large extent. During the twenty-century, the Saadabad Pact 
of 1937 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 represented two early regional security 
alliances further consolidating the regional alliance of Iraq and Turkey under British 
tutelage. Moreover, during the 1980s, Iraq allowed Turkey to conduct hot pursuit 
military operations inside Iraq against PKK militants.489 Iraq and Turkey also had 
deep economic interests. During the war with Iran, Iraq relied completely on the 
Turkish outlet for its energy transportation from Kirkuk to Yumurtalik, on the Turkish 
Mediterranean coast, that delivered half of Iraq’s oil to international markets.490 
Indeed, following the severance of Iraqi relations with Syria and the closure of Iraqi-
Syrian pipeline by Damascus in 1982, and the insecure nature of oil transportation 
through Shatt al-Arab for Iraq due to its proximity to Iran, Turkey remained Iraq’s 
only secure oil outlet to the international markets. Politically and ideologically, while 
both governments in Iraq and Turkey claimed secular credentials and opposed 
political Islam, and the fact that both governments belonged to the Sunni branch of 
Islam created a certain bond between both regimes.491 
The invasion of Kuwait by the forces of GOI, and the subsequent creation of 
the Kurdish de facto state, resulted in the gradual dismantling of the essential pillars 
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of Turkey-Iraqi relations. This dismantlement gradually forced Turkey to build close 
foreign relations with Kurdish political parties. The economic component of the 
relations between Iraq and Turkey was the first to suffer as the result of the First Gulf 
War. Morton Abramowitz, a former American Ambassador in Turkey, claims that 
despite Turkey’s immense loss of dividends from the oil transportation fees, on 8 
August 1990, President Ozal ordered the closing down of the strategic Iraqi-
Yumurtalik oil pipeline, even before President Bush Sr had asked, thereby causing 
a major blow to the Turkish economy, but a warming of relations with the United 
States.492 Losing a lucrative export market in Iraq and Syria, invisible exports and 
pipeline royalties, it is estimated that Turkey incurred around $2.0 billion to $2.5 
billion of lost revenue per year.493 After the war, as the consequence of sanctions on 
Iraq, Turkey aimed to recover some of its losses by allowing smuggled Iraqi oil, 
emanating from the KRI, to reach Turkey through the Ibrahim-Khalil-Habur border 
crossing between Iraq (the border controlled by the KRI) and Turkey. While the oil 
business was not compensating for Turkey’s huge revenue loss, it benefited the KRI 
politically as it forced Turkey to initiate direct ties with the KRI, granting the latter a 
degree of much-needed legitimacy,494 and foreign ties. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly for the development of relations between Turkey and the Kurdish de 
facto state, the Kurdish uprising, and the withdrawal of the Iraqi state from a portion 
of its territory in the north meant that Iraq was no longer the master of the common 
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borders between the two countries. This new reality thereby tacitly prompted or even 
forced Ankara to initiate ties with Kurdish political parties for the attainment of several 
foreign policy interests Turkey had in the region.495 
Turkey had two parallel or even conflicting interests following creation of the 
KRI. One the one hand, as Asa Lundgren notes, Ankara had to interact with the KRI 
to preserve its vital interests in the region, most importantly, the prevention of 
transformation of the de facto state into a de jure independent state, which it was 
thought would have destabilizing ramifications on Turkey’s own Kurds. On the other 
hand, while Turkey withheld granting de facto recognition to the KRI and its official 
institutions, it still had to interact regularly with Kurdish political leadership. Turkey's 
formal and regular relations with the KRI and its political parties indeed produced a 
different outcome from the one Turkey's foreign policy-makers had intended. If 
Turkey’s intention was to prevent the existence of a Kurdish de facto state on its 
border, it policies and interactions not only helped the creation of a de facto state, 
but also in effect strengthened its survival prospects.496 
For the KRI leadership, relations with Turkey were probably the single most 
important foreign relations with an outside entity after the West. Indeed, the very 
survivability of the KRI to a large degree depended on Turkey's good will. In 
consequence, if, prior to 1991, the Kurdish political parties relied on Iran to acquire 
logistical, military, and political support, then after the establishment of the KRI, 
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Turkey replaced Iran as the most important country for the KRI. Statements by 
Kurdish leaders vividly reflect this fact. Barzani, for instance, stated, “We consider 
relations with Turkey to be extremely vital.”497 Hoshyar Zebari, the head of Foreign 
Relations Office of the KDP, further explained that: 
“Turkey is our lifeline to the West and the whole world in our fight against 
Saddam Hussein. We are able to secure allied air protection and 
international aid through Turkey's cooperation. If Poised Hammer (OPC) 
is withdrawn, Saddam's units will again reign in this region and we will 
lose everything.498 
Interestingly, prior to the establishment of the KRI, Turkey lifted its long-time 
policy of no contact with Iraqi Kurdish parties. During the hectic period of the Kurdish 
uprising, President Ozal played an important role in shifting Turkey’s foreign policy 
towards engagement with the Kurds in Iraq. Ozal’s rapprochement with Iraqi Kurds 
was the result of geopolitical, political and strategic alterations following the end of 
the Cold-War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the destruction of the military and 
economic power of Iran and Iraq after eight years of war raised Turkey to the level 
of an eminent regional power and President Ozal of Turkey was determined to make 
use of this newly emerged international context.499  
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Moreover, according to Cengiz Candar, President Ozal was a visionary man 
who foresaw the great geopolitical transformations occurring in the Middle East 
region, particularly in Iraq. He realized that the central government in Iraq would not 
be able to reimpose its hegemony or revert to the pre-war status quo following its 
defeat in the Gulf War. He also realized that Iraq would either descend toward 
fragmentation or, even if Iraq remained as a territorial whole, it would be divided into 
several autonomous units. In these circumstances, Ozal thought that Turkey would 
have to engage with the powers on the ground in order to prevent states hostile to 
Turkey gaining a foothold in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan; an area bordering Turkey. Ozal 
also predicted that if Saddam Hussein’s regime fell, the Iraqi Arab Shiite community, 
who are religiously and ideologically closer to Iraq, would assume power in Bagdad 
based on their numerical majority. Thus, in Ozal’s thinking, geopolitical and political 
imperatives dictated that Turkey should get closer not only to Turkomans in Iraq, but 
also with the Kurds in Iraq.500 Former President Ozal, who was nicknamed as ‘the 
Sultan’ for his Ottomanist orientations, also contemplated the idea of 
decentralization measures for Turkey’s Kurds as the best possible means to 
preserve the unity of the Turkish republic.501 
The first sign of policy change towards the Kurds of Iraq began appearing on 
the eve of the March uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. After intensive back-door 
diplomacy, President Ozal met both Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, in 
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Ankara in March 1991. In the meetings, Turkey aimed to deliver two messages to 
the Kurdish leadership. First, the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity was a top 
priority for Turkey even in the event of the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. 
Second, Turkey did not object to the idea of an Iraqi federation with self-government 
for the Kurds of Iraq.502  
However, given the fact that Turkish domestic politics were very strongly 
entwined with its foreign policies, President Ozal faced intense internal criticism from 
the military establishment as well opposition parties. President Ozal had to carefully 
balance his foreign policy goals with Turkish domestic considerations. In view of this, 
Ozal promptly affirmed Turkish opposition towards the dismemberment of Iraq, while 
emphasizing the importance of the Kurds in the new geopolitical landscape. Ozal 
clearly recognized that times had changed: “Everyone meets with these leaders, if 
we don’t meet, we won’t be able to control what is happening, we will be left off the 
stage”503 was his response to a country used to seeing all Kurdish leaders as 
enemies of the Turkish state. For this reason, Ozal stated that “There is nothing to 
be afraid of talking… We must be friends with them [the Kurds of Iraq]. If we become 
enemies, others can use them against us.”504 Moreover, Ozal declared that “it must 
be made clear that those in the Iraqi Kurdish area are relatives of Turkish citizens. 
So the borders are to some extent artificial, dividing people into two sections.”505 To 
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show Turkish good-will and to buy Iraqi Kurdish cooperation, in one instance Turkey 
even provided the sum of US$13.5 million in aid to the KRI.506 On the other hand, the 
Kurdish leadership viewed with favour and reacted favorably to President Ozal’s 
change in its foreign policies toward the Kurds of Iraq. The Kurdish delegation 
believed that it had scored a great victory when Turkey lifted its no-contact policy 
with the Iraqi Kurds, showed flexibility in regard to the Kurdish objective of creating 
a federation in Iraq and that, with time, Turkey would adopt more favourable policies 
towards the KRI. Talabani, in this regard, stated that “a new page had been turned 
in relations between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq.”507 For the Kurds, Talabani 
declared, “the most significant result… was Turkey’s lifting its objection to the 
establishment of direct relations between the Kurdish front in Iraq and the United 
States…Turkey has for years been putting forth effective and significant obstacles 
to the struggle we have been waging in northern Iraq… I believe that we were able 
to convince them that we do not pose a threat to Turkey… Our goal is to establish a 
federation of Arabs, Turkomans, and Kurds.”508 
However, despite President Ozal’s open policy and contacts with Iraqi Kurds, 
the establishment of the KRI and the declaration of federation caused much anxiety 
and fear in Turkey. Turkey’s foreign policy-makers saw the Kurdish parties’ resolve 
to upgrade Kurds’ demands to that of federation as going ‘one step further’509 beyond 
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the 1970 Autonomy Agreement between the GOI and the people of northern Iraq 
and Turkey opposed it on the ground that it “may result in the division and partition 
of Iraq.”510 Moreover, when discussing the issue of recognizing, or at least, de facto 
recognition of the KRI, one Turkish official stated, “we are not recognizing the so-
called government they established.”511 For Turkish foreign policy-makers, the three 
Kurdish provinces in Iraq now under the territorial control of the KRI were part and 
parcel of the Iraqi territory, and hence not necessitating a different arrangement 
outside the framework of Iraq’s consensus. As one Turkish official commented: 
“If Iraq cannot exercise its sovereignty there, it is a temporary situation 
which unfolded after 1991. But as far as we are concerned, that part of 
Iraq is a territory of the Republic of Iraq and it should remain so.”512 
Moreover, from the Turkish perspective, there were no legal impediments to 
the central GOI providing essential services to the three Kurdish provinces in the 
north of Iraq, as the area was still under Iraqi sovereignty and the GOI was obligated 
to provide services to its population in the north. The Turkish perspective stemmed 
from the realization that the continued survival of the KRI and absence of the GOI 
was an essential element that would, with time, accrue further legitimacy to the KRI. 
Therefore, as Asa Lundgren notes, Turkish foreign policy-makers constantly looked 
at the KRI as a sui generis situation and a power vacuum. One Turkish official stated 
“we see the situation in northern Iraq as an extraordinary situation and every 
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arrangement realized in northern Iraq as temporary.”513 More interestingly, Turkey 
did not wholeheartedly accept the Kurdish strategy of labelling the KRI as a 
democratic experiment in its pursuit of international legitimacy. A Turkish foreign 
ministry official said:  
“You can not declare a democratic Iraq by dividing your country. And 
democracy is not something that can be transplanted into one corner of 
the country and isolated there…So by saying that you have democratic 
institutions in your area, in the final analysis, does not mean too much. 
The goal is to have similar institutions, similar approach, similar 
understanding in all of Iraq.”514 
 
Despite all this, Turkey seemed to show understanding and a degree of 
tolerance towards the KRI. When the KNA announced federation as a mechanism 
of relations between the KRI and the GOI, Suleyman Demirel, then the prime 
minister of Turkey, announced that “'We do not approve of such an action that may 
result in the division and partition of Iraq.”515 Demirel further elaborated that “A 
federated state is a stage ... on the way to an independent state.”516 However, 
Demirel also had a conciliatory statement when further discussing the issue of 
federation implying an implicit acceptance of the Kurdish de facto state: “Actually, 
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there is a very complicated situation here with the people of North Iraq that does not 
fit into the black-white synthesis…  Shouldn't we prefer their being called federated 
to being called dead? ... Okay, I'm not comfortable calling them federal, but I would 
have felt worse if they had died.”517 
Therefore, Turkey periodically extended the mandate of the Western military 
forces based in Turkey under the rubric of the OPC. The maintenance of Western 
military protection in Turkey was crucial to the continued survival of the KRI. 
However, after 1992, the issue of extension of the OPC became hotly debated within 
the Turkish political establishment. Primarily because the Kurdish entity could 
survive due to the Western protective force in Turkey, the Turkish political 
establishment was wary of extending its mandate. Many Opposition figures such as 
Kenan Evren, journalists, the military establishment and several political parties 
objected to the extension of the OPC. Many in the Turkish political establishment 
feared that the KRI might acquire state attributes and the continued provision of 
protection would enable the Kurdish region to secede from Iraq.518  
However, Turkey’s top leadership and the foreign ministry understood the 
importance of the presence of OPC on Turkish soil. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel 
in explaining his acceptance for the extension of the OPC (under the title of 
Operation Poised Hammer in June 1992) stated “This ... is a force which says, ‘I am 
here' in order to prevent the people who have been subjected to Saddam Hussein's 
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tyranny in the past from falling into new difficulties… We cannot watch another 
Halabja [the site of one of Saddam's most notorious chemical gas attacks against 
the Kurds in August 1988].”519 However, under the guise of moral reasons there were 
very practical reasons why Turkey allowed the presence of OPC on its soil. While in 
fact the no-fly zone was reinforcing the KRI, its expulsion from Turkey would have 
simply led to its relocation somewhere else in the region, thereby causing Turkey to 
lose any influence it had over political developments in the Kurdish entity. Moreover, 
as Henri Barkey explains, Turkey’s top decision-makers were careful not to 
jeopardize its strategic relationship with the United States, particularly if Saddam’s 
forces moved against the Kurds in northern Iraq and the consequences of that in 
terms of generating a new wave of Kurdish refugees towards the Turkish border.520 
In return, the U.S. also appreciated its strategic relations with Turkey, the help 
Turkey afforded in the Second Gulf War, Turkish continued cooperation in 
maintaining the ‘no-fly’ zone and the economic losses incurred by Turkey during the 
War.521 
Perhaps unintentionally, Turkey more than any other state, contributed to 
strengthening the survival prospects of the KRI, both politically and economically. 
Through Turkish cooperation, both Presidents Talabani and Barzani travelled and 
began meeting and negotiating with foreign governments without any control or 
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influence from Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Turkish foreign ministry acknowledged the 
role Turkey played in the political and economic survival of the KRI. A Turkish official 
stated that: “one must remember that the level of security, democracy, freedom and 
economic prosperity the Iraqis are enjoying in the north today are largely due to 
Turkey's protective umbrella.”522 
Indeed, this thesis argues that during this period, relations between Turkey 
and the KRI can be characterized as state-to-political party, or government-to-
political party relations. Turkey did not officially extend any sort of recognition to the 
KRI, seeing the situation in Iraq as temporary. Still, Turkey had to preserve its 
interests and therefore establishing relations with Kurdish political leaders was 
perceived as significant to Turkish foreign policy-makers. Therefore, Turkey 
maintained separated relations or contacts with Iraqi Kurdish political parties, 
principally the KDP and the PUK. A Chatham House report vividly demonstrates the 
constraints on the KRI’s foreign relations and opportunities presented to Kurdish 
parties by stating that during this period: 
“The KRG did not constitute the principal foreign policy voice of the 
Kurdistan Region…Instead, the foreign relations of the Kurdistan Region 
were the preserve of the KDP and PUK, each of which maintained its own 
set of relationships with regional and international actors. This made 
sense in the 1990s: the Kurdistan Region and the KRG had only de facto 
standing in the international community, with the region being an 
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‘unrecognised state’ or ‘de facto state’, existing outside the international 
state system, and thus constituting a challenge, or even threat, to other 
states whose internal dynamics and conditions were similar to those 
inside Iraq. For other states, dealing with the KRG would have implied 
recognizing its legitimacy, and even sovereignty, over the autonomous 
region; dealing with the representatives of the KDP and PUK, even if they 
were the same as KRG representatives, was quite acceptable.'523  
Thus, in one of its first acts after the initiation of the relations, Turkey invited both 
parties to open representative offices in Ankara. Saffen Dizayee, who was appointed 
as the KDP representative, played a key role in strengthening the emerging relations 
with Turkey. Dizayye was frequently in contact with the Turkish political 
establishment responding to enquiries and delivering messages between the two 
sides.524 He noted that President Ozal was a visionary in predicting the great 
geopolitical changes in the region and the Kurds of Iraq responded in kind, 
attempting to blossom their relations with Turkey. Turkey, Saffen Dizayee notes, 
granted increasing freedom to the KDP representative, allowing him to meet Turkish 
foreign ministry officials and foreign diplomats in Ankara, as well as providing police 
protection and special (though not diplomatic) registration plates. However, 
intending to counter its image of being a source of instability in the region, Saffen 
Dizayee stressed that “the KDP representation made sure not to take advantage of 
Turkish hospitability; for example, on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, the KDP said the 
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solution must be democratic and non-violent.'525 
Meanwhile, as stated before, the power of Kurdish transnationalism 
represented a significant complicating factor for Kurdish leaders. On the one hand, 
the survival prospects of the KRI, at least partly, depended on Turkish good will. The 
need to preserve the newly-acquired territorial control, de facto independence under 
international protection and, indeed, the domestic sovereignty of the KRI, was 
forcing KRI leaders to distance themselves from the idealist and unrealistic concepts 
of pan-Kurdism, which thought of Greater Kurdistan as the Kurdish homeland 
requiring the assistance of all Kurds for its liberation. For KRI leaders, having 
established domestic sovereignty over a big portion of their claimed territory, state-
and institution-building had replaced warfare, and thus fighting the surrounding large 
states was not an option. On the other hand, Iraqi Kurdish political leaders became 
the subject of a vicious propaganda campaign emanating from the PKK or indeed 
other parties in Greater Kurdistan or abroad. This propaganda depicted these 
leaders as traitors that had sold the cause of Kurdish nationalism in favour of gaining 
material and financial rewards. 
In time, intra-Kurdish disputes led to the intensification of relations with the 
Turkey-based PKK. Prior to 1991, the leading Iraqi Kurdish political parties had 
experienced fluctuating relations with the PKK.526 The establishment of the KRI, 
however, had brought forward new issues that ultimately led to confrontation 
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between Iraqi Kurdish political parties and the PKK. After 1991, and the 
establishment of the KRI, the PKK sought to exploit the vacuum left by the withdrawal 
of the Iraqi army and set up new bases in the mountainous border areas between 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran; areas which Iraqi Kurds lacked the manpower to control, or 
were so remote that no large Iraqi Kurdish settlements existed. The PKK started 
increasingly to use its bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan to launch cross-border attacks 
against Turkish security forces, in response to which Turkey’s military either 
bombarded or conducted military incursions in pursuit of PKK fighters inside Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Turkey also placed increasing pressure on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to 
help stop the PKK’s attacks against Turkish forces.527 
Further complicating matters, the PKK directly encroached on the newly-
acquired Kurdish domestic sovereignty and conceivably threatened its experiment 
in democracy. Fuad Masum, the prime minister of the KRG, claimed that “the PKK 
is collaborating with Iraqi officials” to destroy the nascent Kurdish de facto state.528 
He further claimed that “the Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian governments help the PKK 
against the Iraqi Kurdish movement… because they do not want our parliamentary 
and governmental experiment to be successful.”529  To remedy the threat emanating 
from the PKK, Kurdish political parties requested suspension of the PKK's activity 
against Turkey or withdrawal from Iraqi Kurdistan. In these tense circumstances, and 
to avoid the shadow of a costly war, Talabani tried to act as a mediator between the 
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PKK and Turkey by arguing that “PKK must respond positively to Ozal's statement 
[on implementing Kurdish rights in Turkey] by halting its armed activities and by 
looking for a dialogue with the Turkish government.”530 
The PKK, however, refused to neither halt its attacks nor withdraw its fighters 
from the region, and a series of accusations and counter-accusations ensued 
between Iraqi Kurdish parties and the PKK.531 The desire to maintain Turkish 
cooperation in protection of the Kurdish de facto state prompted the KRI to issue a 
warning to the PKK to the effect that “if it failed to cease activities against Turkey, it 
would be purged from the region."532 As tensions escalated, the PKK in July 1992 
enforced another economic blockade on the region by blocking the only road from 
Turkey into the KRI, thus exacerbating the effects of the double economic embargos 
on the Kurdish region.  
Statements issued by KRI leaders clearly marked the increasing sense of fear 
felt toward the perceived threat to domestic sovereignty, state-building prospects 
and international legitimacy of the KRI. Reiterating the threat posed by the PKK to 
the sovereignty and government of the KRI, Barzani declared that: 
“Ocalan's men acted as if they were the authorities and started to control 
roads and collect taxes… Ocalan's men threated to expel the government 
and parliament from Irbil. They said they would hang all those 'who sold 
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out the homeland'. They even threatened to expel us from Dahuk and al-
Sulimaniyah and started to from espionage, terrorism, and sabotage 
networks inside cities. It has unequivocally been proven that they are 
conspiring and planning to undermine the existing situation in Kurdistan 
and its experiment [the de facto Kurdish government and state in northern 
Iraq].”533  
Talabani echoed Barzani's comments stating that: 
“The PKK members claimed that they intended to establish a 
revolutionary authority and described the Kurdistan Front as a 
treacherous establishment… They also said that they themselves would 
establish a state to replace the front. They failed to establish a 
government in Botan [southeastern Turkey] Turkey. Therefore, they 
planned to establish a government on our behalf in Bahdinan [northern 
Iraq].”534 
Meanwhile, Jawhar Namiq, the Speaker of the KNA, declared at a Paris 
Conference in November 1992 that the leadership of the KRI was not prepared to 
sacrifice “a free Kurdistan, with freely elected political institutions… for the death of 
two Turkish gendarmes that does not bring much.”535 
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The PKK, however, refused to cooperate with regional leaders in any 
meaningful way. Thus, on 4 October 1992, KDP and PUK Peshmerga fighters 
launched a major attack against the PKK. Iraqi Kurds also quietly allowed an 
estimated 20,000 Turkish troops into the KRI to assist, or join in, the fight against 
PKK fighters.536 Launching the attacks occurred on the same day that federalism was 
announced as the present Kurdish nationalist goal in Iraq. This Iraqi Kurdish tactic 
was noticed by the Turkish government and observers following developments in the 
region. Turkish Prime Minister in 1992, Suleyman Demirel, believed that “it was no 
coincidence that the war begun by the peshmerga against the PKK coincided with 
proclamation of this state.”537 Bengio, a long-time observer of Kurdish politics, noted 
“the Iraqi Kurds, probably hoping to gain Turkey's tacit support for their autonomy – 
an idea that frightened Turkey as much as it did Iraq, if no more so – were willing to 
pay the only price that might appease the Turkish government; namely, cooperation 
in combating the PKK.”538 Journalist William Safire, an American conservative and a 
long-time supporter of Kurds, in a similar vein argued that: 
“Cooperating with Turkey to the north, where 10 million Kurds live, 
Peshmerga fighters behind Masoud Barzani successfully took on the 
Marxist terrorist Kurds. This help removes Turkish fears of a territorial 
threat from an autonomous region that might turn into an independent 
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country called Kurdistan.”539 
The Iraqi Kurds were provided with additional tools to ensure the survival of 
their entity and to expand their foreign relations. One of the most important tools 
during this sensitive period was the involvement of the major KRI parties in the 
framework and politics of opposition to Iraq. The next section thus examines Iraqi 
Kurdish involvement under the umbrella of Iraqi opposition. 
 
4.5 Iraqi Kurdish Foreign Relations and Iraqi Opposition 
In the aftermath of the creation of the KRI, Iraqi Kurdish involvement in the 
framework of Iraqi opposition was seen vital by the KRI leadership for continued 
survival of the Kurdish de facto state. Although the emergence of the KRI was a 
direct consequence of international humanitarian protection, its existence was 
contested from its establishment. The KRI leadership constantly expressed its 
respect of the territorial integrity of Iraq, and yet the KRI was still seen by its 
antagonistic neighbours and the international community as at least the first step 
toward an independent state. Therefore, the involvement of Iraqi Kurdish parties 
within the framework of Iraqi opposition served multiple purposes. On the one hand, 
Iraqi Kurdish involvement in the opposition of Iraq could send a signal to hostile 
neighbours and the international community that the KRI intended to remain part of 
                                            





Iraq, and it did not entertain any secessionist tendencies. On the other hand, the 
opposition of Iraq could serve as a vehicle for the KRI leadership to build and 
strengthen its foreign relations, in the process assisting the continued survival of the 
Kurdish de facto state. 
However, like foreign relations with Turkey, the Kurdish political parties – not 
the KRG – became formal participants in the different groupings of Iraqi opposition. 
Still, the important geopolitical position of the KRI, in the foreign policy strategies of 
states hostile to the regime of Saddam Hussein, served the KRI in its survival 
policies. Kurdish political leaders had territorial control over a portion of Iraqi territory 
in the north which could then act as a base for various activities against the regime 
of Saddam Hussein. The KRI also could serve as an alternative political system, 
threatening the authoritarian one-man rule practiced in the rest of Iraq, and an ally 
in the U.S.-led initiatives to counter or remove the regime in Baghdad. 
Despite the overwhelming defeat of Iraq in the Second Gulf War, the regime 
of Saddam Hussein remained intact. While the Bush Sr administration remained 
committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq, it sought to destabilize, and eventually 
replace, the regime of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, President Bush Sr’s declarations 
that “normal Iraqi relations with the US will be difficult, in fact impossible with Saddam 
Hussein still in power”, and that the U.S. seeks an alternative regime that would be 
“compatible with the Western powers”,540 are indicative of the U.S resolve to replace 
the regime of Saddam Hussein.  Moreover, many high-ranking officials in the Bush 
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Sr administration believed that “Saddam saw the end of the Cold War as an 
opportunity to pursue his own expansionism.”541 The U.S. suspicions of Iraq's WMD 
and Iraq's hostility towards Israel led U.S. officials to be convinced of “Saddam’s 
inability to be used [any longer] as a stability card for American interests.”542 
The KDP and PUK had already become active members of the Iraqi 
opposition when, in March 1991, they participated in a conference in Beirut that 
culminated in the forming of the Free Iraqi Council. Following this conference, a 
second conference was held in Vienna, Austria, between 16th and 19th June 1992 
that set the foundation for the creation of an Iraqi National Congress (INC). The 
conference chose a national assembly of 87 members that allocated 23 seats for the 
Kurdish political parties and personalities. During this conference, the Kurds 
demanded recognition of both their right of self-determination and stipulation of the 
view that the unity of Iraq is voluntary. in return for the Kurds’ participation within the 
opposition.543 However, the real foundations of the INC were created in October 
1992, at the third opposition conference, which took place in the KRI in the town of 
Salahaddin, just north of the Kurdish regional capital in Erbil, and the location of the 
headquarters of the KDP. As well as expanding the membership of the opposition 
national assembly to 234 people, the conference established a three-man 
presidential council in charge of international relations that gave the Kurdish seat to 
Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP, as well as establishing a 26-member 
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executive council that allocated 6 seats to the Kurds.544 On the question of 
federalism, the Kurds took a great step forward when both Talabani and Barzani 
publicly advocated federalism as the basis of their future relations with any new 
government in Baghdad. Given the relative strength of the Kurds ,due to their 
territorial control under international auspices, most of the attendees at the 
Salahaddin conference came to accept the view that the Kurds “have special 
national and ethnic characteristics… and approved the right of the Kurds to 
determine their future without secession and within the framework of the single Iraqi 
homeland.”545 Moreover, the Salahaddin conference “fixed Vienna’s conclusions, 
organized the Iraqi opposition and set the Kurdish status in the post-Saddam era ... 
[it also] ratified the Resolution on Federal Law passed by the Kurdish parliament.”546 
The conference also ratified a resolution stating “The [INC] respects the methods of 
the Kurdish people to determine their future relations with the other partners of the 
motherland.”547 
Peter Galbraith managed to transfer to the U.S. captured Iraqi documents 
chronicling atrocities committed against the Kurdish people in Iraq. The documents 
became the legislative files of the U.S. Congress Foreign Relations Committee. 
Galbraith authorized the Human Rights Watch to conduct research on the 
documents. as well as on captured videotapes, coupled with personal interviews and 
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forensic reports.548 In 1994, the Human Rights Watch produced an authoritative 
report in which the crimes perpetuated against the Kurdish people in Iraq were 
recognized as a crime of genocide.549 The formal publication of genocide details by 
a reputable international organization gave further legitimacy to the existence of the 
KRI. These public and official revelations also enhanced U.S. claims about the need 
to change the regime in Baghdad. The revelations also enhanced the ability of the 
Kurdish leadership to promote its remedial right to secession and self-determination, 
which was expressed in the form of a Kurdish right to possess a federal unit within 
the parameters of the Iraqi state. 
Indeed, the fact that Kurdish involvement in the Iraqi opposition was 
recognized as significant in strengthening the survival prospects of the KRI was 
reflected in the new political discourse of Kurdish political parties. The Kurds aligned 
their policies with those of the Iraqi opposition: based on Federalism for Kurdistan, 
Democracy for Iraq. Michael Gunter, an academic and frequent writer on Kurdish 
issues, noted the slogans pronounced at the KDP’s 11th congress held in Erbil in 
1993. Among the slogans read on the banners were ‘Peace, Freedom, Democracy’, 
‘The INC is a Viable Alternative to Dictatorship.’550 These slogans clearly reflected 
that the Kurds hoped to achieve meaningful autonomy and, in the process, ensure 
the survival of the KRI through portraying the Kurdistan Region as an experiment in 
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democracy, and the desire to remain a part of a democratic Iraq through cooperating 
with Iraqi opposition. 
As part of the INC, and actively cooperating with efforts to remove the regime 
of Saddam Hussein, Kurdish political parties also received much-needed financial 
aid, necessary to run the governance affairs in the KRI. The first direct meeting 
between the U.S. State Department and the Kurdish leadership took place on 25 
April 1991, followed by another in May 1991, when the Kurdish delegation met with 
the Assistant Secretary of the Middle East Department.551 Initially the U.S. 
administration of Bush Sr hoped to topple the regime of Saddam via a coup strategy. 
Indeed, just two months after the collapse of the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings, the 
U.S. administration forwarded an intelligence finding to the U.S. Congress, justifying 
the allocation of $15-$20 million dollars to clandestinely cultivate ties with military 
and security officials in Iraq.552 However, according to Kenneth Katzman, in the last 
months of his presidency, the Bush Sr administration decided to shift policy in favour 
of supporting diverse opposition groups in Iraq, instead of the coup strategy the 
administration had previously adopted in Iraq.553 The CIA revelations about 
Saddam’s attempt to assassinate President Bush Sr during his visit to Kuwait, and 
the overall U.S. belief that Saddam was not a reliable partner in its Middle East 
policy, prompted the U.S. to seek other methods, including enabling the Iraqi 
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opposition to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, in July 1992, the US 
Congress allocated US$40 million to the Kurds as part of a strategy to empower the 
Iraqi opposition and to run an anti-Saddam radio station.554 
Yet, despite that, the Kurdish de facto state had to operate under extremely 
difficult geopolitical conditions. Regardless of their overt differences on practically 
every other matter, Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq staunchly agreed to prevent the 
consolidation of the nascent Kurdish entity in Iraq. Perhaps Talabani’s statement 
that ‘we are an island surrounded by hostile countries’555 best summarizes the 
geopolitical constraints placed upon the Kurds. 
The INC served as a vehicle for U.S. support and Kurdish involvement within 
the Iraqi opposition proved to be instrumental in enhancing Kurdish foreign relations 
and the de facto state’s chances of survival. As members of the Iraqi opposition, 
Barzani, Talabani and other Kurdish officials had become personae gratae in several 
Western and regional capitals. Jalal Talabani met in London with the late King 
Hussein of Jordan, in an apparent move by the late King to distance himself from 
Saddam, whom he had supported during the Second Gulf War.556 Moreover, after 
the defection to Jordan of Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s cousin and son-in-law, and the 
person in charge of Iraq's secret armaments, King Hussein publicly declared his 
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willingness to convene a meeting of the Iraqi opposition in Amman – and to play “a 
decisive role to rid the Iraqi people of Saddam and the likes of Hussein Kamel.”557 
Saudi Arabia, the strongest Arab regional ally of the U.S., also became involved in 
organizing the opposition. Saudi officials invited leaders of the Kurdish political 
parties to their capital to discuss the broadening of Iraqi opposition and coordinating 
anti-Saddam activities between Kurds, Turkey, and Syria.558  
Hence, the Kurds also attempted to break out of their geopolitical conundrum 
by searching for allies in the wider region and in international arenas. The leadership 
of the KRI tried to build foreign relations with as many states as possible, with a 
particular focus on those regional states with no Kurdish minorities. Thus, on 8 March 
1993, Talabani visited Kuwait, and from there he declared that "the two fraternal 
people of Iraq and Kuwait," who were both suffering from Saddam's "despicable 
dictatorship," continued to be major allies against him.  Afterwards, when a Kuwaiti 
delegation visited both Barzani and Talabani in Kurdistan, Kuwait pledged to provide 
the sum of $3 million in humanitarian aid to the KRI.559 Talabani also tried to enlist 
the support of world Jewry and Israel through an article published in Yedi' ot Ahranot 
by a reporter who had visited Kurdistan. In the meantime, fearing being labelled as 
traitors, or attempting to create a second Israel in the Middle East, Talabani refuted 
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claims of the presence of Israeli experts in Kurdistan, but stressing Kurdish legitimate 
rights to have relations with Israel, just as Egypt or Palestinians did.560 
Realizing that the regional states would not be so supportive of the Kurds of 
Iraq, if indeed at all sincere, given the domestic constrain of popular Arab fraternity 
and unity, the Kurdish leadership attempted to rally the support of the international 
community, particularly Western great powers. The West was a major source of 
support and legitimacy for the KRI and building and enhancing relations with the 
United States, Britain and France, the three Western permanent members of the 
UNSC, and other Western governments, was essential to the survival of the KRI. In 
London, Barzani and Talabani met with Prime Minister John Major  in February 1992 
and, in Washington, they with met the US Secretary of State James Baker.561 
Talabani and Barzani also visited the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, where they 
were received by President Francois Mitterrand. In the meeting, Mitterrand 
reaffirmed “the Kurdish people’s rights within the framework of a federation in a 
united and democratic Iraq.”562 Kurdish political parties have had historical relations 
with the Socialist Party of France, and the wider Socialist International,563 since the 
early days of the KDP’s formation in 1946.564 The PUK is an official member of the 
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Socialist International.565 Historically, relations between Mitterrand’s socialist party 
and the Kurds of Iraq were apparent when Mustafa Barzani sent Kurdish delegations 
to Paris in search of support during the 1960s.566 France had played an important 
role in initiating the UNSC Resolution 688 and establishment of the no-fly zone and 
Safe Haven for the Kurds in Iraq.567  
However, for all their political aspirations, the West remained ambivalent 
toward the Kurds. The Western allies, as Bengio notes, had two conflicting foreign 
policy objectives with regard to the KRI. On the one hand, they sought to use the 
Kurdish card as a tool for maintaining pressure on, and destabilizing, the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. Thus, the official receptions afforded to Barzani and Talabani were 
designed to send a signal and exert pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein. On 
the other hand, fearing partition of Iraq and paying lip-service to the territorial integrity 
of Iraq, the West continued to see the KRI through aa traditional lens, of a 
humanitarian intervention in support of the Kurds. Western governments sought to 
limit the effect of Kurdish autonomy and refused to interact with the official institutions 
of the KRI, fearing that it would give a certain degree of legitimacy or recognition to 
the Kurdish de facto state.568 When Madame Danielle Mitterrand, President 
Mitterrand’s wife, who had long taken an interest in Kurdish issues in Iraq, attended 
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the first session of the KNA in Erbil (4 October 1992),569 the French government 
immediately issued a statement depicting Madame Mitterrand’s visit as a 
“humanitarian move”570 and  a “personal initiative”,571 not to be interpreted as 
representing an official French political position. However, the personal support and 
dedication of Madame Mitterrand to the Kurdish cause in Iraq and the wider region, 
and her long-time lobbying on behalf of the Kurds, with the support of organizations 
such as the Kurdish Institute of Paris, earned her the title of ‘Mother of the Kurds’ 
amongst the Kurds.572 
Nonetheless, Kurdish participation within the framework of the Iraqi 
opposition played a fundamental role in ensuring the survival of the Kurdish entity 
which was almost wholly dependent on the protection provided by the three Western 
allies, USA, UK and France. In April 1993, Barzani and Talabani visited Washington 
and met with the US Vice President Al Gore, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 
and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. So important for the survival of Kurdish 
autonomy in Iraq, in those meetings, the Kurdish leadership was able to secure a 
promise of continued air cover from allied forces based in Turkey. The Kurds also, 
in those meetings, clearly aimed to align their policies with U.S. policies by 
reassuring the U.S. that the Kurds would not secede from Iraq unilaterally, and that 
the Kurds did not aim to drag the West into another battle by deliberating starting a 
                                            
569 “Death of Danielle Mitterrand, ‘Mother of the Kurds,’” The Kurdish Institute of Paris, 23 November 
2011, accessed: 16 February 2016, http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/death-of-danielle-mitterrand-
quot-mother-of-the-kurds-quot-1232550645.html.  
570 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, Op. Cit., p. 204. 
571 Charountaki, Op. Cit., p. 177. 
572 “Death of Danielle Mitterrand,” Op. Cit.  
234 
 
war with the GOI and thus dragging the West into another Bosnian-style 
nightmare.573 
 
4.6 The Descent into the Civil War: Implications for Foreign Relations 
By 1994, the Kurdish de facto state began to descend into a civil war that 
lasted intermittently until 1997. The eruption of the civil war inside the Kurdish-
controlled zone no doubt had negative repercussions on the Kurds’ international 
standing. Following the inception of the KRI, with the dissemination of information 
about Baghdad’s genocidal campaign, the Kurds of Iraq gained much sympathy and 
good will. The civil war in Kurdistan shattered much of the Kurds’ hard won 
international sympathy. Yet, for all its negative consequences, it did not destroy the 
Kurdish de facto state. In the realm of foreign relations, the result of the civil war, 
ironically, had some conflicting consequences. As a result of the civil war and the 
territorial division of the Kurdish de facto state into two administrative territories, each 
warring party built its own distinctive foreign relations and alliances with outside 
powers, which were not always compatible with the interests of the KRI. Conversely, 
the civil war relieved the fears of those regional powers who were apprehensive that 
the KRI would serve as the foundation of an independent state, in the process further 
relieving the fears of regional states and prolonging the survival of the Kurdish de 
facto state in Iraq, albeit in a divided form. 
                                            
573 Ibid., p. 224. 
235 
 
The Kurdish leadership was cognizant of the negative consequences of the 
civil war on Kurds’ international legitimacy and the survivability of the KRI. Barzani 
once stated that “the fighting harms everybody and undermines the credibility of the 
burgeoning Kurdish administration and erodes the world's understanding of our 
cause.”574 Yet by 1994, the KRI became enmeshed in a serious internal war between 
the principal powers – the KDP and the PUK.  
Several arguments have been promulgated as to why the region was marred 
in the civil war. One of the reasons was clearly related to the complexities of foreign 
relations. Stansfield, for instance notes that at least one of the primary reasons was 
the complexities arising from the position of each party-the KDP and the PUK–in 
relation to the West, Baghdad, and the Iraqi opposition.575 In time, the war took a 
dangerous turn with the intervention of other local, national, regional and even 
international powers. Small squabbles between parties soon triggered a large-scale 
civil war that engulfed almost the whole of the KRI. More than 6,000 peshmerga 
fighters of the KDP, PUK and IMIK were mobilized for the war effort, and fighting 
took place in most cities and towns in Iraqi Kurdistan. By early 1995, the PUK forces 
took over Erbil, the seat of the KNA and KRG. The occupation of Erbil by PUK forces, 
which was described by Masoud Barzani as a “military coup d’état”, had serious 
implications for the nascent KRI as, for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities 
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between Kurdish parties, it paralyzed the working of the official institution of the 
KRI.576 
By 1996, with the continuation of hostilities and the interference of other local 
and regional powers, the political and military situation in the KRI became very 
complicated. Broadly speaking, two conflicting camps had emerged in the KRI. In 
retrospect, it seems, political geography and trade had the strongest influence on 
the KDP’s and the PUK’s alliance formations and foreign relations. The KDP aligned 
itself with Turkey, the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I) and, temporarily, with 
Iraq – while the PUK allied with Iran, the INC and the PKK.577 The territory controlled 
by the KDP shares a long border with Turkey, and therefore, dictated by political 
geography, the KPD maintained cooperative relations with Turkey. The KDP also 
controlled the only internationally-recognized border crossing between Iraq (KRI) 
and Turkey and, as a consequence, both parties benefited from the cross-border 
trade including trucked oil sold by Baghdad through the KDP-controlled territory. 
Similarly, the territory controlled by the PUK shares a border with Iran. Facing the 
same constraints of political geography, the PUK established close relations with 
Iran 578 It is also very clear that another major element in this complex matrix of 
alliances was based on the simple dictum, “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. As the 
PKK was encroaching on KDP territory, Turkey supported the KDP to fight its enemy, 
the PKK; and increased its power in the KRI by checking Iran’s influence. Iran, on 
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the other hand, through its alliance with the PUK, sought to fight its enemy, the 
Iranian KDPI; weaken Baghdad; and increase its sphere of influence by limiting 
Turkish and U.S. sway in the region in the KRI, while Baghdad sought to contain the 
INC, the Iranian ally PUK, and challenge the U.S in the KRI.579 
However, a decisive development in the ongoing warfare happened on 31 
March 1996. Assisted by Iraqi elite forces, KDP forces retook Erbil and expelled the 
PUK and INC forces from the capital. Following some other minor skirmishes, the 
KRI was divided between two zones, controlled by the KDP and the PUK 
respectively, with the capital Erbil remaining in the KDP’s hands. Each party 
established a new cabinet in partnership with smaller parties and other minorities in 
the KRI.580 
The relations that surfaced between the KDP and Baghdad were not a sudden 
or random development. Indeed, as Caspersen argues, limited relations can emerge 
between de facto states and their erstwhile parent states for a variety of economic, 
technical and political reasons.581 The rationale or motivation for the emergent 
limited relations between the KDP and the GOI was rooted in multiple economic and 
political interests. Politically, Masoud Barzani, realizing the limits of international 
support, maintained a line of communications with Baghdad. Economically, the KDP 
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stood to benefit greatly from the proposed OFFP, with its control over the area 
connecting Iraq’s oil pipeline to Turkey.582  
The KRI at that time was in a dire economic situation, and the proposed OFFP 
was the basic tool through which the international community sought to relieve the 
hardship of the Iraqi people – as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Therefore, The KDP officially supported Baghdad's agreement of the OFFP and 
expressed its willingness to provide all the assistance necessary to implement it, 
"especially repairing and operating the pumping station in the Zakho area and 
repairing and operating the part of the pipeline that runs through the areas under our 
control."583 Moreover, Barzani expressed his desire to reach a political settlement 
with Baghdad and even meeting with Saddam, should talks be held on "the Kurdish 
people's future."584 From its side, the PUK also held relations with Baghdad and 
negotiated with Baghdad over political matters of autonomy, and technical matters 
of interest to both sides such water, transportation, electricity and other issues 
related to OFFP.585 
One rather destructive consequence of the civil war was its negative effect in 
the realm of foreign relations, and the Kurds’ international campaign for legitimacy 
and support. The civil war shattered the hard-won positive international image of the 
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Kurds and strengthened the arguments, or voices, of the Kurds’ enemies.  Reports 
that emerged during and following the civil war painted a dire picture of the KRI. One 
report described the KRI as “the Kurdish mess in Northern Iraq;”586 another report 
proclaimed “The Destruction of Iraqi Kurdistan;”587 while another report proclaimed 
the “undeclared demise” of the two-year Kurdish experiment in local governance by 
which, the scenario goes, the Western protectors of the KRI might turn a blind eye 
to military intervention by Saddam in the Kurdish, to restore order and stability.588 
Indeed, in January 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton sent a letter to both Barzani and 
Talabani stating that: “We will no longer cooperate with the other countries to 
maintain security in the region if the clashes continue.”589 
Academic scholars mirrored such criticism. Analysing the aims of the warring 
Kurdish parties during the civil war, Bengio noted that “the aim of the KDP and PUK 
was not to establish a united Kurdistan but for each to enlarge its respective sphere 
of influence and ultimately become the sole power in the region.”590 Indeed, partly 
as a result of the civil war, other observers cast doubt on the claims of the leadership 
about the KRI being a democratic experiment and a successful case of state-
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building. Volker Perthes when analyzing the KRI, stated that “the Kurdish parties ... 
have not been able to put in place even the slightest element of any structure 
designed to create a better, democratic Iraq in the northern part of the country.”591 
The multiple military incursions of Iran, Turkey and limited military intervention 
by Baghdad, clearly demonstrated the reluctance of the Western powers to protect 
the KRI. In this regard, Ofteringer and Backer, two international humanitarian 
workers observed that “The safe haven project has been a cover for refugee 
containment. The Kurds have not been safe from Iraqi, Turkish or Iranian attack.”592 
As such, some observers portrayed the KRI a “power vacuum.”593 The government 
of Turkey particularly was a great exponent of this argument thereby justifying its 
incursions into the KRI in pursuit of PKK fighters. However, as Stansfield argues, the 
concept of a power vacuum envisaging a scenario of political instability is difficult to 
apprehend. It was more correct to talk about a “defense vacuum”594 indicating that 
the KRI was unable, politically and militarily, to prevent military incursions by 
neighbouring states.  
The civil war and the division of the KRI by the Kurds themselves marked a 
self-inflicted damage on the very survivability of the KRI. It reinforced the Kurds’ 
perceived inability to sustain statehood and statesmanship. Gunter, for instance, at 
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the conclusion of a 1997 article, opined that “Unfortunately for them, the Kurds’ 
internecine internal fighting has often vitiated their opportunities…They remain 
divided as were the Germans before 1871 and the Italians before 1861. They also 
lack a Bismarch or Garibaldi.”595 
However, despite weakening and division of the political and administrative 
structure of the KRI, the Kurdish de facto state remained geographically intact. After 
1997, the accumulation of several factors, some related to the Kurds, some not, 
enabled further consolidation of the Kurdish de facto state, or indeed the two Kurdish 
de facto states, as argued by Gareth Stansfield.596  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In 1992, at a decisive moment of change following the defeat of the Baathist 
state in the Second Gulf War, the GOI decided to withdraw state institutions from a 
large part of the Kurdish north. This central secession, in time, enabled the 
leadership of the IKF to establish an unrecognized de facto state on a portion of its 
claimed territory. 
The newly-established KRI initially went through relatively successful 
processes of state- and institution-building. As it was not recognized internationally, 
the existence of the KRI was precarious from the beginning, as it raised the worst 
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fears of neighbouring regional states and the international community that it might 
eventually cause the partition of Iraq. Therefore, despite the lack of a declaration of 
independence, the KRI leadership still had constantly to legitimize and justify its 
existence. As the entity was not recognized, Kurdish political leaders and parties 
became the main actors in the realm of foreign relations. One of the first aims of the 
KRI focused on the foreign policies of self-justification. By transforming their 
discourses and rhetoric, and portraying the KRI as a democratic experiment, Kurdish 
political leaders embraced a strategy which at its heart sought to prove that the KRI 
has earned its sovereignty.  
While the strategy of portraying the KRI was mostly aimed at Western 
audiences, the KRI still had to exist in a tough geopolitical environment. Unsure of 
the extent of Western commitment to the survival of the KRI, Kurdish political leaders 
cooperated with the governments of Iran and Turkey. Given the role Turkey played 
in ensuring the military, political and economic survival of the KRI, Kurdish political 
parties strived very hard to ease Turkish fears and cooperate with its government. 
The power of pan-Kurdism represented a complicating factor on Kurdish foreign 
relations. Fighting, or containing the threat of the PKK insurgency, has been one of 
the tools to ensure Turkish cooperation. Indeed, early on in its existence, the KRI 
rather unsuccessfully sought to depict the KRI as a factor of stability in the region. 
The involvement of Iraqi Kurdish leaders in the framework of the Iraqi 
opposition was also crucial to the survival prospects of the KRI. It ensured a degree 
of interaction with regional and international powers, and a means to reassure the 
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international community that the KRI intended to remain a part of a democratic and 
federal Iraq. Indeed, the geopolitical importance of the KRI in the foreign policy 
strategies of Western powers ensured the continued protection accorded to the KRI. 
The civil war in the KRI, however, practically divided it into two statelets run 
by two different parties. To ensure party survival and their territorial control, each 
party allied with a different grouping of state and non-state actors. Moreover, the civil 
war shattered the hard-won limited international legitimacy it had managed to 
acquire through its own actions. While not overtly criticized for the civil war, as that 
would have implied a certain degree of international recognition, Kurdish friends in 
the West, and observers following the developments in the KRI, heavily criticized the 
Kurdish political parties and leaders. Still, by 1997, a range of new factors enabled 




5 The First Decade of De Facto Existence: Foreign 
Relations of Consolidation  
This chapter essentially continues the examination of the first decade of the 
existence of the Kurdish de facto state between 1997 and 2003. It focuses on the 
dynamics of the OFFP, the dynamics of the intra-Kurdish peace process culminating 
eventually to the U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement of September 1998 and the 
Kurdish participation and role in the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi opposition activities, 
particularly after initiation of the Iraq Liberation Act. The chapter argues that these 
factors enabled the economic, military and political survival as well the further 
consolidation of the Kurdish de facto state.  
 
5.1 Introduction  
In early 1997, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan looked bleak and bitter. The 
Kurdish de facto state was a weakened and divided entity. The double economic 
embargo had taken its toll on all sectors in the KRI. Perhaps the most serious 
consequence of the civil war was on the Kurdish nationalist cause with the division 
of the Kurdish de facto state. The KRI was geographically, politically and 
administratively divided into two distinct regions. The PUK secured its stronghold of 
the Sulaimani governorate and the remains of the Kirkuk governorate and 
established its own new cabinet of the KRG. The KDP consolidated its hold on Erbil 
and all the Dohuk governorate and established a new cabinet for the KRG. The safe 
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haven was endangered when the United States evacuated all Americans operating 
in the KRI for the U.S. government or the variety of U.S.-based relief organizations, 
as well as CIA-funded Arab opposition groupings operating in Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
neighbouring states had significantly increased their influence in the KRI by aligning 
with one or other of the Kurdish parties. Many Kurdish nationalist intellectuals, 
journalist and politicians tolled the death bell for the democratic experiment in the 
KRI. Burhan Jaf, a Kurdish intellectual (later to become KRG’s representative in the 
EU after 2003), argued that “the Kurdish democratic experiment has failed,”597 while 
Fawzi al-Atroushi, a Kurdish nationalist politician and intellectual, sadly noted “the 
outcome of what gathered today has tainted all the songs of praise which we 
composed for the right of this experiment, referred to as democracy, in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.”598  
Yet, the Kurdish de facto state remained geographically intact. Neither the 
GOI nor any other regional state moved to wipe out the KRI, and the U.S. and its 
allies continued to provide air cover. Indeed, after 1997, the two Kurdish political 
parties were further empowered to consolidate the existence of the KRI, hence the 
title of this chapter. This consolidation assisted the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to increase 
and enlarge their foreign relations with state and non-state actors as well a variety 
of international organizations.  
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Nevertheless, this chapter argues that, as in the previous period, the KRI was 
not a unitary actor pursuing specific foreign policies. Rather, the Kurdish political 
leaders and parties enjoyed and widened their foreign relations with the outside 
world. Principally, the KDP and the PUK increased their diplomatic missions abroad 
and allowed their officials to articulate Kurdistan’s interests, which although reflected 
Kurdistan’s interests, still tilted toward the interests of one party and its 
administration. Yet despite the geographical division of the KRI into two de facto 
states, several opportunities presented themselves which eventually allowed both 
leading parties to consolidate the existence of the KRI, cooperate in the realm of 
foreign relations and present a somewhat united diplomatic front in their interactions 
with the outside world. 
 
5.2 Consolidation of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: International Aid and 
OFFP 
After the Gulf War and establishment of the KRI, the Kurdish region faced a 
daunting economic situation. The agricultural basis of the Kurdish economy was 
destroyed. During the 1970s and 1980s, in order to cut the livelihood of Kurdish 
guerilla forces, the GOI evacuated and destroyed villages located between 5-30 
kilometers along the border with Turkey and Iran and declared the area a forbidden 
zone. The displaced population was relocated to the infamous collective towns and 
was forced to rely on government subsidies. The predominance of the oil sector in 
Iraq, as a whole, during the 1980s impacted upon the economic production and 
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socio-economic structure of Kurdish society. For instance, the abundant revenues 
from the oil sector enabled the GOI to become the largest employee in the state, 
hiring an unlimited number of people to serve in both the armed and civilian public 
services. This meant that contrary to the previous period, when people engaged in 
extensive agricultural production, the state replaced cultivated land as the sole 
guarantor of economic goods. In short, by the early 1990s, the Iraqi Kurdish 
economy had been devastated. Coupled with that, the two sanctions imposed on 
Iraqi Kurdistan, first by the UN and then by the GOI, had a profound impact on the 
economic and socio-economic status of the region.599 The most significant effect of 
the international sanctions on Iraq was the near-complete blockade of Iraqi oil sales. 
As Dreze and Gazdar noted, with proceeds from oil generating over 90% of Iraqi 
revenues, “The termination of oil revenues…undermined the extensive involvement 
of the government in the economy through public employment, public subsidies, 
public infrastructure and public services.”600 The double embargo inhibited the ability 
of the KRG to reconstruct destroyed villages, obtain much-needed international 
financial loans or import the machinery and spare parts necessary for economic 
regeneration in the region.  
The socio-economic situation in the Kurdish region after the creation of the 
KRI was as worse than the Kurdish flight towards international borders in early 1992. 
As the result of the sanctions food prices increased, salaries stagnated, and the Iraqi 
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dinar lost its value. For instance, prior to the Second Gulf War, the sum of 100 ID 
(Iraqi Dinar) per month could cover the expenses of an average family; the same 
family after 1992 needed almost ID 2,000 to 3,000 per month to cover the cost of 
food items. While the Kurdish administration had an annual budget of 1.37 billion-
dinar, mostly generated from the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing, one third of the 
budget was allocated to government employees, averaging nearly one million people 
who each received roughly 250 dinars per month.601  Moreover, the Iraqi dinar lost 
its value; it plunged from 50 per $1 in 1993 to about 550 to 700 dinars per $1 in late 
1994; and monthly food rations supplied by the GOI were cut by an average of 40 
percent, significantly reducing the already under-provided food.602 This situation 
prompted an observer to conclude that “the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq in 
April and May 1991 had drama, pathos and media appeal. Its messy and protracted 
aftermath attracted less public attention and sympathy,”603 and a report published by 
the FAO in 1994, described the humanitarian situation in the country (Iraq) as 
“suffering from the pre-famine conditions.”604 
With the establishment of the KRG in 1992, the regional administration tried 
several methods to ease the economic hardships. For example, in order to ensure 
its partial monetary independence and to prevent hyperinflation, the KRG decided to 
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rely on the old ‘swiss print’ Iraqi dinar in the Kurdish region.605 Furthermore, the KRG 
demanded access to frozen Iraqi assets, exemption from the terms of the 
international sanctions regime, and demanded the exercise of pressure against Iraq 
to lift the internal embargo against the KRI.606 Moreover, in 1992, Jordan Times 
reported that the KRG had set up a national oil company named, KurdOil. The 
company never became operative, and the UN, ever-mindful of Iraq’s sovereignty, 
only agreed to set up an escrow account with the frozen Iraqi assets to cover the 
external costs of humanitarian assistance in the whole of Iraq. Thus, the KRG did 
not have any control over the escrow account.607 However, the fact that the KRG 
tried to set up an oil company early on in establishment indicated the KRG’s desire 
to show its economic viability, but only if given the chance to administer its affairs 
freely. 
In May 1996, the GOI and the UN signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) specifying the details of the OFFP. The introduction of the OFFP under UNSC 
Resolution 986 served as a mechanism to reduce the hardships of the Iraqi 
population while maintaining pressure on the regime of Saddam Hussein. Resolution 
986 allowed Iraq initially to sell up to two billion dollars worth of oil every 180 days, 
which were increased gradually to an estimated US$10 billion by 2000.608 The 
proceeds from the sale were then used to buy foodstuffs and other humanitarian 
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needs, except materials prohibited under UNSC resolutions, such as resources 
related to the production of conventional and unconventional weapons.  
The OFFP programme, which was implemented in 13 six-month phases, 
allocated 13% of the oil proceeds to the KRI, divided proportionally to the three 
northern Kurdish governorates. It was probably the first time in the history of the 
Kurds that income from Iraq’s oil money was allocated to the Kurdish region without 
too much control from Baghdad. The OFFP infused a copious amount of money into 
the Kurdish economy. The early international aid given to the KRI centered on 
providing immediate basic relief to ease the consequences of displacement. The 
OFFP, however, transformed the focus of international aid to rehabilitating the 
region’s infrastructure. While during the early international relief period, from 1991 
to 1996, the Kurdish north received over US$1 billion in foreign aid, by the early 
2000s, the OFFP was allocating about $520 million to the KRI every six months.609 
 
Indeed, introduction of the OFFP had a paradoxical consequence on the 
domestic sovereignty of the now two, divided, Kurdish administrations. Not 
recognizing the legitimacy of the KRI’s offices, the GOI transferred administration of 
the programme to the UNOCHI for procuring, transporting and distributing 
humanitarian aid to the Kurdistan region.610 On the one hand, despite shortcomings, 
the UN administration of the OFFP in the KRI was much more efficient than in the 
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regime-controlled territories, which eventually ushered in a period of relative 
economic and political stability. On the other hand, despite the fact that the UN 
agencies running the OFFP cooperated with regional and governorate-level 
authorities, the reality was that the UN agencies had the final decision-making power 
over allocation of money, which somewhat weakened the authority and sovereignty 
of the Kurdish administrations.611 In essence, the UN acted as the government of the 
KRI with its agencies effectively operating as KRG ministries: “UNOCHI as a council 
of ministers, HABITAT as a ministry of housing and reconstruction, and UNICEF as 
a ministry of water and sanitation.”612 Indeed, the OFFP programme was required to 
limit the KRG from developing independent governance policies. It focused primarily 
on relief and rehabilitation; not capacity-building or altering the economic and 
political structure of the KRI. As Natali documents, “Aid allocations increased over 
time; however, the KRG still could not purchase the necessary equipment to make 
investments, build technology, stir local production, engage in legal import-export 
activities, or develop taxation programs.”613 
However, the OFFP ushered a new era of economic activity into the region.  
The large infusion of cash created a new private sector engaged in small-scale food 
processing projects, industrial projects and construction contracting. While overtly 
bureaucratic, the new private sector learned the UN contracting and bidding 
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procedures which encouraged the development of a liberal economy based on the 
principles of a free and competitive market. In short, as Natali states, the OFFP 
unintentionally created a class of nouveau riche which included local entrepreneurs, 
tribal leaders, and political officials. 614  
While there are disagreements over the extent to which the people in the rest 
of Iraq benefited from the OFFP, its implementation was a success in the KRI. 
Improvements were evident in literally every socio-economic denominator. 
Reviewing the situation in Iraq in 2003, Kenneth Katzman noted that food in the three 
Kurdish provinces has become “relatively abundant,” and child mortality rates had 
dropped in the Kurdish north.615 David Hirst, an acknowledged British journalist on 
the affairs of Iraq and the Middle East, noted: 
“It can't be said that prosperity has come to Iraqi Kurdistan-it would take 
three months of a teacher's salary to buy the pair of Italian women's shoes 
on display-but it's obvious that these northern provinces, which until 1990 
were the most backward, deprived and oppressed of President Saddam 
Hussein's domains, are now much better off than those where his writ still 
runs. There are Mercedes, even an occasional BMW, on newly paved 
highways. Hotels are opening, and open-air restaurants flourish beside 
mountain streams. There's a tourist industry too, mainly summer visitors 
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from the Kurdish diaspora, or Iranians who cross the border for a 
weekend's dancing, drinking and veil-free relaxation.”616 
Hirst’s views were echoed by prominent academics with a research focus on 
Iraqi Kurdistan, and indeed by KRG officials themselves. Michiel Leezenberg, a 
scholar and a long-time activist in the reconstruction of the Kurdistan Region, for 
instance, held that “At first blush, Iraqi Kurdistan seems the neoliberal success story 
of post-Saddam Iraq. For decades a poor, underdeveloped and conflict-ridden part 
of the country, it has emerged as by far the most stable, secure and prosperous 
region… especially since the start of the UN oil-for-food programme in 1997.”617  
KRI officials also realized the vitality of the OFFP in relieving Kurdish double 
hardships. In one instance, Shafiq Qazzaz, then the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs 
in the KDP-KRG, stated that “it was 986 that saved us.”618 Sami abdul-Rahman, the 
Deputy Prime Minister of the KDP-KRG, recognized that, “For all its shortcomings, 
oil-for-food rescued our people. Everyone now gets a food basket for a whole month 
every month. It's often worth more than the income of a family… With that oil income, 
we've built schools and clinics, developed agriculture, paved roads and planted 
some 3 million trees. Kurds now have a sense of security,”619 while Barham Salih, 
the Prime Minister of the PUK-KRG, similarly called the OFFP a ‘fantastic concept,’ 
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stating further that “for the first time in our history, Iraqi citizens—all citizens—are 
insured a portion of the country’s oil wealth. The north is a testament to the success 
of the program. Oil is sold and food is bought.”620 
The OFFP enabled the two KRGs to further consolidate the existence of the 
KRI. While the OFFP did not directly fund the two KRGs, theoretically to prevent the 
self-governance capacity of the KRI, the OFFP indirectly assisted the KRI. The 
infusion of OFFP funds to cover the relief and rehabilitation necessities of the KRIO 
meant that revenues generated independently could increasingly be used by the two 
KRGs for strengthening the governance of the KRI. Both ruling parties generated 
significant revenue by the imposition of customs tax and other revenues on the 
lucrative trade from and into Iran and Turkey, which included trade in oil and other 
luxury goods.621  The increasing revenues accrued to both parties strengthened the 
operation, institutionalization and consolidation of the two KRGs. It allowed them to 
more positively assert their authority and enhance their domestic sovereignty. In 
addition to that, the division of the KRG into two distinct administrations, each 
controlled by a different party, eased or relieved the sociopolitical tensions generated 
by having both parties simultaneously ruling the KRI. As Gareth Stansfield has 
noted, ironically the divided government improved the effectiveness of both parties; 
“they focused on being governments rather than parties.”622  In the realm of security, 
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for instance, Fazel Merani, who after 1996 served as the Minister of the Interior in 
the KDP-led KRG, declared in an interview with Stansfield that: 
“After the separation of 1996, security was much improved, even in 
Sulaimania [the stronghold and the seat of PUK’s KRG], because of the 
recognition of one executive power in both places. Each party and 
administration had less need to worry about the internal party situation 
within their respective areas; each was also trying to show that they were 
legal, powerful, and had an operating security and justice system.”623 
 
The OFFP and the new rehabilitation phase also ushered in a new era of 
political engagement between foreign governments, and international organizations, 
both governmental and non-governmental, with the two KRGs. From the outset, 
being insistent on paying lip-service to the sovereignty of Iraq, the UN avoided formal 
interaction with the two KRGs, and instead preferred to work through the local 
governorates. This arrangement, while short of Kurdish aspirations, was still 
accepted by the two KRGs. In a paper essentially predicting the end of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as two de facto states, Nicu Popescu writes that Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are contributing “to their own self-isolation by refusing many 
international contacts for symbolic reasons (such as refusing to let the EU Monitoring 
Mission on their territories, or refusing to meet EU ambassadors to Georgia because 
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they are ambassadors “to Georgia”).”624 It was in effect this realization that prompted 
the two KRGs to adopt a wise and realistic policy and to avoid self-isolation by 
accepting realities, cooperating with the UN agencies and attempting to benefit from 
the UN and its related agencies as much as possible. One outcome was that the two 
KRGs became increasing institutionalized, with stronger relations with a variety of 
stakeholders in the OFFP. This point is succinctly articulated by Stansfield when he 
writes: 
“The oil-for-food programme has acted as a catalyst in the 
institutionalization of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRGs) in Arbil 
and Sulimaniyah. The Kurdish authorities collaborate closely with the UN 
agencies administrating the programme and have a significant 
responsibility in constructing the distribution plans for each phase. 
Kurdish civil servants have also been consistently exposed to UN 
operating procedures and benefited from a range of training programmes 
designed by UN agencies and NGOs.”625 
Moreover, the OFFP further contributed to the political stabilization of the two 
KRGs as important elements in any possible anti-Saddam venture. Noting the 
importance of the political dimensions of the OFFP, Natali noted “after 1996 external 
actors became increasingly involved in stabilizing the Kurdish north as a means of 
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checking the influence of Saddam Hussein… even after the civil war ended, UN 
officials negotiated ongoing disputes between the parties and quelled potential 
conflicts. They taught principles of good governance, negotiation, and administration 
by conducting regular meetings with KRG representatives and incorporating local 
personnel into legitimate bodies. KRG representatives and local populations that 
liaised with the UN gained professional experience and language skills, while 
learning about the policies and protocols of international organizations.”626 
However, relations between the UN and the two KRGs was not always without 
constraints and hostilities. The UN firmly observed its framework of understanding 
with Saddam’s regime, presumably to deny the KRI any form of legitimacy and 
preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. Thus, on many occasions, whilst 
the Kurdish leaders applauded the OFFP, they also voiced their frustration with UN 
mechanisms and the UN’s refusal to implement projects in the KRI without explicit 
authorization from Baghdad. In one instance, Nechirvan Barzani the Prime Minister 
of the KDP-KRG in Erbil, stated: “We’ve been asking for a four-hundred-bed hospital 
for Sulaimaniya for three years… It’s our money, but we need the approval of the 
Iraqis. They get to decide. The World Health Organization is taking its orders from 
the Iraqis. It’s crazy.”627 One more source of frustration for the KRI was that it was 
barred from being heard at the UN level. Unlike the Palestinians, who were granted 
official observer status due to PLO’s higher degree of international legitimacy 
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conferred by the Oslo Accord – however with less territorial control and contiguity 
compared with the KRI – the KRI did not have observer status at the UN and thus it 
was institutionally disadvantaged. The UN, as Matan Chorev observes, would not 
“transition from an emergency humanitarian mission to a more sustainable, long-
term development program, principally because it did not want to grant Iraqi 
Kurdistan [any] degree of acceptance.”628 This frustration was emphatically 
expressed by Barham Salih when he stated: 
“Compare us to other liberation movements around the world. We are very 
mature. We don’t engage in terror. We don’t condone extremist nationalist 
notions that can only burden our people. Please compare what we have 
achieved in the Kurdistan national-authority areas to the Palestinian 
national authority of Mr. Arafat. We have spent the last ten years building 
a secular, democratic society, a civil society. What has he built?”629 
The OFFP, with all its limitations and institutional bias toward the KRI, was 
essential for the economic survival of the KRI. It increasing improved the living 
conditions as well infrastructural renovation in the KRI. This economic improvement 
was matched by normalization of political relations between the parties following the 
U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement which marked the first decisive U.S. 
intervention in the KRI in preparation for a post-Saddam political order in Iraq. 
 
                                            
628 Matan Chorev, “Complex terrains: unrecognized states and globalization,” in Caspersen and 
Stansfield (eds.), Op. Cit., p. 33.  
629 Goldberg, Op. Cit. 
259 
 
5.3 The Road to Washington Agreement 
One of the consequences of the OFFP, as stated, was the expansion of 
political engagements and relations between foreign governments and the two 
KRGs. One result of the Iraqi Kurdish engagement with foreign actors was the 
signing of the Washington Agreement in September 1998. Indeed, since the start of 
the civil war between the KDP and the PUK in 1994, several attempts at mediation 
were made both inside and outside the KRI.630 Quite ironically, the civil war served 
as a prelude for the improvement of foreign relations between Kurdish political 
parties and outside actors. Bengio, in this regard, notes that “[it] was… only through 
intracommunal fighting, so detrimental to their national cause, could the KDP and 
PUK maintain a measure of international interest in the Kurdish cause.”631 With each 
flare-up of hostilities, the mediators, whether, Turkey, the United States, Iran, or even 
Baghdad, would rush to the Kurdish region, sending representatives and inviting 
both parties to attend negotiations in their respective capitals. In general, the 
mediators had several common goals, while they differed on the specifics: “all sought 
to use the Kurdish card for political gains; contain the situation in Kurdistan; 
strengthening their influence over the Kurdish parties, check the influence of rival 
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states in the region; and finally, to prevent the establishment of an independent Iraqi 
Kurdistan.”632  
In time, the burgeoning involvement of multiple actors increasingly alarmed 
the U.S. administration, in the event that other actors might succeed in increasing 
their political cloud on the Kurdish political parties and, as the result, damage U.S. 
interests in Iraq and the Middle East region. One manifestation of this was that secret 
talks were held between the Kurds and Saddam’s regime for a possible reconciliation 
between them. The U.S. had already left the Kurds to their own devices on two 
occasions, in 1975 and 1991, and moreover the Kurdish leader, Barzani, believed 
that the U.S. did not have any concrete policies toward the KRI apart from weak 
gestures of humanitarian concerns. Hence rapprochement with Baghdad was 
necessary, from Barzani’s point of view, to at least maintain a channel of 
communication with Baghdad in the hope of achieving a level of autonomy for the 
Kurds of Iraq.633 
Moreover, an indigenous peace process had been started between the 
warring Kurdish parties without so much as any input from the U.S. government. The 
Kurdish meetings mostly dealt with technical outstanding issues between the parties 
related to the implementation of the OFFP programme, and aimed at confidence-
building measures between the parties. Much to the Kurds’ credit, the Shaqlawa-
Koysanjaq meetings between the KDP and the PUK, in time, set the foundation upon 
                                            




which the U.S. sought to build, to bring about reconciliation between the Kurdish 
parties.634 
The U.S. political initiative, as a preliminary move, was initiated on 18 July 
1998 with the visit of David Welch, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs, along with a Turkish observer for separate talks with Kurdish 
leaders. After four days of negotiations, the U.S. representative invited both leaders 
to Washington to continue discussions.635 
The Washington summit opened on 14 September 1998 with the direct 
involvement of the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and her team. The 
venue and the details were signs of changing times. The meetings involved personal 
diplomacy from Madeleine Albright at the State Department to bridge the differences 
between the two leaders. Eventually, on 17 September 1998, the tripartite meetings 
concluded with the signing of what became known as the ‘Washington 
Agreement’.636, in the Ornate Treaty Room of the State Department. In the brief 
press conference afterwards, Albright declared that they [Barzani and Talabani] had 
“opened a new and hopeful chapter in their efforts to work together on behalf of their 
people,”637 adding that “the renewed spirit of reconciliation between Mr. Barzani and 
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Mr. Talabani exemplified by their joint meeting and join statement today will make it 
easier for the United States and others to help their people.”638 The Washington 
Agreement contained important clauses relating to the continuous survival of the 
KRI. While the Washington Agreement reaffirmed U.S. respect for the territorial 
integrity and unity of Iraq, it also included a clause that demonstrated U.S. respect 
for the inspiration of the Kurdish people, declaring that “Iraq be reformed on a 
federative basis.”639 
Indeed, regardless of the formalities citied in the text of the Agreement, the 
Washington Agreement represented a major diplomatic victory for the KRI and its 
political leaders. Apart from formally ending the military conflict between the warring 
Kurdish parties, the Washington Agreement marked the first decisive U.S. 
involvement in Iraqi Kurdish affairs. Up until 1998, the U.S. had always striven to 
deal with the Iraqi Kurdish parties and its leaders within the framework of Iraq’s 
opposition, such as INC. Therefore, the direct U.S. diplomacy in the Washington 
Agreement was a major shift in U.S foreign policy towards the Kurds, at least within 
the framework of the U.S.’s Iraq policy. Remembering those days when an IKF 
delegation was ushered out of the State Department building to meet with a few 
junior officials in a coffee shop,640 the personal reception accorded to both Barzani 
and Talabani by the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and other high-
raking US officials, was evidence of the increasing importance of the KRI for U.S. 
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geopolitical and geostrategic interests in Iraq and the Middle East region. Kurdish 
political leaders had control over a specific territory and population, representing a 
distinct, although not perfect, political system which was a source of irritation to the 
regime of Saddam Hussein.  The Washington Agreement, in short, as Marianna 
Charountaki states, indicated a major transformation in the U.S. relationship with the 
Iraqi Kurds. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Kurds only possessed direct, 
official but covert, relations with the United States which was transformed into a 
relationship based on humanitarian concerns following the Cold War. The 
Washington Agreement, however, indicated the initiation of a direct, official and overt 
relationship between the United States and political parties of the KRI.641 One major 
manifestation of the U.S. commitment came in the form of it renewing its security 
commitment to the KRI when both Talabani and Barzani asserted that “the United 
States promised to deter Iraqi intervention, should it take place, and to remain 
committed to the Kurdish people’s security.”642 In private though, Kurdish officials 
observed that Albright’s words were stronger, noting that the U.S. would “protect you 
[the Kurds] as we protect Kuwait," provided that the two parties upheld the 
agreement, kept Saddam out of the Kurdish areas and did not provoke Saddam to 
attack the Kurdish north just to drag the U.S. into the battlefield.643 
                                            
641 Charountaki, Op. Cit., pp. 167-168. 
642 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, Op. Cit., p. 264.  
643 See: Alan Makovsky, “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment,” Washington Institute 





However, the importance of the direct relations between the United States 
and the political leaders of the KRI, and the possibility of further consolidation of the 
KRI, rang alarm bells in regional capitals. The direct diplomacy from the U.S. 
administration towards the KRI was perceived as a dangerous precedent that could 
afford more international legitimacy to Iraqi Kurdish aspirations and further 
consolidate the KRI in Iraq. Nevertheless, Kurdish leaders had reaffirmed their 
commitment to a unified Iraq and described their actions as serving the interests of 
Iraq and the region.644 Masoud Barzani had committed the KDP to fight the PKK, 
regardless of the Washington Agreement645 and he paid a three-day visit to Turkey 
en route to the Washington summit where he announced that the he would fight the 
PKK even without help from Turkey.646 Notwithstanding, Ankara was still fearful and 
outraged by the US mediation and of its significant political consequences. A Turkish 
foreign ministry spokesperson, in addition to reaffirming Turkey’s support for the 
territorial integrity of Iraq, stated that Turkey opposes “a permanent Kurdish 
administration in Northern Iraq.”647 Likewise, Mesut Yilmaz, the then Prime Minister 
of Turkey, referred to the Washington Agreement as a ‘diplomatic blunder’, and 
expressed Turkey’s sensitivities towards terms such as ‘Kurdistan’, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’, 
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‘autonomy’, or ‘federalism,’648 all referring to the degree of acceptance of territorial 
dimensions for Kurdish self-rule. This Turkish protest led the U.S. bluntly to remind 
them that federalism and democracy are the twin foundations of the U.S. political 
system, and it was unfair to deny them to Iraqi Kurdistan.649 
The Washington Agreement formalized the end of warfare and normalized 
political relations between the warring Kurdish parties. Joint committees of both their 
parties began to engage in high-level meetings over several issues, both political 
and technical, with the aim of holding multi-party elections to unify the two 
administrations. 
In time, the achievements of the Kurds in pacifying their relations was 
enhanced by their formal inclusion in the U.S.-sponsored umbrella designed to 
unseat the regime of Saddam Hussein.  
5.4 Iraq Liberation Act 
The Operation Desert Storm had not settled the storm between the United 
States and Saddam in Iraq. Although the U.S.-led coalition did score a major and 
quick victory for its short-term aim to evict the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore 
its sovereignty, the longer-term objective of removing the regime of Saddam proved 
more problematic. Gradually, during the late 1990s, international support for the 
continued maintenance of international sanctions on Saddam’s Iraq lessoned. Iraq’s 
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regional neighbours, such as Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey began to ignore the 
terms of the sanctions by engaging in oil trade with Iraq. The international 
community, particularly the three permanent members of the UNSC – Russia, China 
and France – seemed more eager to advance their economic self-interest by defying 
the international sanctions regime. In 2001, Russian companies negotiated contracts 
with Iraq worth $2.3 billion dollars; China by 2001 had already completed 
construction of a fibre-optic communications system for Iraq that could have 
endangered the safety of American and British pilots monitoring the no-fly zone, 
while France had negotiated supply contracts estimated to be worth billions of 
dollars. For the United States and Britain, however, the maintenance of the sanctions 
regime was the primary strategy to prevent Iraq’s rearmament and to bring about 
Iraq’s complete disarmament from its unconventional weapons. As Kenneth Pollack, 
a member of President Clinton’s National Security Council staff, noted, “the 
sanctions were always the greatest impediment to Iraqi military reconstitution, 
particularly to rapid progress on Iraq's nuclear weapons program," and as such for 
the United States and Britain "were always more important than the inspections."650 
Moreover, Saddam Hussein skillfully manipulated the issue of sanctions and the 
sufferings of the Iraqi people, for which he himself was totally responsible by 
diverting resources from the OFFP to enrich his or his followers’ coffers, to exercise 
pressure on the United States and Britain. Despite the visible and clear diversion of 
the OFFP resources and other revenues by Saddam and his inner circle, the 
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international community continued to demand the lifting of sanctions based on the 
sufferings of the people of Iraq.651 
 After the end of the Second Gulf War, there was a prevalent assumption in 
Washington that, given the huge military defeat in the Second Gulf War and the 
delegitimatisation of Saddam’s regime internationally and internally, Saddam could 
not survive in power much longer.652 However, that did not materialize on the ground, 
as not only did Saddam’s regime remain intact in Baghdad, but it also regained some 
of its lost international legitimacy. Overall, during this period, the United States had 
four foreign policy objectives in Iraq: “preventing any Iraqi regional aggression, 
stopping Iraq’s nuclear, biological, chemical and missile programs, removing 
Saddam from power and preventing the spread of regional instability.”653 To meet its 
objectives, Daniel Byman maintains that successive U.S. administrations had 
employed five instruments with varying degrees of emphasis: “economic sanctions; 
weapons inspections; a strong regional military presence; limited military strikes and 
support for the Iraqi opposition.”654 However, the implementation of these 
instruments faced significant challenges and hurdles, and even failures, due both to 
divisions within the U.S. bureaucracy and changing viewpoints in the larger 
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international community, particularly within the permanent members of the UNSC: 
France, Russia, and China. In one instance, expressing Russia’s disagreement with 
the continuation of the economic sanctions on Iraq, Yevgeny Primakov had told 
Madeleine Albright that “without sanctions, the Iraqis would sell oil and pay us; with 
sanctions, they sell oil and use the sanctions as an excuse not to pay us.”655 
Moreover, Kurdish leaders also had reservations about the Iraqi opposition. 
They had the responsibility to run a population of nearly 4 million people and 
administer a region with stumbling difficulties, never mind the ever-watchful eye of 
the surrounding states concerned about further consolidation of the KRI. Maintaining 
the hard-won de facto independence of the KRI and its survival – political, economic, 
and military – was the most important aim of the Kurdish political leaders in both their 
domestic policies and foreign relations. After 1991, several Kurdish parties, 
principally the KDP and PUK, engaged with several Iraqi oppositionist groupings, 
including the INC, INA and SCIRI.656 However, the Kurdish leadership viewed the 
Iraqi opposition as a weak entity not capable of removing the regime of Saddam 
Hussein from power. The Kurds also looked suspiciously at the views and actions of 
the different groupings of the Iraqi opposition. By early 1998, the KDP and the PUK 
had reached the conclusion that the Arab opposition of Iraq was not sincere in its 
promises of granting the Kurds’ political inspirations in any post-Saddam setting. Not 
only this, the multiple tensions within the Iraqi opposition, coupled with the perceived 
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indecisiveness of the U.S. administration to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, 
convinced the Kurdish leadership of the unreliability and untrustworthiness of the 
efforts to oust Saddam Hussein and his regime. Therefore, by early 1998, both 
Kurdish parties maintained distance from the opposition of Iraq. It is interesting that 
in an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper, Al-Hayat, Barzani cast 
doubt on the ability of the Iraqi opposition to guarantee the Kurds’ political 
aspirations, as well as reiterating that the Kurdish parties had a secured territorial 
control with responsibility towards a population which they do not want to endanger 
by engaging in adventurous projects against Iraqi’s regime, stating: 
“Our view is that any opposition abroad will not achieve anything. . . . Our 
 situation differs from that of the opposition abroad. . . . If we are not sure 
the alternative will be democratic and achieves a peaceful solution for the 
Kurdish People on the bases of Federalism, then it will be very difficult for 
us to be part of any plan. . . . This project is not ripe. . . .”657 
while Talabani in an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper, Al-Quds 
Al-Arabi stated that: 
“We are not part of any foreign plan to topple the current regime in 
Baghdad. . . . Regrettably, the INC has been frozen and . . . only Dr. Jalabi 
[Chalabi] and his two deputies . . . remain. . . . We do not believe that the 
opposition abroad can carry out any serious actions”658 
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However, one more factor, combined with the list of other threats emanating 
from Iraq, further worried the U.S. administration of Bill Clinton: the threat of WMD 
in the hands of terrorists and Saddam’s link with terrorist groups. On 21 June1995, 
the Clinton Administration announced a Presidential Directive (PDD 39), which for 
the first time set “the domestic guidelines to address the threat of terrorist attacks 
within the United States utilizing use of chemical and biological weapons.”659 
Moreover, Saddam’s belligerent actions inside and outside Iraq further aggravated 
the relations. The FBI’s revelations that Saddam’s intelligence services were behind 
the assassination attempt against former President George Bush Sr is indicative in 
this regard.660 From 1993 onwards, the U.S. administration, according to 
Charountaki, was influenced by CIA reports asserting that Saddam would not comply 
with the relevant UN resolutions requesting Iraq to destroy its unconventional 
weapons, and that Saddam would not alter its domestic aggressive policies and its 
foreign policy goals of “making Iraq a dominant regional power’, and would attempt 
to “rebuild Iraq’s military might and maintain his power.”661 Certain powerful think 
tanks, as well as influential non-state actors and individuals linked to various interest 
groups, also played a major role in altering the traditional process of U.S. foreign 
policy-making. Among such think tanks, the ‘Project for New American Century’, 
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which is mainly composed of pro-Israeli and neoconservative individuals, was most 
vociferous with regard to Iraq and Saddam’s danger to the Middle East Region.662 
It was within this context, Madeleine Albright claims, that the Clinton 
Administration upgraded its policy towards Saddam’s Iraq from containment with 
inspections to an approach called ‘containment plus.’663 The containment plus 
approach originated from Saddam’s failure to grant full access to UNSCOM to verify 
Iraq’s compliance with UNSC resolutions,664 Iraq’s continuing threatening rhetoric in 
regard of lifting of economic sanctions,665 and the UN declaration (UNSC Resolution 
1205, November 5, 1998) that Iraq was in violation of its earlier agreement (23 
February 1998).666 Indeed, Iraq’s violation of its previous international agreements 
and its expulsion of UN inspectors prompted the United States and Britain to conduct 
a series of military air strikes against Iraqi military, code-named Operation Desert 
Fox, conducted between 16 and 19 December 1998.667 
Part of the containment plus approach entailed increasing U.S. assistance to 
Iraqi opposition groups. The Clinton Administration had reservations in regard to the 
Iraqi opposition’s unity and its inability to unseat the regime of Saddam, as indicated 
by Secretary Albright’s testimony before a U.S. Congress committee to the effect 
that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations” about the 
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opposition’s ability or what the U.S. support to the Iraqi opposition can accomplish.668 
However, several influential U.S. senators viewed assisting the opposition of Iraq as 
a viable means to oust Saddam Hussein from power, and began to exercise 
pressure on the U.S. administration to provide further financial, political and military 
assistance to the Iraqi opposition and, to manifest its commitment, on 1 May 1998, 
the U.S. Congress signed FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174) which 
allocated $US 10 million to support and organize anti-Saddam opposition groups. Of 
this sum, $2 million was allocated to translate and publicize crimes of the Saddam 
Hussein regime, including those perpetuated against the Kurdish people in Iraq.669 
These pressures by the U.S. Congress, and indeed by many other institutions 
and individuals with input into U.S. foreign policy, eventually resulted in a change in 
the official U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq. In 1998, regime change, at least 
theoretically, through the Iraqi opposition, became the official U.S. policy in Iraq,670 
despite skepticism from a large section of the U.S. political and military 
establishment.671 From then on, Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Samuel 
("Sandy") Berger, claimed that the U.S. administration sought  to “strengthen the 
Iraqi opposition because containment might not be sustainable and because 
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Saddam Hussein's continuation in power is detrimental to U.S. interests.”672  The 
change in policy was encapsulated in a congressional bill introduced as the ‘Iraq 
Liberation Act’ (H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338), which was ratified into a law on 31 October 
1998. Enlisting Iraq’s atrocities against its neighbours (Iran and Kuwait), and 
Saddam’s systematic process of annihilation against the Kurds during the 1980s, the 
Iraq Liberation Act stated: 
“It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove 
the regime headed by Saddam from power in Iraq and to promote the 
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.”673 
As well as declaring the official U.S. policy of regime change in Iraq, the Iraq 
Liberation Act had other stipulations that brought the U.S. closer to the Kurdish 
political parties in Iraq. The Iraq Liberation Act authorized the U.S. president to 
provide up to $97 million in defense articles and services and another $2 million in 
broadcasting funds to the Iraqi opposition. In addition, in January 1999, the U.S. 
appointed a career diplomat, Francis J. Ricciardone, as the State Department 
“Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” and the chief liaison with the opposition. But, 
more significantly, in regard to relations between the KRI and the U.S., was the 
designation of eligible parties and groups of the Iraqi opposition to receive U.S. 
military and financial assistance. The list of eligible parties was issued with the U.S. 
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Presidential Determination (P.D. 99-13). The Presidential Determination registered 
seven Iraqi groups eligible for the U.S. assistance. The list included four Arab Iraqi 
groupings: the INC, the INA, SCIRI, and MCM; and three Kurdish groupings: the 
KDP, PUK, and IMIK. However, after 2001, only the KDP and PUK remained the 
prime beneficiaries of the Iraq Liberation Act as the U.S. stopped financing the IMIK 
because of its suspicious links with Al-Qaeda related groups.674  
 
5.5 Foreign Relations After the Civil War 
If the OFFP assisted in ensuring the economic survival of the KRI, the U.S. 
involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish affair marked by the Washington Agreement and the 
inclusion of the KDP and PUK in the U.S.-sponsored efforts to oust the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, ensured political and military survival of the KRI. The thee 
aforementioned factors gave a new impetus and legitimacy to the Kurdish parties 
and an incentive to widen their foreign relations. The civil war had shattered the 
Kurds’ international image and legitimacy. If, previously, the Kurds were viewed as 
victims of outside forces, the civil war affirmed the view that the Kurds were victims 
of their own limitations and betrayal. Separately, but in a more coordinated way, the 
two parties renewed their campaign of international legitimacy by attempting to repair 
the self-inflicted damage through reinvigorating and widening their informal 
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diplomatic ties with other actors in the international system, and bringing about more 
understanding to their cause and aspirations in Iraq. Interestingly, the new foreign 
policy of self-justification started to be supplemented by other ingredients. During the 
previous period, the Kurdish leaders had emphasized that the KRI was an 
experiment in democracy and self-governance. However, reflecting on progression 
in the argument that they had earned their sovereignty, the Kurdish leadership 
started to embrace a strategy of emphasizing the KRI as a model for the rest of Iraq. 
As in the preceding periods, the Kurdish leadership made a conscious 
decision to welcome all media outlets, particularly the most prestigious Western 
media, principally as a tool to convey their messages to the outside world and 
influence Western public opinion, which in turn, they hoped would influence foreign 
policy-making in states such as the U.S. and the UK. Indeed, the media still played 
an important role in the Kurds’ public diplomacy efforts since, despite their increased 
international legitimacy and official meetings, both Kurdish parties were still largely 
seen as Iraqi opposition parties. Thus, it seems, the Kurdish leadership had 
mastered the use of international media as a means of diplomacy. Bengio, in this 
regard, notes “for all their disunity, they [the Kurds] did learn how to avail themselves 
of the international media and make their cause known to the outside world.”675 Thus, 
in an interview, Barham Salih, the Prime Minister of the PUK-held territory, 
commenting on Kurdish achievements in the realm of rehabilitation, reconstruction 
and delivery of public services to the inhabitants of the KRI after the initiation of 
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OFFP, stated: “Kurdistan has traditionally been the least developed part of Iraq, 
economically, politically and socially. If we could achieve this in Kurdistan, we could 
easily achieve it in the rest of Iraq.”676  
Indeed, in a new move, the increasing consolidation and power of the two 
KRGs within the KRI, and the heightened tense relationship between the U.S., UK 
and Iraq, allowed Kurdish officials to publish their own views in opinion pieces. In 
these, the Kurdish officials aimed to highlight the entity’s earned sovereignty and its 
unique achievements in the realm of democratization and state-building. An article 
published by Barham Salih named ‘A Kurdish Model for Iraq,’ highlights the Kurdish 
experiment in democracy, stating: “Peace and stability in the strategically vital gulf 
area will come only from fundamental political change in Iraq and by building on the 
democratic experiment that has taken root in Iraqi Kurdistan.”677 
Similar sentiments were echoed by leaders of the KDP reflecting both parties’ 
common stand and policies regarding the image of the KRI within the international 
system. Focusing on the same theme of democratic experiment, Masoud Barzani 
stated in an interview that “I cannot claim that the democratic experiment in Iraqi 
Kurdistan is ideal and without defects. However, when we compare it with what 
exists around us and in Iraq itself, I think that it was a unique experience and can be 
applied in all Iraq.”678 Nechirvan Barzani on the other hand, justified the need for the 
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continuation of the U.S. protection of the KRI in a similar theme, arguing, “as a result 
of the protection of the US and its allies, a fledgling democracy has taken root in Iraqi 
Kurdistan that has the potential to serve as a model for a future Iraq.”679 Meanwhile, 
Sami abdul-Rahman, the deputy PM in the KDP-controlled administration held “We 
are a picture of the future of Iraq. We're now a fledgling democracy by Mideast 
standards.”680 
Moreover, as a conscious decision to further disseminate their message and 
influence thinking within academia and think tanks – a tool continuously used by the 
Kurdish leadership to this day – the Kurdish leadership welcomed with open arms 
individual academics and observers covering issues related to Kurdistan and the 
wider Middle East hoping that they would publish favourable views on the KRI. One 
such observer was Carole O’Leary, a Professor at the American University in 
Washington. In an article she published in the Washington Post titled ‘A No-Fly, Yes-
Democracy Zone,’681 she clearly makes the argument for the benefits of U.S. 
protection of the KRI. O’ Leary argues that “this crucible of democracy is a welcome 
byproduct of the military arrangements that followed the Gulf War,”682 and she further 
notes “Should the Iraqi army ever violate this safe haven, no part of which is any 
farther from Republican Guard positions than Washington is from Richmond, it would 
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not only crush this experiment in democracy, but destabilize the entire region, 
sending as many as 3 million refugees into Iran and Turkey.”683 In another essay, 
again in the Washington Post, she described the KRI as a ‘10-year-old experiment 
in democracy and pluralism,’ and a ‘golden age’ not only for Kurds, but also for 
‘people in the minority Turkoman, Assyrian and Chaldean communities.’684 
Indeed, the Kurdish foreign policy of self-justification was enlarged to 
encompass the protection of minority rights as a strategy for increasing its 
international legitimacy as well as emphasizing its earned sovereignty. In this regard, 
despite a lack of a declaration of independence, the KRI employed the same 
methods as many other de facto states. As both Caspersen and Voller note, inspired 
by the developments in the post-Cold War era, the protection of minority rights has 
become an essential ingredient in the international campaign for legitimacy 
conducted by de facto states.685 Since the establishment of the KRI, particularly after 
1997, Kurdish leaders have shown great sympathy and sensitivity towards the rights 
of minorities in the KRI. Nechirvan Barzani stated in an interview that “The rights of 
the Turkoman and Assyrians are protected by laws passed by the KNA. As a result 
of our own history, we are very sensitive to the issues of the minorities living in our 
region and have made it a point to recognize and uphold their rights. The KDP has 
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always enshrined minority rights in their policies throughout its 56-year history.”686 
Moreover, the law No. 1 of the Iraqi KNA allocated five seats to the Christian 
community in Kurdistan.687 To  enhance their image as tolerant towards other 
religions, ethnicities and sects in Kurdistan, the two KRGs rebuilt churches and 
Christian villages destroyed during the 1980s.688 In 2001, the KRG in Erbil, following 
legislative changes, created two new directorates within the Ministry of Education to 
oversee the administration of educational programmes for Turkoman and Syriac 
Christian children. In addition, special religious programmes were authorized for 
Christian and Yezidi children attending school. The KRG Ministry of Culture also 
established two special departments staffed by Turkoman and Syriac civil servants 
to showcase and promote their culture.689 The KRG’s efforts were instrumental in 
restoring the Assyrian language, a modern version of the Aramaic used by Jesus, 
according to a Christian leader.690 
These achievements and the Kurdish protection of the rights of minorities 
were also recognized in the statements by minority leaders in the KRI. One Catholic 
leader, Archbishop Yacoub Scher of St. Joseph's Church in Irbil, representing the 
Chaldeans – one of the major Christian denominations in Iraqi Kurdistan – stated 
                                            
686 Rubin, “Interview: Nechirvan Idris Barzani,” Op. Cit. 
687 This allocation was embodied in Section 8, Article 36.3 of the Law No. 1 of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
National Assembly, see: Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, Op. Cit., p. 125.  
688 see: “The status of Christians in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq,” Kurdistan Regional Government 
UK Representation, December 2009, accessed: 29 December 2012, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/Status_Christians_Kurdistan_Region_Dec_09__2009_12
_22_h16m26s16.pdf.  
689 Rubin, “Interview: Nechirvan Idris Barzani,” Op. Cit. 
690 Robin Wright, Op. Cit. 
280 
 
that his group are “protected and respected in the North,” adding that “In Baghdad, 
we have no rights, and relations are strained among the religions.”691 
The continued survival and the increasing consolidation of the KRI drew the 
attention of other states in the wider Middle East region. Realizing that the KRI had 
now become a permanent feature in the geopolitics of the region, many Middle 
Eastern states sought to open channels of communication with the Kurdish political 
parties. From their side, the Kurds also were enthusiastic to widen their foreign 
relations to reach or communicate with as many states as possible. Ideologically, the 
Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq had not only battled with the regime of 
Saddam Hussein, but also with its Arab brethren in other states. For long, the power 
of pan-Arab ideology and the resultant aim of establishing one large unified Arab 
state had clashed with the Kurdish insistence on national self-determination.692 The 
Kurds were fearful that the unity of Arab states would transform the Kurds in Iraq into 
an insignificant minority group on the periphery of the pan-Arab state.693 As a result 
of the continuous warfare, the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement was 
constantly accused of betrayal and treachery, being proxies or clients of the imperial 
West or sometimes even the East – the Soviet bloc. The Kurds were also accused 
of attempting to create a ‘second Israel’ in the northern part of the Arab homeland.694 
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Thus, the Kurdish leadership was keen to approach Arab states in a campaign 
to change the Arabs’ point of view and dispel the misunderstandings that had long 
existed between the Kurds and Arabs in the wider Middle East region. Iraqi Kurds 
seized any opportunity available to them in the realm of public diplomacy to influence 
the Arab decision-makers. Within this context, influencing the viewpoints of Arab 
intellectuals, academics, and those close to the foreign policy establishment, 
constituted an important part of their strategy. One such opportunity presented itself 
when the KDP and the PUK were invited to Cairo, the capital of Egypt, to meet with 
Arab politicians and intellectuals for a conference called The Arab-Kurdish Dialogue. 
The conference, which was endorsed by the former Egyptian leader, President 
Housni Mubarak, was organized by Ahmed Hamroush: “an author, newspaper man, 
a committed communist, an army officer, a theatre director and a major figure in the 
anti-imperialism movements of the 1950s and 1960s”695 who also directed ‘the 
Egyptian committee for solidarity.’696 In the conference, taking a cautious approach 
reflecting the sensitivity and misunderstanding that for years had coloured Arab-
Kurdish relations, both parties reaffirmed their parties’ commitment to the territorial 
integrity of Iraq, while also strongly affirming the Kurds’ right to self-determination, 
albeit one within the confines of the Iraqi state. Talabani, representing the PUK, 
stressed that the Kurds did not wish to secede from Iraq. However, he also stressed 
the voluntary nature of the Kurdish union with Iraq within the framework of an 
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independent Iraqi union.697 Meanwhile, Sami abdul-Rahman, representing the KDP, 
adopted a similar approach, while trying to promote federalism as a solution to the 
Kurdish question in Iraq, when he stated: 
“In this era, following the liberation of peoples and the reconfiguration of 
nations, the era of democratization and human rights, the Kurdish people 
in Iraq are fighting for benefiting from their national and democratic right 
to run their own affairs… At this moment, our people are in need of Iraqi 
unity and its consolidation and the solution is to be found in federalism 
within Iraq.”698 
What the Kurdish leaders reiterated was not of significance by itself, as it 
contained the same elements of rapprochement with the Arab nation, repeating 
commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq and restating Kurdish right to self-
determination within a unified Iraq. What distinguished the conference, however, 
was that for the first time since the establishment of the KRI, Kurdish leaders were 
invited to an Arab capital to present their case publicly. Highlighting this, al-Ahram 
weekly online stated that this conference was “the first discussion of its kind between 
Arab and Kurdish intellectuals and politicians centering on the relations and 
misunderstandings that have existed between the two communities for decades.”699 
Naturally, the conference received fierce criticism from Baghdad, claiming the 
conference represented “interference in Iraq's internal affairs. Iraq also claimed that 
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the meeting gave the United States exactly what it needed to pressure Iraq by 
highlighting the Kurdish claims of mistreatment by Baghdad.”700 
 
The economic consolidation and opportunities present in the KRI allowed the 
Kurdish leadership to increasingly use the economic card as a tool in diplomacy and 
foreign relations. Indeed, as FPA literature has shown, as well as its negative 
dimensions, economic statecraft can also have positive aspects. As Michael 
Mastanduno notes, “Just as trade denial can be used to change behavior, weaken 
capabilities, or induce regime change, so trade promotion-the promise or actuality of 
expanded trade-can be a means to influence a government’s domestic or foreign 
policies or to strengthen its capabilities.”701 This thesis argues that de facto states 
are no exception, and in the case of the KRI, the economic tools – as will be outlined 
in chapter seven – have  been one of the primary means used in diplomacy and 
foreign policy. 
After the United States and Britain, which provided protection to the KRI, 
Turkey represented the most important state capable of influencing the present and 
future of the KRI. Turkey represented the main outlet through which the goods and 
commodities purchased under the OFFP reached the region, through the Habur-
Ibrahim Khalil gate – on the Iraqi side, controlled by the KDP. This gate not only 
controlled the humanitarian needs of the KRI, but also delivered much of the 
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commodities earmarked for the rest of Iraq. Moreover, as mentioned previously, 
since the end of the Second Gulf War, Turkey allowed U.S. and British planes to 
station in the Incerlik base in Turkey to enforce and monitor the no-fly zone over Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Thus, in three successive terms, Operation Provide Comfort, Operation 
Poised Hammer, and finally Operation Northern Watch in 1997 respectively, Turkey 
renewed its authorization for the continued presence of the Allied forces and military 
warplanes in Turkey. Hence, in his visit to Ankara, Masoud Barzani skillfully used 
the economic card by urging Turkish companies to actively engage in trade, 
economic and construction opportunities present in the KRI, declaring that: ‘‘We 
prefer Turkish contractors because of Turkey's proximity and maintenance 
facilities.”702 Perhaps, more importantly, the Kurds began to develop discreet 
economic ties with certain elite figures in the Turkish establishment,703 possibly to 
ensure their continued support for the KRI and the presence of U.S. and British 
military facilities in Turkey. Meanwhile, the Turkish civilian and military bureaucracy, 
noting the increased trade and commercial activities of its rival, Iran, began to 
encourage Turkish businesses to explore business and construction opportunities 
fueled by the OFFP, particularly in the KDP-held territory.704 
Moreover, to guarantee Turkish cooperation, the Kurdish political parties, 
particularly the KDP, developed a modus vivendi with the Turkish government, 
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particularly its military wing. During the 1990s, the Kurdish parties allowed or 
cooperated with several Turkish military incursions inside the KRI in pursuit of PKK 
fighters.705 Virtually at every peace effort between the KDP and PUK, ‘Legitimate 
Security Concerns of Turkey’, interpreted as the security threat presented by the 
PKK, were taken into consideration.706  As a bonus, to allow the Operation Northern 
Watch to continue, and eager to guarantee the military survival of the Kurdish de 
facto state, Turkey was granted permission to place a small but permanent military 
base inside the KRI. Years later, in March 2003, one week after OIF had started, the 
Turkish Ambassador at the UN declared: “it is a common knowledge that elements 
of Turkish Armed Forces are stationed in northern Iraq. And they were sent there not 
yesterday but years before in the context of “Operation Northern Watch.”707  
In Ankara, the KDP and PUK representatives who had been stationed back 
in 1992, during the presidency of Turgut Ozal, had continued to carry out 
paradiplomatic tasks. Safeen Dizayee, the KDP representative, was in constant 
contact with the Turkish foreign ministry; discussing security matters, political 
developments in the region, relations with neighbouring countries and with Europe.708 
Sharing the lucrative border with Turkey and possessing interactions in several 
economic, military and economic matters, the KDP built the closest relations with 
Turkey. Reflecting the existence of strong relations with Turkey and the further 
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consolidation of the KRI, in 2000, the KDP representation office held a Nawroz (the 
Kurdish New Year) celebration event in the Ankara Sheraton inviting many Turkish 
and foreign officials, as well as business people, with the Turkish foreign ministry 
providing security for the event.709. Furthermore, the fact that between 1992 to 2001, 
Masoud Barzani paid six official visits to Ankara is indicative of the close relations 
between Ankara and the KDP.710  
The further consolidation of the KRI prompted both parties – the KDP and 
PUK – to restructure or create more effective foreign representation offices abroad. 
Continuing the tradition of having unofficial foreign representatives, after the creation 
of the KRI, both Kurdish nationalist parties sent and empowered their officials to 
represent their interests abroad. Relations with the West were considered the most 
important by both parties. The consolidation of the two Kurdish administrations 
prompted the parties to hire new KRG officials to represent their respective 
governments in foreign capitals. Initially, the task of these new KRG officials 
overlapped with the political party representatives. They both advocated the 
interests of Kurdistan with an emphasis on the interests and viewpoints of their 
respective parties. This overlap leads Vian Rahman to argue that “The Kurdish case 
shows that it may be misleading to demarcate ‘official’ from ‘unofficial’ diplomacy; 
multiple and varied actors are involved, overlapping and interacting with each other 
in their efforts to project ‘Kurdishness’ and Kurdish demands.”711 Over time, the 
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representatives of the two KRGs became more concerned with issues of diplomacy: 
negotiating over issues related to the Iraqi opposition, the OFFP and the peace 
process between the KDP and PUK; communicating between foreign governments 
and their respective KRGs; and promotion of economic interactions and highlighting 
economic opportunities in their respective territories. The representatives of the 
political parties, however, mostly concerned themselves with promoting their parties 
within the Kurdish diaspora and, in conjunction with the Kurdish diaspora, promoting 
or highlighting Kurdish national symbols, culture and identity as well as the sufferings 
of the Kurds, in the liberal and open atmosphere that is available in the West. 
Interestingly, the new political environment, and the serious issues relating to the 
survival and consolidation of the KRI, encouraged both parties to hire and nurture 
effective and skillful diplomats in the West. Thus, many of those appointed to fill the 
positions of KRG representatives were those who had lived for many years in the 
West or who had left Iraq at an early age either as exiles or asylum-seekers. They 
were educated in Western academic institutions and universities, and fluently spoke 
the language of the state where they were based. This was advantageous in many 
ways. The new KRG representatives were self-trained in the language and methods 
of Western politics, and they realized the importance of incorporating cosmopolitan 
democratic norms into their language of paradiplomacy and public diplomacy.712 
Barham Salih, for instance, escaped from Iraq to Britain at a young age. In 1987, he 
received a PhD degree in Statistics and Computer Applications in Engineering from 
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the University of Liverpool. After the establishment of the KRI, Salih was dispatched 
to Washington to represent the KRG and, after the division of the KRG into two 
governments, Salih represented the PUK-KRG.713 Barham Salih played an important 
role in introducing Kurdistan and the PUK to Washington. As Michael Rubin notes, 
“For many in Washington, be they congressmen, academics, or journalists, the face 
of the Kurdish struggle was Barham Salih, the U.S.-based representative of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) throughout much of the 1990s… Much of the 
positive perception of Kurdistan in the United States remains directly attributable to 
Barham.”714 Somewhere else, noting the personal diplomatic skills of Barham Salih, 
Rubin writes:  
“Barham Salih cultivated not only congressmen, but also their 
junior staffs. He sought relationships not only with star columnists, but 
also with young writers just out-of-college. When Democrats were in 
power, he cultivated relationships with Republicans, and vice versa. He 
understood what many autocrats do not: the key to building relationships 
was not opportunistic engagement with a single party or those in power, 
but rather cultivating the next generations of those who might be. 
Hundreds of people seek meetings with senators, congressmen, National 
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Security Council figures, and editorial writers; few have pre-existing 
relationships upon which they could fall back.”715  
Likewise, when Taha Barwari, who had migrated to Sweden in the early 1980s, was 
appointed to represent the KDP-KRG in Sweden, he raised the profile of Kurdistan 
in Sweden and mobilized the Swedish establishment in support of the Kurds.716  
Indeed, the focus on individuals is reflective of a wider trend in Kurdish foreign 
relations and foreign policy-making. Individual leaders and officials exercise great 
influence on Kurdish foreign relations and policies. Lacking sufficient financial 
resources, personnel, or even permission to operate large foreign policy 
establishment, individuals play an important role in Kurdish diplomacy. Bayan Sami 
abdul-Rahman – who since 2015 has served as the KRG representative in 
Washington717, in explaining the role of individuals in Kurdish foreign relations, 
states, “the KRG is a small operation, so individuals matter a lot. For autonomous 
regions like ours, you learn diplomacy on the job and as you go, there is no civil 
service behind you and you have a small budget and a small team of staff. So each 
person has a disproportionate impact.”718 Moreover, Nechirvan Barzani, the current 
Prime Minister of the KRG, has acknowledged the profound influence of individuals 
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in Kurdish diplomacy and foreign relations by stating “if you have the right person in 
the right job, they can take a negative situation and turn it around.”719  
In retrospect, it seems that the Kurdish democratic experiment, and what it 
achieved, was endorsed by members of the international community, a sign that Iraqi 
Kurds made striking achievements in the realm of foreign relations. For instance, on 
16 May 2002, the European Parliament endorsed the Kurdish democratic 
experiment when it passed a resolution in regard to Iraq/Kurdistan. The resolution 
welcomed “the improvements already achieved in the three [Kurdish-administered] 
governorates in the North of Iraq as regards the development of civil society, which 
prove the potential of the Iraqi people,” and called on the European Commission and 
the Council to take measure for “supporting the democratic experience of the Kurdish 
administration in northern Iraq and projects for the development of civil society in this 
autonomous region.”720 
Such endorsements were significant as they recognized the difficult journey 
the Kurds had undertaken on the road towards democracy, the consolidation of their 
Kurdish de facto state under the prolonged impact of U.S. and U.K protection, and 
the OFFP and their inclusion in the U.S.-led anti-Saddam coalition. However, while 
the international position remained the most important factor in the survivability of 
the KRI, mention should also be made of the skills of the Kurdish leadership in 
manoeuvring and relaying the sensitivities of international and regional powers. 
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Navigating the complex and uncharted territory of international relations, by 2001, 
the Kurdish leadership had achieved much success in the realm of foreign relations. 
This point in clearly illustrated in a speech by Francis J. Ricciardone, the US State 
Department Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, who, in a speech at the American 
University Centre for Global Peace, referring to the Kurds stated that: 
“It is remarkable that Iraqi Kurds, formerly among the most culturally and 
geographically isolated people on the planet, have embraced overt, broad 
engagement with the outside world with both spirit and skill. Their budding 
success in the world arena has been hard won, through an epic and 
painful learning process… as non-state practitioners in international 
relations, in many respects the various Kurdish organizations now enjoy 
greater influence, access, credibility, and meaningful international 
relationships than does the regime which purports to speak for them and 
for all Iraqis from Iraq’s seat at the United Nations.”721  
As non-state actors representing the Kurdish de facto state and the realization 
that the Kurds are the strongest and the most reliable in the anti-Saddam coalition, 
and the only group with territorial control inside Iraq, the U.S strived to finalize the 
implementation of the U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement between the two 
parties. The United States also strove to get closer to the Kurds of Iraq through 
symbolic gestures and provision of much-craved for security assurances. So when 
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Al Gore, the former U.S. Vice President, received Nechirvan Barzani and Jalal 
Talabani in 2000, he reiterated the U.S. commitment to “the protection of the people 
of Iraqi Kurdistan” (and not the people of “the north,” as Albright had stated).722 In 
time, the Iraqi Kurds would move even closer to the U.S., particularly after the events 
of 9/11, the war on terror, and the resultant removal of the regime of Saddam 
Hussein.  
Still, despite the expanding foreign relations between Kurdish political parties, 
neighbouring states and the international community at large and the consolidation 
of the KRI, sovereign states were careful not to grant explicit legitimacy or 
recognition to the KRI.  For instance, despite the closeness of relations between 
Turkey, the KDP and PUK, Ankara never gave any indication of explicitly or implicitly 
recognizing the KRI as a de facto independent entity. When, for instance, Masoud 
Barzani visited Turkey in May 2001, several concerns were raised by Ankara during 
preparations for the visit. The first issue concerned how Mr. Barzani would be treated 
in Turkey; the second concerned Ankara’s repeat of its commitment to the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. A Turkish foreign ministry official is quoted as saying: “We told them 
that he is seen as a political party leader in Iraq, in order not to create a 
misunderstanding on his title and mission.”723 Another Turkish official is quoted as 
saying: 
“We tell them and we treat them as – Mr. Barzani is the chairman of the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq. Mr. Talabani is the chairman or the 
                                            
722 Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, Op. Cit., p. 265.  
723 Lundgren, Op. Cit., p. 87.  
293 
 
president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan… we repeat to them and to 
everybody, Erbil, Sulemanya, and Dohuk are integral part of Iraq. There 
is a power vacuum there. There are problems there. These problems 
need to be resolved within Iraq, by the Iraqis […] We want to encourage 
Baghdad and them to solve this problem among themselves.”724 
Yet, however Turkey attempted to interpret its relations with the Kurdish 
political leaders, the results or the impressions remained fruitful to the Kurdish 
parties: building independent relations with both Kurdish parties meant that the 
Kurdish north was actually a separate entity requiring Turkish engagement to pursue 
its interests. As David McDowall notes: “While Ankara withheld de jure recognition 
of the Kurdish government, its reliance on Iraqi Kurds implied de facto acceptance 
of realities.”725 Moreover, as Bengio argues “the KDP and later the PUK managed to 
turn Turkey into a springboard for forging relations with the outside world and thus 
reinforce their national project.”726 
 
5.6 From 9/11 to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The events of 9/11 were monumental in the recent history of international 
politics. Only once before had the United States come under such a surprise attack, 
Pearl Harbor, during the Second World War. But, that was an attack by the 
conventional army of a warring state. Now, for the first time, the American homeland 
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was attacked by a non-state actor operating from caves high in the mountains of 
Afghanistan. The administration of President George W. Bush quickly identified Al-
Qaeda as the sole perpetrator of the attack.727 As the Americans recovered from the 
immediate shock of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, George W. Bush delivered his first 
State of the Union address to the joint session of the Congress. After making clear 
and explicit demands on the Taliban, as the sovereign authority in the land were Al-
Qaeda operated and its leaders were harboured, Bush stated that: “Every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”728 
The Kurds of Iraq immediately chose the U.S. side. Indeed, the response of the 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership is interesting and telling. Very quickly, the Kurdish political 
leaders realized the great opportunities and challenges lying ahead. Grasping the 
importance of the U.S.-led war on terror on their positions and prospects, Iraqi Kurds 
not only sought to associate themselves with the United States, but also redefined 
their struggle against successive Iraqi regimes as battles against terrorism. Indeed, 
the U.S.-led war on terror provided an opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to reiterate the 
message that they share the same values as the liberal West: “not only are we the 
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victims; we are the good guys, we are like you… we do not constitute a security 
threat,”729 and we share your “hegemonic international values.”730  
This is clearly reflected in a speech delivered by Masoud Barzani before the 
members of the KNA in Erbil a few days after 9/11, when he declared: 
“The 11th of September has become a very important day in the history 
of the world…We express our condolences to the [US] government and 
the families of the victims. This does not mean that we are adopting a new 
position. The KDP has always been against terrorism. The Kurds and the 
KDP have so often been victims of terrorism. It is of utmost necessity that 
all of us follow the events very carefully and wait and see how things 
develop. Similar to the aftermath of the Gulf War, I think that a new 
situation will emerge.”731 
Soon the U.S. military with aid from groups of Afghan fighters, known as 
Northern Alliance, knocked out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. 
However, even during early discussions on Afghanistan involving high-level U.S. 
officials, the issue of toppling Saddam had been discussed. The idea was initially 
suggested by Paul Wolfowitz, the then Deputy Defense Secretary, backed by Donald 
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Rumsfeld, the then Defense Secretary, who suggested “dealing with Iraq would 
show a major commitment to anti-terrorism.”732 
The two KRGs, moreover, sought to align their policies with those of the 
United States and to even unofficially participate in the global war on terrorism. The 
continuous survival or indeed the consolidation of the KRI required quickly building 
rapprochements with the George W. Bush administration. The Kurds soon found 
tangible means to associate the KRI with the United States. Some years before 9/11, 
small groups with more rigid and fundamentalist interpretations of Islam were being 
established in the KRI, more visibly within the PUK sphere of influence. The IMIK, 
the primary Islamic grouping in Kurdistan, had been splintering for a number of years 
and some of the offshoots of the IMIK seemed to have formed the foundations of 
more radical Islamic groups.733 Their division from the IMIK eventually led to the 
formation of Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam),734 on 1 September 2001, just ten 
days before the attacks on America.735 
More importantly, from the point of view of the leadership of the two KRGs, 
was the link between Ansar al-Islam and Al-Qaeda. Ansar al-Islam was a local 
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radical islamist threat to the two, secular and nationalist Kurdish parties. Moreover, 
it was essential for the Kurdish leadership to highlight the threat of the group to the 
U.S. administration and those influencing decision-making in the United States for 
several reasons: establishing the two leading Kurdish parties as partners in the U.S.-
led global coalition to combat terror with all its political, financial and military benefits; 
to destroy the locally grown groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and to enhance the 
consolidation of the KRI. Even before 11th September 2001, the Kurdish parties had 
grappled with the threat of Islamic radical terrorism emanating from the no-man’s-
land near the Iranian border.736 Franso Hariri, the Christian Governor of Erbil and a 
highly-regarded member of the KDP leadership council, was assassinated by one of 
the components of Ansar al-Islam in February 2001.737 Indeed, Barham Salih, who 
returned to Kurdistan to take the position of Prime Minister of the PUK-KRG, was the 
target of another such attack by radical groups thought to be affiliated with Al-
Qaeda.738  
Although the KDP was at the receiving end of Ansar’s extremism, as 
illustrated by the fact that it agreed to establish a ‘joint operation room’739 with the 
PUK to combat terrorism, Ansar al-Islam represented a particularly graver danger to 
the PUK as its area of activities encroached on those of the PUK. Thus, the PUK 
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attempted harder to publicise the connection between the small Kurdish radical 
groups with al-Qaeda. Referring to the PUK attempts to ‘bandwagon’ on the U.S. 
war on terror, an article by the Economist stated, “Within hours of the September 
11th attacks on America, the group's [PUK] websites accused the IMIK and its 
hardline offshoot, Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam), of receiving training and money 
from Al-Qaeda and, for good measure, Iraqi intelligence agents. They were planning, 
says the PUK, to create a haven within a haven for Osama bin Laden.”740 
The Kurdish leadership was quick to highlight the threat posed by the radical 
Islamist groupings. Indeed, the fight against terrorism became an important 
ingredient in underlining Kurdistan’s democratization and possession of liberal, 
secular and democratic values. The fight against terrorists also served as a strategy 
in stressing the KRI’s ability to contribute to the regional and indeed international 
security and stability. Bringing up the theme of the Kurdish experiment in democracy, 
Barham Salih, in a special meeting held at the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, stated that “Out of the ashes of tyranny, the Iraqi Kurds have built something 
tangible: a free, liberal society by Middle Eastern standards.”741 He then continued 
by saying that, “In their declaration, they cite two reasons for setting up this 
organization and for choosing Iraqi Kurdistan as a site for jihad. First, the terrain of 
Iraqi Kurdistan is conducive to jihad. Second, the "seculars," referring to the 
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mainstream Iraqi Kurdish leadership, have turned Iraqi Kurdistan into a haven for 
Jews, Christians, and American influence.”742 Moreover, to achieve better 
understanding on the nature of Ansar al-Islam in the United States and the West in 
general, Jalal Talabani skillfully employed what in the FPA literature has referred to 
as ‘analogical reasoning’.743 Realizing the increasing awareness about the Taliban 
in the West, perhaps due to the recent increase in media coverage, Talabani’s 
analogy sought to associate Ansar al-Islam with the Taliban and point to potential 
solutions along the line of destruction which was wreaked on the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. Thus, in several journalistic interviews, Jalal Talabani branded Ansar 
‘as a kind of Taliban,’744 contending that “they are terrorists who have declared war 
against all Kurdish political parties.”745 In a similar vein, Karim Sinjari, the Interior 
Minister in the KDP-led KRG, citing the link between Al-Qaeda and Ansar, contended 
that “Osama bin Laden believes that the infidels should be beaten in the head, 
meaning the United States. Zawahiri’s philosophy is that you should fight the infidel 
even in the smallest village, that you should try to form Islamic armies everywhere. 
The Kurdish fundamentalists were influenced by Zawahiri.”746 
Soon after the supposed success of the US forces in removing the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, Saddam’s Iraq became the next target of the United 
States which, in U.S. thinking, represented a particularly grave danger to world 
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security, particularly with regards to its alleged possession of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. In time, the Iraqi Kurds would become a major ally in the U.S.-led 
coalition to remove the regime of Saddam and combat Ansar’s threat to the Kurdish 
de facto state, thereby ushering in a new era in the development of the Kurdish de 
facto state.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Despite challenges, the second half of the 1990s represented an important 
period in the transition of the Kurdish de facto state. The end of the uncivil civil war, 
the initiation of the OFFP, the Washington Agreement and inclusion of the KDP and 
PUK into the list of the U.S.-sponsored anti-Saddam opposition groups provided a 
massive boost to the KRI. It represented a major transitory period for the Kurdish 
political parties and their elite, as well as, more importantly, a significant formative 
period for Kurdish foreign relations. The Kurdish de facto state enjoyed a prolonged 
period of stability, relative prosperity and peace, which, in time, allowed the Kurdish 
leadership space to reflect on the future of the nascent entity and decide on the best 
possible strategy in the ever-changing political environment. 
 Indeed, after 1997, in their foreign policy of self-justification, the Kurdish 
parties began to move beyond a focus on democratization to encompass arguments 
portraying the KRI as a model for the future of Iraq. This argument became even 
more important in anticipation of a regime change in Iraq advocated and later 
executed by the George W. Bush administration. Moreover, the geopolitical position 
301 
 
and the geographic location of the KRI along long-standing fault lines, i.e. the 
significant role it could play in the efforts to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, 
prompted the United States to build official, direct and overt relations with the Kurdish 
political entities. 
After 1997, the domestic institutions of the two KRGs were further 
consolidated. This consolidation enabled the continued strengthening of the 
domestic sovereignty and autonomy of the KRI. It also empowered the two KRGs to 
increase their presence internationally, mainly in the capitals of those Western states 
deemed vital for the continued survival of the KRI. However, like the preceding phase 
of survival, the KDP and PUK remained the primary actors in the realm of foreign 
relations. Reflecting on the increasing consolidation of the two KRGs and the 
complex nature of the issues arising, the two KRGs, each led by a different party, 
incorporated and nurtured a more skillful and younger generation of foreign 
representatives that emphasized the language of democratization, civil and human 
rights. These representatives became the face of the two KRGs in foreign capitals 
and came to play an increasingly important role in the implementation of Kurdish 
foreign policy following the fall of the regime in Baghdad and transformation of the 
KRI into a recognized de facto state after 2003, which is the focus of the next chapter 





6 The Second Decade of De Facto Independence: Foreign 
Policies of Image-Building 
This chapter starts the empirical analysis of what is in effect the second 
decade of the existence of the Kurdish de facto state between 2003 and 2007. It 
examines the legalization of the KRI within the state of Iraq, reunification of the two 
KRGs, as well as the significant transformation of the KRI into a recognized de facto 
state. The chapter also extensively examines the foreign policies of image-building 
initiated by the Kurdish leadership. Overall, the chapter argues that during this 
period, image- or brand-building constituted the primary foreign policy aim of the KRI 
6.1 Introduction  
The political development of the post-2003 Iraq can be divided into two 
phases: occupation and state reformation between 2003 and 2005; and civil war, 
terrorism and insurgency between 2005 and 2007. Both developments assisted the 
KRI in significant ways. Contrary to many expectations, the U.S. intervention in Iraq 
and the second state-building processes in Iraq did not lead to the demise of the de 
facto state. Indeed, this thesis argues that during this period the Kurdish de facto 
state underwent a major transition from being an unrecognized de facto state into 
becoming a recognized de facto state. This chapter has been named the foreign 
policy of image-building since, immediately after 2003, the Kurds in Iraq had two 
primary foreign policy objectives. First, to ensure the de facto independence of the 
KRI; second, to counter the negative images surrounding the de facto state by 
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engaging in foreign policies designed to create a positive image of the Kurdish de 
facto state in Iraq. This transformation had several cumulative effects on the position, 
actions and policies of the Kurdish de facto state. Firstly, the transition enabled the 
KRI to emerge eventually as a unitary actor pursuing rational foreign policies in 
pursuit of the national interests of the Kurdish de facto state. After 2003, the official 
and unified institutions of the KRI gradually emerged as foreign policy actors with 
weight and agency in regional and international affairs. On a more fundamental level, 
during the first decade of the KRI, the relationship between the KRI and the regime 
in Baghdad was characterized, where it existed, by central government-to-political 
party relations. The transition after 2003, however, transformed relations between 
the KRI and its parent Iraqi state in Baghdad into a state-to-state, or state-to-
government relationship, to borrow a term used by Robert Olson to categorize 
relations between the KRI and Ankara after 2003.747    
Gradually, after 2003, the KRI began to see its interactions with Baghdad as 
a matter of foreign policy and not an internal affair of Iraq. Despite that, this chapter 
argues that between 2003 and 2007 the KRI’s foreign relations and policies were in 
tandem with the overall outlook and foreign policies of the federal government in 
Baghdad. All in all, the chapter contends that this period, which lasted up to 2007, 
was subsequently foundational in enabling or even forcing the Kurdish de facto state 
to pursue its own independent foreign policies. 
                                            




6.2 The Kurdish de Facto State in Transition 
For a thorough analysis of the numerous transitions that the KRI experienced 
after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a cursory analysis of the pre-war stage is 
required, as many formative events took place then that enabled the KRI later to 
transform into a recognized de facto state. 
As mentioned earlier, after the Taliban were removed from power and Al-
Qaeda was temporarily denied a sanctuary in Afghanistan, the U.S. started to think 
of the next target in its self-declared global war on terror; and Iraq soon came into 
view as that target.  In the aftermath of 9/11, as Toby Dodge notes, the George W. 
Bush administration identified the threat of terrorism as emanating from the most 
ungovernable creations of the decolonialization processes. That is to say, states in 
the developing world that existed on the margins of the international system, and the 
possession of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states, posed the 
gravest danger to the security of the United States and world security.  This new 
doctrine was reflected in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.748 
More specifically, on 29 January 2002, in his State of the Union address to a Joint 
Session of Congress, President Bush as well as identifying the threat of Iran and 
North Korea, also singled out Saddam’s Iraq as constituting an ‘axis of evil’ intent on 
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endangering the security of America and the world.749 As such, as Galbraith notes, 
the war rhetoric against the regime in Iraq started during this session of congress.750  
Simultaneously, while pursuing a political track through the UNSC to disarm 
Iraq from its alleged WMD, the U.S. also worked on military planning,751 reorganizing 
the Iraqi opposition752 and getting the support of local allies, including Iraqi Kurds753 
and Turkey. As early as November 2001, Barham Salih was invited to Washington 
to meet with the U.S. Secretary of Defense to discuss possible Kurdish participation 
in the U.S.-led war to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.754 
The U.S.’s resolve to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein presented 
challenges as well as opportunities to the KRI. One the one hand, Kurdish opposition 
to the regime of Saddam was unparalleled as the Kurds had been on the receiving 
end of Saddam’s brutality for years. On the other hand, as Stansfield notes, “as the 
geopolitical gaze of George W Bush turned towards Iraq, the KDP and PUK were 
well aware that the political gains made since 1991, the economic benefits made 
available to them and the fragile but real security they enjoyed, were threatened by 
a possible change in the status quo.”755  Therefore, anticipating the changes and 
seeking to ensure the survival and further consolidation of their de facto state, the 
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leadership of the KRI embarked upon a thoughtful strategy to maximize its gains and 
reduce its loses. The Kurdish strategy, moreover, had intertwined internal and 
external dimensions. Thus, this thesis argues that while the KRI was still not a 
coherent actor, in the sense of having one central government administrating the 
whole of its territory, the actions of the two KRGs and their leading parties resembled 
the pursuit of foreign policies which embodied ‘goals, values and decisions.’756 If 
foreign policy refers to the design and formation of policies which are directed 
towards external ‘targets,’757 then certainly, an argument can be made to the effect 
that the two KRGs designed strategies and tools for implementation directed towards 
external actors, aimed at ensuring the national interest of the KRI. This thesis argues 
that during this period the national interest of the KRI was articulated in three 
interrelated objectives. First, the immediate survival of the KRI during the OIF; 
second, the long-term survival and consolidation of the KRI in any post-Saddam 
setting; and finally guaranteeing the continuous economic prosperity and security of 
the KRI. While these aims are all domestically focused, they still had foreign policy 
dimensions as many foreign actors did, and could have, a determining influence on 
the future and sustainability of the KRI.   
Facing the new challenges, the KDP and PUK immediately initiated the 
process of reunifying the two governments. Domestically, Iraqi Kurds started with 
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what Stansfield has called the process of ‘calculated compromise,’758 which included 
among other things reunifying the KNA. This was necessary because, as Hoshyar 
Zebari stated, “We are feeling the pressure, we are sensing the danger, and both 
leaderships ... recognise that this is the time to get our house in order.”759 Thus, the 
two parties were eager to show substantial progress in the realm of reconciliation 
amid intense political and military uncertainty. These efforts received a great boost 
when on 4 October 2002, the KDP and PUK reconvened the KNA, with all its original 
105 members in attendance, at its building in Erbil amid statements and remarks 
anticipating great hopes as well as challenges.760 The reconvening of the KNA was 
a significant step in preparation for the regime change in Baghdad and the possibility 
of a new political order. Indeed, as Hoshyar Zebari stated, the reunification of the 
KNA was intended to “send a very powerful message to Baghdad and to our 
neighbors that the Kurdish front is solid, is unified, and that we will move forward.”761 
The United States was also keen to present a united anti-Saddam front so it provided 
$3.1 million dollars in aid to the Kurdish parties to show the U.S resolve to push the 
reconciliation process in Iraqi Kurdistan.762 
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Moreover, realizing their weak position vis-a-vis Baghdad, the Kurdish policy-
makers demanded concrete guarantees of military protection from the U.S. and its 
allies. Carefully but quietly announcing their support for political transformation in 
Iraq, the Kurds also made no secret of their fear of a tactical attack by Saddam 
Hussein. Commenting on this Kurdish conundrum, Masoud Barzani stated: “It is not 
enough to tell us the U.S. will respond at a certain time and place of its choosing… 
We’re in artillery range. Iraq’s Army is weak, but it is still strong enough to crush us. 
We don’t make assumptions about the American response.”763 His views were 
echoed by experts on the Kurds such as Carole O’Leary who stated, “The bottom 
line is that it's easier for Saddam to hit the Kurds than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or 
Israel.”764 Therefore, not seeing US pledges of protection as utterly convincing, 
Barzani on several occasions refused to attend meetings orchestrated to show Iraqi 
opposition unity behind US plans.765 
More importantly, from the Kurds’ perspective, was ensuring the political and 
economic future of the KRI. Economic, political and military survival, as Francis 
Owtram argues, are the primary objectives of the foreign policies of de facto 
states.766 Economically, the OFFP had led in a new era of relative economic 
prosperity, and political and security stabilization for the two KRGs, since 13 per cent 
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of Iraq’s oil revenue was allocated to the three governorates of the KRI. And the 
Kurds had to guarantee the flow of these revenues, in one way or another, to 
maintain their continued economic prosperity and development. In an interview 
Nechirvan Barzani very clearly linked future political arrangements with economic 
security, stating: “If a new federal system of government is agreed among Iraqis, 
Kurdistan region must be guaranteed an equitable share of the country's resources, 
similar to that which is currently guaranteed by the UNSCR-986 Oil-for-Food 
program, which has proved to be a success in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is a necessity for 
the future viability and sustainability of the region. Without such guarantees, the 
stability of the state could once again be threatened.”767 
Politically, uncertainty arose with regard of the future survival of the KRI. The 
Kurds feared that the U.S. and its allies would either replace the regime of Saddam 
with another Sunni strongman, or, even if democracy were installed in Iraq, the 
United States would create a strong central government in Baghdad to which the 
KRI would be forced to succumb.768 Thus as Stansfield notes, realizing the 
weakening of their influence after the regime change in Baghdad, the Kurds adopted 
a dangerous strategy by trying to secure their objectives while Saddam was still in 
power.769 The two Kurdish parties publicly but cautiously refused to become involved 
in any form of U.S.-sponsored covert action lest the previous tragedies and betrayals 
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of 1975 and 1991 be repeated. This is evident from the statements of Kurdish 
leaders. Masoud Barzani said in an interview: “The Iraqi issue won't be solved by 
military action or covert action… We cannot stop the US [from taking covert action], 
but we would like there to be transparency and clarity, and for there to be no covers 
or curtains to hide behind.”770 Moreover, from the outset, Kurdish leaders publicly 
linked their participation in any U.S-led effort to topple the regime of Saddam with 
certain guarantees. In outlining Kurdish conditions in joining the U.S. venture in Iraq, 
Barzani stated “If a federal solution for the Kurdish issue within a democratic, 
pluralistic and parliamentary Iraq is guaranteed, a dictatorial and military alternative 
is not imposed on us and regional interference is not allowed-then the Kurds will play 
a major role."771 
The strategy also involved promoting the idea of federalism as a suitable 
mechanism for post-Saddam political arrangements in Iraq. To gain the upper hand, 
Kurdish politicians, like Barham Salih, began arguing that the KRI was virtually 
independent, but they were voluntarily “asking for reunification. [And therefore] 
Federation is the only solution.”772 Agreeing with Salih, likewise, Dr. Roj Shawees, 
the then Speaker of the KNA in Erbil, laid down some conditions on the Kurdish 
voluntary reunion with the rest of Iraq, stating: “We cannot give up what we have-
near independence-without guarantees... We are a "region" but we are ready to join 
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together again on certain conditions. However, the Kurdish people are not ready to 
accept being ruled as we were ruled before. We will ask for a federal system with 
international guarantees.”773 Indeed, racing against time and to best prepare for the 
post-Saddam arrangements, the KDP and PUK drafted several legal documents 
outlining their vision of a future Iraq as well as a constitutional chapter proposal 
envisioning the nature of their relations with the future Iraqi state. The first document 
named the "General Principles of Federalism for Iraq’’, in effect outlined a political 
system for the future Iraq, while Kurdistan’s constitutional chapter, which at that time 
was under preparation and review, reflected the Kurds’ view of their future relations 
with Baghdad.774 
Thereafter, to achieve approval for federalism and the draft constitution, the 
Kurds adopted a two-track policy. The first track involved influencing the U.S. policy-
makers by using every tool at their disposal. The Kurds were lucky. In this regard, 
as Judith Yaphe remarks, the Kurds, along the Shiite forces, were the backbone of 
an Iraqi liberation army in any move to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein.775 
Furthermore, as Stansfield notes, the Kurds provided the Iraqi opposition with 
territorial legitimacy and the moral high ground, given the atrocities committed by 
Saddam Hussein against the Kurds. The KDP and PUK jointly possessed almost 
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80,000 fighters as well as enjoying territorial control over a large portion of Iraq. 
Therefore, in order to strengthen their position with the U.S. in anticipation of regime 
change, the Iraqi Kurds began to promote themselves as something akin to the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan throughout the pre-war wrangling.776 In addition to 
direct meetings with U.S. officials, the Kurds also conducted a relatively well-
orchestrated public diplomacy campaign through the Western media, think tanks, 
research institutions, and sympathetic individuals777 to guarantee their position in the 
post-Saddam political system of Iraq. The second track, on the other hand, involved 
strengthening their position within the opposition of Iraq. At least, since 1998, both 
Kurdish parties had avoided serious contact with the INC as the main vehicle of the 
Iraqi opposition. However, anticipating regime change, the Kurds strengthened their 
contacts with several Iraqi opposition groupings (whether it be the INC, the ‘Gang of 
Four’ or the ‘Group of Six’).778 Thus, as Stansfield argues, in addition to assuming 
positions of authority within the Iraqi opposition, the KDP and the PUK “had to ensure 
that their opposition partners were sincere in their support for the Kurdish vision of a 
federal Iraq with a clearly defined Kurdistan Region within it.”779  
However vague, the Kurds managed to an extent to gain approval for their 
vision of a future Iraq. The final statements of the latest meetings of the Iraqi 
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opposition, in London between 13 and 16 December 2002780 and in Salahaddin (the 
headquarters of the KDP in the KRI) between 26 February and 1 March 2003 – 
before the run-up to OIF – were vital achievements for the Kurds. These statements, 
as well as saluting the democratic experiment in the KRI, concluded that Iraq should 
be reconstructed on the basis of “democratic, parliamentary, federal and equal 
citizenship to all Iraqis, be they Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians, or 
Chaldeans.”781 Moreover, under the heading of “federalism and the resolution of the 
Kurdish question,” the London conference statement reaffirmed: “its respect for the 
Kurdish people and the free will of the people of Kurdistan to choose suitable and 
appropriate methods in their partnership with the people of the country.”782 These 
two conferences, particularly the conference in London, as Masoud Barzani states, 
set the ground “for the preparation of the 2003 War and Iraq’s democratic identity’ 
along with ‘the principles of federalism.’”783 
Despite the doubts of the Kurdish leaders and the increasing threat to the 
security of the KRI, on 15 February 2003, in a joint statement, the KDP and PUK 
declared their readiness to participate in the U.S.-led OIF to topple the regime of 
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Saddam Hussein.784 Bengio notes that what assured the Kurdish leaders, Barzani 
and Talabani, to make such a declaration was a secret meeting between them and 
President George W. Bush in April 2002.785 Other reports, however, pointed to a 
secret meeting at the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia, between the Kurdish 
leaders and the U.S., for the first time detailing with specific arenas of cooperation 
between Iraqi Kurds and the U.S. military to overthrow Saddam Hussein, rather than 
focusing just on consultations.786 President Bush gave a further boost to Kurdish 
confidence when he stated at a press conference that he favoured an Iraq that was 
“a federation of Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds.”787 
However, ironically, from the Kurdish point of view, Turkey represented the 
greatest challenge to the continuous existence of the KRI. While it is true that Turkey 
had developed a modus vivendi with the Kurdish parties after 1991, Turkey had 
always conceived of the situation in Northern Iraq as a temporary situation. Turkey, 
furthermore, being a unitary state built on a rigid interpretation of territorial integrity 
and a vision of ‘state-founding nationalism’,788  found the existence of a territorially 
autonomous entity for the Kurds in Iraq extremely discomforting. Turkey is a key 
NATO ally of the United States with borders to Iraq (the KRI). The United States, on 
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the other hand, wanted Turkey to play a key role in the OIF. This in turn presented 
a key dilemma to all concerned – Turkey, Iraqi Kurds, and the United States.  
From their side, the participation of Turkey in the OIF was a major challenge 
to the KRI. First, the Kurdish parties realized that if Turkey, with the second largest 
army in NATO, participated in the war, the role of the Kurdish parties would be 
minimal during the fighting phase. Second, the Kurdish leadership believed that 
Turkish influence over the political processes of the second Iraqi state-building 
phase would most certainly be antithetical to Kurdish interests.   Thus, in their 
negotiations with other actors, particularly Turkey, the Kurdish parties sought to 
reassure Turkey of their intentions in the hope that a Turkish military incursion inside 
the KRI might be averted. Expressing Kurdish aims and objectives, Barham Salih, 
wrote that: 
“Although the Kurds have had the opportunity to enjoy total 
independence, they could not secede from the rest of the country in the 
past, and they do not expect to be able to do so in the future… Turkey is 
particularly concerned about stability in a post-Saddam Iraq. Yet, Ankara 
need not worry about the country's territorial integrity following regime 
change. The only reason that the Kurds of Iraq enjoy de facto 
independence today is because the current Iraqi regime has forced this 
separation on them. Although Turkey often views the Kurds as the likely 
316 
 
agents of Iraq's dismemberment, it is the Kurds who are calling for the 
unification of Iraq.”789 
Yet despite Kurdish assurances of their intention to participate in the creation 
of a democratic, peaceful and federal Iraqi state, Turkey feared that destabilization 
caused by the U.S. intervention would create a vacuum eventually enabling the KRI 
to make the transition to de jure independence. It also feared that any such vacuum 
would be seized upon by the PKK to further entrench its position in Northern Iraq 
and launch more attacks against Turkey.790 This is evident in a statement made by 
the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Bulent Ecevit, when he stated: “There is already 
a de facto state (Kurdish state) in northern Iraq. We cannot allow that to go any 
further than what it is now.”791 What agitated Turkey particularly, was the proposed 
Kurdish draft constitution fiercely defended by Masoud Barzani because it called for 
inclusion of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, as the aspired capital of a federal region 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. A Turkish journalist stated, in this regard: “Barzani's draft of a 
federal-practically independent-status for Iraqi Kurdistan...has deeply disturbed 
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Turkish officials… Whether or not the United States attacks Iraq...[northern Iraq] will 
continue to occupy Ankara.”792 
The fate of Kirkuk, moreover, was closely linked with the issue of Turkomans 
who are ethnic/linguistic relatives of the Turks. For years, Turkey had presented itself 
as the protector of its ethnic and linguistic brethren, the Turkoman community in Iraq 
and, particularly, in the KRI.793 Kirkuk and its oil wealth, as viewed by Turkish foreign 
policy-makers, was vital to the establishment of an economically viable Kurdish 
federal region of Iraq or indeed an independent Kurdish state, which Turkey sought 
to avoid at any cost. Therefore, as Iraqi Kurds pushed for federalism, and to counter 
the Kurdish demands, Turkey and the ITF called for the establishment of a Turkoman 
federal unit to include the two vital provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk.794 
From the U.S. side, military planners hoped to open a second front against 
Iraq from the north, and thus required access to the Turkish territory for 
transportation of troops and equipment into northern Iraq as well as the use of 
Turkish military bases by the American military. The Turkish access would allow the 
U.S. to open a northern front so as to force Saddam to distribute his forces between 
a southern and a northern front, thus making it easier for the United States to finish 
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the war in a shorter time and with less casualties.795 Likewise,  to protect its interests, 
Turkey was in negotiation with U.S. officials to deploy as many as 65,000 to 70,000 
Turkish troops inside the KRI. 796  
Despite U.S. assurances to the Kurds that the Turkish military deployment 
would be confined to a ‘limited area, close to the border,’ and explicitly designed for 
‘humanitarian purposes,’797 the leadership of the KRI, particularly Masoud Barzani, 
was adamant in rejecting Turkish military deployment to the region. Several factors 
promoted Barzani to take such a stance. He feared that Turkey would take 
advantage of the chaos in Iraq to destroy the nascent Kurdish de facto state and the 
regional administration. He also feared that deployment of any Turkish force could 
prompt Iran – the other regional power – to intervene militarily, thereby causing the 
collapse of Kurdish self-rule.798 Stansfield succinctly sums up the KDP and Barzani’s 
position, writing: 
“The KDP, which has nurtured its position, particularly since 1997, and 
become perhaps the most powerful entity in Iraqi Kurdistan, has more to 
                                            
795 “Paul Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s N°2, Asks the Turks to calm their Enthusiasm for Grabbing Iraqi 
Kurdistan,” The Kurdish Institute of Paris, No. 213, December 2002, accessed: 19 January 2013, 
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications/bulletins/213.html#bul2; Dexter Filkins and Eric Schmitt, 
“Turkey Demands $32 Billion U.S. Aid Package if It Is to Take Part in a War on Iraq,” International 
New York Times, 19 February 2003, accessed: 17 April 2015 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/19/international/europe/19TURK.html.  
796 “HDN, “General Staff denies reports of extraordinary build-up on Iraq border,’” Hurriyet Daily News, 
19 December 2002, accessed: 25 July 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/general-staff-denies-
reports-of-extraordinary-build-up-on-iraq-border.aspx?pageID=438&n=general-staff-denies-reports-
of-extraordinary-build-up-on-iraq-border-2002-12-19.  
797 Michael Howard and Luke Harding, “US Troops deal alarms Kurds,” the guardian, 10 February 
2003, accessed: 25 July 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/10/turkey.iraq.  
798 See: Dexter Filkins and C. J. Chivers, “U.S. in Talks on Allowing Turkey to Occupy a Kurdish Area 




lose in a post-Saddam Iraq than the PUK. The KDP, therefore, is 
aggressively pursuing a federal Kurdish entity within a new Iraq in an 
attempt to preserve its pre-eminence. Virtually all calls for ‘federalism’ 
have originated from the KDP, as have recent attempts to unify the 
political system. The KDP’s relations with Turkey have deteriorated as 
KDP rhetoric has become increasingly nationalistic particularly when the 
issue of the Turkoman population is brought up by Ankara as a means to 
allow proxy intervention.”799 
Therefore, these new factors resulted in the deterioration of relations and a 
war of words between the KDP and Turkey. The Turkish Defense Minister, 
Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, a member of the right-wing Nationalist Action Party, raised 
the stakes by stating that “Turkey considers northern Iraq to be under its direct care 
and Ankara would not tolerate the region being subjugated to the interests of 
others.”800 He also claimed that because of the presence of Turkic-speaking 
Turkoman people, he considered Kirkuk and Mosul to be ‘Turkish soil’.801  Referring 
to a potential Turkish military participation in the war as ‘invasion,’ the KDP official 
newspaper Brayeti (brotherhood) wrote Turkish troops “will see that we are ready to 
sacrifice ourselves and they will see we are ready to make this land a graveyard for 
the attackers.”802 Barzani also personally insisted that “even if the Turks came as 
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part of a US-led coalition, the KDP would object and would view the Turks as 
invaders, not liberators like the US and the UK.”803 
Finally, after much negotiation with the U.S., the AKP government submitted 
a resolution to the Turkish parliament demanding authorization for the use of Turkish 
territory by US military forces as well as authorization for cross-border operations by 
the Turkish military forces in northern Iraq. However, fortunately for the Kurds, on 1 
March 2003, the resolution was rejected by the AKP-led Turkish parliament.804  
The refusal by the Turkish Parliament presented a golden opportunity to the 
KRI to enhance its position in the U.S.-led coalition and to achieve a greater voice in 
the post-Saddam political arrangements. Western Individuals, writers and journalists 
sympathetic to Kurdish interests lobbied the U.S. administration to rely instead on 
Kurdish Peshmerga forces and leaders.805 The Turkish refusal presented a 
significant blow to Turkish-U.S. relations. While Turkey tried to cast the 
parliamentary decision as the result of the democratic process,806 and both sides – 
Turkey and the U.S. –reaffirmed their strong bilateral relations,807 the administration 
of President George W. Bush was offended and shifted its strategy towards 
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favouring and protecting the interests of the Kurds within the framework of the U.S. 
Iraqi policy. At this juncture, the KDP and PUK, as David Romano notes, made a 
strategic decision to reframe their actions as Iraqi movements fighting for democracy 
for the whole of Iraq, rather than being Kurdish movements wanting to dismember 
Iraq. And in this manner, the Kurds fitted themselves into the overall American 
framing of the war and avoided massive outside state intervention from their 
neighbouring, often hostile, states.808 In short, as Romano argues, the Kurds of Iraq 
avoided ‘the “S” word (separation) in the grievance framing they produced.”809 
So, failing to open a northern front against Saddam’s army via Turkish 
territory, the U.S. established a command centre in northern Iraq to open a modified 
northern front. Furthermore, on 18 March 2003, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special 
Envoy to the Iraqi opposition, conveyed the Kurds’ agreement for their 70,000-strong 
force to operate “under the command and control of coalition commanders.”810 The 
U.S.-led OIF to remove the regime of Saddam from power began in earnest on 19 
March 2003, based on the U.S. Congressional Resolution (HJR 114, PL 107–243, 
16 October 2002).811  
As U.S. and British forces swept north and Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003, the 
KDP and PUK forces, assisted by U.S. Special forces, secured the northern front, 
                                            
808 Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement, Op. Cit., p. 212. 
809 Ibid., p. 217.  
810 “Iraqi Kurds agree to place their forces under US command: American envoy,” Agence France-
Presse, 18 March 2003, accessed: 1 August 2016, 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/867918/posts.  
811 “Authorization for use of military force against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” HJ Res.114 (Public Law 




tied down Iraqi divisions and then wrestled control of Kirkuk and Mosul from 
Saddam’s forces against the explicit wishes of the Turkish government.812 
The KDP and PUK also scored a major achievement by strengthening their 
territorial control and domestic sovereignty. The U.S., the PUK and the KDP had 
labelled Ansar al-Islam as an organization that had links with Al-Qaeda and possibly 
even with Saddam’s intelligence services. Thus, on 23 March 2003 when the war 
was fully underway, PUK forces, assisted by U.S. Special forces and U.S. aerial 
bombing, destroyed much of Ansar’s infrastructure in their fortified mountain 
stronghold along the Iran-Iraq border known as “Little Tora Bora” (PUK-controlled 
territory).813 
The Kurdish informal military alliance with the U.S., and participation of its 
forces alongside U.S. forces to remove a regime that the Kurds had fought for years, 
was seen as watershed in the modern history of Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds now, in the 
words of the first post-invasion U.S. Administrator of Iraq, Jay Garner, were part of 
the “coalition of the Willing.”814 For most of the 20th century, U.S. foreign policy 
towards Iraqi Kurds was influenced by Turkish hostilities towards any manifestation 
of Kurdish nationalism, in or outside Turkey. However, Turkish refusal to allow the 
crossing of U.S. military forces angered the neoconservatives influential in the 
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Pentagon, the U.S. National Security Council and the wider U.S. administration. 
Thereafter, it became more difficult for U.S. officials to sacrifice Kurdish interests in 
favour of Turkey or any other regional state. So, for instance, when Turkey requested 
permission to deploy its forces inside the KRI, based on its agreement to allow the 
U.S. access to Turkish airspace, U.S. officials reiterated their unawareness of such 
a commitment, while requesting Turkey to avoid creating a war within a war which 
would be negative to Turkish interests.815 It was quite simply, as one observer stated, 
Iraqi Kurds’ “Hour of Power”,816 as “The 2003 Iraq war solidified the Kurds’ 
international visibility”.817 
Indeed, the U.S. ousting of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the presence of 
the world’s superpower in Iraq, the Turks’ inability to project force inside the KRI, 
and the participation of Kurdish forces alongside U.S. forces prompted the Kurdish 
genie to step out of the bottle. Describing the Kurdish position following the removal 
of the regime of Saddam Hussein, one anonymous Kurdish politician stated: “We 
Kurds have always been kept at bay by four dogs -Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The 
Iraq dog is dead. The Turkish dog is in the doghouse. The Iranian and Syrian dogs 
cower in their corners.”818 
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6.3 Legalization and Reunification of the Kurdish De Facto State within 
the Iraqi Quasi-State 
The fall of Saddam’s regime was greeted with jubilation and celebrations 
across Iraqi Kurdistan. However, despite extreme pressure from the Kurdish people 
for secession and declaration of an independent state, the Kurdish leadership made 
realistic decisions. The KRI was unable to secede from Iraq due to intense regional 
and international opposition to secession and the extremely disadvantageous 
geopolitical position of the KRI. Therefore, the Kurds opted for semi-total de facto 
independence with the framework of Iraq. Peter Galbraith reflecting on one of his 
meetings with Nechirvan Barzani states that the Kurds had essentially one clear 
goal, “to preserve the de facto independence of Kurdistan.”819 The Kurds also 
realized that safeguarding their de facto independence required active participation 
in the upcoming Iraqi state-building processes launched by the U.S. administration. 
In this regard, Barham Salih stated: “the dominant view among Kurds is that they 
must be represented in Baghdad if they are to avoid the genocidal horrors of the 
past.”820 The Kurdish de facto state opted nominally to rejoin the state of Iraq, while 
virtually endeavouring to maintain its extensive regional autonomy and de facto 
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independence. As Brendan O’Leary notes, “Kurds sought the practicalities of 
maximum feasible statehood within Iraq rather than formal independence.”821 
From the outset, Kurdish political parties realized their best chance of 
preserving their de facto independence was by maintaining good foreign relations 
with the United States as the ultimate authority in Iraq. Throughout the first decade 
of their de facto statehood, the U.S. and the UK had acted as a sort of patron state 
for the KRI.  Without the military security and protection provided by the U.S., and 
the UK, the KRI would not have been able to maintain its survival in its tough 
geopolitical environment in the Middle East region. 
The task of preserving Kurdistan’s de facto independence or enshrining 
Kurdistan’s near-complete autonomy was facilitated by coalescing several factors in 
favour of Iraqi Kurds. Firstly, as Masoud Barzani noted, U.S.-Iraqi Kurdish relations 
after 9/11 had become more solidified “since the Kurds had become, for the United 
States, a major part of the liberation of Iraq and a front against terror, whilst their role 
[was] important for the democratic rebuilding of Iraq as well as for Iraq’s political 
processes.”822 Moreover, Barzani argued that Kurdistan and the U.S. shared 
common strategic goals including “the fight against terrorism, the rebuilding of Iraq’s 
democratic base, and the common agreement on Iraq’s Constitution.”823 Kurdish 
politicians realized that the U.S. was firmly supporting the territorial integrity of Iraq 
and its prospects for democratization, which in U.S. thinking would have had wide 
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positive repercussions in the Middle East region – long a mantle of influential 
neoconservatives in the U.S. political establishment.824 As such, the Kurdish 
leadership avoided making overtly secessionist claims and instead focused on 
preserving the KRI’s near-total de facto independence. Secondly, the fact that 
Turkey was distanced from bearing any influence over the future of Iraq helped the 
Kurdish leadership to focus on negotiating with its Arab partners in the former Iraqi 
opposition over issues relating to the future of the KRI. 
Thirdly, and perhaps, more importantly, as later events proved, the U. S’s 
toppling of Saddam’s regime in the first week of April 2003 did not merely represent 
substitution of one regime with another, more democratic, regime. It constituted, as 
Toby Dodge argues, the complete collapse of the administrative and coercive 
capacity of the Iraqi state.825 The above fact combined with the absence of an Arab 
Iraqi elite united around a common platform or ideology further eased the task of the 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership. Harvey also focuses on this point, when he states: 
“In the wake of the United States led war on Iraq in 2003, the absence of 
a strong and politically antagonistic central regime in Baghdad enabled 
Kurdish politicians and political parties to exert a profound influence on 
the future trajectory of Iraqi politics.”826 
The second Iraqi state-building process was vital for the continued survival of 
the KRI. For this reason, from the outset, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership was keen to 
                                            
824 Neoconservatives viewed Iraq as a ‘strategic prize.’ “Once liberated, they say, Iraq will provide the 
spark to transform the region- the Palestinians, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and ultimately even Egypt-
from Autocracy to democracy,” see: Yaphe, Op. Cit., p. 25.   
825 Toby Dodge, “The Causes of US Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2007), pp. 85- 106. 
826 Harvey, Op. Cit., p. 12. 
327 
 
join the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi political institutions.827 The Kurds, as Henri Barkey 
notes, “were the only ones to regard the U.S. occupation of Iraq as liberation. The 
Kurdish-controlled areas became Iraq’s most stable and prosperous regions. Kurds 
also took an active political role in Baghdad.”828 The first U.S. attempt to administer 
post-Saddam Iraq materialized when the White House announced the creation of 
the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on 20 January 
2003 and dispatched on 21 April 2003 the retired U.S. general, Jay Garner, to lead 
it in Iraq.829 But, in mid-May 2003, ORHA tenure came to an abrupt end when the 
White House dispatched Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III to lead the newly 
established Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). As the head of CPA, Bremer was 
effectively Iraq’s occupation governor and exercised supreme executive, judicial and 
legislative authority in Iraq until June 2004, when sovereignty was transferred to an 
interim Iraqi government (IIG).830 In mid-July 2003, Bremer appointed a twenty-five-
member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) with advisory powers that comprised five 
Kurds including Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.831 Moreover, Hoshyar Zebari, 
of the KDP leadership, served as a ‘foreign minister’ in the cabinet that was 
appointed by the IGC from September 2003 until the IIG was formed to assume 
                                            
827 See: Dickinson, Op. Cit. 
828 Barkey, “Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan,” Op. Cit., p. 7.  
829 “The Visit to Kurdistan of Jay Garner, The Provincial Civil Administrator of Iraq,” The Kurdish 
Institute of Paris, No. 217, April 2003, accessed: 19 January 2013, 
http://www.institutkurde.org/en/publications/bulletins/217.html#bul1.  
830 For a more detailed account on the events during the first year of U.S. occupation, see: L Paul 
Bremer, My Year in Iraq (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006). 
831 Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Congressional 




sovereignty on 28 June 2004.832 Kurds were given eight prominent positions within 
the new IIG, including Hoshyar Zebari as the Foreign Minister and Barham Salih as 
the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, as well as a myriad of pivotal, if less visible 
positions throughout the institutions of government. However, the Kurds, as the 
second nationality or ethnic group in Iraq, believed that they deserved one of the top 
executive positions, either the presidency and premiership.833 
Nevertheless, the future of Kurdistan could not be secured merely by Kurdish 
participation in executive posts in Baghdad. During many periods of Kurdish 
existence in Iraq, Kurds had possessed posts in Baghdad, particularly when the 
central government was weak and seeking compromise and consensus with the 
Kurds, only to revert to violence one it was stronger and more secure. For this 
reason, as Liam Anderson argues, Kurdish leaders approached the negotiations 
over the TAL and the permanent constitution with three strategic goals: “first, to 
preserve the autonomy of governance of the Kurdistan Region at or near pre-2003 
levels; second, to secure the constitutional guarantees necessary to defend Kurdish 
autonomy against future, resurgent Arab majority governments in Baghdad; and 
third, to define the boundaries of the Kurdistan Region and, specifically, to reclaim 
as Kurdish disputed territories such as Kirkuk.”834  
It is important to reiterate that the Kurds saw their interactions with Baghdad 
on matters of foreign policy as another distinct entity. As the KRI could not declare 
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independence, Kurdish negotiators viewed their participation in the processes of 
second Iraqi state formation as a matter of defending Kurdistan from Baghdad. 
Galbraith notes this point when he wrote that, “The Kurds saw the writing of Iraq’s 
interim constitution not as an opportunity to build a new Iraq (as Bremer believed) 
but as a purely defensive exercise.”835Thus, the constitutional process was viewed 
as a means to achieve Kurdish national interests.  Up to this date, Kurdish 
negotiations in the TAL had been considered a major victory for the Kurdish leaders. 
Sensing history being made and realizing the opportunity to stipulate the legalization 
of Kurdish de facto independence, Barzani and Talabani jointly strived and 
negotiated very hard. Michael Kelly, an American constitutional adviser to the KRG, 
states that the Arab leaders were deeply divided over several issues, such as the 
role of religion, women rights and overall definition of the identity of the Iraqi state, 
“The Kurds, on the other hand, presented a united Barzani-Talabani front backed by 
a team of Western constitutional law experts led by Peter Galbraith and Brenden 
O‘Leary. Comparatively, it was no surprise that Kurdish positions should have 
advanced over the split Sunni/Shia Arab positions as the TAL came together.”836  
The TAL, which was introduced on 8 March 2004, represented a temporary 
but important text since it constituted the basic outlines of the political shape of the 
future Iraqi state. Being better prepared to deal with constitutional issues, KRI 
leaders submitted Kurdistan’s draft Constitutional Proposal to the CPA and the Arab 
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political leaders on 13 February 2004 as the most basic Kurdish demands for 
eventual incorporation into the TAL.837 Although Kurdistan did not secure all its 
demands, the TAL, however, represented a milestone for the achievement of 
Kurdish goals. The TAL recognized the KRG as the official government of territories 
controlled by the KRI on and before 19 March 2003 (Article 53 A), recognized the 
supremacy of the laws of KNA (Article 54 B), recognized the Kurdish language as 
one of the two official languages of Iraq (Article 9) and enshrined a mechanism to 
resolve the issue of disputed areas including Kirkuk in Article 58.838 Thereafter, for 
the Kurds, TAL became almost a sacred text as it could serve as the basis of Kurdish 
federalism in Iraq, which for the Kurds had become “the sine qua non of [their] 
participation in a post-2003 Iraq.”839  
However, the Kurdish success in enshrining their de facto independence in 
the TAL was not an easy and straightforward process. Kurdish leaders faced 
mounting opposition and pressure from most of their erstwhile Arab opposition 
partners, and even the U.S. administration, in the form of CPA. In one instance, 
Barzani and Talabani complained to President Bush that “It was rare for the U.S. 
government or the CPA to refer to Kurdistan or the Kurdish people.”840 Moreover, 
the head of CPA, Bremer, informed Barzani that the White House wished to omit any 
references to the KRI and its institutions in the TAL.841 Indeed, high-level Kurdish 
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officials such as Nechirvan Barzani demonstrated their frustration by stating that the 
principles of federalism were ignored by the United States in the post-Saddam 
political arrangements.842 Moreover, the Kurds  were furious that the United States 
failed to incorporate the TAL into the U.S.-sponsored UNSC resolution 1546 that 
formally ended the U.S. tenure in Iraq. Expressing his frustration, Nechirvan Barzani 
described the omission as “This is a negative sign,” stating further that “It is very 
disappointing for the Kurdish people not to have the [interim constitution] and 
federalism mentioned in the resolution”843 and led some observers to conclude that 
the Kurds have been ‘sold out’ by the U.S.844 
The Kurds presented a united foreign policy front in the upcoming nationwide 
elections to elect an Iraqi transitional national assembly, which was mainly 
responsible for drafting a permanent Iraqi constitution to be put to a referendum of 
the people of Iraq, and appointing a caretaker government. In the elections that took 
place on 30 January 2005, all the Kurdish parties ran on a single block called the 
‘Kurdistan Alliance’, and succeeded in gaining about 26 per cent of the votes which 
translated into 75 Assembly seats.845 Having emerged as the second strongest 
grouping in the Iraqi COR after the Shiite ‘United Iraqi Alliance’, and as the second 
nationality in Iraq, the Kurds managed to promote Jalal Talabani to the presidency 
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of Iraq, which he kept following the December 2005 nationwide elections and the 
establishment of a government headed by Prime Minister Nouri Kamil al-Maliki 
However, despite the strong Kurdish representation in the Iraqi COR, the 
Kurds faced mounting challenges to enshrine their de facto independence from 
Bagdad.  Therefore, lobbying foreign governments and attempting to influence public 
opinion became a primary tool used by the Kurdish leadership. Despite the 
reservations of Western governments, the West still constituted the primary source 
of support and sympathy for Kurdish aspirations. The Kurds thus initiated a well-
orchestrated public diplomacy campaign aimed at influencing public opinion in the 
West. The increasing visibility of the KRI, its legitimacy gained through its 
participation in the OIF, and the wide contacts it had built, allowed the Kurdish 
leadership more latitude to present its views and press for the achievement of its 
interests. Nechirvan Barzani, used an opinion piece in the Financial Times to send 
a message to Britain regarding the negotiations on the Iraqi constitution writing: 
“We must keep the autonomy with which we have been able to 
safeguard our region’s security, ensure relative prosperity and educate 
our people so that women as well as men play an equal role in society 
and politics. We have and shall maintain the highest standards of 
protections for national and religious minorities.”846  
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He further drew some red lines that if not met, the people of Kurdistan would reject 
the constitution, stating:  
“If Kurdistan’s red lines are not met – a fair referendum in Kirkuk, control 
of our natural resources, recognition of our lawful army and meaningful 
law-making powers – our people will reject any new Iraqi constitution.”847  
In another opinion piece, targeted at Americans, Qubad Talabani, the PUK’s U.S. 
representative, wrote that: 
“The danger is that some US officials, desperate to meet the final 
deadline, will ask us to concede on core principles…This would be an 
injustice to Iraq's Kurds, who have fought steadfastly to defend values of 
the kind Americans and other citizens of the free world take for granted.” 
He adds “while some may have abandoned their struggle for democracy 
in Iraq, the US should not. We the Kurds certainly have not.”848 
 
The Permanent Iraqi Constitution that was ratified in a popular referendum in 
October 2005 marked a considerable victory for the people of Iraqi Kurdistan. Article 
1 established Iraq as a federal entity.849 Article 117, recognized the existence of the 
Kurdistan Region along with its existing authorities, as a federal region. Article 120 
gave the region the right to adopt a constitution. Article 121, section one, designated 
to regional powers the right to exercise executive, legislative and judicial control in 
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their regions; section three allocated the regions a share of the national revenue; 
and section five empowered the regional authorities to organize and maintain 
internal security forces for the region such as police, security services and guards,850 
in effect a code word legalizing the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. Article 141 
recognized and validated all legislation enacted by the KNA and governmental 
decisions including court orders and contracts enacted in the KRI since 1992.851 
Article 115, however, can be considered as one of the most important clauses in the 
Constitution stipulating consolidation of the KRI, stating: 
“All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal 
government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that 
are not organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared 
between the federal government and the regional government, priority 
shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in 
a region in case of dispute.”852 
 
Furthermore, Article 121 (section two), further specified that: 
“In case of a contradiction between regional and national legislation in 
respect to a matter outside the exclusive authorities of the federal 
government, the regional power shall have the right to amend the 
application of the national legislation within that region.”853 
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These two articles represented the primary safety valves set by the Kurdish 
negotiators to protect the Kurdish de facto independent territory from the rest of Iraq. 
As Sean Kane notes, “the critical point is that, with the exception of a set of exclusive 
powers explicitly given to the federal government, the Iraqi Constitution gives 
regional law “priority” over national law (in article 115) and regional legislatures the 
ability to amend the application of national law within their region (article 121.2) on 
most matters.”854 
Many Kurdish politicians, academics, intellectuals, as well as foreign friends 
and supporters contributed to protecting Kurdistan’s powers in the Constitution of 
Iraq. However, as James Glanz notes, Masoud Barzani, backed by a team of 
Western constitutional law experts led by Peter Galbraith and Brendan O’Leary,855 
played the major role in preserving and consolidating Kurdistan’s de facto 
independence from Baghdad; a de facto independence encompassing almost all 
dimensions of sovereignty except international legal sovereignty. Noting that the 
Constitution of Iraq essentially stipulated the quasi-independence of the Kurdish de 
facto state, one observer concluded: 
“The old Kurdish guerrilla leader is savoring his most recent victory, won 
not on the field of battle but in the arid drawing rooms of Baghdad's 
constitutional convention. In three weeks of talks here, Masoud Barzani, 
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the former guerrilla leader, quietly secured in the new Iraqi constitution 
virtually everything the Kurds were asking for, enshrining powers of 
autonomy that approach those of a sovereign state.”856 
While another observer concluded: 
“Barzani . . . dominated the process of making the final constitution. And 
it is true: the Kurds kept everything the TAL gave them, made new gains 
with respect to a further weakening of the jurisdiction of the federal 
government and the ultimate disposition of Kirkuk as well, and even 
managed to gain a kind of mediating position with respect to some issues 
such as the question of Islam and the state.”857 
In the processes of government formation, the Kurds maintained their strong 
position. In the four-year government that was formed in April-May 2006, the Kurds 
occupied several important positions of authority with Talabani serving as President, 
Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister and Barham Salih serving as one of the two 
Deputy Prime Ministers.858 The Kurds also received a share of positions in the civil 
and military services, including high-ranking positions in the ministries, the military 
or even Iraqi security and intelligence services. The Kurdish leadership made sure 
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to put across the message that as the second nationality in Iraq, they deserved these 
positions. Commenting on his assumption of the position of the President of the Iraqi 
Republic, Jalal Talabani stated in an interview: “I think it is normal that our struggle 
started and developed and reached this stage of success. With the collapse of the 
dictatorship, a new Iraq is going to be reshaped, and the Kurds must have their share 
in the main posts of this country, because we are the second nationality of Iraq.”859 
Notwithstanding its ability to stipulate its virtual independence in the 
Constitution of Iraq by maintaining unity and good negotiating skills, the KRI had a 
negative image and suffered from a major public relations fiasco. Despite the 
legalization of the KRI within the new Iraqi state, the continuing division of the KRG 
soon emerged as a major foreign policy problem for the Kurdish leadership. The 
legalization of the Kurdish de facto state in Iraq meant expanding interaction 
between members of the international community and the KRI. If during the first 
decade of the KRI’s existence interaction was minimal, now states, international 
organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations as well as a myriad of other actors 
communicated with the KRI over matters directly related to the KRI and its people. 
The division of the KRG also was detrimental to Kurdistan’s foreign policy of image-
building. The Kurds quite simply could not demand autonomy from Baghdad within 
a territorially compact federal region while they were divided into two distinct regions, 
particularly given the fact that during the early stages of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, 
                                            




the CPA and many Iraqi-Arab political groups had envisioned basing Iraq’s federal 
structure on the country’s 18 existing structures.860  
The Kurds also realized that the consolidation of the KRI would not go 
unchallenged from the rest of Arab population of Iraq, powerful neighbouring states, 
the larger Arab world and indeed supporters of the principle of territorial integrity in 
the larger international community. Hence it became imperative for the Kurdish 
leadership to strengthen the KRI by unifying and reactivating its political institutions. 
As one anonymous Kurdish official asserted “the leadership planned to ‘defend 
Kurdistan from Baghdad’, rather than from the ‘green line’ separating the Kurdistan 
Region from the rest of Iraq.”861 And defending Kurdistan from Baghdad required a 
unitary de facto state both at the level of domestic politics and foreign policy.  
The Kurdish leadership also feared that initiation of the nascent democratic 
processes in Iraq might lead to invalidation of the claims long being made by the 
Kurdish leadership about the KRI being an experiment in democracy. The first direct 
and public meeting between the KDP and PUK with regard to the unification of the 
two KRGs had taken place on 12 June 2003 – around two months after the removal 
of the regime of Saddam Hussein. The names of the participants reflect the weight 
given to the issue of reunification: President Masoud Barzani of the KDP, Nechirvan 
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Barzani of the KPD-KRG, President Jalal Talabani of the PUK as well as PM Barham 
Salih of the PUK-KRG.862  
To highlight the maturity and the democratic credibility of the KRI, the 
reunification process started with an election campaign. The election for a new KNA 
in the KRI took place on 30 January – the same date as the first Iraq-wide elections 
– 2005. The Kurdistan Alliance, which consisted of the KDP and PUK as well as 
countless smaller Kurdish parties, ran on a unified list and managed to gain 104 out 
of 111 seats (five other seats were reserved for Christians, as in the 1992 
elections).863 This time, however, the elections were observed and monitored by 
various individuals and agencies, including the UN.  On 12 June 2005, the newly 
elected KNA selected Masoud Barzani as “President of Kurdistan”.864 The processes 
of reunification were given a further boost when both parties signed the Unification 
Agreement on 21 January 2006 which represented a road-map to reunify the KRG,865 
and subsequently formed a new KRG under the premiership of PM Nechirvan 
Barzani.866 
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While the reunification was at a most critical stage, and the KRI faced 
significant internal fissures and problems,867 the Kurdish leadership still attempted 
to portray the elections and the reunification of the KRG as a strong indication of its 
democratic credentials and proof of its endeavour to build an effective statehood. 
Following the formation of the unified KRG, during a speech delivered before 
members of the KNA, Nechirvan Barzani said: 
“We are determined to establish strong constitutional institutions to further 
support the democratic process. Our main task is forming a system of 
good governance through the participation of all groups, with 
transparency and accountability, which means a modern, professional 
government.”868 
Moreover, a KRG website article specifically referring to the need to protect the de 
facto independence of the KRI stated: 
“We must secure and guarantee the historic achievements of our people 
and the realization of our full and just rights… and developing and growing 
the democratic experience in the Kurdistan Region with further 
strengthening of stability and liberty through the creation of a lasting 
unification of the KRG.”869 
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In short, by mid-2006, the KRI emerged as a much more consolidated, unitary 









6.4 Foreign Policy of Image-Building at Full Gear 
At first glance, it seems that according to the Constitution of Iraq the KRI was 
deprived of the power to formulate and pursue its own foreign policies. Article 110 
(1) of the Constitution of Iraq clearly stipulated that the federal government shall 
have exclusive authority over: 
“Formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, 
signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, 
signing, and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign 
economic and trade policy.”870 
Moreover, article 121 (4) stipulated: 
“Offices for the regions and governorates shall be established in 
embassies and diplomatic missions, in order to follow cultural, social, and 
developmental affairs.”871 
However, the KRI officials realized very well that the continued survival of the 
KRI, militarily, politically, and economically did not depend on the clauses written in 
the Iraqi Constitution. Although it had not seceded from Iraq, the KRI still realized 
that to maintain its wide de facto independence, legitimize it, and demonstrate its 
autonomy and ability to function like a state, it must ensure positive engagement with 
the international community and adhere to international standards on 
democratization and good governance. The task of building a positive image for the 
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KRI or ‘nation-branding’872 therefore became a priority for the leadership of the KRI. 
The literature of FPA has analyzed the role of ‘national self-image’ as a determinant 
of foreign policy at the state-level. Laura Neack, for example, defines national self-
image as “the story people in a country tell about who they are as a people, who 
their country “is” in the world, and what their country does in the world.” Moreover, 
Neack argues that there may exist a subnational self-image which basically 
“promulgates different stories and narratives.”873 The KRI leadership set about 
redefining the Kurds in the international arena. The story, however, now differed. If 
during the first decade of the KRI’s existence the story had focused on the KRI as 
an experiment in democracy, after 2003, the story was expanded to include other 
elements, such as the KRI’s successful state-building, signs of security and stability, 
protection of minority rights, contribution to the war on terror and insurgency, as well 
as its potential economic viability. All the stories endeavoured to set Kurdistan as an 
entity apart from the rest of Iraq. In other words, the KRI leaders started a process 
of identity formation which was distinct from the rest of Iraq.  
The partial reunification of the KRG, Kurdistan’s legalization within the 
framework of Iraq, its rising international visibility as the result of the OIF and its 
close relationship with the U.S., allowed the KRI to embark on a conscious foreign 
policy to build and enhance a positive image for Kurdistan. The task was ever more 
essential since despite all the Kurds’ sufferings and achievements, the international 
community had little understanding of the KRI compared with, for instance, Palestine 
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or Taiwan. Moreover, the Kurds possessed values such as tolerance, openness 
towards other cultures, sects, religions and ethnicities which needed to be 
highlighted. Foreign policy is essentially the link between domestic politics and 
international relations. Therefore, each development at domestic level became a 
primary tool in the hand of Kurdish policy-makers and officials to achieve the foreign 
policy objective of the KRI: image-building. This combination of national interest and 
national self-image created an interesting domestic political consensus to which the 
major parties of the KRI, particularly the KDP and the PUK, subscribed. In short, to 
protect its existence, the KRI sought international visibility. 
Perhaps the best indicator of the KRI’s early attempt at further visibility, and 
its efforts to highlight its achievements in the realm of political consolidation and 
democratization, was made right after the unification of the KRG. When a 2005 EU 
report failed to mention the 2005 KNA elections and establishment of the reunified 
KRG, the KRG’s representation office in Brussels issued a public statement, in which 
it protested what it called a ‘dangerous omission’, stating: 
“The report makes no reference to the elections in Kurdistan in Iraq to the 
Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), the formation of a new Government 
and the appointment of a President of the Kurdistan federal region. KRG 
expresses its concern, not so much because the report fails to recognise 
institutions foreseen by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), but 
because the report makes no reference to the positive democratic 
example that the people of Kurdistan and these institutions have offered 
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to the federal republic of Iraq and their important contribution to the 
stability of the whole region…”874 
Indeed, the need to widen the interactions of the KRI with the international 
community required a new approach. Aiming to highlight the KRI as a unitary foreign 
policy actor, the KRG rationalized the organization of its foreign policy machine both 
inside the KRI as well as abroad. However, the KRG had to be careful not to 
antagonize the federal government in Baghdad, the ever-watchful neighbouring 
states, and possibly its U.S. patron. Therefore, instead of establishing a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which would send a signal of Kurdistan’s intention to formulate and 
pursue foreign policy, the KRG in September 2006 opted for a Department of Foreign 
Relations (hereafter DFR), under a director with ministerial rank.875 Moreover, the 
KRG streamlined the process of formation of the DFR and confirmed its 
representatives abroad. The United States and the UK were on the top of the list, 
where Qubad Talabani and Bayan Sami abdul-Rahman were confirmed as the KRG 
representatives respectively. Moreover, aiming to show the KRI as an effective actor 
and its ability to engage in foreign relations with other states on an independent 
basis, none of the KRG foreign representation offices resided inside Iraq’s 
embassies as stipulated in the Iraqi constitution. 
There were also more strategic calculations that benefited the KRI. The U.S. 
intervention in 2003 culminated in a strategic alteration in the relationship between 
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Iraq and Iran. While prior to 2003, the Baathi regime had acted as a bulwark against 
Persian ambitions to dominate the Gulf Region, the removal of the Baathi regime 
gradually opened Iraq to Iranian influence. The decisive victory of Islamic-oriented 
Shiite parties such as the Islamic Dawa party, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(ISCI)876 and al-Sadr in two successive Iraqi-wide national elections, in January and 
December 2005, and their accession to power, intensified the Iranian cloud over the 
politics of Iraq.  The United States, as Bayram Sinkaya notes, played a major role in 
this transformation “simply by its intervention in Iraq in 2003 that destroyed the Baath 
rule and built a new federal and ‘democratic’ regime. Iran effectively utilized the 
structural change and new circumstances in the neighboring country, and elevated 
Baghdad-Tehran relations to a ‘strategic’ level.”877  In these circumstances and 
following the weak electoral showing of an array of Arab secular and liberal 
groupings whom the U.S. previously had counted on, Kurds emerged as the largest 
pro-U.S. and pro-secularism force in the new Iraqi state. Faced with this new 
situation the initial U.S. strategy, which had sought to weaken the Kurds for fear of 
separatism, gave way to a new approach favouring the Kurds as defendants of 
secularism and the most pro-U.S. force in Iraq. Hence, a visit to Kurdistan by the 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, in 2005 symbolized this shift in U.S. foreign 
policy. Before going to Baghdad, as the capital of Iraq, and meeting with Iraqi 
officials, Rice stopped in Kurdistan and met Barzani. As Michael Rubin writes, “By 
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going first to Barzani's headquarters rather than to Baghdad, she bolstered the 
Kurdish leader's position in the eyes of his constituents and among the other Iraqi 
political leaders negotiating in the nation's capital.”878 
The importance of the KRI as a fundamental part of America’s Iraqi foreign 
policy became visible when for the first time in October 2005 President George W. 
Bush received Masoud Barzani as the President of the KRI – not as the leader of an 
Iraqi opposition party – at the White House. In the meeting, the first of its kind, Bush 
assured Barzani that “America will stand with the people that desire a free and 
democratic Iraq,”879 and he commended the Kurds’ tolerance towards other religions 
and ethnic backgrounds.880 However, for the Kurds and their leaders, the importance 
of the meeting lay in the ‘official declaration of a US Kurdish policy,’881 and what that 
meant for the survival and de facto independence of the KRI. For the Kurds, 
Barzani’s visit to the White House and the formal reception accorded to him was a 
major victory, particularly given the fact that Barzani was not the leader of an 
independent state. Commenting that Barzani’s visit “is recognition of identity of Iraqi 
Kurdistan,” Talabani stated that: 
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 “This is the first time in history that the president of the United States is 
inviting the president of the Kurdistan region. This is the first that that such 
a kind of contact on this high level will happen between the U.S. and Iraqi 
Kurdistan. The visit is also important because the Kurdistan delegation 
will be received by the president and high personalities in the name of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. This is a kind of recognition for the identity of Iraqi 
Kurdistan by the U.S. within the framework of Iraq.”882 
Soon the KRI began to promote itself as a heaven of stability, security and 
tolerance in an otherwise ocean of violence, instability and religious fundamentalism. 
Several factors helped the KRI in this foreign policy of image-building. The George 
W. Bush administration had initially hoped that the removal of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime would not only usher in the evolution of democracy in Iraq, but also the wider 
Middle East region.883 However, these hopes were soon dashed. The U.S. 
occupation of Iraq resulted not only in the replacement of one regime with another, 
but also fundamentally destroyed the state of Iraq, which led to the eruption of 
multiple forms of violence and wars. As Toby Dodge argues, “In the space of two 
years, because of invasion and then state collapse, Iraq went from rogue, the first 
category of problematic state, to the second, collapsed.”884 A number of violent and 
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armed insurgent and terrorist groups emerged with varying ideologies and aims that 
hampered the processes of state-building in Iraq and deprived it of security and 
stability.885 In the space of two years, after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, 380 terrorist 
attacks were carried out throughout Iraq,886 except in the territories under the control 
of the KRI. By March 2008, the IOM estimated that 2.4 million Iraqis (outside the 
boundaries of the KRI) had fled the country, mainly to Jordan and Syria, and 2.7 
million were displaced inside Iraq as IDPs.887 By comparison, between 2003 and 
2010, only 7 to 16 terrorist attacks were carried out in territories under the control of 
the KRI;888 with the most significant being the suicide bombing of the KDP and PUK 
headquarters in Erbil on February 2004.889 
However, the KRI’s depiction of itself as an oasis of stability did not remain 
only at the level of rhetoric or verbal proclamation. The KRI suffered from few security 
threats emanating from terrorism: the threat of Ansar al-Islam was long removed 
from the region; the KRI was isolated from the rest of Iraq for a long time and thus 
the chaos in the rest of Iraq did not reach the KRI and the professionalism and 
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vigilance of Kurdish security services prevented the infiltration of insurgents and 
terrorists from the rest of Iraq to the KRI. 
Even though the threat of Ansar al-Islam was removed from the region and 
few terrorist activities targeted Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRI still sought to promote itself 
at the front in the global war on terror. By promoting the KRI as a front against 
international terrorism, the Kurdish authorities sought to convey the image that not 
only was the KRI not a threat to anyone, but it could indeed contribute to regional 
and international security and stability as well as any responsible and peace-loving 
state. In other words, maintaining and contributing to regional and international 
security played an important part in the image-building foreign policies of the KRI 
and its efforts to highlight the entity’s earned sovereignty. Moreover, the signs of 
security and stability in the KRI were used to emphasize the effectiveness of the 
unrecognized entity in comparison to its recognized parent state (Iraq), where the 
state had failed to provide minimum security to its citizens. These claims also 
conveyed implicitly the idea that the KRI was capable of statehood, thus deserving 
statehood, whereas Iraq which enjoyed international recognition was indeed a failed 
state. 
To achieve this aim, the KRI officials used several tools. They sought to 
highlight the tolerant culture of the Kurdish people as well as stressing the 
professionalism of the Kurdish security services. In an interview, Masrour Barzani, 
who is currently the Chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, an 
institution that oversees Kurdistan’s security policy, stated that the security of 
Kurdistan was due to the “collective work of all people involved in providing security 
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for this area. But the main reason is the culture of our people and our region. The 
people in the Kurdistan region do not support radicals or extremism. There is very 
good cooperation between our agency and our people. The support we get from our 
people is the key.”890 Barzani in other places promoted the idea of the capability of 
Kurdish security services in combating violent Islamic fundamentalist groups in the 
region and elsewhere in Iraq, stating: “Yes, there is [a terrorist threat to the region], 
but it is much lower than to other parts of Iraq. And it would have been great had we 
not fought Islamist movements in the region and outside of it.”891 
To promote the KRI as a contributor to stability and security and to enhance 
its alliance and friendship with the United States, the Kurdish leadership allowed the 
deployment of Kurdish Peshmerga forces in other Iraqi provinces to help combat 
insurgency.892 The contribution of the Peshmerge forces in the OIF had already 
brought the Kurds a great deal of appreciation and support from the United States. 
In the 2003-era, the U.S. commanders formed strong bonds with the Kurdish 
leadership, which in turn allowed the Kurds to have much more influence over the 
course of the counter-insurgency and indeed the whole political and military affairs 
of Iraq. An article in the Wall Street Journal, wrote: 
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 “In 2003, then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus's 101st Airborne Division took 
responsibility for security in Iraq's three Kurdish provinces and formed a 
strong bond with Mr. Barzani, said a former senior U.S. officer. Every 
month or so, the two met for lunch in a field tent on a Kurdish mountain to 
discuss military strategy and battles Mr. Barzani had fought against Mr. 
Hussein's forces. The Army division began building the region's two 
largest landing strips—now used in part for arms deliveries and U.S.-
Kurdish joint collection of intelligence on the jihadists. Mr. Barzani also 
forged ties to a generation of U.S. diplomats. Among other things, he went 
hiking with Mr. Jeffrey, a former ambassador both to Iraq and Turkey.”893 
The commitment of the KRI to portray itself as a heaven of security and 
stability. and as a key partner in the counter-insurgency efforts. went beyond 
maintenance and contribution to the security of the region and the whole of Iraq. In 
2006, the KNA passed a regional counter-terrorism bill, Law No. 3 (2006): Anti-Terror 
Law in the Kurdistan Region.894 The fact that the KRI anti-terror legislation was 
almost identical with the Iraqi counter-terrorism legislation that was passed in 2005 
raised questions about the intentions of Kurdish authorities in passing a specific KRI 
anti-terror legislation. Some insisted that there was no need to pass such legislation, 
given the fact that under Article 110 of the Iraqi constitution, national security 
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remained the exclusive authority of the federal government in Baghdad. Instead 
others focused on the desire of the KRG to suppress political opposition, abuse and 
torture of prisoners detained in the regional detention facilities. 
 
However, a better explanation for the KRI’s Anti-Terror law, as well as other 
aspects of its counter-insurgency policies, lay in its foreign policies of image-building 
and self-justification. De facto states, as stated in Chapter Two of this thesis, are 
usually portrayed as an attractive territory for a multitude of criminal, illicit groups 
and terrorist groups, as well as sources of danger to regional and international 
security. Thus, the KRI’s actions could be viewed within this context. As Voller notes, 
“If the KRG was aspiring to portray itself as an oasis of stability, then the Anti-Terror 
Law added a legal (statist) dimension into that;” it also “demonstrated the KRG’s 
independence of the government in Baghdad” and “as yet another way for the KRG 
as a de facto state to prove its sovereignty”895 In short, the Kurdish leadership was 
trying to disassociate the KRI from the image of an ungovernable territory, so often 
called black spots in the literature of de facto statehood. 
This aspect of the KRI’s earned sovereignty came to the attention of U.S. 
political and military officials as well as many foreign observers. Lieutenant Dennis 
Chapman of the U.S. National Army Guard, who authored a report on Kurdistan’s 
security institutions, states: 
“The Peshmerga and their colleagues in the other Kurdish security 
services have successfully established security in the Kurdistan Region, 
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354 
 
clearly the safest and most stable region of the country. The Kurds are 
justifiably proud of the fact that not a single American soldier has been 
killed due to enemy action in the Kurdistan Region since 2003. What’s 
more, they have done what few governments in the Middle East have 
been able to do: They have helped to create a polity capable of conducting 
free elections and that, with certain important exceptions, protects the 
rights and security of its citizens.”896 
The relatively secure environment of the KRI thus allowed Kurdish officials to 
add other elements to their foreign policy of image-building and self-justification. By 
the mid-2000s, Kurdish officials increasingly began to label the KRI as the only 
‘success story’ of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. Dr. Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to 
the President of the Kurdistan Region, stated in an interview that “The Kurdistan 
Region is a success story, not only in comparison to the rest of the country but to 
the rest of the region as well. Certainly, it is a success story in terms of security…” 
897  
Although in a sense all of Iraq’s diverse groups were and are legitimate 
targets for violence and coercion based on their ethnicity, sectarian or religious 
affiliations, religious minorities such as Christians, Yezidis and Mandaeans were 
more vulnerable because of their small numbers, dispersion through Iraq, or their 
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location in the hotbed of extremism and terrorism. Of these groups, the Christians 
were more vulnerable because of their association with the West and the Western 
occupation of Iraq.  
Beginning with the U.S. intervention in Iraq, al-Qaeda and other insurgent 
groups bombed and destroyed dozens of Christian churches, kidnapped and killed 
several priests and bishops and continuously harassed and killed ordinary Christian 
citizens.898 Faced with this situation, the KRI immediately adopted an open-gate 
policy to Christian IDPs, and for that matter IDPs from other ethnicities and sects in 
Iraq. Moreover, Nechirvan Barzani instructed Sarkis Agajan, the Finance Minister of 
the KRG, and himself a Christian Kurd, to use the KRG’s funds to build several 
houses, apartments, churches and community halls in the KRI to offer them as an 
alternative to leaving Iraq.899   
This thesis argues that the KRI came to associate protection of the rights of 
minorities as a central element in its foreign policy of image-building. The fact that 
protection of minority rights as well other democratic principles had been given 
significant emphasis by U.S. foreign policy, actions of the EU in regard of 
guaranteeing recognition to the former Yugoslav republics, as well as the EU’s 
accession criteria, prompted the Kurdish leadership to pay great attention to 
welcoming and protecting minorities fleeing from the rest of Iraq. Statements and 
actions of the Kurdish leadership reflect the fact that the KRI aimed to present to the 
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West, and the international community at large, Kurdistan’s secular, tolerant and 
democratic values and its effective statehood. Thus, in an interview, Masrour 
Barzani, employing a form of competitive democratization stated:  
“Kurdistan has opened her arms to accommodate all those who seek 
protection and flee violence…Kurdistan has always been a very tolerant 
and friendly place for all ethnicities and religions. People in Kurdistan 
have historically been free in practicing their religions and different 
ethnicities have been freely living together. More recently, Kurdistan has 
become a shelter and sanctuary for other religious and ethnic groups who 
have fled other violent parts of Iraq.”900  
Indeed, welcoming minorities also served as an opportunity for the KRG to 
showcase its positive sovereignty. In other words, the KRI did not only engage in 
competitive democratization, it also engaged in competitive statehood in comparison 
with its Iraqi parent state. Nechirvan Barzani in this regard stated: 
“The Kurdistan Region has offered its full support at a time when it has 
been chiefly the federal government’s responsibility to do so… This 
assistance has included employing them within the KRG, rebuild some 
100 villages and helping around 10,000 families with monthly stipends… 
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When the exodus of Christians became known, the KRG allocated 
250,000 Iraqi Dinars to each family to help them.”901  
These sentiments were also shared by the leaders of the Christian community 
who expressed thanks to the KRG. Ninos Mishu of the St. John Baptism Church, for 
instance, said, “We are free here in Kurdistan to use our church here to pray, to 
make a holy mass… Thanks for God, and for our government [the KRG] that love 
the Christian people… We was attacked as Christians [in Baghdad]. We spent 
Christmas in big fear. Our church was bombed by the terrorism.”902 Another Christian 
citizen stated, “Life isn't possible in Baghdad for us at the moment… The government 
[Baghdad Government] doesn't seem to be serious about protecting us here… the 
Kurds have offered us shelter and we will go. I couldn't stay in Baghdad even if it 
was built of gold.”903 
The fact that the KRI associated the protection of minorities to its foreign 
policy of image-building is clearly illustrated in a report published by the KRG 
representation office in London in 2012. The report, as well as highlighting the KRI’s 
actions in responding to the needs of the minorities fleeing to the KRI, states, “The 
Kurdistan Region has become a safe haven for internally displaced Iraqis of all 
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ethnicities, religions and sects. According to the International Organization for 
Migration 39% of the IDP families that it has assessed in the Kurdistan Region 
belong to religious or ethnic minorities… Not only Christians but also Sunni and Shia 
Arabs and Yazidis from different social classes have found refuge in the Kurdistan 
Region.”904 
Interestingly, the practices of the Kurdish leadership in welcoming and 
protecting IDPs in Iraq was noted by the international community. In 2009, President 
Masoud Barzani was received at the Vatican by Pope Benedict XVI. In the meeting, 
the Pope praised the KRI as an “example of tolerance and peaceful co-existence of 
different communities.”905 As Hemen Hawrami, an aide to President Masoud 
Barzani, remarks, presidents of recognized states usually have a time limit of 15 to 
20 minutes in their meetings with the Pope. However, the meeting of the Pope with 
President Barzani lasted 45 minutes as the Pope wished to enquire about the 
tolerant nature of the Kurdish people and its government.906 Previous to that, in 2006, 
Sarkis Agajan was knighted by Pope Benedict for his care and humanitarian 
gestures to the Christian community in Iraq.907 
Not only did the KRI seek to enhance its image in regard to the protection of 
minorities and IDPs, but also other civil rights indexes, including freedom of the 
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press, protest, and women rights, among others. Enshrining equal institutional 
representation and democratization was a big part of this effort. During the January 
2005 elections, the KNA passed a law increasing the number of seats for minority 
groups from five to eleven seats, including and extending seats to the Turkoman 
community in the KRI908 who willfully did not participate in the 1992 KRI elections.909 
Moreover, as a sort of competitive democratization, the KRI increased the minimum 
number of seats for women in the KNA from 25 per cent as set in 1992 to 30 per 
cent in 2005, in an effort to overshadow the 25 per cent quota the Iraqi COR set for 
the share of women in Baghdad. Moreover, reflecting the increasing influence of 
transnational activism and KRI’s young population, a local NGO, funded by American 
NGOs such as IRI, successfully campaigned for the minimum age requirement of 
parliamentary candidates to be reduced from 30 to 25, thus increasing the amount 
of youth participation in the democratic process. 
During much of the 1990s, the two KRGs remained relatively indifferent to the 
plight of women and gender-based violence was somehow tolerated. However, after 
2003, the KRI’s image imperative impressed it to be more responsive to 
transnational activism with regard to women’s rights. The KRI followed carefully 
reports published by state governments, INGOs, NGOs, UNAMI, the media and 
others regarding human rights and civil liberties. For example, it monitored reports 
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published by the German WADI foundation910 and Human Rights Watch911 about the 
practice of FGM in parts of Kurdistan. Women’s organizations also raised the issue 
of honour-killing in the KRI.912 The fact that these reports associated the KRI’s 
actions in combating violence, the inhuman treatment of women, and other of human 
rights, with good governance and international acceptance prompted the KRG to 
take suitable legislative and enforcement action against these practices. It is also 
true that the KRG was aware that the alliance of transnational coalitions of major 
NGOs, International organizations and individuals in defense of civil rights would 
have an important influence on the image of the KRI. For instance, UNAMI supported 
the publication of several reports highlighting these matters. In 2009, a local NGO, 
Asuda, based in Sulaimania, published a report on violence against women.913 It is 
interesting that the report associated the KRI with statehood in terms of its 
responsibilities, reminding the KRI of the responsibilities of states under the United 
Nations General Assembly resolution ‘Working Towards the Elimination of Crimes 
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Committed in the Name of Honour’, according to which, “states have an obligation 
to prevent, investigate and punish perpetrators.”914 
Against this backdrop, and being ever careful about its image abroad, the 
KRG acted to remedy these practices and to find reasonable solutions which could 
balance the competing views of different local domestic groups and outside actors. 
Thus in 2008, the KNA passed a legislation prohibiting forced marriage and 
restricted, but not completely eliminated, polygamy among other legal 
requirements.915 The KNA also passed legislation in 2011 listing various types of 
legally-punishable forms of domestic violence which among other issues 
criminalized the practice of FGM.916 Moreover, the KRG published a five-year 
national strategy to combat violence against women,917 as well as establishing 
several governmental bodies to monitor the implementation of the legislation and to 
bring perpetrators to justice.918 In addition, the KRG established several 
government-sponsored shelters for women escaping domestic violence, the only 
place in Iraq where such shelters existed.919  
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These domestic developments were soon integrated into the rhetoric and 
actions of Kurdish politicians in their foreign policy of image-building. For instance, 
when Qubad Talabani, the KRG representative in the United States, attended an 
Ambassador’s roundtable on women issues in Washington, he sought to highlight 
each of KRG’s achievements in criminalizing honour-based killings increasing the 
number of female parliamentarians, as well as the KRG’s shelters for women, to 
name just a few.920 
KRG practices in regard to abuse of prisoners, particularly political prisoners, 
as well as terrorists captured and detained by the KRG security services, received 
primary attention from human rights groups. Amnesty International and several other 
groups published reports criticizing the KRG for its violations against certain human 
liberties. These violations referred to the KRG’s internal security services – Asayish 
– and their alleged unlawful practices such as torture, prolonged and extralegal 
detentions and forceful disappearances. It also referred to dangers in freedom of 
expression, including media freedom and slow and sluggish implementation of 
legislation protecting women in the KRI.921 However, instead of ignoring these 
reports, as most Middle Eastern states usually do, the KRG embraced the criticism 
and engaged in dialogue with the relevant organizations to discuss possible 
misconceptions and areas of cooperation to correct KRG practices. Being concerned 
about the image of the KRI, Nechirvan Barzani personally received the 
                                            
920 Ibid.  
921 “Hope and Fear: Human Rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” Amnesty International (2009), 
accessed: 17 August 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE14/006/2009/en/.  
363 
 
representatives of Amnesty International – the only regional leader to do so at the 
time – and discussed the KRG’s determination to abide by international human rights 
standards, outlining actions the KRG had taken and would be taking to address the 
alleged human rights violations.922  
Media freedom was also marked as a significant issue in the KRI foreign 
policy of image-building. In 2007, the KNA passed a law that was criticized by most 
journalists as restricting freedom of their activities and reporting.923 However, being 
ever-concerned about the image of the KRI, President Barzani  met with the 
syndicate of journalists and other stakeholders and made sure that necessary 
amendments were made in the draft law, which he then later signed into a press law 
on 11 October 2008.924 Meanwhile, statements made by both President Masoud 
Barzani and PM Nechirvan Barzani underlined the KRG’s association of respect for 
media freedom with the KRI’s foreign policy of image-building. President Barzani for 
instance, insisted “Kurds have sacrificed their lives for freedom, and I fully support 
the media’s right to criticise the government. I reject any law that is against the 
journalists’ fundamental rights,”925 while the PM stated, “I have said earlier that the 
measures of our success are not construction or other more cosmetic projects. In 
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fact, the genuine measurement of our progress is our respect for the principles of 
democracy and human rights. We have to be honest with the principles that we have 
declared.”926 Consequently, according to a Freedom House report, the new 
legislation granted “unprecedented freedoms” to journalists, eliminating 
imprisonment penalties for defamation. It was implemented rather successfully, 
leading to a “numerical improvement” in the general statistics.”927  
This is not to suggest, however, that there were no impending challenges 
facing Kurdistan’s transition to democracy, or in its endeavour to have a positive 
image internationally: “We remind the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that 
media freedom constitutes one of the foundations of democracy and we therefore 
urge the KRG authorities to deploy the necessary means to protect journalists’ work,” 
the Reporters Without Borders stated in 2016.928 Kurdish politicians, particularly after 
2003, have been very sensitive to criticism on human and civil rights violations. This 
is not only because of the KRI’s foreign image. It is also related to KRI’s “popular 
legitimacy”.929 The leadership of most de facto states, if not all, claim to represent 
the democratic will of the people, which has been an integral part of their rhetoric 
from the outset, and they often base their right to secession on democratic principles 
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of the people’s right to self-determination.930 Likewise, in the KRI, as Nicole Watts 
argues, “an important part of Kurdish national identity as articulated by Kurdish 
political elites for at least two decades has been the idea that Kurdish politics is 
democratic politics and that the “will of the people” matters.”931 So when faced with 
criticism, KRI politicians in most cases did not deny their shortcomings, but often 
responded by focusing on Kurdistan’s ‘democratic-ness’,932 arguing that despite 
challenges, Kurdistan was on the road to democracy, and that democracy is a 
journey, not a destination, with the implication that even the most-established 
democracies are still on the same journey as Kurdistan. 
Before 2003, the KRI benefited from relatively generous international 
humanitarian aid that provided the Kurdish region with immediate relief assistance, 
and later the OFFP infused funds for rehabilitation purposes. However, with the 
initiation of the ‘democracy mission’933 after 2003, the politics of aid changed 
considerably from a focus on delivery of goods and services to prioritizing capacity 
building and encouragement of free-market oriented policies which concentrated on 
direct investment, the private sector and good governance. During government 
formation negotiations in Baghdad, 17 per cent of the Iraqi national budget was 
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allocated to the KRI. The KRI’s budget in 2004-2005 surpassed $2226 million.934 
The allocation was the first in history that the government in Baghdad directly, and 
willingly, assigned to the Kurdish region. Moreover, in contrast to the early relief 
period, the U.S. government and its agencies assumed the leading role in 
reconstruction of Iraq with an initial Congressional allocation of US$18.6 billion.935  
Contrary to the early periods of aid which imposed conditions on the UN’s 
engagement with KRI authorities, the democracy mission enabled the UN’s 
reengagement with the KRI as a federal region of Iraq.936 Following the transfer of 
sovereignty to Iraq by UNSC resolution 1546, once again, the UN agencies and 
several humanitarian aid organizations became active in the socio-economic 
development of Iraq and the KRI.937 Of the new Iraqi reconstruction budget 
earmarked for the KRI, $602 million was allocated to construction which helped 
create an “industrial zone, hydropower stations, road rehabilitation, private-sector 
development, and microwave links connecting cities such as Sulaimani, Arbil, and 
Kirkuk to the rest of Iraq.”938 
Indeed, the KRI was about to embark on a new road in its economic policies 
which was closely related to its image-building foreign policy. After 2003, the KRI 
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received $1.5 billion from the UN’s unspent OFFP fund.939 The procurement of OFFP 
money represented the beginning of the development of a sophisticated foreign 
policy strategy, utilizing lobbying as an instrument to influence the foreign policy of 
other actors, in this case the United States. Lobbying is generally defined as a 
“deliberate attempt to influence political decision through various forms of advocacy 
directed at policymakers on behalf of another person, organization or group.”940 The 
U.S. democratic system, as Mearsheimer et al, note, is particularly receptive to the 
activities of interest groups and lobbying groups. This is because these groups “are 
committed to an issue to which the bulk of the population is indifferent, [and the] 
policymaker will tend to accommodate those who care about the issue, even if their 
numbers are small, confident that the rest of the population will not penalize them 
for doing so.”941 
In contrast to the previous aid periods, the United States and UN agencies 
were less enthusiastic in channeling funds to the KRI. This was based on two 
calculations. Firstly, the United States sought to limit Kurdish autonomy and, 
secondly, it felt that funds were more needed in central and southern Iraq. The U.S. 
CPA administration in Iraq, as Natali argues, “Instead of using the Kurdistan region 
as a model for the rest of Iraq… challenged the Kurdish autonomy project and 
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antagonized the Kurds.”942 After 2003, the U.S. State Department maintained that 
the KRI had benefited from huge external aid in the form of goods and services, as 
well as being a safe haven with a ‘no fly zone’ and, therefore, the much more 
unstable regions of southern and central Iraq needed and deserved more money 
than the Kurdish north.943 Observers covering the region voiced similar views. 
Michiel Leezenberg, in one instance, argued that, “At present Iraqi Kurdistan is long 
past the reconstruction stage. The rehabilitation of basic infrastructural facilities, 
which in Iraq as a whole has yet to get off the ground, has made considerable 
progress in the Kurdish-held north since the establishment of a de facto independent 
entity there in 1991.”944 These views strongly influenced U.S. decision-making. Of 
the United States Congress reconstruction funds earmarked for Iraq, that accounted 
to $18.6 billion dollars, the KRI received only about US$1 billion, despite the fact the 
KRI requested 17 per cent of the funds, based on the percentage of its budget 
allocation from Iraq.945  
In mid-2005, the Kurdish leadership realized that the remaining unspent 
OFFP money was held in a trust fund in the United States. Thereafter, the task of 
procuring funding fell to Farhad Barzani, the then KDP representative in the United 
States. Appreciating the difficulties in navigating the U.S. political system, the 
representative turned to Danny Yatom, a former director of the Mossad, for 
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assistance. Yatom eventually hired the lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers, 
which agreed on 3 June 2004 to represent the KDP for $29,000 a month. Only after 
lobbying the White House, did the Kurds manage, on 23 June 2004, to receive $1.5 
billion of the original $4 billion of the OFFP money.946 This successful lobbying was 
hailed as the first and a major victory for the Kurds in the United States, and was 
evidence of the increasing ability of the KRI to influence U.S. foreign policy in the 
post-2003 era. Commenting on this victory, Qubad Talabani stated: “The firm's 
lobbying was very helpful in getting us the oil-for-food money… It was a tangible 
victory for the Kurds.”947 
This situation, however, heralded in a new strategy in the thinking of the KRI 
leadership, which partly aimed to change the image of the KRI and its people from 
poor willing aid recipients to an entity that possessed a huge potential of economic 
viability. The experience of other de facto states also might have convinced the KRI 
of the desirability of achieving economic prosperity and lessening reliance on 
international aid. The de facto state of Biafra (Nigeria, from 1967-1970) provides a 
good example in this regard. As Caspersen, in a confidential memorandum the 
Biafran ministry of foreign affairs, concluded, “the humanitarian approach has 
backfired. Ours now is the picture of a piteous starving sickly people non-viable and 
incapable of defending themselves from hunger and war.”948  Moreover, as 
Caspersen notes, de facto states are often viewed as ‘criminal badlands,’949 whose 
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economies, insofar as they exist, often rely on smuggling or other forms of war 
profiting.  
This negative image could also be applied to the KRI in the early stages of its 
existence. A New York Times report back in 1994 stated, “Kurdistan is a major hub 
for cigarette smuggling into Saddam-controlled areas Iraq, Iran, and Turkey with the 
KRG gaining funds from customs collected at the border point with Turkey.”950 
Moreover, with tacit U.S. approval Kurdistan had become a major transit point for 
Iraq’s smuggled oil to Turkey in contravention to UNSC resolution 661 (August 6, 
1990) which imposed sanctions on Iraq.951 
Then a new strategy evolved. Instead lobbying for aid, the principle focus 
would be on investment or, to be more precise, attracting foreign direct investment 
(hereafter FDI) into the KRI. Indeed, there was a domestic rationale for this policy. 
Although the KRI was partially resurrected during the two initial phases of 
international aid, it was still badly damaged due to long years of destruction and 
negligence. As Caspersen argues, “A legacy of war is common to most de facto 
states and the reality facing these entities, following the cessation of hostilities, is 
often very far from the stated nationalist goals of security and prosperity. There is an 
acute lack of resources and many of the entities almost have to start from scratch; 
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their infrastructure having been destroyed, agricultural land littered with landmines, 
and no functioning economy.”952 
The KRI had to act quickly to preserve its internal legitimacy. Therefore, FDI 
was crucial to initiate the rebuilding of the KRI and to satisfy the demands of an 
increasingly demanding population. This is evident in a speech delivered by the head 
of DFR, Minister Falah Mustafa, stating, “We believe that the private sector is the 
true engine of growth and that foreign direct investment is a key component… This 
foreign direct investment is crucially helpful. It will help us to rebuild our inadequate 
infrastructure. We are in need of better roads, communications systems, water 
treatment plants, hospitals and many other necessities.”953 
One can argue that advancing the KRI economically was also part of a wider 
political-ideological project that sought to offset the negative consequences of being 
unable to secede from Iraq. This point is succinctly articulated by Harvey, stating:  
“At the formal level, the transition occurring in Iraqi Kurdistan can be 
articulated in terms of KRG attempts at moving the region toward the 
creation of a commercial entrepôt as part of a wider political and economic 
agenda; as well as being part of a highly considered ideological project 
by the KRG – one in which transition to statehood has not been fully ruled 
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out. What is surprising is how this form of political and institutional 
development may, in the short term, allow the Kurdish administration to 
offset the negative effects of ambiguous status by adopting a model 
which, as other examples in the international system attest, provides 
leverage in more sophisticated economic and political terms.954 
To achieve this objective, the reunified KRG, once again, began to promote 
the KRI as an island of stability and security in an otherwise unstable Iraq. For that 
matter, the KRG, in addition to highlighting its democratic experiment, began to focus 
further on its domestic sovereignty, namely its ability to provide security and stability 
in the KRI. However, in its strive to attract FDI, the KRI faced a major difficulty. It was 
still part of Iraq, and due to Iraq’s worsening security situation and its negative image 
in the international arena, investors were reluctant to commit their capital to the KRI, 
or indeed the rest of Iraq. 
To remedy this situation, the KRG started a fierce public relations campaign 
that, among other things, aimed to create an image for the KRI distinct from that of 
the rest of Iraq. The Kurdish leadership and the Kurds in general were frustrated that 
their region had to suffer because of Arab Iraqis. So, before long, with the help of 
American friends, and a lobbying firm closely associated with the U.S. Republican 
Party, named Russo Marsh & Rogers, the KRG began a public relations campaign 
which essentially sought to manufacture a nation brand for Kurdistan as the Other 
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Iraq.955 In fact, this term appeared in the title of a KRG campaign documentary that 
aimed to attract investment, and also to highlight Kurdistan’s security and stability, 
its positive attitude towards the West, and Kurdistan’s secularism and 
democratization amid sectarianism and religiously-inspired terrorism in Iraq. In one 
of the chapters, the narrator argues that “the Kurds have proven that they are, 
indeed, a committed force for freedom and democracy in a part of the world that 
desperately needs it… For the first time in history the Kurds set up their own civil 
democratic structures, and further developed their judiciary, police and security 
forces.”956 Then the narrator continues, “So strong has Kurdish security become, 
fewer than two hundred coalition troops are currently stationed throughout the entire 
Kurdistan Autonomous Region. And as of the spring of 2005, not a single coalition 
soldier has lost his life on Kurdish soil.”957 Then an interviewee is quoted as saying, 
“The Kurdish people in general are secular. They’re less attached to religion than, 
let’s say, the Shiites [sic] of the south or the rest of Iraq.”958 Indeed, it was interesting 
that the company which organized this brand-building project for the KRI also 
referred to the shared values between the Kurds and the West. In response to why 
the firm had agreed to help Kurdistan, Joe Wierzbicki, a representative of the firm 
stated, “of all the different groups in Iraq that have a vision for the future, the vision 
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of the Kurds is closest to ours. It's important to recognize that the Kurds are not 
hostile to the West.”959 Moreover, to promote Kurdistan, the campaigners decided to 
broadcast the documentary on prime-time U.S. TV networks. Bill Garaway, who had 
filmed the documentary, enlisted lobbying firms such as Russo Marsh & Rogers, to 
help promote the commercials.960 Within a short amount of time, the commercials 
were aired on major U.S. TV networks, such as CBS’s-60 minutes among others.961 
However, the legacy of Iraq’s centrally-controlled economic system hampered 
FDI. There were no institutional and legal frameworks to regulate FDI in Kurdistan. 
Realizing this shortcoming, in 2006 the KNA passed a law entitled “Investment Law 
in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.”962 The Investment Law, which until that time was one 
of the few laws translated into English, was described as one of the most 
progressive, liberal and investor-friendly laws in the Middle East Region. To attract 
FDI, the law provided several generous incentives and concessions to potential 
investors in Kurdistan that included “the possibility of owning land, up to 10-year tax 
holidays and the removal of tariffs on exports and imports related to investment 
projects.”963 The fact that the Law was passed just three months after the KRG 
became unified shows the urgency with which Kurdish politicians dealt with the issue 
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of enhancing Kurdistan’s image as a commercial hub. Moreover, even at that early 
stage of Kurdistan’s rise, the KRG began to promote the KRI as a tourist destination. 
The KRG, as they had done previously, adopted an open-arms policy towards 
Western journalists reporting on the KRI. In one such article, Harry Schute, a retired 
U.S. military general who served in Iraq after 2003 and later chose to remain in the 
KRI, was interviewed and said that “I feel safer in Arbil or Suleimaniyah than in 
Camden, New Jersey.”964  
One of the images the Kurdish elite, and indeed the wider general population, 
was eager to promote was of comparing Kurdistan to small and wealthy nations such 
as South Korea and Singapore, but more so with small and oil-wealthy Arab nations 
like the UAE. These states are relatively small and surrounded by more powerful 
and often hostile neighbours, yet they have managed to preserve their political 
independence and sovereignty. The KRI had stronger incentives for its 
rapprochement with the UAE. Politically, the UAE is a federal state, and its financial 
hub, Dubai, is an emirate within the union. Therefore, by aspiring to be compared 
with Dubai, the Kurdish elite sought to portray that the existence of wealthy, 
prosperous and federal regions in the Middle East region is not a curse.  During a 
visit from a UK parliamentary fact-finding mission to the KRI, Fazel Merani, the 
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Secretary of the Political Bureau of the KDP is quoted as saying, “The United Arab 
Emirates is a good Middle Eastern example of the success of federalism.”965  
The KRG clearly had incentives to associate the KRI with the small, wealthy 
and rich nations of the Gulf. By comparing and associating itself with these states, 
the KRI relayed the image that, if given opportunity, it could be a prosperous and 
viable state that could not only provide economic goods to its citizens, but also 
contribute to regional and international economic prosperity. As Voller argues, by 
trying to associate the KRI with oil-wealthy hubs such as Dubai, the KRI not only 
strived to attract investors, but also to “signal to the international community its 
potential for self-sufficiency.”966 Thus, soon after the reunification, the KRG began to 
send government officials to Dubai to meet business leaders and organizations. One 
such meeting took place in June 2006 when a large KRG delegation visited Dubai. 
The fact that the delegation was composed of many civilian officials, including 
economic advisers, but was headed by Karim Sinjari, the KRG Minister of Interior, 
was telling. In Dubai, Sinjari declared, “Although, the hardships and difficulties Iraq 
has always been undergoing, we, in Kurdistan, succeeded in surpassing those 
difficulties and have worked on developing the region economically, commercially, 
industrially and on the tourism level and we are in need of Dubai's leading experience 
                                            
965 “The Kurdistan Region: Future Prospects,” UK parliamentary fact-finding visit to the Kurdistan 
Region in Iraq 9-15 February 2008, KRG website, June 2008, 
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966 Voller, “From Rebellion to De Facto Statehood,” Op. Cit., p.  211.  
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on all front.”967 In 2007, Nechirvan Barzani visited Dubai to meet with Sheikh 
Hamdan bin Mohammed Rashid Al Maktoum, the Crown Prince of Dubai and the 
Chairman of the Executive Council of Dubai, and other officials to discuss arenas of 
economic cooperation between the two nations.968 Soon after this meeting, the KRG 
Minister of Planning stated, “the Kurdistan region will draw on the successful models 
of cities like Dubai and Singapore with the ultimate goal of creating ‘the Kurdish 
model’.”969 Furthermore, the Dubai-based English-language Gulf News reported, 
‘Kurdistan adopts Dubai plan to boost development,’970 stating that the KRI had 
found the Dubai model to be the most appropriate for Kurdistan and that the KRG 
aimed to encourage potential investors from Dubai, as well as encouraging 
companies and financial institutions with experience in Dubai and the Gulf region to 
operate in the KRI.971 In 2010, the UAE reported that it would increase its investment 
in the KRI to over $6 billion by 2013.972 
With an Investment Law in place and benefiting from the generally secure 
atmosphere in the KRI, the KRG began to promote the de facto state as a ‘gateway’ 
to Iraq and indeed, the rest of the Middle East region. Being a landlocked territory 
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with no access to the sea, the KRG early on realized the importance of building 
airports to serve the political and economic needs of the KRI. As Bengio notes, the 
building of airports was necessary to ensure a degree of freedom in communicating 
with the outside world, in other words, to assure the survival of the KRI.973 
Constructing airports was also necessary to maintain constant communication and 
interaction with the rest of the international community. Throughout the early decade 
of the KRI’s existence, the Kurdish leaders relied on the good-will of Iran, Syria but 
mostly Turkey, for their travel to the outside world, particularly to the West. However, 
a new approach was needed to build independent foreign relations with a range of 
actors. Thus, major construction for building an airport in Erbil – the capital of the 
KRI – to international standards began in 2004 at a cost of $400 million. The airport, 
which can accommodate 300 million passengers a year, can handle the largest 
aircraft, such as Airbus A 380,974 as it has the fifth largest runway in the world.975 
The KRG succeeded in attracting large amounts of investment from Turkish 
and Iranian companies, firms from Arab states such as Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, 
and significant investment from Gulf countries. Western firms were still reluctant to 
commit investment to the KRI, although it was increasingly vital for the KRI to attract 
them. The desire to attract Western companies, particularly U.S. companies, had 
economic and political dimensions. Economically, Western companies possessed 
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the most sophisticated technology, expertise and capital that could accelerate the 
processes of economic rejuvenation in the region. However, this thesis argues that 
the political reason was more dominant in the thinking of the leadership of the KRI. 
As Caspersen argues, for de facto states the renewal of warfare with their parent 
states is an ever-present possibility.976 Most de facto states are established following 
secessionist warfare or state breakdown at some point, and therefore, parent states 
are primed to re-establish central control over the territory when their resources and 
circumstances permit. Kurdish leaders seem to have realized that “U.S. foreign 
policy is most heavily and consistently influenced by internationally-oriented 
business leaders, followed by experts who, however, may themselves be influenced 
by business.”977 Again, although the KRI was not the result of an explicit secessionist 
warfare, it still had to protect its near-total de facto independence from Baghdad. 
Therefore, the KRI’s foreign policy entailed granting contracts in various sectors – 
reconstruction, communications, electricity production, aviation, oil/gas projects 
among others – to companies belonging to Western states, particularly those seen 
as bearing significant influence on the direction of foreign policy. As some Kurdish 
officials put it, the KRI should distribute its eggs in multiple baskets.978 The rationale 
behind this thinking was that, in times of need, when the KRI was possibly under 
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military attack or political assault by its parent state or its neighbours to reduce or 
diminish its de facto independence, those states with solid economic interests inside 
the KRI would help defend Kurdistan, particularly given the fact that the KRI could 
not fully trust the surrounding states no matter how much investment they had in the 
KRI. 
Consequently, the KRG made concerted efforts to attract Western 
companies. The KRI used several tools to this end. One of the tools was to inform 
Western companies about developments taking place in the KRI. To do this, the 
KRG began publishing high-quality, and probably costly, brochures and magazines 
about the KRI. The fact that some of the first brochures were little more than an 
introduction to the KRI is testament that the KRI was little known internationally.979 
Subsequently, when the KRI managed to attract some investment, these magazines 
began to showcase Kurdistan’s advancement in some sectors and highlighted 
potential investment opportunities. The topics covered in these magazines 
emphasized  Kurdistan’s security and stability, its tolerant nature toward minorities, 
law and order, women and community relations, media and religious diversity, in 
addition to business, construction and economic opportunities; proven and potential 
oil and gas reserves in the KRI; electricity, health and universities projects; 
environmental friendliness of the Kurds; and tourism plans, just to mention a few.980 
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The coverage of these topics clearly reflects the KRI’s desire to build its foreign 
image based on its earned sovereignty and democratization, and also portraying the 
KRI as a major business and economic hub in the Middle East Region. Indeed, in 
2007, the KRG’s lobbying efforts paid off when Franklin L. Lavin, the U.S. Under 
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade visited Erbil to promote Kurdistan as 
a ‘gateway’ for U.S. businesses in Iraq.981 This visit clearly underlined the success of 
the lobbying efforts of the KRG representation in the United States, and possibly the 
success of the lobbying firm hired by the KRG to promote its interests in Washington. 
6.5 Conclusion 
One of the consequences of Saddam Hussein’s central secession was that 
the authorities in Bagdad never regained de facto political control of the KRI, even 
during the second state-building processes in Iraq. Indeed, if between 1991 and 
2003 the Kurdish entity was an unrecognized de facto state, after 2003, the KRI 
transformed into a recognized de facto state. This transformation has had a 
significant impact on the domestic and foreign policies of the KRI. Domestically, the 
KRI consolidated its territorial control and control over the legitimate tools of 
violence. It also consolidated its official institutions by reactivating the KNA, 
establishing the office of president and reunifying the two KRGs. Internationally, the 
interactions of the KRI began to take the shape of a unitary foreign policy actor, 
pursuing strategically defined foreign policies and presenting one diplomatic face to 
the outside world. While Kurdish political parties maintained their foreign relations, 
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the executive branches of the KRI, particularly the presidency and the offices of the 
prime minister of the KRG, gradually and increasingly emerged as the primary 
foreign policy-makers. The KRI quickly organized the institution with the foremost 
responsibility for the day-to-day implementation of foreign policy, the DFR, 
developed a capable body of diplomatic representatives and opened foreign 
representation offices in capitals deemed vital for the continuous survival of the de 
facto state. 
This chapter argues that between 2003 and 2007, the national interest of the 
Kurdish de facto state was defined in terms of achieving two objectives: 
consolidating its de facto independence through political and legal processes, such 
as negotiation over the constitution of Iraq; and pursuing a foreign policy with the 
aim of creating a positive image for the KRI in the international arena. The Kurdish 
elite sought to create and enhance a positive image of the KRI, i.e. nation-branding, 
that not only sought to create an identity for the KRI, but also sought to distinguish 
the KRI from the rest of Iraq.  
Diplomacy was a major instrument employed by the KRI leadership in pursuit 
of its foreign policy objectives. The KRI sought international visibility, not invisibility. 
For this reason, each development at the domestic level became part and parcel of 
the foreign policy of image-building. Kurdish officials repeatedly focused on 
highlighting the KRI’s achievements in several arenas: signs of security and stability, 
its contribution to the war on terror and counterinsurgency, law and order in the 
region, respect for the right of minorities and the general human rights situation in 
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the KRI. The Kurdish leadership also continued its extensive interactions with the 
media, research institutions, think tanks and other observers covering the region, to 
assure further engagement with the international community. 
In short, during this phase of its existence, the KRI emerged as a “second de facto 
foreign policy centre in Iraq.”982 Between 2003 and 2007, foreign relations between 
Baghdad and the KRI was marked by relative harmony and cooperation as Kurdish 
leaders cooperated closely with their Arab counterparts in Baghdad and the U.S.-led 
coalition in the second state-building processes in Iraq. Thus, the foreign policy 
component of the KRI was still, to a large degree, in line with the overall outlook of 
Iraq’s foreign policy. 
After 2007, the KRI transformed into an independent actor pursuing an 
independent foreign policy in all but name. Moreover, this foreign policy was aimed 
at ensuring the survival of the de facto independent Kurdish entity and was, on most 
issues, contrary to the foreign policy strategy and objectives of its parent state-Iraq. 
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7 The Second Decade of De Facto Independence: 
Independency in Foreign Policy-Making 
This chapter continues the examination of the second decade of the existence 
of the Kurdish de facto state. It examines the nature of relations between the KRI 
and Baghdad between 2007 and 2011. It also examines the utilization of economic 
statecraft by the KRI as a vital instrument of foreign policy. It examines the 
determinants of the KRI’s foreign policy towards Turkey. The chapter also examines 
other aspects of KRI’s independency in foreign policy notably the expansion of KRI’s 
foreign relations offices, opening of foreign consulates in Erbil and signing of 
independent agreements with several states and sub-state regions. It argues that on 
the one hand the pursuit of independent foreign policies reflected the increasing 
consolidation, visibility and legitimacy of the Kurdish entity. However, on the other 
hand, it reflected the need to ensure and affirm the de facto independence and 
continuous survival of the Kurdish de facto state in a context of the lack of 
international recognition.  
 
7.1 Introduction  
The year 2007 can be marked as formative in the transformation of the KRI 
into an independent foreign policy actor. If already now known, beginning in 
2007/2008, the Kurdish leadership reached the conclusion that its once Arab Shiite 
partners in the Iraqi opposition can not to be fully trusted. This concern was 
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aggravated following the start of the negotiations between Iraq and the United States 
over the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Iraq and the nature of future relations 
between the two states. Amid the rising tensions with PM al-Maliki’s government, the 
leadership of the KRI began to articulate independent foreign policy goals which its 
heart aimed at ensuring the survival and de facto independence of the KRI.  
 
7.2 Frustrations with Baghdad, Disputed Areas, and Confrontations 
along the Trigger Line 
The passing of the Iraqi Constitution had brought great hope to the leadership 
of the KRI. The Kurds had become ‘kingmakers’ in the post-Saddam processes of 
state-building, largely due to the potential ability of their COR representatives to alter 
the balance of power between one faction or the other in the government-formation 
negotiations.983 The period between 2003 and 2007 can be marked as a relatively 
peaceful phase in the relationship between the KRI and the GOI. The presence of 
Kurdish politicians in influential positions in Baghdad helped to solve some of 
simmering disputes between the Kurds and Arabs. Indeed, while in office, Kurdish 
politicians in Baghdad constantly lobbied powerful factions in Baghdad in defense of 
Kurdish issues.984  
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After 2007, serious tensions began to engulf the KRI-Baghdad relations over 
several highly sensitive issues. The Kurdish leadership hoped, that by utilizing the 
constitutional provisions they had negotiated with their Arab-Iraqi partners, the Kurds 
would be able to secure all the territories to which they had laid claim outside the 
official boundaries of the KRI. As Natali argues, “In contrast to previous periods, 
whereby the Kirkuk issue was part of backdoor discussions conducted between Iraqi 
presidents and Kurdish leaders during sporadic ceasefires, it has become part of 
constitutional processes within a decentralized political system.”985 Article 58 of the 
TAL, later incorporated into article 140 of the 2005 Constitution of Iraq, had 
enshrined stipulations to resolve legally and officially conflicts in the status of 
disputed territories between the KRI and Baghdad. The disputed territories are a 
swath of land stretching from Sinjar in the northwest, next to the Iraq-Syria border, 
down to Baladruz, next to the Iraq-Iran border, and contain a mixed group of 
ethnicities and religions including Arab, Turkoman, Kurdish, Christian, Yezidi, and 
Shabak communities. In the middle of the argument lay the dispute over the jewel in 
the crown –Kirkuk with its super-giant oilfield containing an estimated15 billion 
barrels of oil. Kirkuk is a typical case of a very protracted and complicated situation.986 
The disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk, fall into the category of territorial disputes 
between entities within a sovereign state – between the Iraqi parent state and the 
Kurdish de facto state. Moreover, the dispute is being fought on three levels and has 
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into the matter, see: Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, Crisis in Kirkuk: the ethnopolitics of 
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two dimensions. It is an intra- and inter-dispute among different communities in 
Northern Iraq (principally Arabs, Kurds and Turkoman), a dispute between Baghdad 
and the KRI and a dispute that draws in regional powers such Turkey and Iran.987 
Largely due to the sheer complexity of the dispute and the dangerous 
possibility of invoking regional intervention, on the insistence of the Kurds, the TAL 
and the Constitution of Iraq enshrined mechanisms to provide a permanent legal 
resolution to the issue of the disputed territories. Article 58 of the TAL and Article 
140 of the Iraqi constitution stipulated that by the end of 2007 a process of 
normalization (i.e. reversal of Arabization), a census and a referendum should take 
place in the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, to determine the will of their citizens 
concerning the status of these territories; in other words, whether these regions 
should join the KRI or remain under the auspices of the federal government in 
Baghdad.988 However, by 2008, not only had the constitutional articles in regard to 
disputed territories not been implemented, but voices began to be heard in Baghdad 
arguing that the constitutional mechanism on the disputed territories was vague, 
invalid and void because the deadline for its implementation has effectively passed. 
But despite certain opinions in Baghdad, the KRI was adamant and insistent on the 
legality of the constitutional articles, and was resolute on its implementation.989 
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In 2009, several developments further intensified the question of the disputed 
territories. In the KNA and presidential elections, a new opposition party called 
Gorran (the Movement of Change) won 25 out of 111 seats in the KNA, effectively 
become the second largest block after the Kurdistan Alliance, which was composed 
of the KDP and PUK. The emergence of Gorran thus created further pressures on 
the leadership of the established Kurdish parties to deliver the foreign policy 
objectives of the Kurds – foreign policy was the most important matter for 
consideration between Bagdad and the KRI. Furthermore, Gorran viewed the 
inability of the Kurdish leadership to deliver Kirkuk and other disputed territories to 
the fold of the KRI as a sign of failure of the KDP and PUK leadership, and used it 
as a significant ingredient in its political discourses. As David Romano notes, 
“Increased competition between the KDP, PUK and a new, more vigorous Kurdish 
opposition in the form of Gorran will probably make it much more risky for any 
Kurdish leader to appear ‘soft’ on Kurdish claims to disputed territories or other 
‘Kurdish rights’ relating to oil, Peshmerga and autonomy.”990 
The signs of this became apparent when in late 2009 UNAMI published a 
non-binding report that outlined four options for resolving the issue of disputed 
territories, specifically Kirkuk.991 However, Masoud Barzani, who was directly elected 
by the people of Kurdistan in the 2009 presidential elections, winning nearly 70 per 
cent  of the votes, refused to comply with the recommendation of the UNAMI, 
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insisting on implementation of article 140 of the constitution.992 Moreover, the Kurdish 
leaders had prepared a draft constitution for the Kurdistan Region to be put to a 
referendum simultaneously with the 2009 elections. The draft constitution enshrined 
Kurdish claims to the disputed territories as well as the oil and gas available in the 
area. The draft constitution alarmed Iraqi and indeed American officials such as Vice 
President Joe Biden and other Obama administration officials.993 
For the Kurds, article 140, which promised territorial reintegration into 
Kurdistan of a land seen by most Kurds as their ancestral land, was of utmost 
importance. The KRI also viewed its continued attachment with Iraq as dependent 
upon the implementation of the constitutional provisions drafted and ratified in 2005, 
specifically provisions of article 140. During a question and answer session at the 
Brookings Institution, president Barzani explicitly stated: “In fact, during the time of 
the drafting of the Constitution [in 2005] that was the main provision for us to continue 
participating in the political process for a solution to be found for Kirkuk on the basis 
of Article 140.”994 Without this happening, as Stansfield notes, “the rhetoric of Kurdish 
leaders moved notably from a discourse about their future within a federal Iraqi state 
to one about their future as an independent entity.”995 This was indeed evident when 
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in response to a question, Nechirvan Barzani stated, “We have a constitution in this 
country. We will not take any other step until we lose hope in that constitution. There 
is no doubt if and when we lose hope that the constitution is not adhered to, certainly 
there are other options.”996 
The status of the disputed territories became part of a large game of political 
manoeuvering by several Iraqi politicians, which further alarmed the Kurdish 
leadership, over the possibility of military confrontation with Iraq. Soon after the 
intensification of the Sunni insurgency and terrorism in the mixed Sunni-Shiite areas 
in Iraq, the US military requested Kurdish leaders to deploy Kurdish Peshmerga 
forces to most parts of the disputed territories to enforce security and stability.997 As 
well as assisting the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces (ISF) in the so-called Sunni 
triangle – the  hotbed of the Sunni insurgency after 2003 – the Kurdish leaders also 
supported the inclusion of some Kurdish personnel in the early formation of the Iraqi 
army.998 At a seminar held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington D.C., Masoud Barzani argued that after 2003, the Kurds constituted the 
backbone of the Iraqi army “because, at that time, neither the Shiites nor the Sunnis 
were ready and willing to join the Iraqi army.”999 
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However, by 2008, there was a military stand-off between the KRI and 
Baghdad, under PM al-Maliki. The first clash took place in and around the disputed 
city of Khanaqin in the Diyala Province, which is located some 150 kilometers north-
east of Baghdad just outside the southern border of the KRI. The conflict, which was 
triggered by al-Maliki’s decision in 2008 to deploy ISF, apparently to drive al-Qaeda 
out of the area, was seen by the Kurdish leadership as an attempt to force an 
outcome on the KRI, as it ordered Kurdish Peshmerga forces to withdraw from the 
town and its environs within 24 hours.1000 In addition, several other intense near-
confrontations occurred in other parts of the disputed territories, including in the Altun 
Kupri district of Kirkuk in 2009,1001 and in the environs of Mosul in 2009 and 2010.1002 
The intensity and the factors underlying these near-confrontations led many regional 
and international observers to conclude that the disputed territories  resembled a 
‘trigger line’,1003 responsible for precipitating a territorial war in Iraq. 
Although these immediate tensions were defused by American mediation in 
the form of U.S.-sponsored confidence-building measures, that included 
establishment of a joint Security Architecture,1004 it nevertheless sent a clear 
message to the Kurdish leadership. In essence what Stansfield and Anderson name 
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as ‘The Khanaqin Effect’1005 reverberated through Kurdistan and reignited historical 
antipathies and fears, arousing a strong emotional reaction from the Kurds especially 
given the fact that Khanaqin had been subjected to a harsh policy of Arabization and 
genocide during the Baathist state. As Stansfield and Liam Anderson observe, the 
above-mentioned events led the Kurdish leadership to reach several serious 
conclusions: 1. while ISF may be weak now, this may change as the ISF was 
provided with weaponry and training by the United States; 2. neither PM al-Maliki 
nor any other Iraqi leader can fully be trusted; 3. the event repeats a historical pattern 
by which when Baghdad is weak it accepts the Kurds’ demands, and vice versa 
when Baghdad is strong, it tries to reimpose its preeminence, or at worst crush the 
Kurdish people.1006  
Moreover, the Constitution of Iraq clearly and strongly empowered federal 
regions over the central government, in part to prevent the excessive centralization 
that had previously led to oppression and suffering for the people of Iraq. As Michael 
Kelly notes, the Constitution severely constrained the federal authority’s powers in 
autonomous regions.1007 However, two new sources of tension were added to the 
complexity of Iraqi politics, both revolving around PM al-Maliki. A new camp, 
coalesced around PM al-Maliki, was beginning to make demands on recentralizing 
power to the hands of the central government. This situation saw the emergence of 
two camps: one roughly comprised of Kurds and ISCI promoting federalism and 
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decentralization, and another camp led by PM al-Maliki comprising Sadrists, Sunni 
tribal Arabs, independent and secular Arab groups promoting strong centralism. 
While on the surface neither ethnic nor sectarian, as Stansfield and Anderson note, 
this new struggle pitted “centralists against “regionalists” in a defining struggle to 
determine how power is to be structured in Iraq.”1008 
This new alignment was particularly frustrating for the leadership of the KRI. 
As Reidar Visser argues, “Maliki [had] rediscovered an ideological superstructure 
that is making him increasingly immune against criticism at home: using the 
language of centralism, Iraqi nationalism and at times anti-federalism, he has 
become independent enough to challenge even some of his longstanding coalition 
partners such as the Kurds and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).”1009 
Moreover, PM al-Maliki was beginning to accumulate more and more executive and 
patronage powers in his office. As an INSI officer told a Guardian journalist, “Maliki 
is running a dictatorship-everything is run by his office and advisers, he is 
surrounded by his party and clan members. They form a tight knot that is running 
Iraq now. He is not building a country; he is building a state for his own party and his 
own people."1010 Al-Maliki’s decision in 2008 to support the formation of Isnad 
councils directly tied to his office- rather than any official Iraqi institution- in the 
disputed territories further aggravated the tensions between the KRI and Baghdad. 
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Isnad councils were essentially para-military militias composed mainly of some Arab 
Sunnis and Shiites, as well as Turkomans, opposed to the implementation of Article 
140 of the Constitution.1011 Kurdish leaders viewed these formations as an attempt 
by al-Maliki to force an outcome on the KRI in regard of disputed territories and, an 
alarm-bill or a threat to the future existence of the Kurdish de facto state. this became 
clearer when PM al-Maliki emerged as the prime strategist and leader of the 
fragmented Iraqi groups demanding changes to the articles in the Constitution that 
guaranteed extensive powers to the regions over the powers of the central 
government.1012 As the KRI constituted the only constitutionally defined region in Iraq, 
the move was understandably interpreted as targeting the de facto independence of 
the KRI. 
These few examples clearly illustrate the tense political and military 
relationship in 2008 and 2009. Following these tensions, personal relations between 
Masoud Barzani and PM al-Maliki reached their lowest point since 2003, with 
Masoud Barzani telling PM al-Maliki to his face that “You smell like a dictator.”1013 
The fear of a military confrontation prompted the KRI to engage in a military build-up 
of its forces, with reports claiming that it received three planeloads of arms and 
ammunition from Bulgaria,1014 and possibly some from Russia.1015 Baghdad also 
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engaged in a military build-up with reports claiming multi-billion dollars’ worth of arms 
contracts with the United States1016 and Russia.1017  The details of the U.S. arms deals 
with Iraq, which included 18 M-16 fighter jets, greatly worried the Kurdish leadership. 
Masoud Barzani directly lobbied the White House not to sell M-16 fighter jets to Iraq, 
stating that “The F-16 must not reach the hand of this man… We must either prevent 
him [al-Maliki] from having these weapons, or if he has them, he should not stay in 
his position.”1018 
These new tensions, and the perceived indifference of PM al-Maliki’s camp 
towards the constitutional mechanism, eventually prompted the KRI leadership to 
set the constitution as the benchmark of Iraq’s unity, and conversely its violation as 
the point of Kurdish departure or formal secession from Iraq. Without adherence to 
Iraq’s constitution, the KRI gradually began to raise the spectre of unilateral 
secession from Iraq. In a session held at the Brookings Institution, Masoud Barzani 
stated, “So long as Iraq is governed by this Constitution, we will move accordingly 
based on the decision that was taken by the Parliament of Kurdistan in order to 
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remain within the boundaries of Iraq, and also work and cooperate with Baghdad 
and the political forces and the rest of Iraq to build a Federal Democratic Iraq.”1019 
While the above-mentioned issues increased Kurdish fears of confrontation 
and eventually a military showdown with Baghdad’s forces, another development 
further incensed Kurdish leadership on the peculiarity of their situation and the 
eventual loss of de facto independence. Throughout these episodes of 2007-2008, 
the United States had played a stabilizing and mediating role in calming the tensions 
between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds. However, the approaching expiration of the UNSC 
Resolution 1790, which authorized and mandated the activities of the multinational 
forces under U.S. command in Iraq until 31 December 2008, extremely worried the 
Kurdish leadership.1020  
As Baghdad and Washington engaged in intense negotiations to sign up a 
new SOFA and a border strategic framework agreement,1021 the leadership of the 
KRI was anxious over the withdrawal of its U.S. semi-patron from Iraq. The worries 
seemed to have stemmed from the distinctive geopolitical position of the KRI and 
the fear that withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq would allow the often-hostile regional 
states, as well as the Shiite-dominated Arab government in Baghdad, to weaken its 
domestic sovereignty and de facto independence, or even worse at some point move 
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to destroy the Kurdish de facto state. The KRI officials also feared that the Kurds 
would be sold-out in favour of Iraqi and regional stability at a time when several 
sensitive political, economic and territorial disagreements remained outstanding 
between the KRI and its parent state in Baghdad, as well as between the KRI and 
the regional states. To be precise, the KRI leadership wondered if the withdrawal of 
US forces would mean the end of U.S. engagement in Iraq. 
Already in 2007, privy to back-door negotiations between Baghdad and 
Washington, alarm bells rang among KRI officials over their future position in Iraq 
and the region. One article, possibly engineered by Kurdish lobbying, stated, 
“Talabani, the son of Iraq's president, is lobbying Congress and the Bush 
administration not to withdraw U.S. forces. He says that it's a matter of survival for 
Iraq's 5 million ethnic Kurds, most of whom live in the northern provinces that make 
up the semi-autonomous Kurdistan regional government.”1022 Indeed, Qubad 
Talabani himself stated, “In the Middle East, we're seen as being allied with the 
United States… That makes us unpopular in the Arab world, but we're proud of it. 
We hope that alliance, that friendship, will be reciprocated."1023 It is also interesting 
that the Kurds, being aware of their precarious geopolitical position, were envisioning 
the sort of relationship with the United States enjoyed by Taiwan and Israel. Qubad 
Talabani in this regard stated, “Kurds want the sort of 'strategic and institutional 
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relationship' that Israel and Taiwan have with the United States ... We are seeking 
the same protection.”1024 To ensure the future survival of the Kurdish de facto state, 
the Kurdish leadership quietly, and Kurdish supporters in the West more loudly, 
promoted the idea of stationing a segment of US forces in KRI territory. In a speech 
at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2008, Masoud 
Barzani, replying to a question, stated: “if the United States requests for its forces to 
be based in Kurdistan region, I am confident that the Kurdistan regional parliament 
and the people of Kurdistan region and the Kurdistan regional government would 
welcome that.”1025 While Masoud Barzani’s comments were cautiously reflecting the 
myriad threats and limitations of non-recognition experienced by the KRI, Kurdish 
friends in the West were more forward-looking and explicit in their arguments for the 
presence of U.S. forces in the KRI. John Hannah, for instance, published several 
articles in the influential Foreign Policy magazine arguing for the establishment of a 
more institutional relationship between the US and the KRI. In one such article, he 
writes: 
“Properly nourished, Iraqi Kurdistan has all the makings of a U.S. strategic 
asset. Iraq's Arabs… have been profoundly ambivalent about a continued 
role for American troops. But not the Kurds, whose leaders loudly 
proclaimed their desire for a permanent U.S. presence, and whose 
population of some 5 million is overwhelmingly pro-American…Kurdish 
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security and intelligence forces are competent and battle-hardened, and 
after years of cooperation have built up excellent working relations with 
their U.S. counterparts, including in fighting Al Qaeda.”1026  
While, in another article, which again argued in favour of a stronger US-KRI 
relationship, Hannah touches upon the psychological implications of the 1975 
betrayal – see Chapter Three – in explaining the Kurdish desire for a permanent U.S. 
presence in Iraq and the KRI, stating: 
“U.S. policymakers must understand the psychological the Kurds have 
toward America. Today, the Kurds seek to retain a bilateral relationship 
with the United States because of their Kurdish fears of abandonment and 
a lack of trust, not from mutual interests and partnership. These 
sentiments are ingrained in the thinking of the KRG’s leaders, who lived 
through a time when Kurds were a casualty of the Cold War’s great game 
in the Middle East.”1027 
Indeed, revealing the level of anxiety and concern felt by the Kurdish leadership 
over the planned U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, in 2010, the President of the KRI 
personally visited President Obama at the White House to enquire about the state 
of U.S. commitment toward the KRI. According to Qubad Talabani: 
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 “President Barzani came to the U.S. to have one question answered:  Will 
a withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq mean a withdrawal of U.S. 
commitment and engagement with Iraq and Kurdistan?  During our 
meetings, we heard an emphatic “No.” We were continuously told that the 
U.S. will remain engaged and help the political forces in Iraq overcome 
their differences. The administration also expressed interest in seeing the 
Kurdistan Region continue to develop and prosper, while at the same time 
continuing to play a leading role in Iraq’s democratization.”1028 
 
In the end, Iraq, with strong Kurdish participation in Baghdad, and the U.S. 
reached an agreement on the SOFA1029 and a strategic framework agreement 
between Iraq and the U.S.1030 was ratified by the COR in November 2008.1031 The 
agreement envisioned the complete withdrawal of the U.S. combat forces from Iraq 
by the end of 2011. In this way, the leadership of the KRI had at least three years to 
resolve its outstanding issues with Baghdad and design ways to ensure the survival 
of the Kurdish de facto independence of the KRI.  
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7.3 External Economic Relations and the Kurdish de Facto State: 
Putting Hydrocarbon Resources at the Centre 
The question of the future survival of the Kurdish de facto state and the 
planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is intimately intertwined with the KRI’s 
unilateral policies regarding oil/gas reserves in the KRI. The question of oil had for 
long been a bone of contention between the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement 
and successive Iraqi governments in Baghdad, and played a major role in the 
Kurdish leadership’s framing of grievances. In fact, President Barzani himself 
authored a paper in the Wall Street Journal stating: 
“ever since the discovery of oil in Iraq in the 1920s, successive Iraqi 
governments have sought to keep oil out of Kurdish hands, blocking 
exploration and development of fields in Kurdistan. Saddam Hussein's 
government went even further, using Iraqi oil revenues to finance the 
military campaigns that destroyed more than 4,500 Kurdish villages and 
to pay for the poison gas used to kill thousands of Kurdish civilians.”1032 
With this in mind, the Kurdish negotiators managed to insert a clause in the 
2005 Constitution of Iraq which was later interpreted by KRI’s leaders as giving them 
the authority and power to manage Kurdistan’s hydrocarbon resources. Interestingly, 
the question of the management of oil/gas resources was not included in Article 110, 
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which referred to the exclusive powers of the federal government, nor in Article 114 
on shared powers between the federal and regional governments. Oil and gas 
matters were mentioned in separate constitutional articles – 111 and 112. Article 111 
states, “Oil and gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and 
governorates,” while Article 112 (section A), more important from the perspective of 
the KRI’s leaders, states: 
“The federal government, with the producing governorates and regional 
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted 
from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair 
manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the 
country…”1033 
The term present fields constituted the bone of contention between Baghdad 
and Erbil when negotiations were underway to pass an Iraqi oil legislation package 
which included a hydrocarbon law and a revenue-sharing law in 2007. As with the 
centralist/federalist debate, the question of oil/gas management, which during the 
Saddam era was managed by a highly centralized and state-led oil sector, received 
varied interpretations by the different stakeholders in Baghdad and Erbil.1034 
Whether inserted deliberately or not, reference to present fields later empowered the 
KRI’s officials to argue that the KRI has a constitutional right to manage oil/gas fields 
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found or explored after the passing of the Constitution. As Sean Kane, notes, “the 
Kurds were successful in creating a constitutional framework for Iraq where the main 
question was not what control regions should have over oil but rather what role was 
left for the national government.”1035 
Soon after its reunification, the KRI began to assert its preeminence in the 
management of its oil and gas reserves. Since the constitution was notoriously, and 
perhaps intentionally, silent on the question of undeveloped fields or any new fields 
as opposed to present fields, the KRI declared its right to manage untapped oil/gas 
reserves in the KRI. Based on this interpretation, Ashti Hawrami, the KRG Minister 
of Natural Resources, envisaged that ‘the regions and governorates will have all the 
controls,’ in other words, the KRI had an exclusive constitutionally-defined right to 
manage all aspects of oil/gas policy in the KRI.1036 This entailed Kurdistan’s 
unilateral right to control and manage newly found oil/gas reserves including signing 
contracts with international oil companies (IOC).  
Meanwhile, as part of the U.S. surge in Iraq,1037 the Bush Administration had 
set a list of political milestones by which to monitor the political progress in Iraq. One 
of them pertained to the passage of a comprehensive national oil law in Iraq.1038 
Mostly as a favour to the U.S. government, and a Kurdish interest to share the larger 
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pot of Iraqi oil revenues generated from Iraq’s south oilfields, the KRI negotiators 
participated in deliberations over the passage of a national Iraqi oil law.1039 
Soon negotiations stalled, partly due to Kurdistan’s insistence on Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSC) visa-a-vis Service Contracts preferred by the federal 
government.1040 Quite simply, the companies operating under the PSCs become 
stakeholders in the development of oil fields. As Stanley Reed notes, “Under 
Kurdistan’s terms, oil companies can earn $US3 to $US5 a barrel, compare with a 
$US1 a barrel under Baghdad’s contracts.”1041 Interestingly, Kurdistan’s negotiators 
had sought a side political agreement to the effect that if a national hydrocarbon law 
was not passed by the Iraqi COR by May 2007, then each side could pursue its own 
independent contracting arrangements.1042 With no Iraq-wide agreement in sight and 
relying on Kurdistan’s specific interpretation of the constitution, in August 2007, the 
KNA passed a draft oil and gas law for the KRI,1043 later ratified as a hydrocarbon 
law in 2009. Among other stipulations, the regional law empowered the KRI to sign 
oil contracts with IOCs and, in general, enacted the supremacy of the regional law 
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and powers visa-a-vis the laws of the central government of Baghdad. On the basis 
of this law, which adopted the free-market liberal marketing strategy of PSCs, in late 
2007 and early 2008 the KRG signed a plethora of independent oil exploration 
contracts with a wide variety of international companies,1044 despite apparent 
objections from circles of the U.S. administration.1045  
The Baghdad government, however, persistently refused to acknowledge the 
legitimacy and legality of PSCs with IOCs.1046 Al-Shahristani, Iraq’s Oil Minister, who 
had become PM al-Maliki’s voice in opposing the KRI’s contracts with IOCs, adopted 
several aggressive policies that included excluding from bidding rounds any 
company that had previously entered into a contract with the KRI. Al-Shahristani 
later described KRI/IOC deals as “null and void,”1047 while in countering the KRI oil 
deals, Al-Shahristani threatened to resume working under the old Saddam-era 
legislation.1048 He further specified that until a new national oil law was passed, the 
Ministry of Oil and the State Oil Marketing Organization (Somo) were to be the sole 
governmental bodies responsible for the management of all aspects of petroleum 
resources, and as such any KRI contract signed without explicit approval of the 
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federal government would not be considered a contract.1049 Moreover, as the KRI 
did not possess an independent pipeline for trade purposes, and could only rely on 
overland exportation to possibly Iran and Turkey, Al-Shahristani declared any such 
export of oil would be considered “smuggled” by the central government.1050 Minister 
Al-Shahristani fulfilled his promise of blacklisting companies with deals with the KRI 
such as SK Energy of South Korea, OMV of Austria and Reliance Industries of 
India.1051 In Short as, Lydia Khalil argues, “Their [Kurds] insistence on a 
decentralized oil regulation system, which would allow the KRG and any other future 
federal region control over new-found resources, has helped awaken the sleeping 
giant of Iraqi nationalism.”1052 
When faced with challenges to their independent foreign oil contracting, the 
KRI fiercely legitimized its contracts within the framework of the Constitution of Iraq 
and the draft Iraqi hydrocarbon law, and continually highlighted Minister al-
Shahristani’s words as ‘unconstitutional threats’.1053 In one statement, while 
confirming KRI’s right to unilaterally sign PSCs with IOCs, the KRI also rebuked the 
federal government’s reversion to the Saddam-era legislation as unconstitutional, 
stating, “our contracts with the IOCs are both constitutional and legal within the 
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framework of the Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law. Dr. Shahristani keeps saying that Iraqi 
law does not allow this or that. People around the world wonder which law he is 
talking about because they know that since most of Saddam’s laws contradict the 
new Constitution, they are now null and void.”1054  
Besides its fights with the Bagdad government, the KRI paid great attention 
to the issue of gaining legitimacy and legalization for its unilateral contracts with IOCs 
in the eyes of the international community. Therefore, the KRI sought the opinion of 
prominent international legal experts on the constitutionality and legitimacy of its 
PSCs. In one instance, Prof. James Crawford, a renowned authority on international 
law from the University of Cambridge, was commissioned by the KRG to extend a 
legal opinion on the matter. After deliberations, Prof. Crawford confirmed that the 
KRI’s oil and gas law was in conformity with the Constitution of Iraq and Iraq’s 
hydrocarbon law.1055 
Ever since the passage of the hydrocarbon law, there has been intense 
debate over the KRI’s objectives. Distinct from the obvious Kurdish grievances over 
the role of oil in their subjugation since the establishment of Iraq as an independent 
state, there were other tangible factors behind the KRI’s unilateralism with respect 
to the control and management of oil/gas reserves in the KRI. Some observers, if 
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not most, have argued that the KRI’s actions were driven by the desire to obtain 
economic independence in preparation for unilateral secession from Iraq or 
independent statehood.1056 Some have noted that as with most other Middle Eastern 
states, the KRI was on the path to becoming a rentier state;1057 while others have 
observed the KRI’s domestic imperatives, namely sustainment of the large network 
of patronage gathered around the leadership of the KDP and PUK.1058  
While the above statements might hold some elements of truth, a better 
understanding of the KRI’s independent, external, economic relations with IOCs can 
be found in its position of de facto statehood in the international system and its 
foreign policy objectives. The now extensive literature on de facto statehood makes 
it clear that international responses to de facto states range from isolation and non-
engagement, to limited engagement because of security concerns or strategic 
interests of sovereign states.1059 The importance of resources and the strategic 
location of de facto states have already been noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
pushing governments and an array of commercial interests to build relations with 
them. The practice of foreign policy for de facto states is aimed at survival and 
attracting aid, trade, and investment which enables them to engage in foreign 
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economic relations to maintain their internal legitimacy in the eyes of a war-torn 
citizenry, who might have experienced years of destruction, war, and discrimination.  
The KRI’s foreign policy of survival dictated that it demonstrates its domestic 
sovereignty and economic viability as a de facto independent entity. Indeed, the 
control of hydrocarbon resources indicated a progression of arguments deployed by 
the KRI in its legitimation campaign, or in other words in its foreign policy of self-
justification. While initially the KRI highlighted its democratization and successful 
state-building, the control over hydrocarbon resources enabled it to incorporate 
economic viability as an important element in its argument of earned sovereignty. In 
a study of the three de facto states in the Caucasus, Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud 
note that in their interactions with the international community, unrecognized de facto 
states have come to highlight their economic viability and prospects for economic 
survival.1060 This is often based on the belief that recognition might be withheld from 
entities that lack reasonable economic perspectives. A text on an Abkhazian 
governmental website, for instance, reads: 
“Given its natural wealth, important strategic position, and active and 
enterprising population, one can positively assess the perspectives for 
dynamic economic development. The numerous Abkhazian diaspora 
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communities all over the world will undoubtedly also contribute to the 
economic recovery and prosperity of Abkhazia.1061 
 
The KRI in this regard is no different to many other de facto states. The position 
of de facto statehood, and the resulting imperative of foreign policy self-justification, 
had led the KRI to view control over oil/gas resources as a fundamental part in 
highlighting the viability of its economic sovereignty. In other words, as Voller notes, 
the KRI’s efforts at unilaterally exerting its control over hydrocarbon resources “lies 
in the concept of sovereignty — more precisely, contested sovereignty — and the 
resultant pursuit of international legitimacy… Kurdish unilateralism indicates that the 
KRG associates control over oil reserves, even if theoretical, with sovereignty. By 
taking one-sided steps with regard to the control and use of oil reserves in the 
Kurdistan Region and the disputed territories, the KRG has signaled to Baghdad, 
Ankara and the other parties involved that it has control, or domestic sovereignty, 
over its region. More than anything, independent legislation helped the KRG to 
validate its autonomy from Baghdad.”1062  
Moreover, for the KRI, its control over hydrocarbon resources was of utmost 
importance as part of its foreign policy. Without this control, the strategic interests 
and economic diplomacy of states would have dictated that they ignore the KRI in 
favour of Baghdad as the sole guarantor of economic privileges. The KRI leadership 
seemed also to have understood the importance of having powerful friends, both in 
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maintaining its de facto independence and in advancing the eventual goal of 
recognition, if and when it declared de jure statehood. Therefore, control over oil/gas 
resources had been interpreted by the Kurdish leadership as an insurance policy 
against isolation and the guarantor of extensive engagement with the international 
system of sovereign states and powerful actors such as multinational oil companies. 
Thus, this research argues that, in addition to the the entity’s strategy to stress 
earned sovereignty and economic viability, oil and gas have been instrumental in 
achieving the KRI’s foreign policy objectives. After 2007, Kurdish officials 
consistently utilized oil in the conduct of its diplomacy. The hydrocarbon policies and 
deals of the KRI were important in several regards: 1. ensuring the survival of the 
KRI-economically, politically and militarily; 2. obtaining the much-needed foreign 
investment and trade, which is partly related ensuring continued domestic legitimacy 
by the people of the KRI in the form of provision economic goods; 3. demonstrating 
the entity’s ability to engage in foreign relations with other actors as per the fourth 
point of the Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states; and 4. 
increasing foreign recognition of the entity  by sovereign states, even if of a de facto 
kind. In other words, the KRI aimed to use its hydrocarbon resources as a tool or 
instrument of economic statecraft which has been defined by Michael Mastanduno 
as “the use of economic tools and relationships to achieve foreign policy 
objectives.”1063 Moreover, it was not only building economic external relations with 
IOCs, through signing unilateral oil/gas deals, that was important for the KRI. The 
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very fact that the KRI engaged in a variety of foreign interactions to convince IOCs 
to invest in the KRI, over Baghdad’s constant legal objections, demonstrates the 
Kurds’ skillful diplomacy and success in achieving foreign policy goals. 
The use of economic statecraft, i.e. the utilization of economic means to 
guarantee interaction with members of the international community, becomes 
evident in the statements of KRI officials. Falah Mustafa, the head of the DFR, for 
instance, states, “When businesses come and companies come, it means you have 
more and more interaction with the outside world. Sometimes there are international 
companies, which are giant, and the moment those companies come the others 
follow.”1064 Sarbaz Hawrami, a senior adviser to the Prime Minister of the KRG, in a 
similar vein, emphasizing the importance of the presence of oil and gas companies 
in ensuring the survival prospects of the KRI and maintaining its de facto 
independence, states “The most important point is that the interests of the Region 
will be linked with the interests of those companies and their governments.”1065 
An Article published in the Wall Street Journal succinctly sums up the KRI’s 
foreign policy objectives, stating: 
 “Kurdish officials look at the flurry of oil contracts they're signing as a two-
pronged insurance policy. By cutting deals with companies from countries 
as diverse as Australia, Britain, France, India, Russia, South Korea, 
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Turkey and the U.S., the Kurds say they hope to win international political 
support in case things go awry with Baghdad. And in case Iraq were to 
break up, the Kurds would have their own abundant revenue stream. "Has 
this been deliberate? It certainly has," says a beaming Mr. Hawrami, the 
Kurdish natural-resources minister, who has crafted the bulk of the 
contracts awarded so far. "We want a balance. We want friends on all 
sides,” Hawrami had declared.”1066  
The KRG’s use of energy resources as a foreign policy instrument becomes clear 
when considering the progression of developments with regard to the KRG’s oil 
deals. Feeling a sense of foreboding apropos the gradual empowerment of the 
Baghdad government over the KRI, and the lack of an agreement between the two, 
Ashti Hawrami stated, “We do not want to be hobbled by the political paralysis in 
Baghdad.”1067 The KRG’s oil deals started by initiating PSCs with small companies, 
such as DNO, WesternZagros Resources Ltd, Genel Energy and Addax Petroleum 
Inc among others. However, for the KRI to benefit from petroleum resources as a 
foreign policy instrument, the KRI needed to attract bigger, and may be eventually 
super-giant, multinationals not only for their economic resources but also for their 
political clout. Certainly, even before the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s regime and 
the passing of Iraq’s Constitution, the KDP and PUK had signed an abundance of 
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exploration contracts with a number of relatively small foreign companies, including 
the Turkish Pet Oil and Genel Energy, to operate in PUK-controlled territory.1068 But 
now, with the Constitution of Iraq and the KRG’s oil/gas law in place, and feeling a 
sense of looming danger because of the planned U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the 
resultant fear of losing, or at worst the destruction of, the KRI, the KRI sought to build 
an energy industry in the shortest time possible. Thus, it sought to attract bigger 
companies.  
This is a view supported by oil experts with experience in the KRI. One 
anonymous expert stated, “Ashti Hawrami does not want small companies in the 
Kurdish region right now. He wants more experienced companies. He wants to 
create facts on the ground.”1069 And Indeed, Qader Aziz, Masoud Barzani’s envoy in 
the Article 140 Committee – the committee working on the implementation of Article 
140 of the Constitution – commented, referring to Kurdish leaders, “they believe that 
if big companies come to Kurdistan, they will protect the region, because they are 
supported by big countries.”1070 Moreover, a report published following a roundtable 
discussion at the American University of Sulaimani in the KRI reached similar 
conclusions. Among its findings was that “Mr. Hawrami is not only in the business of 
building an [oil] industry, but in nation building too,”1071 and that “The KRG’s strategy 
is to attract Big Oil and tie its security and autonomy to the interest of major 
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international oil importers;”1072 and “The KRG feels under pressure to achieve these 
goals in a short time, since the window of opportunity is closing on it [since] Baghdad 
is getting stronger and therefore abler to undercut KRG’s energy goals.”1073 And 
indeed, the KRI’s officials hoped that giant IOCs would gradually transform into the 
Iraqi Kurds’ best advocates in their respective capitals to support policies favourable 
to the KRI.1074 
KRI officials initially confirmed their commitment to share oil revenues with 
the rest of Iraq in a fair and equitable manner. In an article published by Nechirvan 
Barzani, he states, “Federalism means that we have the liberty to develop our 
resources under the umbrella, but not the central control, of Iraq. It means that as 
17% of the population we will receive 17% of the wealth, and that we will accordingly 
share 83% of our wealth with the rest of the population.”1075 There is no wonder the 
KRI sought to reach an agreement on revenue sharing more than the hydrocarbon 
law. As Sean Kane notes, “Like the rest of Iraq, the KRG has limited nonoil revenues 
and large social-safety-net, civil service, and security-force-wage bills it must 
pay.”1076 To cover these expenses, the KRG was almost entirely dependent on the 
annual transfer of its working budget from Baghdad’s coffers which increased from 
about $2.5 billion in 2005 to $13 billion in 2014,1077 and which was itself primarily 
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financed by oil production in southern Iraq (mainly Basra) and Kirkuk (still officially 
outside KRI’s jurisdiction). 
However, before long, the KRI realized the unpredictability of reliance on 
Baghdad. Virtually, at every debate on budget allocation in Baghdad since 2004, 
there were concerted efforts by many Arab Sunni and Shiite MPs, with obvious 
backing from their political masters, to scale down the KRI’s 17 per cent share of the 
budget to a smaller figure, usually to around 10 to 13 per cent. However, even with 
the smaller figure, there were delays in transfer of the KRI’s budget. This situation 
was succinctly summed up by Nechirvan Barzani when he stated: 
“We still depend on a system of budget allocation, rather than a 
constitutionally required revenue sharing mechanism. In the past few 
years, the people of Kurdistan have suffered considerably from repeated 
delays in budget distribution. We have no doubt that these delays are 
caused by political calculations rather than technical or administrative 
problems.”1078  
Increasing its sense of alarm at achieving economic independence was the 
fact that the KRI knew well in advance that the central government would one day 
blacklist the KRI. An anonymous KRG official stated to Natali that, “We know that 
the Baghdad government will stop funding us one day so we are making 
preparations with oil companies to establish an independent economy.”1079 Indeed, 
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on several occasions since early 2006, Baghdad used this economic weapon in the 
process disrupting the KRI’s governing functions and programmes. It is, as Gareth 
Stansfield notes, “the fear of being economically dependent on Baghdad that moved 
the Kurds to plan for an independent oil and gas sector as early as 2004… The more 
Baghdad squeeze[d], the more the Kurds move[d] towards economic 
independence.”1080 As a consequence of this, in 2009, six months after the KRI 
passed its Hydrocarbon Bill, during a visit to the European Parliament, Masoud 
Barzani stressed that the KRI would keep oil revenues for itself since “they 
[Baghdad] often use that [oil revenue] as a weapon against us [the Kurds].”1081 
In 2011, the KRI scored a major victory by signing PSCs for six exploration 
blocks with the global multinational giant ExxonMobil.1082 The signing of exploration 
deals with ExxonMobil was a watershed in the transformation of the KRI into an 
independent foreign policy actor. ExxonMobil provided legitimacy to the KRI’s 
previous contracts with smaller oil companies and it paved the way for the signing of 
exploration deals with several of the world’s major companies such as U.S. Chevron, 
French Total and Russian Gazprom.1083 As well as its economic rationale in 
solidifying the Kurdish oil industry, the intent of Kurdish lobbying for access to these 
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companies was directly related to the KRI’s foreign policy of survival, as well as 
possessing political and psychological importance for the Kurds. Masoud Barzani 
stated that, “his deal with Exxon Mobil was a security guarantee, and was equal to 
ten American military divisions in terms of the protection the big oil company provides 
the Kurds against Baghdad.”1084 This thesis stops at the year 2011. However, it 
seems that the utilization of oil/gas in the foreign policies of the KRI can partly explain 
the U.S. decision in 2014 to defend Erbil and the KRI against the fierce onslaught of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1085 
Yet, to all intent and purposes, the KRI could not pursue its independent 
external economic relations and become an actor in the ‘global energy market’1086 
and ensure the economic viability of its landlocked territory,1087 without first making 
essential rapprochements with its neighbouring states, particularly Turkey. The KRI 
is essentially a landlocked territory and surrounded by states with more sizeable 
Kurdish populations. However, despite geopolitical constraints and historical 
animosities, the leadership of the KRI did not relent and constantly sought to open 
pathways for oil exportation by building relations with neighbouring states. Although 
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the politics of hydrocarbon resources constituted an important instrument in the 
hands of Kurdish foreign policy-makers, there were serious obstacles and entangled 
processes at play which complicated Kurdish relations with its neighbour, Turkey. 
Therefore, the next section of this chapter looks at the evolution of the foreign 
policies of the Kurdish de facto state toward Turkey, especially after 2003. 
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7.4 Turkey and the Kurdish De Facto State: A Foreign Policy Success 
During much of the 1990s, Turkey and the KRI enjoyed cordial, if not always 
problem-free, relations. Soon the new realities created by the U.S. intervention in 
Iraq angered Turkish politicians and to quote Bengio, transformed the dynamics of 
relations gradually from ‘trilateral engagement to estrangement.’1088 Effectively 
barred from having a chair at the post-Saddam political reconstruction of the Iraqi 
state, Turkey issued several ‘redlines’ that should not to be crossed by Kurdish 
political parties in Iraq. Chief among these redlines were establishment of ethnic 
federalism; and attachment of Kirkuk with its substantial oil wealth and Mosul 
(essentially most of the areas claimed by the KRI) into any Kurdish federal entity in 
Iraq. Ankara also treated the rights of the Turkoman community in Iraq, particularly 
in Kirkuk, as one of its main political objectives. In addition, Turkey requested 
freedom of action to intervene militarily in northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK fighters; it 
further demanded action from U.S. military forces and Kurdish political parties in 
combating the PKK.1089 However, the principal redline, that merited Turkey’s 
unilateral military intervention in Iraq, focused on prevention of the establishment of 
a Kurdish state or even a Kurdish ethnic federal unit within Iraq, as Turkey feared 
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such autonomy would embolden its own restive and sizeable Kurdish population 
which would endanger Turkey’s territorial integrity.1090 
However, in contrast to the 1990s, immediately after 2003, the dynamics of 
relations had changed in favour of the KRI and the Kurds did not feel compelled to 
respond unconditionally to the demands of Turkey. The Kurds of Iraq, in contrast to 
Turkey, wholeheartedly supported the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, thus dislodging 
Turkey from its long-established position of being the only Muslim ally of the United 
States in the region. The presence of the world’s superpower in Iraq and its alliance 
with the Kurds quite simply emboldened the Kurdish leadership to pursue 
independent foreign policies with regard to Turkey. While the United States still 
valued its alliance with Turkey, the Turks, as Henri Barkey notes, were convinced 
that the United States “prefers its newfound Kurdish allies to its old NATO ally,”1091 
a view that was boldly disseminated to the Turkish public through Turkish politicians, 
pundits and generals. 
By late 2003, the Turkish approach to the situation in the KRI had become 
stringent and mistrustful. With no access to the KRI, Turkey argued that as the 
occupying power in Iraq, it was the responsibility of the United States to eliminate 
the PKK in the region.1092 However, the Pentagon, which by late 2003 was already 
engaged in the intense counter-insurgency raging in the south of the KRI, was 
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reluctant to open another front to tackle the PKK in the north and thus ignored 
Turkey’s demands. Moreover, as Matthew Byrza, a former White House staffer 
notes, U.S. officials also worried that tackling the PKK could reignite the intra-Kurdish 
armed conflict of the 1990s, or even worse, a Kurdish-Sunni-Shiite infighting that 
would have wide repercussions on the already fragile state of security and stability 
in Iraq. However, Ankara felt that a deliberate and conscious policy was underway 
to undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey.1093 For Turkey, such ignorance of PKK 
terrorism also contradicted President George W. Bush’s premise of “Those who 
provide safe haven to terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists.”1094 More frustrating 
for the Turks was the fact that the PKK had been considered a terrorist organization 
by the U.S. State Department since 1997.1095 President George W. Bush had also 
shared Turkey’s concerns on several occasions by declaring, “We will work together 
[with Turkey] to deal with the PKK. We are after terrorists. Once we declare a group 
a terrorist group we mean it.”1096 At worst, the U.S. inaction in Iraq reignited Turkey’s 
gravest nightmare, which has been described by Asa Lundgren as ‘Sevres 
Syndrome’.1097 According to this view, the United States had a hidden agenda to 
create a Kurdish state in Iraq, instigate Kurdish separatism in Turkey and finalize the 
dismantlement of Turkey following the first phase of dismemberment by Allied 
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powers after the First World War. Turkish suspicions were reinforced by voices that 
began to be heard within the political establishment in Washington, calling for 
reorganization of Iraq into three or more autonomous regions,1098 or indeed its 
fragmentation into separate independent states.1099 
Turkish fears and disappointments over the U.S.’s lack of respect with regard 
to Turkish redlines and its encouragement of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq eventually 
resulted in Turkey taking unilateral actions in Northern Iraq. Amid deteriorating 
trilateral relations between Turkey, the United States and the KRI, a team of 11 
Turkish special forces was arrested by U.S. forces in the Kurdish city of Sulaimani 
on 4 July 2003. The arrest, apparently based on intelligence reports that Turkish 
commandos, who were housed at the headquarters of the pro-Turkish ITF, were 
plotting to assassinate the newly installed Kurdish governor of Kirkuk further fueled 
the already intense dynamics in the trilateral relationship.1100 While the immediate 
crisis was averted, it nonetheless, in the words of General Hilmi Ozkok, Turkish army 
Chief of Staff, “led to the biggest crisis of confidence ever between Turkish and US 
forces,”1101 while PM Erdogan stated, “For an allied country to behave in such a way 
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toward its ally cannot be explained… This incident is not acceptable.”1102 Some 
Turkish circles, however, blamed the incident on neoconservatives in the Pentagon 
who wished to punish Turkey for its non-cooperation during the 2003 war which 
crystalized “the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule in northern Iraq.”1103 But more 
open-minded Turkish observers noted that "With the rest of Iraq in chaos, Iraqi Kurds 
are Washington's only reliable allies,”1104 and therefore Washington could not afford 
to alienate its local Kurdish allies. Meanwhile, U.S. forces announced that coalition 
forces were the only force responsible in the area and any concern by Turkey should 
be raised with U.S. forces, while a State Department spokesperson reaffirmed that 
the U.S. “had substantial intelligence” that Turkey was involved in “activity involving 
local leadership.”1105 
Effectively barred from interference in Iraq’s affairs by the United States, 
Turkey tried to defend its national interests from the sidelines. For this purpose, 
Turkey hosted or participated in several regional initiatives to pursue its interests. 
Indeed, before the U.S. intervention in Iraq, Turkey had hosted a major summit in 
Istanbul, which was followed after the war by meetings in other regional capitals. It 
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is noticeable that the states involved had diametrically opposed views on several 
matters including, for instance, the U.S. presence in Iraq, Iraqi interim government, 
border security, etc. For Turkey, however, the most important issue involved the 
Kurdish nationalist ambitions, namely, preventing PKK’s cross-border infiltration into 
Turkey and maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq by preventing establishment of 
a Kurdish state in Iraq.  
As Turkey was still boycotting the KRI, the meetings became an important 
venue through which the Kurds of Iraq could communicate their messages and 
policies to the regional states through the ever-capable hand of their Kurdish Iraqi 
foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari. In a meeting held in Amman on 6 January 2005, 
Zebari affirmed that “the idea of federation meant geopolitical division not ethnic 
division”1106 and as a result the conference accepted the ‘federation idea’ in the 
context of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq.1107 However, 
these proclamations failed to ease Turkey’s concerns. 
To make matters worse for Ankara, the KRI, in contrast to the 1990s, stopped 
aiding Turkey in its fight against the PKK once it was relieved from the threat of 
Saddam and no longer in need of the protection provided through Turkish territory 
and airspace.1108 In addition to that, the Kurdish political parties declared the PMF 
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persona non grata and successfully asked for its closure in October 2004, making 
Turkey lose yet another layer of influence inside Iraqi Kurdistan.1109 The Kurdish 
foreign policy of non-cooperation with Turkey had its roots in several domestic 
determinants. For one, having emerged as liberators of Kirkuk and defenders of 
Kurdistan,1110 the KRI, particularly Masoud Barzani, could not be seen cooperating 
with Turkey – particularly given Ankara’s intransigence in regard to the Kurd’s 
demand to incorporate disputed areas and establish a Kurdish federalist state in 
Iraq. Second, as Bengio notes, soon after the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, Iraqi 
Kurdish leadership began to ‘don the mantle of Pan-Kurdism’.1111 This notion made 
it more difficult for the KRI to fight the PKK and return to the ‘Kurd-on-Kurd’1112 
violence which characterized much of the earlier period. Moreover, Kurds across the 
Middle East, rightly or wrongly, felt that the U.S. intervention in Iraq would serve as 
a precursor for a pan-Kurdish state spanning the established states of Syria, Iran, 
Turkey and Iraq. Thirdly, the KDP and PUK were reluctant to turn their forces on the 
battle-hardened PKK, which the much more sophisticated Turkish army had failed 
to dislodge, contain or eradicate since the early 1980s. Moreover, and even worse 
from Turkey’s perspective, the KRI refused to label the PKK a terrorist organization 
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particularly given popular sympathy for the PKK’s struggle in Turkey and the PKK 
refraining from directly challenging the KRI’s authority after 2003.1113 
With the U.S. army in Iraq and the KRI unable or unwilling to combat the PKK 
in northern Iraq, or had done so half-heartedly, the rhetoric of Turkey changed from 
that of asking the United States and the KRI to do the job to one of threatening 
unilateral Turkish military incursion inside the KRI to eradicate the PKK. Turkey’s 
army declared that, if the U.S. does “nothing to prevent the continuing presence of 
the PKK terrorist organization in northern Iraq… we could … go into the region 
ourselves.”1114 Failing to receive permission for military incursion inside the KRI from 
the United States, Turkey thereby resorted to periodic and sporadic air 
bombardments targeting PKK bases in northern Iraq.1115 The animosity became all 
the more challenging since in June 2004 the PKK ended its cease-fire with Turkey, 
apparently because of Turkey’s failure to implement wide-ranging conciliatory moves 
toward the Kurdish issue in Turkey, and began to increase its cross-border military 
operations inside Turkey.1116 
However, this thesis argues that the most important issue standing in the way 
of Iraqi Kurdish cooperation with Turkey was Turkey’s non-recognition of the KRI as 
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a single political entity. As a sign of its non-recognition of the KRI, Turkey avoided 
direct contact with the KRI’s officials even if they were part of Iraqi delegations, and 
bypassing the KRI, established direct contact with Baghdad.1117 In 2008, PM al-
Maliki of Iraq and PM Erdogan signed an agreement establishing a ministerial-level 
council to strengthen security, political and economic relations between Iraq and 
Turkey.1118 The ministerial council between the two countries was soon elevated to 
a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council1119 that among other things aimed to 
combat the PKK’s presence in Iraq. Showing Iraq’s commitment to fighting the PKK, 
and perhaps even trying to demonstrate to Turkey, Iraq’s sovereignty and effective 
control over the KRI, PM al-Maliki stated, “Iraq does not allow party members [PKK] 
to operate from its territory, and will not allow it in the future.”1120 
As stated above, Turkey’s non-recognition of the KRI was an obstacle to 
Turkey-KRI relations, and prevented the KRI from cooperating with the Turkish 
government. Indeed, gaining recognition – either de jure or de facto – is a major 
foreign policy aim of de facto states. While it was the case that during the 1990s 
Turkey built relations with Kurdish political parties, after 2003, the KRI wanted 
Turkish recognition of a unitary Kurdish de facto state. However, Turkey was 
unwilling to provide such a recognition – rather than to any political party per se. This 
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point was clearly evident when Masoud Barzani stated, “You [Turkey] do not talk to 
me in an official capacity. You do not accept me as a partner for talks. You do not 
maintain a dialogue with me. Then suddenly you want me to take action for you 
against the PKK? Is this a way to do things?”1121 
Moreover, while Masoud Barzani was cognizant of Turkey’s strength and its 
overall geopolitical and strategic importance for the United States, the West and 
indeed for the KRI, he embarked on a conscious foreign policy strategy that, at its 
heart, aimed to gain Turkey’s de facto recognition of the Kurdish de facto state in 
Iraq. One could even argue that Masoud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani had agreed 
on a delicate and purposeful division of labour between themselves. Being the son 
of the Kurdish charismatic leader Mustafa Barzani and President of the KRI, Masoud 
Barzani holds the mantle of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and is bestowed with a 
certain responsibility toward other Kurds across the borders in Syria, Turkey and 
Iran. As a Kurdish nationalist leader, the spread of the “Kurdish proto-nation”1122 
across Turkey, Iran and Syria, and the power of trans-state Kurdish identity, 
constituted significant internal and external determinants on Masoud Barzani’s 
foreign policy-making as a leader. However, Nechirvan Barzani, being responsible 
for the functional day-to-day running of the government, had freedom to articulate 
the KRI’s national interests, which needed to adopt a more conciliatory tone toward 
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Turkey. The same duality can be discerned from the actions and statements of Jalal 
Talabani and Masoud Barzani. As David Romano notes, being the leader of the KRI, 
Masoud Barzani was more constrained by domestic determinants, i.e. the rising tide 
of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, in expressing his foreign policy toward Turkey. While, 
Jalal Talabani, at that stage, was less constrained due to his ceremonial role as the 
President of Iraq.1123 
This double-track foreign policy indeed became apparent during the height of 
Turkish-Kurdish tensions in 2007-2008. Although, since at least 2005, there were 
secret meetings between Masoud Barzani and high-level officials from the Turkish 
National Intelligence Organization (MIT)1124 to mend bilateral ties, tensions grew in 
2007. Indeed, the year 2007 was a game-changer in the triangle of relations between 
Turkey, the United States and the KRI. From the peak of tensions, relations then 
transformed into an atmosphere of tranquility as the interests of both sides 
converged on many levels. 
The issue of Turkey’s de facto recognition of the KRI intermingled with two 
other principal tensions – the Kirkuk Issue and PKK. The approaching deadline for 
the complete implementation of Constitutional Article 140, which envisaged 
normalization, census and a referendum in the disputed territories to take place 
before 31 December 2007, raised tensions between Turkey and the KRI. The Kurds 
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had hoped, as Peter Bartu argues, to resolve the issue of disputed territories before 
the departure of President George W. Bush from the White House, to ensure U.S. 
protection for the foreseeable internal and external challenges. As the KRI time and 
again affirmed its commitment to Iraq’s integrity, it sought to present the issue of 
disputed areas as one of administration, i.e. consideration of who would administer 
these areas in a federal Iraq.1125 However, this was not to be, as the disputed 
territories remained a “Powder Keg”.1126 In Turkey, PM Erdogan stated that if Kirkuk 
is integrated into the KRI, “[He] fear[s] that it could come to a very big civil war,” and 
that, “Kirkuk belongs to all Iraqis,” and “It would be wrong to give the city to only one 
ethnic group.”1127 Amid the rising pressures, Masoud Barzani warned that Turkey 
was pursuing an “aggressive policy” and “Ankara’s stance is not important to us,”1128 
therefore “if Article 140 is not implemented, then there will be a real civil war.”1129 
Moreover, in response to Turkish threats concerning Kirkuk, apparently in defense 
of the Turkoman community, Masoud Barzani responded with a counter-threat, 
stating in an interview with the Dubai-based Al-Arabiya channel, “Turkey is not 
allowed to intervene in the Kirkuk issue and if it does, we will interfere in Diyarbakir's 
issues and other cities in Turkey… There are 30 million Kurds in Turkey and we don't 
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interfere there. If they (the Turks) interfere in Kirkuk over just thousands of 
Turkomans, then we will take action for the 30 million Kurds in Turkey.”1130 Masoud 
Barzani’s comments elicited an angry response from PM Erdogan stating, “He's 
[Masoud Barzani] out of place… He'll be crushed under his words,”1131 and “Northern 
Iraq, which is a neighbor, is making a serious mistake: The price for them will be very 
high.”1132 
Further complicating relations between the two neighbours, starting from late 
2007, the PKK started to launch sporadic attacks against Turkish security forces 
along the Turkey-Iraq border, apparently in the hope of drawing Turkish forces into 
the KRI.1133 Whatever the PKK’s intentions in spiking further incursions inside 
Turkey, this time Turkish foreign policy-makers thought that the real motivation for 
the attacks was linked to the issues of northern Iraq. In an article, Ahmet Davutoglu, 
Ambassador and Chief Advisor to Turkish PM Erdogan, and later his Foreign 
Minister from 2009 onwards,  stated that the real reason for the spike in PKK violence 
in 2006-2007 was “Kirkuk’s rise to the agenda”.1134 Despite Davutoglu’s 
proclamations, the Kemalist-nationalist establishment continued to believe that 
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enjoying U.S. support, the President of the KRI continued to use the PKK as a 
‘bargaining chip’ against Turkey and that “Masoud Barzani, harbour pan-Kurdish 
ambitions within which the PKK plays an important part.”1135 In any case, the 
spectacular attacks launched by PKK guerillas against Turkish security forces and 
the failure of the trilateral commission, which included Turkey, Baghdad and the 
United States, to achieve any tangible progress on the issue of the PKK caused a 
backlash, mounting internal pressure on the AKP government to conduct unilateral 
military cross-border operations inside the KRI to target PKK bases. Thus, on 17 
October 2007, the AKP government sought and received parliamentary 
authorization for military operations in northern Iraq.1136  
The parliamentary authorization, however, sparked a new round of rhetorical 
tensions between Turkey and the KRI. Still the AKP government in Turkey refused 
to recognize or deal directly with the KRI authorities. In one instance, PM Erdogan 
described Masoud Barzani as a “tribal leader”, and stated that his counterparts in 
Iraq were Iraq’s President and Prime Minister.1137 Moreover, in a press conference 
in Istanbul, Yasar Buyukanit, Turkey’s Chief of General Staff, issued a dark threat 
against the KRI, particularly Masoud Barzani, by asking, “Are we going to fight only 
the PKK once we enter northern Iraq or will something happen with Barzani?”1138 
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Responding to these threats, Masoud Barzani constantly reiterated his position that 
the PKK was not a terrorist organization and the PKK issue was part of a wider 
Kurdish problem in Turkey that could only solved by political means. Indeed, in 
several interviews, Masoud Barzani stated: “the PKK is not a terrorist organization… 
but if in order to solve the [Kurdish] problem Turkey proposed a peaceful path and 
the PKK rejected this, then I would agree that the PKK is a terrorist organization. At 
the moment, however, this is not the case.”1139 When faced with Turkish threats 
toward the KRI, Masoud Barzani responded by arguing “The problem of Turkey is 
neither Kirkuk nor the PKK, but Turkey has a problem with the existence of the 
Kurds.”1140 
The deepening rift between Turkey and the KRI, however, had significant 
ramifications for the U.S. policy in Iraq. As Bill Park argues, as “a treaty ally of Turkey, 
friend of the KRG, and as a partner and non-treaty ally with Iraq”,1141 the United 
States increasingly had to play a balancing and moderating role in the triangle of 
constantly strained relations between these three actors. However, Turkish 
sensitivities had deteriorated to a potentially dangerous level, particularly given 
Turkey’s suspicions that the United States was working to create a pan-Kurdish 
state, and in the process, dismember Turkey. To ease these sensitivities, President 
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George W. Bush received PM Erdogan at the White House  on 5 November 2007. 
In the meeting, President Bush stated that the United States considered the PKK “an 
enemy of Turkey and therefore an enemy of the United States.”1142 The meeting also 
reversed the previous U.S. policy of non-cooperation with Turkey in regard to 
combating the PKK, as the U.S. pledged and provided “actionable intelligence”1143 
on the PKK’s locations in northern Iraq. The rapprochement between the two also 
allowed Turkish military forces, for the first time since at least 1997, to cross into 
northern Iraq from 21 to 29 February 2008 to target bases belonging to the PKK.1144  
While the KRI quietly acquiesced with the 2008 Turkish incursion into the KRI, 
perhaps due to pressure from the United States,1145 other internal and external 
determinants, both in the KRI and in Turkey, eventually culminated into what some 
have labelled as a “catholic marriage” between Turkey and the KRI.1146 
Internally, in the KRI, demonstrating the influence of human agency in 
overcoming structural constraints on foreign policy, PM Nechirvan Barzani worked 
assiduously to build relations and gain Turkey’s de facto recognition of the KRI. 
Nechirvan Barzani very well realized the importance of Turkey to the survival 
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prospects of the KRI, especially given the fact that the KRI is a landlocked territory 
requiring Turkish cooperation to export oil and gas from the region to international 
markets. Thus, Nechirvan Barzani could be considered as the engineer of the 
relationship between the KRI and Turkey during the post-2003 era. An article 
published in the World Time Magazine succinctly makes this point when the writer 
notes, “If there is one man who deserves the credit for the growing Turkish-Kurd 
rapprochement, it’s Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan.”1147 
Throughout the height of tensions between Turkey and the KRI, Nechirvan Barzani 
sent positive signals making clear his intention to build strong relations with Turkey. 
While there is no doubt that there were many secret meetings between PM Barzani 
and Turkish officials, as circumstances required he constantly stepped in publicly to 
ease tensions with Turkey. For instance, when Masoud Barzani threatened 
interference in Turkish Kurdish affairs, Nechirvan Barzani immediately tried to soothe 
Turkish anger by declaring: “Turkey is an important country for us, and we extend 
our hand of friendship to them and hope they will take it.”1148  
In Turkey, some leading figures in the Turkish foreign policy-making circle 
also became frustrated with the traditional isolationist Turkish policy toward the KRI. 
They recognized that shunning the KRI was counterproductive and that, as Gareth 
Stansfield notes, “the Kurds were no longer isolated politically and geographically in 
the mountains of the north, but were now in Baghdad, with a very significant role to 
                                            
1147 Newton-Small, Op. Cit. 
1148 Muhammed A. Salih, “PM Barzani extends hand of friendship to Turkey,” The Globe, 18 April 
2007, accessed: 10 September 2016, http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc041807MS.html.  
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play in the government of Iraq.”1149 They also recognized that, as a friend of the 
United States, the KRI had Washington’s blessing, and that as fellow Kurds, the KRI 
could bear more influence than Baghdad on the Kurds in Turkey, and hence could 
help Turkey overcome its PKK problem. This circle of Turkish politicians, whom Bill 
Park calls the “forward group”, included many individuals. One of them was Murat 
Ozcelik, who served as Turkey’s Special Envoy in Iraq until his appointment as 
Ambassador to Baghdad in 2009.1150 Perhaps more influential was the diplomacy of 
Emre Taner, the head of the MIT, who had secretly engaged with Iraqi Kurdish 
leadership since 2005. General Ilker Basbug, who replaced Yasar Buyukanit as the 
Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish army from August 2008, also seemed to 
favour rapprochement with the KRI.1151 However, Ahmet Davutoglu was the real 
mastermind behind the Turkish opening towards the KRI, therefore, the Kurds have 
labelled this Turkish policy as “Mr. Davutoglu Policy.”1152 
Apart from government officials, certain highly regarded individuals within the 
Turkish media, civil society and business associations also pushed for KRI-Turkey 
relations. For instance, Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish media personality, 
wrote several articles arguing that Turkey should directly recognize the KRI 
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authorities in pursuit of its national interests. In one article, he wrote: “Masoud 
Barzani eats at the White House with President Bush. Then he goes to the European 
Parliament and has lunch with the representatives. He even tours Europe and makes 
friends with leaders. What does he find when goes back home? Turkey calls him a 
tribal chieftain. He is refused admittance. He's treated as a nobody. This is the 
attitude that upsets Masoud Barzani most and goads him into protecting the PKK… 
In international relations, it's your own country's interests that are in the foreground, 
and not your emotions. Yesterday, we carried Barzani on our shoulders. Today, we 
can't criticize him enough. Tomorrow, you may see him become “our best friend” 
again.”1153 Moreover, an understanding began to crystalize within a wide circle of 
Turkish politicians to the effect that the Turkoman community, whom Turkey 
supported against the Kurds at different intervals, was not waiting to be saved by 
Ankara as 50 percent or more of the Iraqi Turkoman are Shiite. Indeed, during the 
2005 Iraqi elections, the Shiite Turkoman population in Iraq showed their allegiance 
to their sectarian identity by voting for Iraqi Shiite parties.1154 The ITF, the only 
Turkey-aligned Turcoman party, on the other hand, performed relatively poorly in the 
January 2005 Iraqi elections compared with the Kurdish-aligned Turkoman 
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groupings.1155 Additionally, understanding began to grow in Turkey to the effect that 
the army could not easily intervene in Kirkuk, as at least from an operational point of 
view, Kirkuk is 452 kilometers from the Turkish border.1156 
Concomitantly, there were significant domestic policy changes in Turkey that, 
without much input from the KRI, helped to alter Turkish foreign policy-making 
toward the KRI. For example, under the AKP government, Turkey adopted ‘New-
Ottomanism’ as its grand governing vision which eventually combined with Kemalism 
to set in motion what Taspinar labels as ‘Turkish Gaullism’.1157  The foreign policy 
dimension of this new vision was articulated under the influence of AKP’s Foreign 
Policy Strategist and later its Foreign Minister from 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu. He built 
on the belief that Turkey enjoyed a great “strategic depth” in its environs and thus it 
should aim to rebuild historical ties dating back to Ottoman times as well as 
diplomatic, political and economic relations with its neighbouring regions (Middle 
East, North Africa, the Balkans, and Eurasia),1158 particularly through employment 
of soft power.1159 Accompanying this vision was a pro-active AKP foreign policy 
labelled “zero-problem-with-neighbors” which was aimed at “maximizing cooperation 
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with its neighbors while minimizing problems in its surrounding regions.”1160 
Meanwhile, in the competing determinants of Turkish foreign policy-Kemalism and 
Islamism-gradually after 2002 the Islamist narrative began to hold sway on Turkish 
foreign policy at the expense of the other,1161 which in itself slowly transformed 
toward a “Sunnification of Turkish foreign policy.”1162 By 2007, it seems that the AKP 
government won the battle against what is called “deep state”1163 and significantly 
altered civil-military relations in the Turkish state in favour of the elected AKP 
government. Part of the endeavour to curtail the Turkish military’s power and 
influence on Turkish society involved resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey, because, 
as Henri Barkey argues “the [Kurdish] insurgency has enabled the military to 
maintain a very visible and critical role in society.1164 
More importantly, regional realignments or external determinates of foreign 
policy were paramount in altering Turkey-KRI foreign relations. The planned U.S. 
military withdrawal from Iraq had a significant effect on the deliberations of both 
sides. As a Chatham House report notes, during Saddam’s reign, Iraq’s military 
power and foreign policy projection in the Gulf area and the wider Arab world was a 
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major issue of concern for many regional and international powers.1165 However, a 
weakened and bloodied Iraq, whose government had become only one of several 
‘state-like actors’1166 among an array of  powerful non-state actors jockeying for 
power and influence, and the increasing Iranian influence in Baghdad, had now 
replaced the old fear from Iraq. 
Indeed, the increasing Iranian influence in Baghdad was a significant foreign 
policy determinant for both Turkey and the KRI. No doubt the U.S. decision to 
remove the regime of Saddam enhanced Iran’s regional security environment, by 
turning the government in Baghdad from a strategic foe to a strategic partner of Iran.  
Iraq’s Shiite population and Iran’s Shiite government share strong religious ties and 
economic interdependence had been growing, especially since international and 
U.S. economic sanctions forced Iran to replace its traditional trade partners in the 
region – Turkey and the UAE – with Iraq. Moreover, both Iran and PM al-Maliki’s 
government shared fear of a strong Sunni faction in Iraq connected with Sunni 
regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. For the first time, possibly since 
its establishment as an independent state, Iraq had become a friendly strategic 
power for Iran, as exemplified by high-level visits between the two countries including 
a March 2008 visit to Baghdad by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the first 
of its kind since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. The heightened state-level 
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collaboration eventually culminated in the signing of 100 cooperation agreements 
between Iraq and Iran by January 2010.1167 However, from the Iranian perspective, 
the presence of the U.S. and the empowerment of ethnic-religious groups in Iraq 
presented unprecedented security challenges, particularly given the unique ethnic 
geopolitics of Iran.1168  
Iran had long enjoyed cordial relations with the leadership of the KDP and 
PUK. Notwithstanding historical relations between Iran and Iraqi Kurds, soon after 
2003, Iran recognized Kurdistan’s autonomy in Iraq. The Iranian Ambassador in 
Baghdad attended the inauguration of the new KNA in May 2006 alongside U.S., 
British, French and Chinese ambassadors, contrary to Turkey which declined to 
send its ambassador.1169 Iran became the first state to establish two consulates in 
the Kurdistan region – one in Erbil and the other in Sulaimani,1170 the PUK stronghold. 
Iran also had no qualms in receiving high-level Kurdish officials and negotiating 
directly with them in pursuit of Iranian national interests. Moreover, Iran was also 
aware that a half-dozen Iranian Kurdish resistance groups were based in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. Contrary to Turkey’s request that the KRI must act to eliminate the PKK, 
Iran sought the KRI’s cooperation in containing (but not eliminating) these groups 
and stopping them from staging attacks against Iranian security forces along the 
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Iran-Iraq (Kurdish de facto state) border. With Iran and Turkish rapprochement after 
2003, the PKK created a branch party called PJAK to stage guerilla attacks against 
Iran. Constituting another grave danger to the security of the KRI, the KRI sought to 
contain PJAK and prevent it from launching attacks against Iran from territories of 
the KRI. Thus, when KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani met Iranian Interior Minister 
Mostafa Purmohammadi in May 2007, border security was a key point of 
discussions, during which Nechirvan Barzani stated: "Iran's security is our security, 
and Iran has always been a good neighbor of (Iraqi) Kurdistan… We will not allow 
any hostile act to be committed against Iran from the land of (Iraqi) Kurdistan under 
any circumstances, and we are prepared to allay any possible concerns.”1171 
Therefore, despite sporadic PJAK attacks and Iranian shelling of their bases, 
Nechirvan Barzani eventually managed to secure a ceasefire between the two in 
2011, which is still relevant now.1172 Moreover, despite the continuation of minor 
security problems along the border, trade and commerce relations between the KRI 
and Iran exceeded $8 billion U.S. dollars by 2012.1173 
However, despite mutual public assurances of trust and reciprocity, Iraqi 
Kurdish leadership, particularly the KDP leadership, still harboured deep mistrust of 
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Iranian intentions. Notwithstanding historical pre-de facto state memories of the 
defeat and betrayal of the Kurdish national liberation movement, the more recent 
Iranian policy of empowering its close ideological and religious Shiite clients, 
particularly PM al-Maliki’s government, and1174 the U.S.-Iranian tensions over the 
latter’s nuclear programme, prompted the KRI leadership to seek positive foreign 
relations with Turkey.  
Considering the geopolitical position of the KRI, Turkey could act as a 
strategic ally for the Kurdish de facto state especially given its importance as an 
energy transportation hub. The KRI on the other hand could act as a strategic buffer 
zone between the turbulent Arab part of Iraq and Turkey as well as a bulwark against 
the spear of Shiism in Turkey.1175 Steadily religious-ideological considerations were 
given more weight in the relations between Turkey and the KRI. As Gareth Stansfield 
notes, the Sunni-Shiite divide following the civil war in Iraq in 2006-2008 realigned 
Turkey’s foreign policy with that of the KRI.1176 Turkish relations with Baghdad were 
further restrained following the March 2010 Iraqi national elections. In the elections, 
Turkey organized and supported a broad array of secular Sunni politicians, as well 
Shiite secular candidates, under the banner of Al-Iraqiya, which was led by the 
former U.S.-appointed Prime Minister of the 2004-2005 interim government of Iraq, 
Ayad Allawi. Although the Al-Iraqiya won more seats (91 seats) than any other Iraqi 
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political bloc, and Masoud Barzani successfully brokered an agreement known as 
the ‘Erbil Agreement’ which led to the formation of a new Iraqi cabinet, PM al-Maliki 
later refused to implement terms of the agreement which stipulated power-sharing 
with the largely Sunni Al-Iraqiya. This development, coupled with the increasingly 
authoritarian tendencies of PM al-Maliki, caused a major Turkish foreign policy shift 
toward the KRI.1177 
Facing the prospect of losing the overt support of the United States, as U.S. 
forces began their gradual planned withdrawal from Iraq, and the waning of U.S. 
influence, the Kurdish leadership was prompted to think carefully about which state 
they wanted to hitch their wagon to, especially considering the geopolitical peculiarity 
of the KRI. Hence, by 2007, the choice rested with Turkey. As one anonymous 
Kurdish official noted, “Iraq and Syria will always be Arab states, and there will be 
no room for us Kurds in them, except as second-class citizens,”1178 and that “the KRG 
will be part of Iraq only in the theoretical sense.”1179 In making his arguments that the 
KRI must align with Turkey not Iran, the official then noted: “The Iranians give us 
either honey with poison, or poison with honey. The Turks offer either honey or 
poison.”1180 Such statements also indicate that by strategically pivoting toward 
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Turkey, the KRI also hoped to find in Turkey a regional patron state and a future ally 
against the Shiite-led governments in Baghdad and perhaps even against Iran.1181 
Bilateral trade, reconstruction and economic interdependence also 
constituted major determinants in the foreign policies of Turkey and the KRI. The 
KRI was eager to attract investment to hasten the process of rebuilding the Kurdish 
de facto state, in part to maintain its internal legitimacy through provision of 
employment, better services, and to create a positive image as a commercial and 
business hub not only in Iraq but connected to the wider Middle East region. For this, 
Turkey represented the ideal choice, particularly in the field of reconstruction. Having 
the expertise and know-how, and being connected to Western and international 
markets with access to the latest technology and innovations, Turkish firms of all 
varieties presented ideal choices to Kurdistan’s trade and business environment.1182 
The KRI also aimed to increase its de facto recognition and consolidation through 
economic engagement with Turkey. This endeavour somehow fitted with the AKP 
leadership’s foreign policy aims. Kemal Kirişci notes that since the early 1990s, 
Turkey has been in the process of becoming a ‘trading state’, a process that started 
during Turgut Ozal’s presidency continuing forcefully under the AKP government.1183 
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A major manifestation of this is the expansion of the Turkish economy from $7 billion 
to one worth over $700 billion.1184 
Thus, the KRI adopted an open-arm policy towards Turkish companies which, 
noticing the huge economic potential and the relatively liberal business and 
investment climate in the KRI, jumped at the opportunity. The close geographical 
proximity, high demand for Turkish consumer goods, and trans-border cultural 
affinity between the two nations rapidly contributed to the emergence of strong 
economic and trade relations between the KRI and Turkey. Indeed, this thesis 
argues that while economic rationale played a major role, the primary aim behind the 
KRI’s open-arm policy towards the Turkish private sector was political. By openly 
embracing Turkish businesses and investments, the KRI aimed to demonstrate to 
the Turkish political elite the benefits of collaborating and engaging with the KRI, in 
the process gaining Turkey’s de facto recognition of the Kurdish de facto state in 
Iraq. The KRI also seemed to have realized the importance of the Turkish private 
sector in influencing Turkish domestic and foreign policy decisions to a party such 
as the AKP, which prides itself on the astonishing Turkish economic improvement 
following its tenure in power. Furthermore, the heightened level of economic 
relations with the KRI meant that Turkish foreign policy-makers had increasingly to 
take note of the views of a variety of domestic business groups with stakes in 
Kurdistan’s economy. By 2007, a Washington Times report noted, “380 out of 500 
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foreign companies [in the KRG] are Turkish. In Dohuk, a city farther west, 65 percent 
of contracts worth about $350 million so far this year have gone to Turkish 
companies. Worth another $350 million and $300 million, respectively, brand new 
airports in Irbil and Sulaimaniyah are Turkish products. Another Turkish company 
won a $260 million bid to build a new university campus in Sulaimani.”1185 
However, the politics of natural resources played a significant role in the 
foreign policy thinking of Turkey and the KRI. It might be worth remembering 
arguments made in Chapter Two of this thesis about the role natural resources play 
in socializing de facto states into the international system of sovereign states and 
influencing the position of neighbouring or patron states toward the ethno-nationalist 
conflicts in other states. Turkey had initially adopted a hostile policy toward the KRI’s 
hydrocarbon policies. Soon after the KRI adopted its petroleum law, Turkey’s Energy 
Minister, Hilmi Güler, travelled to Baghdad to ratify the signing of an agreement over 
a proposed pipeline to carry Iraqi oil to Western markets through Turkey. In addition 
to having specific arrangements with Baghdad, Turkey also joined efforts in 
collaboration with Iran and Syria to “prevent the KRG from circumventing the central 
authority’s embargo.”1186 
However, this thesis argues, the KRI very successfully employed the energy 
card as an instrument of foreign policy implementation, not only to gain Turkey’s de 
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facto recognition, but also to gain its security, political, military and economic 
cooperation. Hence, in 2007, the KRI began to send several signals to Turkey. 
Highlighting the importance of the KRI to Turkey’s energy security, Minister Ashti 
Hawrami stated in an interview with a Turkish reporter, “It is in Turkey's interest to 
be in direct contact with us. It is a 'first come, first served' situation. There are 20-25 
billion barrels of oil reserves in Kurdistan. It is more than we need.”1187 He then added, 
"It is in Turkey's interest as well to establish relations with us."1188 In short, as Soner 
Cagaptay notes, in 2007 “the KRG offered Turkey to jointly explore the region’s 
hydrocarbon riches,”1189 or as Natali asserts, some KRI elites invited Turkey “to 
invade economically not militarily.”1190 Moreover, to ease Turkish sensitivities – in 
the  government and the people – the KRI once again, in the words of its Prime 
Minister, affirmed its position that peace and dialogue between the PKK and Turkey 
must be the way forward, while pledging to take firmer action to contain the PKK.1191 
Th KRG prime minister even published an opinion piece in the Washington Post 
stating: 
“We [the KRG] have condemned and will continue to condemn the PKK 
for its unwarranted attacks in Turkey. We insist that its members lay down 
their arms immediately… Just as we ask the Turks to seek a peaceful 
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resolution, so must the PKK abandon its failed strategy of armed conflict. 
Diplomacy and dialogue must be given a chance.”1192  
It is noticeable that Barzani’s opinion piece was published on the same day 
that President George W. Bush met PM Erdogan at the white House, when he 
affirmed the U.S. commitment to provide actionable intelligence to help Turkey in its 
struggle against the PKK. After this pledge, one Turkish official conceded to an 
American official, “Your efforts against the PKK have changed everything. Now we 
can move ahead on our full range of energy issues.”1193 
In 2011, Turkey imported 30 million barrels of oil and 40 BCM of natural 
gas,1194 most of which came from Iran and Russia.1195 More interesting for Turkey, 
the KRI has the potential (if well invested) to export up to 10 BCM of gas to Turkey 
as early as 2020.1196 Natural gas is more cumbersome and costly to transport, 
however, but with adequate infrastructure, Turkey stands ready to reap consumption 
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and price benefits from the KRI.1197 Turkey’s domestic gas consumption has already 
more than tripled from 15 BCM in 2000 to 46 BCM in 2010,1198 of which only 1.4 
percent is produced domestically while only 6.7 of oil demand is produced locally. 
Concomitantly, as part of its energy security, Turkey has always sought to position 
itself as a secure and reliable transit state connecting vast oil/gas resources from the 
Caspian and Middle East to European markets.1199 Turkey is one of “the global swing 
states”1200 with a population of over 70 million and an economy ranked 17th in the 
world by gross domestic product.1201 Therefore, an estimated 30 to 60 billion barrels 
of oil, excluding the Kirkuk fields, and 3 TCM of gas in the near-by KRI1202 
represented an ideal opportunity for Turkey to enhance its energy security. Motivated 
by its huger for energy resources to sustain Turkey’s rapid economic growth,1203 
which is an important benchmark of the AKP’s electoral success, to lessen its 
reliance on actors such as Russia and Iran and to advance its vision of becoming a 
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top-10 economy by 2023, which requires sustainable oil and gas supplies,1204 the 
AKP government began to look to its south-eastern Iraqi Kurdistan neighbour.  
Meanwhile, the nascent energy industry of the KRI needed huge amounts of 
investment from Turkish and non-Turkish sources. Perhaps, more importantly, the 
KRI realized that without Turkish collaboration, the IOCs would be reluctant to 
commit huge investments to its oil/gas sector, particularly given the continuing threat 
of blacklisting and legal action by the Baghdad government. The KRI knew well in 
advance that without finding a safe and reliable transit territory for transport and sale 
of Kurdish oil/gas, the whole energy industry would be at the mercy of Baghdad and 
a source of constant concern for IOCs investing in the KRI. Thus, Turkey ranked 
high in Kurdish foreign policy calculations. 
The energy sector and Turkey’s rapprochement enabled the KRI to withstand 
pressures exercised by PM al-Maliki’s government, opened a new era for the Kurds 
and instantly raised the KRI’s international status and visibility. The energy factor 
coupled with the aforementioned factors paved the way for high-level officials to 
meet and discuss outstanding issues between Erbil and Ankara. Although by 2007 
the KRI and Turkey had geared up for dialogue,1205 the first direct meeting between 
the KRI and Turkey took place in Baghdad in 2008 when Ahmet Davutoglu and Murat 
Ozcelik met with Nechirvan Barzani and the Kurdish Iraqi president, Jalal 
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Talabani.1206 This initial meeting paved the way for the establishment of official 
relations between the KRI and Turkey, independent of Baghdad. Visits and meetings 
between high-level KRI and Turkish officials have since become commonplace. The 
first historical visit of  Ahmet Davutoglu as Turkey’s Foreign Minister to Erbil in 2009 
was commensurate with Turkey extending de facto recognition to the KRI,1207 when 
he stated that “Turkey could serve as a bridge to Europe for you [the KRI], while you 
could serve as a gateway to the Gulf for Turkey.”1208 This visit was followed by 
Masoud Barzani’s first official visit to Turkey as the President of the Kurdistan Region 
in 2010, not as the leader of the KDP,1209 followed by PM Erdogan’s first-ever official 
visit to Erbil in 2011.1210 Indeed, these mutual visits were seen by observers as 
transformative events in Turkish-KRI relations not only for the Kurds of Iraq, but also 
for Turkey’s Kurds. Gareth Stansfield for instance noted that these official visits 
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indicate that “we're into a new era of the Turkish relationship with the Kurds, both 
across the border and its own.”1211 
No doubt the KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani, who has described Ankara rather 
than Baghdad as a “strategic partner”,1212 and other KRI officials have become 
persona grata in Ankara particularly as foreign policy issues of mutual concern have 
expanded. In short, in the space of few years from 2007 to 2011, the KRI-Turkey ties 
have been transformed into an “official, direct and institutionalized relationship.”1213 
Indeed, the deepening economic relations have led some observers to argue that 
“an undeclared economic commonwealth”1214 has been established between the KRI 
and Turkey. Available figures indicate that bilateral trade has jumped from an 
estimated $1.4 billion in 2007 to almost $12 billion in 2011.1215 According to a 
Finnish-Swiss report, approximately 75 to 80 per cent of construction projects in the 
KRI were undertaken by Turkish companies including the two international airports 
in Erbil and Sulaimani. Moreover, while in 2008, there were only 485 Turkish 
companies in the KRI, by the end of 2013, more than 1500 Turkish companies were 
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registered, which represents more than half the foreign companies operating in the 
KRI.1216  
This research stops in the year 2011 with the game-changing U.S. military 
withdrawal from Iraq. The withdrawal, as Charountaki argues, “saw the expansion of 
relations between Turkey and the KRG into a strategic alliance,”1217 involving a 
variety of political, economic and security matters. These matters include a 
transformative 2012 KRI-Turkey agreement to build a direct oil pipeline to transport 
the KRI’s oil to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan1218 and a 50-year energy 
deal between the KRI and Turkey.1219 This started the independent transportation 
and sale of Kurdish oil in 2014,1220 with, according to reports, some oil being sold to 
Israeli companies.1221 Other indicators of warming relations include the increasing 
role of Iraqi Kurdish politicians as mediators in the triangle peace process between 
the AKP’s government, Turkey’s Kurds and the PKK.1222 This is exemplified by 
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Masoud Barzani’s 2013 visit to Diyarbakir, the largest Kurdish city in Turkey’s 
southeast, during which he delivered a speech in Kurdish and PM Erdogan, for the 
first time, pronounced the word “Kurdistan” – both formerly seen as anathema in the 
Turkish republic.1223 It is also illustrated by the KRI’s 2013 tacit approval for the 
relocation of some PKK militants to its territory, amid Baghdad’s objections, to kick-
start a stagnated peace process between the PKK and Turkey.1224 In addition, 
Turkey and the KRI President have collaborated closely after the onset of the Syrian 
civil war in 2011, which saw the Kurds of Syria playing a significant role in Syria’s 
chaotic civil war.1225 
In any case, the level of interaction and interdependence between Iraqi 
Kurdistan and Turkey have reached such unprecedented levels that several 
observers are now suggesting that Turkey is acting as a ‘midwife for a Kurdish 
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state’,1226 a ‘patron state’1227 for the Kurdish de facto state, or as a ‘big brother’1228 for 
the Kurds in Iraq. Indeed, if prior to 2007, Turkish officials had shown great 
sensitivities to the prospect of an independent Kurdistan, in 2015 Huseyn Celik, a 
high-ranking AKP official, indicated that an “In the past an independent Kurdish state 
was a reason for war [for Turkey] but no one has the right to say this now.”1229 
Whatever the case, the dynamics of relations indicate the emergence of a strategic 
alliance rather than a temporary marriage between the KRI and Turkey that may 
outlast the current AKP leadership.1230 If, once, the U.S. warned Iraqi Kurds that in 
the event of a military showdown with Turkey they should not count on U.S. support, 
now the joke in Turkish diplomatic circles is that “the United States wanted Turkey 
and Iraq’s Kurds to become friends, not to get married.”1231 
The opening between Turkey and the KRI was replicated in the relations 
between the KRI and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Several 
ideological, economic, geopolitical determinants can be discerned in the 
rapprochement between Arab Sunni states, particularly the Arab monarchies in the 
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Gulf and the KRI. The rise of the Shiite to the centre of political power in Iraq through 
their electoral majority following the U.S. intervention of 2003 increased Shiite’s 
political activism and assertiveness across the Sunni-led Arab Gulf monarchies. As 
Vali Nasr argues, “By liberating and empowering Iraq's Shiite majority, the Bush 
administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian 
balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.”1232 The Shiite-Sunni rift was 
further inflamed following the bombing of the Shiite sacred Al-Askari Shrine in the 
northern Iraqi city of Samara in 2006 by Sunni jihadists.1233 States such as Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait contain sizeable Shiite minorities, while Bahrain is a majority 
Shiite populated-state ruled by a Sunni monarchy. Therefore, the fact that the 
sectarian violence in Iraq could have potential destabilizing effects on the security 
and stability of the Arab Gulf states caused a great degree of concern for the Arab 
Gulf monarchies.1234 PM al-Maliki’s policies particularly following the formation of the 
second al-Maliki government in November 2010 including marginalization of the 
Arab Sunni community in Iraq, blocking meaningful Sunni participation in power and 
governance in Iraq and his negative response to the Sunni’s demand of the creation 
of a federal Sunni region similar to the KRI further increased the Sunni’s grievances 
towards the Shiite-run government in Baghdad.1235 Added to this, al-Maliki’s 
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consolidation of power particularly over Iraqi national security institutions, his 
disregard of the Erbil Agreement which stipulated power-sharing between the Shiites 
and Sunnis represented by Al-Iraqiya in the new December 2010 Iraqi cabinet,1236 
and al-Maliki’s targeting of key Sunni leaders immediately following the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces at the end of 211 further alienated the Sunni Arab states1237 as well  as 
Turkey from Iraq. Related to this, the increase of the Iranian influence and 
penetration into Iraq1238 caused a great deal of alarm to the Sunni Middle Eastern 
states, particularly the small Arab Gulf states vulnerable to Iranian interference. 
These rifts were exploded by the aftermath of the Arab uprisings- the so-called Arab 
spring- particularly the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011 which by default divided 
the Middle East into two camps: a Sunni camp and a Shiite camp with increasing 
involvement of non-state groups, including the emergence and empowerment of 
extremist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda.1239  
Indeed, KRI’s foreign policy objectives also overlapped with those of the Arab 
Gulf states.1240The foreign policy of the KRI was built around refraining from 
interfering in the Iraqi and the regional Sunni and Shiite tensions. The Iraqi Kurds 
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détente with Iran and close ethnic and geographic proximity to Iran remined high in 
KRI’s foreign policy considerations. However, the increasing power and 
assertiveness of Baghdad and ramifications of the Syria civil war in a way pushed 
the KRI to seek some form of external balancing toward Iran and al-Maliki’s 
government by searching for Sunni regional allies in the Middle East, particularly the 
Arab Gulf states. 
After 2003, majority of Arab Sunni states had established indirect relations 
with the KRI through the GOI within the Iraqi federal context. However, after 2007, 
the GCC states became readier to sidestep the GOI to establish direct and official 
relations with the KRI. The alignment of the broader security and geopolitical 
interests paved the way for expansion of economic relations between the KRI and 
the Arab-Gulf states.1241 The UAE has built the closet economic relations with the 
KRI with increase in investment, mutual visits and opening of three UAE trade 
representation offices in Erbil.1242 Likewise, in 2009, Qatar signed a memorandum 
of understanding with the KRI covering the fields of infrastructure, agriculture 
investment and development as well as tourism and aviation.1243 Saudi Arabia, as 
the strongest  and largest state in the Gulf primarily due to its demography, 
geographic size and its political and religious standing as Islam’s founding location 
has also built independent relations with the KRI.  The KRI has made its first attempts 
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at building relations with Saudi Arabia in 2007 when Masoud Barzani paid a visit to 
Saudi Arabia following an invitation from King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi 
Arabia.1244 However, it now seems the government of Saudi Arabia has extended 
direct de facto recognition to the KRI as a state-like entity with independent foreign 
policy. This is exemplified by the recent grand reception granted to Masoud Barzani 
following his visit to Riyadh on 30 November 2015 and the official opening of a Saudi 
consulate in Erbil in 2016.1245 As far as other GCC states are concerned, although 
good, friendly and emotional relations exist between the KRI and Kuwait due to both 
people’s experience of oppression by the regime of Saddam Hussein, no records of 
existing relations are available between the KRI and the two states of Bahrain and 
Oman.1246
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7.5 Signing Treaties, Consulates, Foreign Representations and 
Lobbying: Proving Independency in Foreign Policy 
Building foreign relations with Turkey was a major foreign policy success for 
the KRI. This success opened new pathways and further engagement between the 
KRI and the rest of the international community. Previously states dealt cautiously 
with the KRI fearing a possible clash or unrest between the two entities would harm 
their investment or personnel located in the region. The United States, for instance, 
as Michael Gunter notes, persistently reiterated that “The KRG must get along with 
Turkey or else, in a showdown between the two, the KRG will not be able to count 
on U.S. support.”1247 
Concomitantly, other states and indeed many observers began to take note 
of the increasing viability, domestic sovereignty, stability and economic viability 
enjoyed by the KRI. Gareth Stansfield, for instance noted, “the Kurdistan Region has 
matured into an institutionalized reality in territorial, political and economic terms, 
and is now transforming the patterns of international relations in the Middle East, 
altering established norms of interaction and forcing the reappraisal of orthodox 
views concerning the national interests of regional states that are embracing the idea 
of Kurdistan, at least for now, rather than denying it.”1248 Dennis Chapman, working 
closely with Kurdish security forces, stated that “Where other parties and militias in 
the Middle East have adopted the radical models of Marxism or militant Islam and 
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often moved into the orbit of rogue regimes, the KDP and PUK and their forces have 
moderated themselves, remaining consistently secular… [and] openly seeking 
alliance with the United States and the West instead.”1249 
The increasing legitimacy, visibility and viability of the Kurdish de facto state, 
led many states to grant some sort of de facto recognition to the KRI by establishing 
their consulates in the capital of the KRI-Erbil. While the establishment of consulates 
in itself is a normal practice regulated by international conventions, and does not 
signify extension of diplomatic recognition, the opening of consulates in Erbil for the 
first time in the modern history of Iraqi Kurds clearly illustrated the success of the 
foreign policies of the KRI. These consulates in effect meant that the path chosen 
by the Kurdish leadership, in not declaring unilateral independence from Iraq, 
brought much recognition and engagement to the KRI, instead of the isolation faced 
by many Eurasian and Caucasian de facto states. Indeed, many believed that at 
various intervals, particularly 1991 and 2003, Iraqi Kurds had the opportunity to 
declare unilateral independence from Baghdad. However, most likely such a move 
would have transformed the KRI into a black-hole by drawing the wrath of 
neighbouring states as well as the possible loss of de facto independence, 
destruction or forced reintegration into Iraq. The fact that the prospect of gaining 
international support and de facto recognition constituted a major foreign policy aim 
in non-declaration of independence is clear from statements and interviews of KRI 
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officials. In one instance, Falah Mustafa, stated in an interview with David Romano 
that: 
 “We were a de facto entity without international recognition, almost 
independent. We gave up some of our power and independence [in 2003] 
to rejoin Iraq. This was difficult for the Kurdish parties and many of the 
Kurdish people. We did this for legal and international recognition. When 
we travel abroad, we are received officially as Kurdistan Regional 
Government delegations now. We are part of Iraq, but we are the 
Kurdistan Regional Government.”1250 
The first states to establish consulates in Erbil were Germany, France, Russia 
and Iran. They were soon joined by the United States, the UK, Sweden and Turkey; 
as well as Egypt and Jordan, the first Arab Sunni states to open consulates there.1251 
The establishment of Turkey’s ‘pseudo-embassy’ in Erbil was seen a major 
breakthrough in the KRI’s foreign relations with the once hostile Turkish state and 
as a testament to Turkey’s de facto recognition of the KRI and its realization of the 
important role the KRI plays in regional stability, economic prosperity and 
international relations of the Middle East region.1252 Moreover, in an ironic twist of 
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history, in 2011, former UK Prime Minister Sir John Major who played a vital role in 
establishing the Safe Haven for Iraqi Kurds twenty years earlier, arrived in the KRI 
to officially open the British Consulate General in Erbil.1253 The KRI now hosts almost 
40 consulates, embassy offices, honorary consuls, offices of government and non-
governmental International Organizations in Erbil including the EU Delegation.1254  
The establishment of a U.S. consulate in Erbil represented a particularly 
important foreign policy victory for the KRI. The U.S. Congress Resolution 873 of 
2010 to launch a consulate in Erbil is illustrative of the U.S.’s vote of confidence in 
the KRI. According to the resolution, named Establishing a United States Consulate 
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: “the establishment of a United States Consulate in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq will reaffirm United States support for the stability, 
prosperity, and democracy that the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has achieved.”1255 The 
resolution also stated that “the Kurds of Iraq have been willing partners with the 
United States in the democratic transition in Iraq since 2003,”1256 and that “the United 
States and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been full partners in the 
battle against terrorists who seek to undermine progress toward an Iraq that is 
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prosperous, free, and federal.” 1257 Indeed, despite the fact the KRI has so far been 
unable to establish the kind of institutional relationship with the United States as that 
enjoyed by Israel and Taiwan, it had now become commonplace to refer to the 
existing relationship between the KRI and the United States as a ‘special 
relationship’.1258 The US consulate was officially opened in Erbil in 2011.1259 
The establishment of the U.S. consulate bestowed greater legitimacy and 
status on the KRI. It also raised the Kurdish political and strategic profile. Compared 
with Baghdad, where embassy staff were confined in their buildings due to the 
extremely dangerous security situation, the foreign representations in Erbil felt much 
more secure to carry out their daily functions due to the stable and secure 
environment in the KRI. Moreover, as Bengio has noted, the foreign missions in the 
KRI “pay lip service to the fiction that Erbil is an Iraqi city in that they call their 
diplomatic facilities consulates rather than embassies, but this is increasingly a 
distinction without a difference.”1260 
The lobbying efforts of the KRI has so far been unable to convince the United 
States to support Iraqi Kurdish independence.1261 However, realizing the importance 
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of the United States in Kurdistan’s survival and maintenance of its de facto 
independence, a major part of the KRI’s foreign policy strategy focused on the game 
of buying influence in Washington D.C. Since 2003, KRI officials have cultivated 
close ties with many current and former U.S. officials in the State and Defense 
Departments, the CIA, as well as a combination of military hawks, Conservative 
Republicans and liberal Democrats in the Congress. In 2007, the KRI purchased a 
$3.1 million building less than two kilometers from the White House to operate as its 
foreign representation office in Washington, with a budget reportedly over $1 million 
a year.1262 Also, realizing the vastness of the U.S. government and the complexities 
of navigating the U.S. system, the KRI has since hired and retained a range of 
lobbying firms including Dentons, BGR Group, Greenberg Traurig, Gryphon Partners 
and Qorvis Communications at a cost of more than $6 million since 2010.1263 The 
use of lobbying firms is particularly compelling since the Kurds do not possess a 
large diaspora in the United States capable of influencing the U.S. foreign policy 
decision-making similar to the Israeli or the Armenian diaspora in Washington.1264 
These lobbying firms played a vital role in establishing a Kurdish-American 
Congressional Caucus in 2008 to lobby Capitol Hill on vital KRI’s interests. They 
                                            
1262 Bill Allison, “In the Fight Against ISIS, Kurds Turn to Key Allies on K Street,” Foreign Policy, 26 
October 2015, accessed: 10 August 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/26/in-fight-against-isis-
kurds-turn-to-allies-on-k-street/.  
1263 See: Eric Liptonmay, “Iraqi Kurds Build Washington Lobbying Machine to Fund War Against ISIS,” 
International New York Times, 6 May 2016, accessed: 29 August 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/politics/iraqi-kurds-build-washington-lobbying-machine-
against-isis.html?_r=0.  
1264 While still an asset, it is estimated that there are only 400,000 Kurdish diasporas in the US, see: 
Chandrasekaran, Op. Cit. 
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have also helped establish a U.S.-Kurdistan Business Council,1265 a non-profit trade 
association in charge of advancing Kurdistan’s image as a business-friendly place 
and encouraging U.S. investments in Kurdistan.1266  
Signing independent agreements or protocols with regions or indeed with 
governments of states also became a primary foreign policy objective of the KRI. 
Indeed, signing agreements with decentralized regions or states to promote trade, 
business and investment is not a novel development, as it is perhaps now a common 
practice amongst Western decentralized liberal states and regions of Western 
Europe and Northern America. However, the signing of independent agreements 
with so distant regions by the KRI served as an opportunity to demonstrate its 
stateness and independency in foreign policy, as well as showing its eagerness to 
build closer ties with the Western liberal world. Within this context, in 2010, Masoud 
Barzani signed a statement of intent to develop long-term commercial, economic 
and cultural relations between France and the KRI.1267 Following this declaration, the 
KRI signed a memorandum of understanding with the French province of Dordogne 
to enhance region-to-region relations in the fields of education, agriculture and water 
development.1268 Similarly, seeking to strengthen bilateral relations with the United 
Kingdom, the KRI put a particularly important emphasis on relations with the UK’s  
                                            
1265 Kate Brannen, “From Kirkuk to K Street,” Foreign Policy, 13 August 2014, accessed: 9 March 
2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/13/from-kirkuk-to-k-street/.  
1266 For more info on this organization, see: “United States-Kurdistan Business Council,” accessed: 4 
October 2016, http://www.uskbizcouncil.org/.  
1267 “President Barzani meets President Sarkozy, signs protocol with French Government,” KRG 
website, 17 June 2010, accessed: 23 January 2013, 
http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?r=223&l=12&s=02010100&a=35598&s=010000.  
1268 “French province of Dordogne signs agreement with KRG,” DFR website, 10 December 2012, 
accessed: 23 January 2013, http://www.dfr.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=42170.  
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constituent units. A least since 2010, the KRI began its first actions to meet and lobby 
Northern Ireland officials and business leaders.1269 The lobbying and meetings finally 
resulted to the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the KRI and 
Northern Ireland in 2012 focusing on the fields of investment, commerce, education, 
tourism and agriculture.1270 The first signs of enhanced cooperation between the two 
sides appeared when the KRG Ministry of Agriculture signed an agreement in the 
fields of agricultural development and research with the Northern Ireland Agri-Food 
and Biosciences Institute (AFBI) in 2012,1271 whereas the opening of a Northern 
Ireland trade office in Erbil opened new pathways for closer relations between the 
two sides.1272 
Kurdish officials used to label Iraqi Kurdistan only as a constitutionally-
recognized federal region of Iraq. In the realm of foreign relations, Kurdish officials 
claimed that, “the KRG is part of Iraq, and foreign policy is the exclusive domain of 
Baghdad.”1273  However, the increasing consolidation and sovereignty of the KRI has 
now led Kurdish officials to publicly name the KRI as a de facto state with its own 
                                            
1269 “UK Representative meets Northern Ireland’s trade minister in Belfast,” KRG website, 9 
September 2010, accessed: 28 May 2017, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&s=02010100&r=223&a=36739&s=010000; “Kurdistan and 
Northern Ireland seek to increase trade and business relations,” DFR website, 2 July 2011, accessed: 
28 May 2017, http://www.dfr.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?l=12&a=40562.  
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Telegraph, 17 July 2012, accessed: 28 May 2017, 
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/news/foster-calls-on-companies-to-build-more-trade-
links-with-kurdistan-28771558.html; “Northern Ireland Minister signs joint declaration with Kurdistan,” 
KRG website, 17 July 2012, accessed: 28 May 2017, 
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1271 “Kurdistan region of Iraq signs agriculture agreement with N. Ireland,” 15 August 2012, accessed: 
28 May 2017, http://www.ifpinfo.com/Agriculture-NewsArticle-721#.WSoLnmiGNUQ.  
1272 “Foster opens new Invest NI office in Kurdistan,” Invest NI, 17 July 2012, accessed: 28 May 2017, 
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1273 Kinninmont, Stansfield and Sirri, Op. Cit., p. 21. 
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foreign policies.1274 In an article entitled “Kurdistan Region has its own Foreign 
Policy,” Hemen Hawrami, an aide to President Barzani, lists the foreign policy aims 
of the KRI. His list is: 
1- protection and development of Kurdistan Region,  
2- attainment of unachieved aims,  
3- expanding the network of friends of Kurdistan abroad, and weakening 
enemies or foes of Kurdistan.1275  
 
Elsewhere, Hawrami states the principles that guide the foreign policies of Masoud 
Barzani, which are: “mutual interest, balance in relations, openness, positive 
neutrality, pragmatism, rejection of the belief of fatalism and the principle of the first 
is Kurdistan.”1276 He further adds that: “these principles became the identity of 
Kurdistan's foreign policy under Masoud Barzani's presidency in a way that not only 
creates a geopolitical position for Kurdistan but also leaves a positive legacy on 
Kurdistan.”1277 
While initially the DFR was a small operation compared with other KRG 
ministries, and indeed in comparison with the ever-ubiquitous political party 
representation offices, the increasing engagement of the KRI with the international 
community necessitated the expansion of the DFR as a vital KRG department in 
charge of implementation of the KRI’s foreign policies. Thus, in 2009, the KRG 
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sovereign-state/.  
1275 Hemen Hawrami, “Hereme Kurdestan Xaweny Siyasete Derewey Khoyte,” [Kurdistan Region has 
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boosted the expansion and institutionalization of the DFR as an important foreign 
policy department.1278 Currently the KRI has 14 representative offices abroad in a 
range of states including Australia, Austria, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, 
Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.1279 The cost of KRI representation offices abroad is $15 million dollars per 
year.1280  
 
According to the DFR website, the responsibilities of the DFR include: 
1- Strengthening bilateral relations with the international community, 
2- Promoting trade, investment, tourism and institutional ties, 
3- Supervising the KRG’s offices overseas, 
4- Liaising with the diplomatic community in the Kurdistan region 
5- Conducting and supporting activities that enhance the image of the 
Kurdistan region, 
6- Providing legal and authentication services to the people of the region 
and its citizens abroad.1281 
 
While, the list of objectives of the DFR include: 
1- Promoting and protecting the interests of the Kurdistan Region and its 
citizens abroad, 
2- Encouraging meaningful political and economic relations with the 
international community, especially with neighbouring countries, in the 
interest of promoting peace, stability and economic development, 
                                            
1278 “Official Order,” KRG website, no: 143, 25 January 2009, accessed: 3 December 2013, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/uploads/documents/Official_order_25_Jan_09__2009_06_04_h19m0s19.pdf.  
1279 See: “KRG Offices Abroad,” KRG Department of Foreign Relations, accessed: 17 August 2016, 
http://dfr.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?p=40&l=12&s=020100&r=364.  
1280 “KRG: No foreign offices will be closed,” Rudaw, 8 August 2016, accessed: 7 May 2017, 
http://www.rudaw.net/NewsDetails.aspx?pageid=237298.  
1281 See: “The Kurdistan Regional Government Department of Foreign Relations,” KRG website, 
accessed: August 17, 2016, http://dfr.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?p=25&l=12&s=010000&r=332.  
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3- And providing efficient and effective consular and legal services to the 
people of the Region.1282 
 
The functions assigned to the DFR, this thesis argues, are not arbitrary. If one 
looks at the websites of the foreign ministries of many small states, there might be 
similar statements of key aims and objectives. These functions clearly indicate that 
the KRI views and portrays itself as a ‘state-like’1283 entity, fully committed to 
projecting foreign policy and building foreign relations rather than leaving it in the 
hands of its parent state in Baghdad. This is evident in a paper published by the 
KRG UK representation office under the title of “The KRG’s Foreign Policies,” stating: 
“For decades the people of the Kurdistan Region were deliberately 
isolated from the world under the repressive policies of previous Iraqi 
governments, and especially under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime. 
Since 2003, the KRG has ensured that we are full participants in the 
international community by forging closer foreign ties.”1284 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the transformation of the Kurdish de facto state 
into an independent foreign policy actor. After 2007, tensions began to appear in 
relations between Erbil and Baghdad. On the surface the unease related to the 
status of the disputed territories and issues related to the establishment of a newly-
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created federal state. A deeper look, however, reveals that the Kurdish leadership 
began to see its entity as a de facto state. Increasingly, this consolidation, visibility, 
assertiveness and international legitimacy of the Kurdish de facto state alarmed 
Baghdad. 
The unique geopolitical position of the KRI, issues of access to oil/gas 
transportation routes, economic independence and attainment of general economic 
goods, not to mention the upheaval in Iraq, were significant determinants in the KRI’s 
foreign policy. Increasing concern over the future survivability, possible destruction 
and the loss of de facto independence pushed the KRI leadership to build 
independent foreign relations, including external economic relations, with variety of 
state and non-state actors. Hydrocarbon resources also played an important role in 
Kurdish foreign policy and diplomacy. The KRI signed independent contracts with a 
variety of IOCs and utilized oil/gas resources as an instrument of economic statecraft 
to build independent foreign relations with sovereign states. In addition, hydrocarbon 
resources allowed the KRI to add a new element to its foreign policy of self-
justification: promoting its economic viability. 
Turkey plays an important role in the foreign policy considerations of the KRI. 
KRI leadership views foreign relations with Turkey as extremely important for the 
continuous economic, military and political survival of the Kurdish de facto state, 
particularly in post-American Iraq. Thus, Turkey’s de facto recognition of the KRI 
represented a major foreign policy success. 
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Moreover, between 2003 and 2011, the KRI added other factors which were 
evidence of its stateness and independency in foreign policy. For example, the fact 
that foreign consulates and offices of international organizations were established in 
Erbil, the expansion and professionalization of KRG representation offices abroad, 
and the signing of independent memorandums of understanding and protocols with 
several states and sub-state regions signified major foreign policy successes. These 
developments clearly confirmed the de facto recognition granted to the KRI. 
8 Concluding Remarks 
The emergence of the KRI was an accidental outcome of the Second Gulf 
War, international humanitarian intervention and the subsequent central secession 
of Iraq - when Saddam Hussein ordered the withdrawal of Iraqi state institutions from 
a delimited zone based on the March 1970 agreement between the KDP and the 
GOI. Secure in their region under Western protection, the Kurds of Iraq refrained 
from warfare with the central GOI or from declaring immediate independent 
statehood. Instead they focused their attention on building state-like institutions, 
such as an assembly and government. They also put in place essential institutions 
capable of providing a modicum of security and services to its population. In other 
words, the Kurds of Iraq focused on establishing de facto statehood. 
After two decades of transition and frequent transformation, the KRI is a de 
facto state par excellence and an independent foreign policy actor. It has achieved 
a high degree of de facto independence and territorial control over most of its 
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claimed territory, including its capital, Erbil. The KRI has also clearly crossed the 
threshold of two years of existence proclaimed by the early theorists of the de facto 
state as an important criterion of de facto statehood. More importantly, there is a 
visible desire for independence within Iraqi Kurdistan. On 25 September 2017, the 
KRI conducted its first officially-sanctioned independence referendum.1285 An 
overwhelming majority of the population, nearing 93 percent of the voters, supported 
secession or independence from Iraq. This fact thus distinguishes the KRI from 
autonomous regions, states-within-states, associated territories or entities with 
extensive autonomy. De facto states are often born from national liberation 
movements and transition into independent statehood often remains their aspiring 
goal. 
This thesis argues that between 1992 and 2011 the KRI has experienced four 
major transitions. In the first five years of its existence, the KRI was an unrecognized 
de facto state and faced daunting internal and external challenges. Internally, the 
KRI’s official domestic institutions did not exhibit a great ability or capacity to regulate 
or control the domestic setting of the region. Instead, the KDP and the PUK 
continued, in a de facto manner, to control or administrate their respective zones of 
influence in the KRI. The problems were compounded by the dual-effect of 
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sanctions; one imposed by the international community, and the other by the GOI. 
Externally, although not totally ostracized, from its establishment the existence of the 
KRI was precarious. The Kurdish leadership constantly reiterated its commitment to 
a unitary federal and democratic Iraq. Despite this, the international community, 
particularly the neighbouring states, continued to view the KRI as the foundation of 
an independent state and as such were careful not to grant it de facto recognition. 
This lack of recognition partly prevented the official institutions of the KRI- KRG- from 
projecting any specific foreign policies - in other words, the KRI did not emerge as a 
unitary actor engaging in rational foreign policies in pursuit of its national interests. 
Within this context, survival represented the major aim of Kurdish foreign 
relations. The KRI only benefited indirectly from foreign relations – which remained 
the preserve of the leading Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, with each 
enjoying a set of independent foreign relations with regional and international actors. 
The KDP and the PUK were unable to withstand the pressures exerted by the 
governments of Turkey and Iran. In order to maintain a level of good-will, to assure 
the survival and prolong the existence of the KRI, the KDP and PUK cooperated with 
the governments of Turkey and Iran to contain the threat of Turkish Kurdish and 
Iranian Kurdish oppositionist groups fighting those governments. Moreover, the 
different groupings of the Iraqi opposition constituted a major vehicle through which 
the KDP and PUK established foreign relations, particularly with the Western world. 
Foreign relations with the West were given significant weight and attention by 
the Kurdish political parties. The West, particularly the United States, the UK and 
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France were crucial for the continued survival of the KRI through their military 
protection from the Incirlik base in Turkey. To assure continuous protection, the 
Kurdish parties reframed their nationalist project, naming the KRI a democratic 
experiment as part of their foreign policy of self-justification. Lacking official, direct 
and independent external relations, the Kurdish leadership also strategically 
cooperated with Western media, think tanks, academics and individuals, and 
influential current and former officials in the West, to disseminate their message and 
protect Kurdistani interests: a policy which has continued to this day. 
The descent into civil war as well as shattering some of the hard-won 
international sympathy towards the Kurdish cause, increased regional interference 
in the KRI with each leading Kurdish party building independent foreign relations with 
a group of actors composed of states and non-state actors. However, the KRI 
remained geographically intact, as the West continued to provide protection from 
Saddam’s Iraq, and no actor moved to wipe out the KRI. 
In the next five years, i.e. between 1997 and 2003, consolidation of the KRI 
became the primary aim of Iraqi Kurdish foreign relations. The end of the civil war, 
the peace agreement between the KDP and PUK under the auspices of the United 
States, and inclusion of the KDP and PUK in the list of legitimate Iraqi opposition 
groups (and therefore eligible for U.S. support), enhanced the political and military 
survival of the KRI. Moreover, the dynamics of the OFFP, which for the first time in 
modern Kurdish history allocated a reasonably large amount of funding to the Kurds, 
under UN tutelage, enhanced the economic survival of the KRI. These factors 
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enabled the divided KRGs, under the KDP and PUK, to focus on being governments 
rather than parties and achieve remarkable success. In its interactions with the rest 
of the international community, the increasing political stabilization and economic 
development enabled the Kurdish leadership to designate the KRI as a fine model 
for the rest of Iraq in its foreign policy of self-justification.  
The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 marked a significant turning point for the 
KRI. In Iraq’s second state-building process, the KRI transformed into a recognized 
de facto state. This transformation paved the way for reunification and transformation 
of the KRI as a unitary actor both internally and externally. Internally, the KDP and 
PUK reunified the two KRGs, established the office of President and renewed the 
legitimacy of the KNA by conducting a fresh election and selecting a new KNA. 
Externally, the KRI’s official institutions increasingly replaced the parties as official 
foreign policy-makers, articulating rational foreign policies and presenting a united 
diplomatic voice to the outside world in pursuit of Kurdistan national interests. This 
thesis has argued that between 2003 and 2007, image-building, or brand-building, 
was the KRI’s key foreign policy goal. The KRI attached primary importance to 
demonstrating its respect of international hegemonic values such as democratization 
and protection of the right of minorities, welcoming and sheltering IDPs escaping the 
violence in the rest of Iraq, particularly those from the minority groups. It also gave 
attention to freedom of the press and women rights. The KRI endeavored to prove 
its effective statehood by exhibiting the signs of law and order, stability and security 
prevalent in the region. It also aimed to demonstrate its ability to act as a factor for 
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stability and security in Iraq, and the rest of the region, by cooperating with the U.S.-
led coalition forces in the fight against insurgency and terrorism in Iraq. Moreover, 
the image-building was directly related to attracting FDI partly as a means of 
rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure of the KRI, and to maintain the support of the 
general population by improving the level of general services. 
After 2007, however, this thesis argues that the KRI transformed into an 
independent foreign policy actor. The planned withdrawal of the Kurdish semi-patron 
from Iraq - the U.S. forces - which occurred in December 2011, increasingly alarmed 
the Kurdish leadership over the possible loss of de facto independence. To assure 
the economic survival of the KRI, the Kurdish leadership asserted sovereignty over 
hydrocarbon resources, signed independent contracts with IOCs and intensified its 
lobbying efforts to attract FDI into the region. The KRI utilized oil/gas as a tool to 
prove its economic viability and achieve economic independency. The KRI also 
utilized oil/gas resources as an insurance policy against the loss of de facto 
independence by building independent foreign relations with sovereign states, tying 
the interests of other states with those of the KRI and, in the process, ensuring the 
survival and security of the KRI. Building independent foreign relations with Turkey 
as a significant regional force after 2007/2008 represented a major foreign policy 
success as Turkey could play a leading role in ensuring the political, military and 
economic survival of the KRI. In this regard, Turkey played a major role in the 
development of the oil/gas sector in the KRI, while the President of the KRI mediated 
in the ongoing peace process in Turkey. The KRI also demonstrated other aspects 
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of its stateness and the capability to enter into independent foreign relations with 
other states by expanding and professionalizing its foreign representations abroad, 
opening of foreign consulates in Erbil, and signing independent agreements with 
states and sub-state regions.  
As the Kurdish case clearly shows, although not totally accepted in the 
international system as fully sovereign states, de facto states are still able to project 
foreign policy in pursuit of certain goals and objectives. Indeed, the existence of de 
facto states in important geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic regions on the 
one hand allows them to project foreign policy, while, on the other hand, it forces 
sovereign states to find ways of interacting with them in pursuit of their national 
interests. 
The KRI post-2003 is clearly different from previous times in terms of its 
acknowledgement as a recognized de facto state within the borders of the Iraqi state, 
and the wider role its now plays in the international relations of the Middle East. With 
the demise of the strong Baathist state, Kurdish political parties merged their 
administrations, strengthened their monopoly on legitimate means of violence within 
their territory and possibly, for the first time in Kurdish history, presented a united 
front, thereby turning the KRI into a unitary foreign policy actor. From 2003 to 2011, 
the executive institutions of the KRI presented a single diplomatic face to the outside 
world, articulating a certain set of national interests which they pursued and elevated 
above all other partisan, sectarian or domestic political interests.  
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However, there are enduring determinants providing the underlying structure 
for KRI’s foreign policy and its foreign relations with the outside world. These include 
internal as well as external factors. Domestic political dynamics include the still 
contested question of the KRI’s future; whether it can make the transition toward 
independent statehood or will be forced to remain as part of Iraq. This leads to how 
the KRI ought to protect its de facto independence and deal with federal authorities 
in Baghdad; an issue which is seen as a matter of foreign policy for the KRI 
leadership. Secondly, it concerns the rivalry or competition between major Kurdish 
political parties, particularly the KDP and PUK, and several other Kurdish political 
groupings which have recently emerged. Indeed, because Kurdish political 
groupings have exercised great influence on the Kurdish nationalist liberation 
movement, they have retained considerable influence in the processes of foreign 
policy-making and KRI’s foreign relations after 1991. Thirdly, whilst it is beyond the 
scope of this research, and possibly an interesting area for future study, individual 
Kurdish leaders have exercised and continue to assert a great amount of influence 
on the KRI’s foreign policy. From 1975 onwards, Masoud Barzani and Jalal 
Talabani1286 became the most prevalent and well-known figures in the Kurdish 
nationalist movement in Iraq and its foremost spokespersons. Thus, these leaders’ 
perceptions, personalities, characters, beliefs, values, psychology, views of history, 
motivations and attitudes could be counted as having an important bearing on the 
KRI’s foreign policy. Moreover, a duality can be identified in the way Kurdish political 
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parties continue to enjoy foreign relations with several actors beside the official 
foreign policy articulated and executed by the highest executive authorities of the 
KRI - at least in the regional context. Moreover, the politicized Kurdish identity, 
particularly the power of pan-Kurdish nationalism, and the dispersal of Kurds in the 
neighbouring states function as powerful determinants of foreign policy of the KRI.  
The domestic political dynamics overlap with or reinforce the insecurity 
generated by the KRI’s peculiar geopolitical location. The KRI is a small sized entity 
both in terms of its geography and population. Additionally, as well as the rest of 
Iraq, the entity borders the two most powerful and influential regional powers in the 
Middle East (Iran and Turkey), from the East and Northwest respectively, not to 
mention Syria from the West. With these states containing large and restive Kurdish 
minorities, the existence of the KRI creates immense sensitivities for the 
governments of these states, thereby causing a unique set of challenges for the KRI. 
While neutrality or alignment with a neighbouring large state can appear as an 
attractive foreign policy choice, the KRI’s situation is much more complex - with both 
states endeavoring to increase their influence on the entity, while at the same time 
cooperating to prevent its transformation into an independent state. 
Other facets of geography with a direct influence on the KRI’s foreign policy include 
the lack of access to sea ports. The KRI is landlocked and therefore needs to build 
good relations with neighbouring states which have access to a coastline. Even 
though hydrocarbon resources - gas as well as oil - play an important role in the 
foreign policy and diplomacy of the KRI, access to ports enabling the exportation of 
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hydrocarbon resources through pipelines that run into neighbouring countries 
(mainly Turkey, but also potentially Iran, Syria, or even the rest of Iraq) is an 
important determinant of KRI’s foreign policy. National capacity, often defined as 
military preparedness, its technological advancement and economic development 
have a profound influence on its foreign policy. Being denied independent statehood 
disables the KRI from acquiring the military hardware and weapon systems needed 
to protect its existence. Therefore, being unable to substantially develop its internal 
military capabilities, the KRI must constantly look for external alliances and balances 
to protect the entity or deter its parent state. In addition to advancing the well-being 
of its populace and attracting much-needed international investment, the KRI must 
avoid armed clashes and attempt to create a safe and stable environment for 
investment, to continue its path of economic development. The lack of protection by 
international law could be added as an important foreign policy determinant for the 
KRI. Lacking international legal sovereignty often means that not only are de facto 
states not protected by international law, but also their de facto autonomy and 
domestic sovereignty is threatened. Therefore, a significant portion of foreign policy 
conducted by de facto states such as the KRI is directed toward constant 
negotiations with sovereign actors, in search of patron states willing to use their 
power or clout to guarantee the continued existence of the entity. 
The case of the KRI demonstrates that further research is needed on the 
foreign policy component of de facto states. The theoretical framework of de facto 
statehood, and the literature of FPA, lacks in-depth analysis of foreign policy as an 
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important form of political action in de facto states. What is particularly lacking is a 
deeper understanding of the various determinants particularly at the level of 
individual and state analysis, influencing foreign policy decision-making of elites 
presiding over de facto states. 
Twenty-five years have passed since the KRI took the initiative to establish 
its first institutions. Since then, the KRI has become a much more consolidated entity 
and a prevailing reality in territorial, political, military and economic terms. It remains 
to be seen whether the KRI will make the final transition to realize that most important 
goal of national liberation movements: achievement of independent sovereign 
statehood. More importantly, though, whenever the KRI moves ahead with 
announcing its total independence and separation from Iraq, foreign policy will surely 
play a major role in the realization of independence, particularly in the context of 
gaining foreign diplomatic recognition for the nascent Kurdish state. Foreign policy 
will also be significant in protecting the nascent state from any security, economic 
and political repercussions of independence. 
The future of the KRI will probably be determined by the dynamics of regional 
politics in the Middle East. War, conflict, violence and sectarianism have become 
common characteristics in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The KRI has not only managed 
with Western help to safeguard its territorial control, de facto independence and 
sovereignty, but also for now asserts territorial control over most of its claimed 
territories including Kirkuk. The KRI currently enjoys positive, productive and deep 
foreign relations both regionally and internationally. Since its establishment, 
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particularly after 2003, the KRI has been keen to project itself as a status quo actor 
by constantly refraining from interfering in the Kurdish issues of neighbouring states. 
While the KRI is still besieged by a set of deep internal and external problems, it 
remains to be seen if it can achieve an amicable divorce from Iraq and gain 
substantial recognition of its independence. Within this context gaining recognition 
of its independence from its parent state – Iraq – from the neighbouring states, 
particularly Turkey, major powers such the United States, UK, France, Russia, China 
and Germany, and indeed from major regional and international organizations such 
as the EU and the UN would be crucial for its entry into the international system as 
an independent state. 
Regardless of the outcome of the independence referendum, the political 
developments over the last two decades indicate that the KRI is committed to take 
full responsibility over its future destiny and the goals of its foreign policy for the 
years to come. In short, the KRI is no longer an object to serve the national interests 
of other powers, but has transformed into a subject of history, in the sense of 
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10 Official Documents 
The Text of the Executive Order Establishing the KRG Department of 
Foreign Relations 
 
Kurdistan Regional Government – Iraq 
Council of Ministers 
Council Secretariat 
No: 143 
Date: 25 / 01 / 2009 
Official Order 
 
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Article 121 and relevant Paragraphs and Articles of the 
permanent Constitution of Federal Iraq, with reference to Article 22 of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government Council of Ministers Law No. 1 of 15 June 2006, we have decided the 
following… 
First – The Department of Foreign Relations is a Department that falls under of the 
Premiership of the Council of Ministers of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and performs the 
duties outlined below: 
A – Strengthening the position of the Kurdistan Regional Government with foreign 
countries in the fields of politics, culture, social affairs, economy, and development, in 
coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Iraq. 
B – Supervising the Kurdistan Regional Government’s overseas offices and 
endeavoring to strengthen KRG relations, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign 
567 
 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Iraq. 
C – Facilitating the missions of foreign representatives within the Kurdistan 
Region, and endeavoring to promote the Region’s bilateral relations, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Iraq. 
 
D – Supervising the visits of foreign delegations to the Kurdistan Region by 
providing assistance with accommodation and agendas, and coordinating with relevant KRG 
authorities and also with the Federal Government of Iraq. 
 
E – Ratifying and authenticating documents and powers of attorney for citizens of 
the Region, as well as such documents belonging to members of our diaspora overseas that 
have been approved by KRG representatives abroad or Federal Iraqi Government 
Consulates or Embassies, for use within the Kurdistan Region, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Iraq. 
 
F – Ensuring that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s message reaches the 
outside world through the Kurdistan Regional Government’s official website and by 
strengthening ties with effective foreign media. 
 
G – Coordinating with United Nations Agencies and international organizations in 
the Kurdistan Region whose nature of work requires such coordination with the 
Department of Foreign Relations. 
 
H – Cooperating and coordinating with relevant institutions and authorities at the 
568 
 
Kurdistan Region level, and functioning as a focal point with the objective of cementing 
institutionalization. 
I – Cooperating and coordinating with international companies and foreign 
investors in order to stimulate economic activity and enhance investment in the Region. 
 
J – Organizing KRG relations and contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Federal Republic of Iraq, through the office of the Head of the Department of Foreign 
Relations, to ensure KRG participation in international events and activities. 
 
Second – The department consists of the following directorates: 
 
1. Directorate of International Relations in the Region: An official with at least a 
bachelor’s degree leads this directorate, and supervises the bilateral affairs of 
the Kurdistan Regional Government with foreign countries, and also organizes 
all fields of KRG coordination with foreign representatives posted in the 
Kurdistan Region. 
 
Second- This directorate consists of two sections: 
 
A) Foreign Relations Section 
B) Foreign Representation Offices in the Kurdistan Region Section 
 
2. Directorate of KRG Offices Abroad: An official with at least a bachelor’s 
degree leads this directorate, and organizes and coordinates relations between 
the KRG representatives abroad and the various KRG departments and 
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ministries in the Region. He/She also supervises the activities of KRG foreign 
representatives abroad in the fields of culture, social affairs, and development. 
This directorate consists of two sections: 
 
A) Cultural Section 
B) Development Section 
 
3. Directorate of International Organizations: An official with at least a bachelor’s 
degree leads this directorate, and supervises affairs with the United Nations and 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and endeavors 
to strengthen and develop KRG relations with international organizations and 
United Nations Agencies. 
 
This directorate consists of two sections: 
A) International Organizations Section 
B) United Nations Agencies Section 
 
4. Directorate of Protocol and Delegations: An official with at least a bachelor’s 
degree leads this directorate, and oversees the affairs of foreign delegations 
invited to the Region by the KRG, including the preparation of itineraries and 
the provision of necessary logistical arrangements. 
 
This directorate consists of three sections: 
 
A) Protocol Section 
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B) Translation/Interpretation Section 
C) Logistics Section 
5. Directorate of Legal Affairs: An official with at least a bachelor’s degree in the 
field of law leads this directorate, and supervises legal affairs and the 
ratification of documents and powers of attorney for citizens and expatriates, 
inasmuch as they are related to the Kurdistan Region, in coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Iraq. 
 
This directorate consists of two sections: 
 
A) Legal Affairs Section 
B) Documentation Section 
 
6. Directorate of Media and Communications: An official with at least a 
bachelor’s degree leads this directorate, and ensures that the KRG message is 
transmitted to the international community, supervises the KRG website and 
media affairs, and also extends necessary assistance and facilitation to foreign 
journalists. 
 
This directorate consists of two sections: 
 
A) Public Relations Section 
B) KRG Website Section 
 
7. Directorate of Administration and Finance: An official with at least a bachelor’s 
571 
 
degree leads this directorate, and supervises and organizes the administrative, 
financial, auditing, personnel, and related services within the Department. 
This directorate consists of three sections: 
 
A) Administrative Section 
B) Financial Section 





Kurdistan Regional Government 
cc: Presidency of the Kurdistan Region / Correspondence No. 531, 24 December 2008 
KRG Ministries 
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11.1 Appendix A: Map of Iraq 





11.2 Appendix B: Oil fields in KRI and Iraq 
 
 
Figure 3: Oil/gas fields and pipelines: KRI and disputed territories. Source: “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble 
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